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Introduction 
 
 
Secession and territorial referendum. At a first glance, it seems a very bad-matched couple. 
How can the right to secede come to terms with one of the most important means used to enhance 
popular aggregation? Although the matching sounds strange, it can be noticed that secession and 
territorial referendum share at least one feature: both of them are at the border between international 
and domestic law. As far as the former is concerned, secession entails the relationship between the 
central government and sub-national units and, where successful, it acquires importance from the 
point of view of international law on States’ creation. Thus, being at the crossing between national 
and international law is to be considered an intrinsic feature of secession. As regards referenda, they 
are not new to international law: they were used extensively after the first World War within the 
framework of the League of Nations to re-draw boundaries on the basis of the nationality principle. 
Then, they gain new momentum during the nineties with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union.1  
In this general framework, the opportunity to link secessionist movements to territorial 
referenda is given by recent State practice, which seems to confer a high value to territorial referenda 
by perceiving them as a means to legitimate territorial re-apportionments. Suffice it to mention a few 
examples: in 2009 Curacao voted for partial autonomy from the Netherlands through a referendum; 
in 2011 South Sudan declared independence after a referendum; and lastly in March 2013, the 
inhabitants of the Falkland Malvinas decided to maintain their status as Overseas Territory of the 
United Kingdom in a referendum.2 Moreover, 2014 started with the debated territorial referendum 
held in the Ukrainian region of Crimea,3 continued with the Scottish4 referendum dated 14 August 
and ended with the failed attempt by the inhabitants of Catalonia to resort to popular consultation to 
gain independence from Spain.5 The age of seceding referenda, as it could be labelled, has not 
																																								 																				
1 See Y. Beigbeder: “Referendum” in Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690e1088?rskey=C5ibck&result=9&prd
=EPIL, last visited 2 February 2015. 
2 A. Peters: “The principle of uti possidetis iuris” in C. Walter (eds.), Secession and Self-Determination in International 
Law, Oxford, 2014, p. 134. 
3 The events in Ukraine led to a huge debate among international legal scholars, due to the variety of legal issues raised 
by the secessionist struggle of the Crimean inhabitants, ranging from the right to secede to the ban on the use of force and 
non-intervention by third States. To have an overview of the most striking legal questions surrounding Crimea’s 
independence it’s useful to have a look at Opinio juris Blog, at http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/06/really-violate-
international-law-crimea-hold-referendum-secession/ and at Questions of International Law, at http://www.qil-
qdi.org/category/zoom-out/?cat=19, which devote a specific section to the topic.  
4 S. Tierney: “Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Independence for Scotland”, European Constitutional Law 
Review, 2013, vol. 9, n.3, pp. 359-390. 
5 E. R. Bartlett Castellà: “Scotland and Catalonia: Two Historic Nations Challenge a Three Hundred Year- Old Status 
Quo”, American Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, vol.3, n.4, pp. 63-75. 
2 
 
terminated yet. At the time this research is finalized, Catalonia has just held a referendum about 
secession from Spain, in which over 90% of the votes supported independence.6 Since the quarrel 
between the Catalan region and the parent State is still ongoing at the research mainly focuses on the 
origins of the Catalan case form 2010. 
1.  Research Question and Preliminary Remarks 
 In light of the above, the research question of the thesis will be whether according to 
international law the referendum is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for secession, or both.7 
Since the research aims at discovering if there is an obligation to conduct a referendum to secede, 
grounded in the international legal order, it partly leaves aside an analysis of the theories about 
statehood and recognition in international law, which will be proper of a study focusing on the debate 
over democratic statehood in international law. Considering that practice of secession is so varied, 
the fact that the only common facet is that sub-units claim that with a referendum they can legitimately 
constitute themselves as independent has to be underlined and cannot be ignored. However, while 
leaving the in-depth study of legal issues relating to recognition and creation of statehood to another 
piece of research, some of these issues, such as the respect of the principle of effectiveness8 and of 
the Montevideo criteria,9 are not ignored in this thesis. For secession, in fact, recognition remains 
crucial, “if not for statehood as such, then for the ability of an emerging State to actualize its statehood 
through international intercourse and membership in international relations”.10 For instance, if we 
																																								 																				
6 The government of Catalonia published the official results of the referendum. Figures show that 90.8% of the vote casted 
were in favour of independence, although the turnout was 42%. The declaration of independence signed by the Prime 
Minister of Catalonia Puigdemont has been freezed at the time this research is finished. 
http://www.catalangovernment.eu/pres_gov/AppJava/government/pressnotice/303544/catalan-self-determination-
referendum.html 
7 See A. Peters: “Populist International Law? The Suspended Independence and the Normative Value of the Referendum 
on Catalonia”, EJILTALK, Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 12 October 2017, 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/populist-international-law-the-suspended-independence-and-the-normative-value-of-the-
referendum-on-catalonia/ 
8 The pivotal role of effectiveness against the existence of international rules governing the establishment of States dates 
back to the Kelsenian theory of the legal fact. For the establishment of States, Kelsen claims that, “ce qui est décisif, et 
seul décisif, c’est l’effectivité de l’autorité nouvelle, c’est l’efficacité de l’ordre nouveau” See H. Kelsen: “La naissance 
de l’Etat et la formation de sa nationalitè. Les principes, leur application au cas de la Tchecoslovaquieˮ, Rivista Italiana 
di Diritto Internazionale, 1929, vol. 3, p. 620. In the same vein see also A. Ruiz, Gli Enti Soggetto dell’Ordinamento 
Internazionale, Milano, 1951, pp. 178-179; V.D. Degan: “Création et disparition de l’Etat (à la lumière de trois 
fédérations multiethniques en Europe)ˮ, Recueil des Cours, 1999, vol. 279, p. 227. In 1991 the Badinter Commission 
restated that “the existence or disappearance of a State is a question of fact”, thus confirming that international law does 
not have a key role in States’ creation.  In other words, international law regulates neither the process of evolution of a 
simple group into a new entity, nor the existence of an established State, provided that it de facto exists. Bandinter 
Commission, Opinion n. 1, reprinted in European Journal of International Law, 1992, vol. 1, p. 182-183. 
9 The new subject of international law has to effectively establish itself satisfying the criteria for statehood set in the 
Montevideo Convention. The 1933 Montevideo Convention requires a State to have a defined territory, a permanent 
population and a government. Those are commonly referred to as the “classical statehood criteria”. Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed on 26 December 1933, entered into force on 26 December 1934, 
reprinted in The American Journal of International Law (Supplement), 1934, vol. 28, p. 75. 
10 See M. Weller: “Secession and Self-Determiantion in Wester Europe. The Case of Catalonia”, 19 October 2017, 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/secession-and-self-determination-in-western-europe-the-case-of-catalonia/#more-15619 
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were to find that secession carried out via referendum receives positive responses by the members of 
the international community only when conducted in a pacified manner and in compliance with 
certain international standards, we might even argue that the referendum could compensate for the 
lack of consent to secession by the parent State. As a result, the focus will be on states’ responses to 
secession, depending on how and under which circumstances the popular consultation is conducted. 
Two major cases can be detected: international reactions to seceding referenda conducted (i) in a 
pacific framework within well-established democracies and (ii) in the context of the use of force and 
intervention by a third party, even in countries where minority rights are respected. For both groups, 
a further issue of distinction is whether or not referenda are held in compliance with procedural 
requirements. A study of international reactions in the cases above mentioned will help shed light on 
the possible emergence and consolidation of an international rule pursuant to which secession can 
lawfully occur through a referendum. 
1.1 Secession between international and domestic law 
In the opening it was affirmed that secession and referendum have a double nature, as they lie 
at the intersection between international and domestic law. The inquiry into the double nature of the 
right to secede will be conducted from the international legal perspective, but EU law and to a certain 
extent constitutional law issues will not be set aside. International legal scholars approaching seceding 
movements adopt different perspectives. At one side of the spectrum, for instance, a broad notion of 
secession can be embraced, one which encompasses cases of both separation and dismemberment, so 
that secession takes place every time a new entity is formed form a pre-existing State. At the other 
side, it could be considered, citing Kohen, that “secession is the creation of a new independent entity 
through the separation of part of the territory and population of an existing State, without the consent 
of the latter”.11 Between 2001 and 2003 the Consortium on International Dispute Resolution initiated 
a series of Regional Conferences on self-determination and secession – in Europe, USA, 
Commonwealth and Russia- promoted by the International Law Association and other leading 
international institutes such as the Asser Institute. Each regional conference adopted a final document 
focusing on a definition of secession and self-determination under current international law. The 
Western Conferences defined secession as arising “whenever a significant portion of the population 
of a given territory being part of a State, expresses by word or deed the wish to withdraw from the 
State and become a State in itself or become part of another State”.12 The Commonwealth Conference 
																																								 																				
11 As M. Kohen explains, ˝ in cases where the parent State consent to separation, the process is that of devolution rather 
than secession. See M.G. Kohen:“ Création d’Etats en droit international contemporain”, Bancaja Euromediterranean 
Courses of International Law, vol. 6, Pamplona, Centro Internacional Bancaja para la Paz y el Desarrollo, 2002, p. 571.   
12 J. Dahlitz (ed.), Secession and International Law. Conflict Avoidance – Regional Reappraisals, United Nations, New 
York, Geneva, 2003, pp. 75-85. 
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opposed that definition, claiming that 1) the absence of any reference to self-determination could lead 
to consider secession as merely separatism; 2) secession, like self-determination, is inscribed to 
people, not to a portion of the population; 3) the definition lacks any sort of imposition to secessionist 
movements, such as the respect for the constitution of the parent State in order to be considered 
legitimate, so that even actions contrary to national and international law could be legitimated. Lastly, 
the American Conference drafted another definition recognizing the right to secede “where the 
population of a territory is subjected to gross, discriminatory and continuing violations of 
fundamental rights directed against secessionist groups”.13 
Regional differences in the interpretation and the application of international law are not 
uncommon but it is still possible to make some remarks: (i) contrary to the views expressed by the 
Commonwealth Conference, seceding attempts usually are not grounded on the Constitution of a 
State, unless the Constitution itself provides for cases of separation of part of the territory. Moreover, 
(ii) seceding struggles are frequently carried out by sub-national units whose rights are respected and 
usually constitutionally guaranteed. Lastly, (iii) the process towards secession is a constant flux, so 
that it may well be that the parent State eventually gives its consent to the territorial change under 
certain conditions.  
The present study will address each one of these issues, with a view to present a notion of 
secession which responds to the recent practice in this field. In any case, differences between the 
definitions are to be justified by the unclear status of secession under international law. The major 
challenge facing legal researchers about secession is that there are no international instruments upon 
which one can rely to define secession, no provisions directly defining and regulating it. While it is 
true that no right to secede exists under international law as it now stands, this does not imply that 
international law prohibits secession. In the words used by the Canadian Supreme Court in the 
Reference Re Secession of Quebec case, “international law contains neither a right of unilateral 
secession nor the explicit denial of such right”.14 Arguably, States have an interest in converting 
neutrality of international law into a ban on secession, justifying this approach by virtue of the fact 
that secession endangers territorial integrity. This is demonstrated by the reluctance to use the term 
secession in the international arena: in the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect 
of Treaties, art. 34 sets no distinction between devolution and secession. Rather, the wording used is 
“ separation of part of a State”.15 In addition, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
																																								 																				
13 Ibid.p. 84. 
14 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, 20 August 1998, reprinted in International Law Reports, 
1998, n. 161, p. 576 and ss., para.61. 
15 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, signed at Vienna on 23 August 1978, entered into 
force on 6 November 1996. See United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1946, p. 3. 
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concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (hereinafter the Declaration on Friendly Relations) principle V states that “the 
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a ‘people’ constitutes a mode of 
implementing the right to self-determination, in addition to the establishment of an independent State, 
the free association with or integration in an independent State”.16 The Declaration on Friendly 
Relations refers to the establishment of an independent State, not to secession.17  
However, principle V gives the chance to set out some legal problems linked to the definition 
of secession, notably (i) the relationship with the right to self-determination and (ii) the reasons upon 
which secession relies. Starting from the latter point, over the last decade the international community 
has witnessed several examples of secessionist movements. Although the claim on statehood is often 
based upon a mixture of arguments encompassing violation of human rights or the right to self-
determination, the ultimate ratio of separatism may vary. Sometimes, struggles were aimed at 
establishing a new State, as was the case with Kosovo, South Ossetia or South Sudan. Some other 
times, for example in the case of the Crimean region within Ukraine, independent struggles arose 
from the will to become part of another State, namely the Russian Federation.  
States’ views on claims to statehood are too different to draw a common line, yet there is a 
hypothesis towards which a considerable group of scholars as well as some states have converged: it 
is secession in response to serious violations of human rights referred to above. This theory is known 
as the theory of remedial secession,18 according to which a sub-national group is entitled to secede 
from the parent State only when  human rights of its members are seriously breached. Apart from its 
strict link with human rights law, the remedial right theory takes strength from a specific event: the 
secession of Bangladesh19. According to Crawford,20 Bangladesh is the only case of successful 
secession occurred in the past decades and this is one of the factors influencing the support for the 
remedial secession. Whatever the case might be, current examples of secession have given a new 
																																								 																				
16 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Declaration concerning Friendly Relations), annexed to the General 
Assembly Resolution A/Res/2625 dated 24 October 1970. 
17 See M. G. Kohen (ed.), Secession: International Law Perspectives, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 4-5. 
18 See L.M. Frakel: “International Law on Secession: New Rules for a new Era”, Huston Journal of International Law, 
1992, n. 14, pp. 521-564; D. Mursweiek: “The Issue of a Right to Secession – Reconsidered” in C. Toumuschat (ed.) 
Modern Law of Self-Determination, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, pp. 38-39; S. Van den Driest, Remedial Secession: 
A Right to External Self-Determination as a Remedy to Serious Injustices?, Cambridge, 2013. 
19 L. Bucheit, Secession: the Legitimacy of Self-Determination, New-Haven- London, 1978 p. 198; T.D. Musgrave Self-
Determination and National Minorities, Oxford, 1997, p. 189. 
20 See J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2006, pp. 110- 120, as well as the Report “State practice 
and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession” prepared for the Department of Justice of Canada in the case 
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, reprinted in A. Bayesfky ( ed.), Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and 
Lessons Learned, The Hague- London- New York, 2000, pp. 3-65. 
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impetus to the debate on international law on territorial changes.21 Although the remedial right theory 
has been acquiring increasing support, recent attempts to secede such as those carried out by Scotland 
or Catalonia, have occurred in States where sub-national communities have been respected and 
protected. Moreover, it has been observed above that secession is a complex process through which 
the attitude of the parent State varies and may even turn into a consent to secession, such as in the 
case of Scotland. As a result, an accurate scholar has to start the inquiry assuming that clear-cut 
answers are almost impossible. These struggles towards secession cannot be included neither in the 
concepts of remedial secession nor in the framework of self–determination as a legal title grounded 
in the international legal order. The study therefore will question the legal soundness of the remedial 
right theory. Regarding the relationship with self-determination, Toumuschat defines the right to self-
determination as “a child of the General Assembly”.22 As it will be showed in the next Chapter, this 
claim finds its roots in the consistent practice of the UN which focused on self-determination of 
peoples, especially since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples.23 However, self-determination as perceived within the framework of the UN 
does not include the right to establish an independent State for sub-national units of a sovereign State 
which are free to participate on the public State affairs.24  
 
While international law still remains indecisive over secession, national legal orders may 
provide much more clear-cut answers. Needless to say, secession is legal when provided for by the 
Constitution of a certain State. Although the subject-matter of the present inquiry belongs to the 
international legal order, it is important to give a brief reappraisal on how domestic legal orders 
approach the phenomena of secession, since it is useful for acquiring a comprehensive view of the 
legal problems at stake. The Constitution of Burma dated 1947, for instance, granted such a right to 
minorities settled within the Union of Burma. In particular, minority groups were entitled to exercise 
their right to secede ten years after the entry into force of the Burmese Constitution.25 The 1977 
																																								 																				
21 See, among the others, A. Tancredi: “La Crisi in Crimea”, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2014, vol.8, pp. 485-
487, as well as the huge contributions referred to in footnote 3. 
22 C. Toumuschat: “Secession and self-determination” in M. G. Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives, cit., 
p. 37. 
23 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 A/Res/1514 on 14 December 1960. 
24 Scholars supports this view. See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1995, p. 
61; A. Kiss “The Peoples’ Right to Secession”, Human Rights Law Journal, 1986, n. 7, p. 168; A. Pellet: “Quel Avenir 
pour le Droit des Peoples à Disposer d’eux même?”, El Derecho Internacional en un Mondo en Transformacìon: Liber 
amicorum en Homenaje al Profesor Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, Montevideo, 1994, pp. 255-276; H. Hannum: 
“Rethinking Self-Determination”, Virginia Journal of International Law,1993, n. 34 p. 1, at pp. 45-47. 
25 D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, The Hague- London- New York, 2002, p. 313. 
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Constitution of the Soviet Union, then, provided for a right of secession for the Soviet Republics.26 
Through these examples secession acquires a purely domestic dimension, which may lead to 
reconsider it as one among the possible means for facing territorial changes, plainly regulated by the 
legal system. Mancini in fact points out that it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive approach to 
secession, one that encompasses both its revolutionary and its institutionally conservative dimensions 
if we really want to understand it thoroughly. 27 In light of these assumptions, the study does not leave 
aside those cases in which the parent State has accepted the unilateral claim for secession by a sub-
unit, either through the establishment of a procedure under domestic law or through a special 
agreement. Accordingly, a comprehensive approach requires not to look at secession as an isolated 
phenomenon, which entails only the creation of new States in international law, but rather as a part 
of a broader dynamic between a State and its sub-national communities. From this perspective, 
secessionist claims concern both international and domestic law, in that the central government may 
either consider secession forbidden, or as one of the rights conferred upon the sub-national 
communities, subject to the necessary legal rules.28 Indeed, domestic law may set alternative solutions 
to secession which may nonetheless take into account and satisfy the requests of seceding entities. 
1.2 Secession and/or autonomy under domestic law 
Secessionist groups want their uniqueness to be recognized for a variety of reasons: their 
particular historical development as a community, their religion or culture. The ethnic composition 
of many States is indeed not homogeneous:29 sometimes multi-ethnicity is the result of historical 
territorial re-apportionments, such as in the case of Ukraine where the region of Crimea was 
historically Russian. Some other times ethnic diversity is embedded in the concept of statehood itself, 
like in the African continent where tribalism was the primitive form of statehood but it is still visible 
in contemporary States. The fact that practice gives many examples of secessions occurring in multi-
ethnic States does not imply that minorities only resort to secession. Indeed, the request of minorities 
is primarily autonomy and not secession;30 firstly searched at the internal level, and if not, through 
separation from the parent State. Acknowledging diversity and enacting specific rules to safeguard 
the collective uniqueness of a sub-national unit is a welcomed solution to avoid secessionists 
																																								 																				
26 J. Hadley: “The Way Opened, the Way Blocked: Assessing the Contrasting Fates of Chechnya and Kosovo” in A. 
Pavković and P. Radan (eds.), On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalization, Hampshire, 2008, p. 86. 
27 S. Mancini: “Secession and Self-Determination”, in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford, 2012, p. 482- 499. 
28 P. Radan: Secessionist Referenda in International and Domestic Law”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2012, vol.18, 
pp. 8-21. 
29 J. Summers: “Democracy, Minorities and International Law”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 
2009, vol.16, n. 2, pp. 266-268. 
30 J. Castellino: “International Law and Self-Determination. Peoples, Indigenous Peoples and Minorities” in C. Walter 
(ed.), Secession and Self Determination in International Law, cit., pp. 27-54. 
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struggles. The most functioning measures are constitutional arrangements granting territorial political 
autonomy. According to Raič, territorial autonomy is a form of self-determination in that it enables 
the sub-national groups to affirm their uniqueness but at the same time it represents a concession 
made by the central government to pursue internal stability.31 On the same pattern, Hannum states 
that autonomy serves as a “means of reinforcing their own sub-unit identity beyond that of being 
merely citizens of the State”.32 Through the granting of autonomy the group acquires the power to 
enact specific legislation to set its annual budget or to manage cultural and social affairs. In the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), for example, six federal republics could be 
distinguished alongside two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina.33 The Crimean region, 
instead, had a different degree of autonomy, on the basis of which the people of Crimea could 
establish their own institutions in order to promote their traditions, language and culture.34  
After this brief sketch on different types of autonomy, one may question whether international 
law interplays with how sub-units get more autonomy, in particular through the link with the exercise 
of self-determination within the borders of the State. In fact, States enjoy a wide discretion because 
the matter is confined to the domestic arena, provided that they respect fundamental human rights of 
the individual. The most popular choice to respond to seceding claims seems to be that of negotiating 
a new territorial settlement, through a process involving also a referendum. State practice confirms 
that negotiations followed by constitutional referenda with a view to settle a different territorial 
structure are frequent, Belgium, Canada and Ethiopia to mention only a few examples.35 The Basques 
in Spain enjoy territorial autonomy on the basis of the organic law 3/197936 of 18 December 1979. 
Greenland was granted autonomy by the Greenland Home Rule Act, Danish Act n. 57737 dated one 
year before. The Greenlanders have appointed a Commission tasked with drafting recommendations 
on separation and a new Home Rule Bill. In one of its recommendations the Commission stated that 
people from Greenland were not struggling for independence tout court, but for “ an identity of their 
own, or rather for better possibilities of strengthening and developing their identity through increased 
																																								 																				
31 D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., p. 281-283. 
32 H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, 
Philadelphia, 2011, p. 474. 
33 For a comprehensive view on the formation, internal structure and dissolution of the SFRY see S. Trifunovska (ed.), 
Yugoslavia Through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution, Dordrecht- Boston-London, 1994. 
34 See A. Peters: “The Crimean Vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of Territorial Referendum”, forthcoming 
in C. Calliess (ed), Liber amicorum Torsten Stein (2015), currently available on-line at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463536, last visited 4 February 2015. 
35 P. Radan: “Secession: a Word in Search of a Meaning”, cit., p. 18-34. 
36 Organic Law 3/1979 of 18 December on the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country dated 18 December 1979, 
available in the on-line database of the European University Institute, Project European Union Democracy Observatory 
on Citizenship, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/national-electoral-
laws/?search=1&name=&level=Regional&country=Spain&submit=Search.  
37 Greenland Home Rule Act, Act No. 577, dated 29 November 1978, available http://www.stm.dk/_p_12712.html, site of 
the Danish Prime Minister’s Office.  
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self-responsibility”.38Art. 11 of the Constitution of Moldova, then, recognizes the autonomy of the 
Gagauz region. The preamble of the Gagauz Autonomy Act - which enables the establishment of the 
autonomous region- defines the granting as a manifestation of the right to self-determination.39  
In the examples above self-determination is exercised within the borders of the State. When 
the requests for more autonomy are not followed by the parent State and independent struggles persist, 
the right to secede may come into play. In other words, secession would not be perceived as an 
extension of self-determination, but as an autonomous title. In Chapter 2 this position is advanced in 
detail.40  
1.3 Is international law giving some guidelines to secessionist processes? 
So far it was seen that contrary to what one may think of secession, i.e. that it is a one-spot 
event whereby a new entity is born out of a pre-existing one, secession is a dynamic process which 
finds its roots in the domestic arena and may, eventually, reach the international arena. Taking the 
definition given by Crawford “secession is the process by which a particular group seeks to separate 
itself from the State to which it belongs, and to create a new State”.41 It is precisely the interpretation 
of secession as a continuous process that is the point of departure of this study. 
Pragmatically, secession is an internal issue up until the central government either accepts 
separation on the basis of domestic rules or manages to control the dialogue with the secessionist 
group. However, when the tensions between the parties are likely to put at risk the stability of the 
international system, in particular when there are serious violations of human rights, there is a 
growing trend in scholarly literature42  that maintains that international law may - in the vests of a 
“guardian”, require the respect of a certain procedure. According to Tancredi, these rules can be 
collectively labelled the due process for secession, an emerging rather than an established set of 
international rules on State creation in cases of secession. The respect of procedural requirements, the 
argument continues, does not result in an international legal title to create a new subject of 
international law. The creation of statehood will still be evaluated against the benchmark of 
effectiveness and statehood criteria. By contrast, when the set of rules forming the due process is not 
respected, there is, according to the model, an obligation not to recognize the entity born out of a 
process of secession. Nevertheless, even in the case of non compliance with the due process, the 
sphere of application of the norms remains procedural, so that the new State which has come into 
																																								 																				
38 D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., p. 285. 
39 See J. Chinn and S.D. Roper: “Territorial Autonomy in Gagauz”, Nationality Papers, vol. 26, n.1, 1998, p. 87. 
40 A. Tancredi, La Secessione in Diritto Internazionale, Napoli, 2001, p. 24.  
41 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Cambridge, 1997, p. 85. 
42 A. Tancredi, La Secessione in Diritto Internazionale, cit., p. 699, citing for a first elaboration of the procedural approach, 
inter alia, T. Franck: “Communities in Transition: Autonomy, Self-Governance and Independence”, Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law 1993, p. 261. 
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being without respecting the due process will not be non-existent, but will lie in isolation, unable to 
establish international relations with the other states.43 In Chapter 2 it is showed that the due process 
combines the application of the following legal rules, (i) the ban on intervention by third parties (ii) 
the respect of the uti possidetis iuris, according to which the creation of a new State must occur within 
the previous existing administrative boundaries and (iii) the resort to territorial referenda.44 It will be 
seen that even the most recent cases of secession satisfy the normative due process, provided that the 
application of this model is not limited to cases of grave breaches of human rights, but expanded to 
attempts to secede occurring in states with well-established mechanisms for minority protection and 
freedom of expression.  
1.4 Secession and territorial referenda: a complex interplay 
As stated in the opening, we want to inquiry on how the couple secession – territorial 
referendum may impact on territorial changes, i.e. if a sub-unit can lawfully secede by referendum. 
Arguably, the subject matter of the research leads to ask firstly how a referendum may impact on 
international law. Is it only a domestic tool? In the opening of this introduction we have argued that 
just like the double nature of secession referred to above, referenda on territorial changes seem to 
start acquiring a crucial position in international law. The analysis of the role of referendum in 
international law on territorial changes and its link to secession is not a new task for international 
legal research.45 In the second half of the nineties legal experts started to focus on whether “ the will 
to statehood has begun to develop into a prerequisite for statehood”.46 The analysis of referenda was 
inspired by the process of the dissolution of the USSR, by the events in the SFRY and by the examples 
of Eritrea or Kosovo. In the USSR, for instance, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan all 
resorted to territorial referenda to legitimate their choice of independence.  
However, practice and scholars’ positions are far from being clearly set. On the one side, as 
Cassese affirmed in 1995, referenda should be the way to be followed to give legality to territorial 
changes.47 It is not tantamount to say that territorial referenda affect substantially international law 
on territorial changes and confer to people a legal title to secede. Rather, it means that in seceding 
processes referenda might have a procedural role. Although practice does not allow to maintain that 
																																								 																				
43 See for the latest considerations about the model A. Tancredi: “Secessione e Diritto Internazionale: un’Analisi del 
Dibattito”, Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 2015, n. 2, pp. 473-474 
44 Although the present research will focus mainly on the resort to territorial referendum, intervention by third parties will 
be dwelled upon with in the last chapter in the context of international law about recognition. 
45 T. D. Grant: “A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects in light of International Law”, Virginia Journal 
of International Law, 1991, n. 40, pp. 145-248; C. Hillgruber: “The Admission of new States to the International 
Community”, European Journal of International Law, 1998, vol.9, pp. 491-520. 
46 T. D. Grant: “A Panel of Experts for Chechnya”, cit., p. 201. 
47 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, cit., p. 191.  
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popular consent confers a legal title to secede, the wording of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Re 
Reference Secession of Quebec case that it cannot be ignored is still valid today.48 The intrinsic value 
of a referendum lies in its ability to give a shared answer to a question. A majoritarian vote may be 
analysed from different points of view in social sciences: from a legal point of view, for instance, in 
terms of compliance with the rule of law and established legal standards. Such a striking role under 
domestic law cannot be ignored by international law on territorial changes, in particular by the 
international legal order, where individuals and their rights play a fundamental role in the progressive 
development of the law. 
On the other side, according to Peters “from a purely normative perspective, the best procedure 
for establishing a State boundary is a referendum conducted among the interested populations under 
international supervision”.49 Peters goes beyond the principle of uti possidetis juris and its value 
under international law, arguing that a free and fair vote can serve as a legitimating factor in settling 
new boundaries. In Peters’ view uti possidetis maintains an important role as a starting point for 
popular consent because any territorial referendum needs to rely on established borders. Furthermore, 
Peters has developed her approach by maintaining that “as a matter of customary international law a 
free territorial referendum is emerging as a procedural condition sine qua non for territorial 
changes”.50 The Badinter Commission in its Opinion n.4 on Bosnia Herzegovina (B-H) seems to 
support this view when it states that “ the will of the peoples of B-H to constitute B-H as a sovereign 
and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established. This assessment could be 
reviewed if appropriate guarantees were provided by the republic applying for recognition, possibly 
by means of a referendum of all citizens of B-H without distinction, carried out under international 
supervision”.51 The preference for the tool referendum is justified, inter alia, by the fact that a 
referendum represents a peaceful but very powerful way for the secessionist group to confront with 
the parent State, in that it gives to the central government a clear expression of the will of a certain 
sub-national unit. Along this line of thought, the study will underline the possible links between 
referenda and negotiations involving the seceding unit, the parent State and all the interest 
stakeholders.  
																																								 																				
48 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., at p. 221 “ the continued existence and operation of 
the Canadian constitutional order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that 
they no longer wish to remain in Canada”. 
49 A. Peters: “The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris”, in C. Walter, Secession and Self-Determination in International Law, 
cit., p. 133. 
50 A Peters: “Sense and Nonsense of Territorial Referenda in Ukraine, and Why the 16 March Referendum in Crimea 
Does Not Justify Crimea’s Alteration of Territorial Status under International Law” published by the blog of the European 
Journal of International Law, http://www.ejiltalk.org/sense-and-nonsense-of-territorial-referenda-in-ukraine-and-why-
the-16-march-referendum-in-crimea-does-not-justify-crimeas-alteration-of-territorial-status-under-international-law/ 
(last visited 8 January 2015). 
51 Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 4, reprinted in International Legal Materials, 1992, vol. 31, p. 1488 ff. See also S. 
Terrett, The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Commission, Aldershot, 2000. 
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2. Methodology and Structure  
The study follows the traditional pattern of selection and interpretation of (i) legal acts (ii) 
practice and (iii) scholarly literature. However, a typical feature of the research is its cross-cutting 
nature. Since the field of territorial changes and secession lies at the intersection between national 
and international legal orders, constitutional practice and comparative constitutional analysis is all 
the more relevant to find principles of law. Hence, the thesis relies on materials from a varied 
assortment of sources, ranging from international legal instruments and case-law– including the ICJ, 
Human Rights’ Bodies and domestic courts chosen on the basis of their relevance to the subject matter 
of the research- to states’ declarations and doctrine.52 
2.1 Methodology  
 The thesis follows an empirical approach and looks at the various instances of the interrelation 
between secession and referendum in international law. Since we shall analyse the existence of a 
process for creation of statehood characterised by secession and referendum, cases study lie at the 
core of this work. With more than 300 sovereignty and territorial referenda held since the eighteen 
century, a selection is unavoidable. The examples analysed in the following pages are Quebec, 
Montenegro, Scotland, Crimea and Catalonia, albeit other situations such as that of the region of 
Karakalpakstan within Uzbekistan, Kosovo, Abkhazia and Ossetia, will be concisely analysed as 
well. In particular, the complexity of the case of Crimea justifies its analysis at three different stages: 
(i) when dealing with secession, (ii) with the analysis of referendum in international law on territorial 
changes and (iii) with recognition of an entity born out of a seceding referendum. The selection made 
can be motivated on several grounds: for Scotland, Crimea and Catalonia, they are the most recent 
examples and quite similar in timing, thus the road to find elements for the consolidation of an 
international rule necessarily has to involve their inquiry. Secondly, the case of Quebec is so far the 
only one in which a domestic Court clearly discussed the use of a referendum to secede and with 
regulation of this process in international law. By the same token, Montenegro has reached 
independence throughout a referendum with a high involvement of the international community. In 
the main cases study, secession originates in the context of a democratic system pursuant to which 
freedom of expression and minority protection are ensured. This element is important in light of the 
																																								 																				
52 Among the sources, those references which may have been useful to develop the main argument, but that were 
mentioned either briefly in the core text or just in the footnotes, are not included in the bibliography. An example are the 
resolutions of the United Nations pertaining to the violation of art. 2(4) of the UN Charter within the framework of the 
decolonisation, such as in the case of Timor or West New Guinea. This choice is mandated by the high interdisciplinary 
nature of the research which requires the researcher to circumscribe the area of study. In this sense, some issues, i.e. the 
possible critiques that could be advanced against the referendum, in particular the fact that its widespread use could 
amount to the domination of the majority against the minority within a State, will not be studied as they are worthy of a 
thorough analysis that is left to other publications. 
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legal justifications adduced by sub-units vis-à-vis the parent State, be those secession as a remedy to 
serious injustices, the exercise of their right to self-determination or the expression of a right to decide 
on their status. Throughout an inquiry about the legal soundness of each argument, the research will 
explore the relationship between secession and referendum and more generally the role of popular 
consultations in international law on territorial changes. 
2.2 Structure 
 The inquiry begins from the right to self-determination and its current status under international 
law. Chapter 1 explores the boundaries of the right to self-determination with special emphasis to the 
evolution of the understanding of the right. From a right belonging to colonies, substantially equated 
to independence, the right to self-determination can be also exercised within the borders of the parent 
State. In this second dimension, the exercise of the right to self-determination has been progressively 
linked to concepts of democratic statehood and the rule of law. 
 Chapter 2 discusses the approach of international law towards secession, with a particular focus 
on the procedural requirements for carrying out a secession,  that may be in the way of consolidation 
at the international level. The Chapter can be subdivided into two parts: the first one covers the 
normative framework for secession, with a critique to the remedial secession theory and the rational 
underpinning the support for the application of a normative due process. The second one presents an 
attempt to disentangle secession from self-determination, arguing that secession is not a particular 
form of the exercise of the right to self-determination. In other words, the Chapter adopts the 
normative due process referred to above vis-à-vis the exercise of an autonomous right to secede. 
 Chapter 3, then, goes to the core of the inquiry. When it is affirmed that there is a trend in 
consolidation in international law about the use of the referendum to re-draw the borders of states, 
one of the most common arguments is that popular consultations about territorial changes are quite 
an old practice, beginning from the plebiscites hold after the French Revolution. Recalling that the 
main question is whether referenda legitimate per se a secession and whether there is a procedural 
obligation to resort to referenda, Chapter 3 begins from the analysis of the plebiscites carried out after 
the World War I. If plebiscites can be considered the ancestors of territorial referenda, then it could 
be even argued that there is sufficient practice and opinio juris establishing referenda as the 
legitimating tool to carry out a secession. In the Chapter, the main differences between plebiscites 
and referenda are listed. Then, throughout the cases of Quebec, Scotland, Karakalpakstan, Catalonia 
and Crimea, the contours of the legal status of referenda in international law on territorial changes 
are defined.  
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 Chapter 4 follows the main inquiry and focuses on the procedural requirements for a free and 
fair territorial referendum. Always adopting an empirical approach, Montenegro together with 
Crimea serve as the cases study for discerning the internationally consolidated standards for the 
conduct of a territorial referendum. In so doing, special attention is devoted to the practice of the 
Council of Europe in light of its role in the field of democracy through the rule of law. Once the 
procedural requirements have been established, attention is paid to what happens following a 
referendum about secession, notably to the reactions by the international community and more in 
general to the law on the recognition of statehood. In this part, other cases study such as Abkhazia, 
Ossetia, together with some remarks about Catalonia will be presented to the extent relevant for the 
subject matter of the Chapter.   
 Chapter 4 will lead to the general Conclusions to the research, in which one and each piece of 
the puzzle collected in the previous chapters will be put together. The author hopes that, through the 
following investigation, the research can contribute to the development of a systematic approach and, 
in some small part, to the shedding of light on the controversial international law questions on 
territorial changes and the use of tools for the expression of the will of the people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
                                                 Chapter 1 
Only a colonial peoples’ right? Trajectories of self-determination in 
International law   
 
 The present Chapter explores the historical evolution of the right to self-determination and its 
contemporary legal status under international law. Firstly, the topic will be introduced by describing 
the historical origins of self-determination that can be traced back to the American and French 
revolution. It will be shown how self-determination was affirmed as a political principle and 
eventually evolved into a legal right. Then, the Chapter will analyse the general features of the right 
to self-determination focusing in particular on the most controversial issues arising from its 
enforcement.  
The assumption guiding the inquiry is that international law acknowledges the existence of two 
dimensions of the right to self-determination, internal and external.53 The former is generally defined 
as the right of all peoples “to exercise those rights and freedoms which permit the expression of the 
popular will”.54 External self-determination, by contrast, was firstly conceived as leading to 
independence, due to its ties to the decolonization period. However, the external dimension has never 
been clearly defined because its enforcement clashes with the territorial status quo of the international 
community.   
Self-determination involves not only peoples and States but also other actors – e.g. 
international, regional courts -  as well as international organizations. It can thus be analysed from a 
variety of perspectives. The point of view chosen for the present analysis is the double dimension of 
self-determination in international law. Referring to a double dimension of the right to self-
determination is not tantamount to claim that there are two kinds of self-determination. International 
law acknowledges one right to self-determination. However, this right can be enforced in two 
directions, on the one hand towards the management of internal affairs and on the other hand 
externally towards creation of statehood. Pragmatically, it is the latter direction that touches upon the 
																																								 																				
53 The distinction between internal and external self-determination has been often criticised. Weller for example argues 
that it is a questionable distinction whose effect is complicating the interpretation of the right. By splitting the concept 
into two parts, one could even come to the conclusion that self-determination is not a continuous right that is applicable 
to circumstances concerning both the identity and the governance of a State. See M. Weller, Escaping the Self-
Determination Trap, 2008, Cambridge, p.23. 
54 See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 53. 
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desire of sub-national units to secede from the parent State and the one which may include the use of 
territorial referendum.55  
1 From a Political Principle to a Legal Rule 
A reappraisal on the evolution of self-determination cannot but begin from the development of 
the Western political thought on the relationship between citizens and their sovereign. It was during 
the eighteenth century – with the American and French Revolution – that the idea of government 
based on an exchange of guarantees, i.e. consent to be governed for security guarantees, gained 
momentum. Despite the fact that the two revolutions were influenced by the age of the Enlightenment, 
thus they were mainly devoted to individualism and equal rights, the American and the French 
revolution set the roots for the affirmation of the principle of self-determination after World War I.  
  
In this general framework, two notions lie at the basis of the principle of self-determination: 
peoples’ sovereignty and ethnicity.56 The former was the driving force in the American and French 
revolution: gradually, populations started to oppose the authority and legitimacy of the central 
government that was considered alien from them. The Declaration of Independence of the United 
States of America dated 4 July 1776 reads as follows: “whenever any form of government becomes 
destructive (…) it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Government”.57 
Accordingly, here popular sovereignty becomes the idea justifying the destruction of an existing 
central authority and its replacement by a new one. In broader terms, this line of reasoning opens the 
door for a role of the people in the making of the State. The other concept influencing self-
determination is ethnicity.58 In fact, belonging to an ethnic group is one of the milestones in the path 
towards the making of a nation. The awareness of being part to the same community is in fact a 
constant feature of all self-determination claims. In the aftermath of the revolutions, then, liberalism 
and nationalism shaped the evolution of the principle of self-determination. Liberalism emphasizes 
the internal dimension of self-determination due to its demand for a representative government. 
																																								 																				
55 This choice should not be misunderstood. It does not pretend to be the best approach to self-determination, nor a 
complete one because the research topic is not self-determination. Therefore, the legal analysis provided will be as detailed 
as it is needed to understand the following chapters. 
56 For supporters of this view see. S. F. Van den Driest, Remedial Secession. A Right to External Self-Determination as 
a Remedy to Serious Injustices?, Cambridge, 2013, pp.14-17. 
57 Declaration of Independence of the United States, 4 July 1976, quoted in J. Summers, Peoples and International Law: 
How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations, Leiden-Boston, 2007, pp. 95-96. 
58 S. Van den Driest, Remedial Secession. A Right to External Self-Determination as a Remedy to Serious Injustices?, 
cit., p. 16. 
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Finally, nationalist ideology advocates for people’s choice of their status in the international 
community and thus it supports the external dimension of self-determination.59 
1.1 Self-determination after World War I 
The first references to self-determination are to be found in Lenin and Wilson’s political 
discourse. Although the perspectives of the two statesmen were inspired by different political 
ideologies, they still share some aspects and eventually merged into the notion of self-determination 
under international law. Therefore, this section will give a reappraisal of Lenin and Wilson’s political 
thought about self-determination first.  
Lenin’s conception of self-determination interrelates with free access to economic resources: 
the ultimate ratio of self-determination is in fact the spread of socialist revolution. In this perspective, 
“the interest of capitalist development and of the freedom of class struggle will be best served by 
secession in cases of subjugation by an oppressor”.60 According to Cassese, three major elements can 
be set out from Lenin’s idea: first, ethnic and national groups can resort to self-determination to freely 
determine their own destiny. Secondly, self-determination should serve as a guiding principle for 
inter-States relations, e.g. by prohibiting territorial annexations carried out without, or contrary to the 
results of, popular consultations. Hence, it ultimately regulates territorial changes within the 
international community. Lastly, self-determination cannot but clash with imperialism because its 
application stems from the principle of freedom. Therefore, its enforcement allows for independence 
from external powers. This last element is of particular importance, because it will be reiterated by 
the USSR at the UN in the aftermath of World War II.61 
From the aforementioned, it can be inferred that in Lenin’s conception the external dimension 
of self-determination was predominant, although the rationale underpinning the principle rests 
internal, namely the right of people to freely determine their political status and have access to 
economic resources. The external dimension of self-determination was less present in Wilsons’ 
political thought if compared to that of the soviet leader, or at least there was less trust in its real 
application. Wilson’s perspective of self-determination found its roots in democratic political thought 
as developed during and after the American Revolution. For Wilson, self-determination was best 
realized through self-government because only a democratic form of government could give to a 
community the chance to administer itself while ensuring compliance with fundamental rights. The 
																																								 																				
59 Ibid. 
60 V.I. Lenin: “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”, in Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow, 1964, quoted by D. 
Raić, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., p. 186. 
61 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 16. 
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ultimate consequence of the implementation of this idea would be a long-term peace for the 
international community. 
On January 8, 1918 Wilson delivered a speech to a joint session of the US Congress62 in which 
he addressed the post war settlement: based on his idea of self-determination he claimed that nations 
should be established by well-defined communities living in a determined territory. Although self-
determination was not mentioned during the speech, Wilson himself confirmed later in the so called 
Fourteen Points Address to the Congress that self-determination in his view was not an empty word 
but “an imperative principle of action”.63 The notion of self-determination had an international 
dimension, to say that it was supposed to apply at the international level, while surprisingly there is 
no mention of the manner in which it could apply in the USA. It seems as if Wilson wanted to convey 
the idea that self-determination was nothing more than a political principle, highly dependent on the 
post-war situation in Europe. In other words, self-determination in Wilson’s words was not yet a 
principle under international law: it was a political principle to manage international relations. This 
is confirmed by the fact that self-determination was defined in vague terms: whilst the principle could 
be applied to the claims of specific ethnic groups, no clarification was really given as to who was 
entitled to take advantage of it – e.g. only ethnic sub-national units, or even small communities or 
groups. Moreover, there was no reference to the existence of corresponding duties owed by other 
States, be they the Allies or the defeated powers.  
Nevertheless, the definition provides some hints with respect to the strong link between 
internal and external self-determination. In Wilson’s discourse internal and external self-
determination are inextricably linked. By requiring the establishment of governments based on 
consent of the governed, the internal dimension of self-determination was present. By arguing that 
sub-units with common ethnic characters should be allowed to govern their own territory the external 
dimension of self-determination was affirmed. Yet, it must be noted that in the aftermath of the second 
World War, on the practical plan, the application of the principle of self-determination was 
problematic due to the coexistence of many small nationalities within the borders of existing States, 
above all in Central and Eastern Europe. A straightforward application of the principle could in fact 
lead to thousands of small States and hinder the maintenance of peace and stability, not to mention 
the strategic interests of the great powers. 
 
																																								 																				
62 T.W. Wilson: “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress”, in A.S. Link (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
Princeton, 1984, p. 102. 
63 The Fourteen Points Address was delivered to the Congress 8 January 1918 and Wilson stressed that “self-determination 
is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril”. See 
D. Raić, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit, p. 182. The full text is available through the on-line repository 
of Yale Law School University, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp  
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1.2 Self-determination and the Mandate System in the Covenant of the League of Nations 
The difficulties linked to the mise en pratique of the principle of self-determination can be seen 
in the subsequent practice of the League of Nations. The American draft proposal64 on self-
determination was not accepted and the final version of the Covenant of the League of Nations65 does 
not mention self-determination, probably due to States’ fear for the consequences it could have on 
the geopolitical system at that time. However, mandates were established with the purpose of guiding 
colonies of the defeated powers towards welfare and self-government, thus in line with the principle 
of self-determination. The League of Nations was entitled to act as a supervisor of the system, which 
was composed by three different types of mandate, depending on the level of self-administration 
granted to the formerly colonized territories. The highest level of autonomy was enjoyed by A 
mandates, such as Turkey, Central Africa and German territories; B mandates had some form of 
autonomy, while C mandates, such as South West Africa, needed a broad supervision by advanced 
nations.66 Despite the fact that these territories were still subject to some level of external control, the 
Mandate System marked the emergence of a new approach to the management of non-advanced 
territories, that shifted from subjugation toward administration carried out with the ultimate aim of 
establishing self-government.  
Moreover, the League of Nations engaged itself in the protection of minorities and ethnic 
groups alongside the Mandate System. In this field, the League acted as a forum for negotiation on 
minority rights for the adoption of bilateral or multilateral treaties67 on the issue. After the First World 
War, in fact, minorities’ protection was not the subject of any universal legal instrument, albeit within 
the framework of the League some special Committees were established. They were tasked with 
monitoring compliance with the obligations concerning protection of minorities as envisaged by the 
relevant treaties. At the very beginning of its creation, the system of the League of Nations charged 
with a right to petition only the members of the Council of the League.68 However, the exercise of 
																																								 																				
64 The USA draft proposal suggested that Art. 10 should refer to self-determination to justify territorial readjustments “by 
reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships”. See. D.H. 
Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2, New York and London, 1928 quoted by D. Raić, Statehood and the Law of 
Self-Determination, cit., p. 194. 
65 Covenant of the League of Nations, reprinted in League of Nations Official Journal, 1920, p. 3. 
66 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 741-745. 
67 See for instance the conventions providing for minority protection such as the Convention related to Upper Silesia, 
dated 15 may 1922 and several pledges to ensure the rights of minorities made to the League of Nations by Finland (1921), 
Albania (1921) or Estonia (1923) to mention only a few. See for references P. Hilpold: “The League of nations and the 
Protection of Minorities – Rediscovering a Great Experiment”, Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law Online, 
2013, vol.17, pp. 87-124.      
68 The powers of the League of Nations with respect to protection of minorities were not included in the Covenant of the 
League and other bilateral and multilateral agreement were not conclusive on the issue. Thus, as it is observed by 
Sierpowsky, it was necessary to build up procedures ex novo. See S. Sierpowski: “Minorities in the System of the League 
of Nations”, P. Smith, Ethnic Groups in International Relations, 1991, New York, pp. 12-20; see also J. Stone: “The Legal 
Nature of the Minorities Petition”, British Yearbook of International Law, 1931, vol. 12, pp. 76-94.  
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the right was soon extended to minorities themselves and also to states which had no representative 
in the Council.69 Then, if the claim passed an initial scrutiny and it was verified that there could be a 
violation of minorities’ rights as envisaged by the treaty at stake, the petition could be examined by 
the Council. In practice, only a few petitions ever reached the Council- e.g. the disputes for Vilna in 
1922 or Memel dated 1923, or the Åaland Island case. The latter in particular require the League to 
confront itself with the application of the principle of self-determination and even with secession.   
a) The Åaland Island Case 
As far as the facts are concerned, the case involved Sweden, Finland and the Åaland Island. 
The small island was administered as part of the Finnish province of Russia, whilst Sweden could 
only argue to have exercised sovereignty in the past. After Finland declared independence from 
Russia, in 1919 the Åalanders organised their own plebiscite which resulted in a clear majority in 
favour of uniting with Sweden.70 In light of the opposition by Finland and the support by Sweden, 
the petition came in front of the Council. Sweden, in particular, claimed that the Aland Island should 
decide about its status with a plebiscite. Unconventionally, two reports were issued about the legal 
questions surrounding the Åaland case. Firstly, the Council of the League appointed a Committee of 
Jurist (hereinafter Committee), to determine whether the question put by the Åalanders belonged only 
to the domestic legal domain, thus outside of the scope of the Covenant of the League of Nations.  
Self-determination was a central issue because the Committee needed first to determine whether 
the right claimed by the people of the Åaland island existed under international law. According to the 
Committee, self-determination could not be viewed as a right under positive international law at that 
time. In spite of having an important role to play in modern political thought, it was not mentioned in 
the relevant legal instruments but only in some bilateral treaties. This was not sufficient to prove its 
status as an established legal right in international law.71 In this sense, the argument about the use of 
plebiscites was completely set aside. The conclusion of the Committee was focused on the fact that 
the dispute “does not refer to a definite established political situation, depending exclusively upon 
the territorial sovereignty of a State”.72 It was for every sovereign State “which is definitely 
																																								 																				
69 Following the Italian Representative’s Report (Tittoni’s Report) on petitions and minority protection, the Council on 
25 October 1920 adopted a resolution to that purpose. See Report Adopted by the Council of the League on 20 October 
1920 in League of Nations, Protection of Linguistic, Racial and Religious Minorities by the League of Nations, 1929, 
Geneva, pp. 6-12. See for an account about minority rights in the League on Nations S. Sierpowski: “Minorities in the 
System of the League of Nations”, cit., ibid. 
70 F.D. Scott, Sweden, The Nations History, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, pp. 500-504. 
71 League of Nations, Report of the International Commission of Jurists: “Although the principle of self-determination of 
peoples plays an important role in modern political thought, especially since the Great War, it must be pointed out that 
there is no mention of it in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The recognition of this principle in a certain number 
of international treatise cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the Law of 
Nations” reprinted in League of Nations Organization Journal, Special Supplement, 1920, n.3, para. 5. 
72 League of Nations, Report of the International Commission of Jurists, cit., p. 14. 
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constituted”73 to grant or refuse the right to self-determination to sub-communities living within its 
borders.74 Hence, precisely because the demands of the Åalanders were developed “at a time when 
Finland had not yet acquired the characters of a definite entity”,75 there could still be an argument 
for the admissibility of the case. As Cassese observes, the application of the principle of self-
determination came back in the business because Finland could not be deemed a totally sovereign 
State.76 In this sense, Crawford aptly underlines that the Committee admitted that self-determination 
could apply to territories that are detached from the parent State: the degree of control exercised by 
Finland was so blatant that the unit was in effect a non-self-governing territory, subject to a carence 
de souveraineté.77 Following the report of the Committee, for the purposes of developing some 
practical recommendation, the Council of the League appointed a Commission of Rapporteurs. The 
Commission of Rapporteurs took the chance to express its view about self-determination and 
substantially confirmed the interpretation given by the Committee. Self-determination, rather than 
being a rule of international law, was a principle of justice and liberty which had been interpreted in 
different ways by the members of the international community. In the case at stake, the Åland island 
should remain with Finland, but the country had to enforce the guarantees for minorities’ protection 
provided under the Finnish 1920 Autonomy Law.78 In other words, as long as Finland granted some 
form of autonomy to the Åalanders, their rights were protected. Hence, the Commission of 
Rapporteurs ruled out the hypothesis of unconditional secession,79 albeit it draw a line between the 
lack or failure of the kin State to ensure protection of minorities and secession as a last resort.80 In 
cases of serious mistreatment and violation of minorities treatise, the Commission continued, the 
possibility of extreme actions was foreseen, taken as a last resort measure. This approach anticipates 
the one which will be analysed in the next Chapter, notably the remedial right theory for secession. 
 
Going back to the subject matter of this Chapter, in order to better assess the role of the Åaland 
case in the context of a legal reappraisal on self-determination, it is worth noting that the two Reports 
set down some of the characteristics required for a group to be considered a minority such as sharing 
the same language and culture or religion and being capable to administer itself. For the first time, an 
																																								 																				
73 League of Nations, Report of the International Commission of Jurists: “Generally speaking, the grant or the refusal of 
such a right (to separate themselves from the State of which they form part) to a portion of its population of determining 
its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State 
which is definitely constituted”, para. 5. 
74 Ibid.  
75 League of Nations, Report of the International Commission of Jurists, cit., p. 14. 
76 A. Cassese, Self-Determination, a Legal Reappraisal, cit., pp. 27-30. 
77 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, cit., p. 126. 
78 See Official Journal of the League of Nations, September 1921, pp. 701-702. 
79 League of Nations, Report of the International Commission of Rapporteurs presented to the Council of the League, 16 
April 1921, League of Nations Document B7/2I/68/106, VII, pp. 22-23. 
80 League of Nations, Report of the International Commission of Rapporteurs, cit., pp. 21; 28. 
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international body was putting down the basic features for acknowledging the existence of a 
distinguished group among the people of a nation. Therefore, the work of the League of Nations in 
this field should not be underestimated, as it probably paved the way for the better regulation of 
minority issues in international law which eventually started since the end of the Second World War 
As Cassese maintains “a policy line was put forward which the world community, to some extent, 
took up and, indeed, which might yield even more fruit in the future”.81 This view is confirmed by the 
ICJ case-law on Namibia and the construction of a wall in Palestine, respectively. In both cases the 
Court, while expressing its view on the development of international law of self-determination, held 
that the ultimate aim of the “sacred trust” referred to by Art. 22 of the Covenant was the self-
determination of the peoples concerned.82         
2 The purport of self-determination in the UN Practice 
The fruits of the contribution brought by the League of Nations in the Åaland island case were 
picked up by the United Nations since the very beginning of its activity. Self-determination was in 
fact mentioned among the purposes of the UN in the UN Charter. Art.1 (2) reads: “the Purposes of 
the United Nations are: […] to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”83 
 Undoubtedly, several merits of the United Nations with respect to the enforceability of the 
right to self-determination can be recognized: (i) the codification of the principle in an international 
legal document; (ii) its crystallization in international legal discourse and practice of the States; (iii) 
its wide application in the context of formation of new subjects of international law. However, there 
are also some pitfalls. The most important one is that the principle was not defined in the Charter: its 
main features thus have to be discerned from practice. Given that practice concerns mainly the 
independence of colonies, this strict interrelation with the decolonization period begun to be seen as 
an intrinsic feature of self-determination.  
In the next sections it will be shown that (1) the contribution of the United Nations is 
considerable with respect to the evolution of a general right to self-determination in the international 
																																								 																				
81 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 33. 
82 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 267, Advisory Opinion, 1971, ICJ Reports 1971, para 52-53; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ 
Reports 2004, para.70. 
83 Reference to self-determination was sponsored by the USSR for Art. 55 as well, although the Soviets would have liked 
to include self-determination also in the operative provisions dealing with administration of territories. Such proposal, 
however, was opposed by the colonial powers of the time. As a counterbalance, colonial powers strongly supported the 
clear affirmation of the principle of non -interference in domestic affairs (Art. 2 (7)). Hence, no reference to self-
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trusteeships. 
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legal order while (2) in practice the purport of self-determination appears to be narrowed to the 
decolonization context. The use of self-determination in the Charter raises several questions, indeed. 
It could be questioned whether self-determination applies to States or also to the inhabitants of a 
territory, whether it acknowledges a broad notion of people – which could include even small 
communities within a State – or whether the target has to be only colonies. Following our approach 
that focuses on the dichotomy between internal and external self-determination, this section argues 
that at first the UN championed self-determination in its external dimension, a sort of right to 
decolonization. However, after colonies were dismantled, self-determination ended up to be 
supported mainly in its internal dimension.84 In the Charter of the United Nations, self-determination 
was a principle, finally codified in an international instrument, but still a political principle. It could 
not constitute the legal basis of a claim because it was not precisely defined. Its characterization as a 
legal entitlement came as a consequence of many other elements, like the spread of human rights in 
international law. It was the combination of General Assembly resolutions, human rights treaties, and 
international case-law that turned self-determination into a right under international law. 
The development of the notion of self-determination in the UN practice rests on a combination 
of factors: not only the references contained in the Preamble of the UN Charter and the General 
Assembly’s practice, but in particular the application of Chapters IX and XX, devoted to the 
Trusteeship System and to non-Self-Governing territories. On the one hand, the trusteeship system 
indirectly contributed to affirm the right to self-determination among peoples because the entrusted 
powers were asked to guide those territories to independence. On the other hand, non-self-governing 
territories were supposed to develop progressively autonomous forms of self-government, on the 
basis of the peoples’ political aspirations.85 
In this general legal framework, the chance for the UN to adopt relevant documents in the field 
was given by the rising of the movement of the non-aligned countries. In particular, in 1955 the 
representatives of Eastern European and African-Asian countries assembled in Bandung strongly 
asked for a speedy end of colonialism.86 Five years later the UN General Assembly managed to adopt 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People annexed to 
Resolution 151487 which is considered a landmark piece for the study of self-determination in the UN 
																																								 																				
84 It merits to mention here that even by looking at the travaux preparatoires, no support for a right to external self-
determination can be found outside the colonial dominions, as showed by H. Quane in “The United Nations and the 
Evolving Right to Self-Determination”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1998, vol. 47, pp. 540-545. 
85 D. Raić, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., pp. 203-205. 
86 The Conference of Bandung was a meeting hosted by the Indonesian city between 18-24 April 1955. The meeting 
assembled Asian and African countries united under the idea of African Asian solidarity against the bipolar system. 
87 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (hereinafter also the Declaration on 
Colonial Peoples’ Independence), annexed to General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted on 14 December 1960, 
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1514(XV)  
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practice, together with resolution 154188 adopted one day later and resolution 156489 establishing a 
special committee on decolonisation.90 The Declaration annexed to resolution 1514 above mentioned 
did not come out of nothing, but was the ultimate step after a number of resolutions adopted by the 
Assembly that had mentioned the right to self-determination.91 In addition, though the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights92 contains no reference to self-determination, an implicit mention of 
the means to enforce this right can be found. For instance, art. 21 states that “the will of people shall 
be the basis of the authority of government”. Admittedly, the wording suggests the acknowledgment 
of a human right to self-determinate – here mostly in its internal aspect.93 
 As regards the Declaration on Colonial Peoples’ Independence, the issue at stake is quite clear: 
the rationale underpinning the adoption of the document was to bring independence to as many people 
subject to external subjugation as possible. Although the resolution opposes colonialism in all its 
forms and calls for its eradication, it does not go as far as to declare that self-determination is an 
absolute right, the application of which cannot be limited. Self-determination is in fact encapsulated 
into the principle of territorial integrity, thus it is still subject to a strict control. Moreover, the fact 
that self-determination was considered a right belonging to all peoples, by virtue of which they were 
entitled to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development raises many interpretative doubts because no definition of people was provided.94  
 
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter 
																																								 																				
88 General Assembly, Resolution 1541, Principles which should guide Members in Determining whether or not an 
obligation exists to transmit the information called for under art. 73 of the Charter, adopted on 15 December 1960. 
89 General Assembly, Resolution 1564 adopted on 27 November 1961. 
90 As regards the right to self-determination in international law, its legal status has been consolidated by a series of 
documents, the majority of which will be scrutinised briefly in this Chapter, such as, inter alia, the (1) Helsinki Final Act 
adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter CSCE) in 1975, (2) the African Charter 
of Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981; (3) the CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe adopted in 1990; (4), and the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993. The latter will be analysed in the next Chapter in the inquiry about 
the legal basis surrounding the theory of remedial secession. 
91 See among the others, UN Doc. A/Res/37/42, 3 Dec. 1982; UN Doc. A/Res/38/16, 22 Nov. 1983; UN Doc.; 
A/Res/39/18,25 Nov. 1984; UN Doc. A/Res/40/24, 29 Nov. 1985; UN Doc. A/Res/41/100, 4 Dec. 1986; UN Doc. 
A/Res/42/94, 7 Dec. 1987; UN Doc. A/Res/43/105, 8 Dec. 1988; UN Doc. A/Res/44/80, 8 Dec. 1989; UN Doc. 
A/Res/54/155, 29 Feb. 2000. To have a comprehensive overview of the work of the GA in promoting self-determination, 
it’s worth visiting the specific section devoted to it in http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/ga_resolutions.shtml . 
92 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10 1948, General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), UN 
Doc. A/810. 
93 D. Shelton, “Self-Determination and Secession: the Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals” in J. 
Dahlitz, Secession and International Law, cit., p. 49; see also A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, cit., p. 92. 
94 Declaration Granting Independence, supra: Art. 1 The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an 
impediment to the promotion of the world peace and co-operation. Art. 2 All peoples have the right to self-determination; 
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.” The problematic definition of people under international law will be tackled in the next section of the 
Chapter. 
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Declaration on Friendly Relations),95 then, contains a section dedicated to self-determination. The 
right to self-determination is acknowledged as belonging to peoples, but the overarching nature of 
the principle of territorial integrity is clearly affirmed.96 The wording of the Declaration as well as 
its structure support this view, since territorial integrity is placed within the very first preamble’s 
clauses.97 Almost twenty years later, this position is confirmed in the opinions of the Arbitration 
Commission98 established by the European Commission during the dissolution of the Former 
Yugoslavia. The Commission recognized not only the right to self-government of the former federal 
units, but stressed that the making of a new nation had to be in compliance with the principle of uti 
possidetis juris. In other words, the preservation of existing boundaries – hence indirectly also of the 
territorial integrity-comes first, even when claims for independence are at stake. Opinion n. 1 
confirms this assumption as it reads “it is well established that, whatever the circumstance, the right 
to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti 
possidetis juris) except when States concerned agree otherwise”.99 
  From the stand point of the double nature of the right to self-determination, the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations seems to endorse mainly the external dimension of the right. Nevertheless, a 
reference to internal self-determination can be found in the form of peoples’ right to participate to the 
domestic affairs of their State, regardless of race, creed, religion and colour. By enlarging the 
categories for which a certain policy may be considered discriminatory, the Declaration extended the 
sphere of application of the right to self-determination to include also internal forms of government, 
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accordance with the Charter of the United Nations annexed to the General Assembly Resolution A/Res/2625 dated 24 
October 1970 (hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations). Principle 1 enshrines “[…] the right of all peoples freely 
to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
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purposes of the United Nations” 
98 The Arbitration Commission is known as Badinter Commission, for its President Robert Badinter. It was appointed by 
the European Economic Community on the 27th August 1991 with a vague mandate, namely to rule by means of binding 
decisions upon request from 'valid Yugoslavian authorities. The Commission finally gave four opinions, on the requests 
of Lord Carrington, President of the Peace Conference (Opinion No. 1); by the Serbian Republic, using the Conference 
as intermediary (Opinions Nos. 2 and 3) and the Council of Ministers of the EEC (Opinions Nos. 4 to 7) respectively. See 
Chapter 3 at pp. 136-146. 
99 Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 1, International Legal Materials, 1992, n. 31, p. 1498 ff., para 1. 
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thus to a certain extent it introduced internal self-determination among international rules.100 Hence, 
the dichotomy of the right to self-determination clearly presents itself in the Declaration. The 
Declaration explains that external self-determination can take place through three different 
modalities,101 namely: 1) the establishment of a new independent sovereign entity; 2) free association 
with another independent State and 3) integration with an independent State.102 Yet it is important to 
point out that association and integration can take place only with a previous approval by the peoples 
concerned as reference to the “freely expressed will” shows.103  
In spite of being only a blatant affirmation, it was the first time that an international document 
acknowledged the value of popular consent in a broad context. This further corroborates the view that 
the Declaration on Friendly Relations took the debate to a new level by building a bridge between, 
on the one side, self-determination which results into independence and on the other side internal 
forms of participation in governmental affairs. In the case of self-determination applied within the 
borders of the State, the Declaration opposes the politics of those States which deny the participation 
of groups based on their race, creed or colour. As far as the external dimension of self-determination 
is concerned, the wording of the Declaration is not clear enough to allow us to say that it takes a 
decisive step towards establishing external self-determination in the form of secession.104 This 
depends also by the intrinsic nature of General Assembly’s resolutions. They are not binding upon 
the member States, therefore, although there are elements testifying that self-determination was 
becoming a legal right, the vagueness of the formulation makes it problematic to hold that with the 
practice of the General Assembly the principle of self-determination gained the status of a legal right. 
Perhaps, it is more appropriate to claim that the action of UN marked a change in the approach in that 
self-determination is not used to justify the action of the mandate powers, but is something belonging 
to peoples, the inhabitants of certain territories. As Suksi put it “the doctrine of self-determination 
was at least originally used to undermine the right of acquisition of territories by means of conquest, 
which seldom paid any attention to the interests of people living in the territory in question”.105 
																																								 																				
100 In particular, vis-à-vis the situation in South Africa, with the Declaration the international community was taking a 
stand against people’s subjugation and non-representation in State’s institutions on the grounds of racial and religious 
discrimination. 
101 Declaration on Friendly Relations, cit.: “The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association 
or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people 
constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people”. 
102 Examples of the three modalities are, to mention only a few, the cases of the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname, North 
Borneo and Sarawak, or the federated states of Micronesia and Palau. 
103 Declaration on Friendly Relations, cit., principle 1: “To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the 
freely expressed will of the peoples concerned”. 
104 See Chapter 2 pp. 63-66. 
105 M. Suksi: “Keeping the Lid on the Secessionist Kettle- a Review of Legal Interpretations concerning Claims of Self-
Determination by Minority Populations”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2005, vol. 12, p. 197. 
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3 Self-Determination in human rights law: individual and collective nature of the 
right 
 
The framework just mentioned changed from 1960 onwards, when the international community 
has faced the emergence of self-determination within human rights law. That self-determination was 
becoming a predominant issue within the international debate could be easily seen by looking at the 
exponential growth of admissions to the UN of former colonies between 1960 and 1990. First 
conceived as a political principle declared in the UN arena, self-determination has acquired the status 
of a legal right due to its inclusion in human rights instruments as well as through international 
jurisprudence. In particular, the ICJ has played a pivotal role in the definition of the boundaries of the 
right to self-determination, whilst human rights bodies have not relied so much on self-determination, 
albeit they have tried to set out its basic features as a human right.106 In this sense, the inclusion of 
the right to self-determination in the cluster of human rights properly defined raises some problems. 
It is important to recall that the right to self-determination was introduced in international law in 
vague terms and its legal contours rest difficult to grasp. Self-determination has a strong political 
dimension that in fact goes against the clarity and preciseness required to define a legal title, 
especially a human right. 
The major step toward the acquisition of the status of right was taken in 1966 with the adoption 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights107 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.108 Art.1 (1) common to the Covenants reads as follows “All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.109 The sphere of 
application of the right to self-determination as envisaged in the Covenants has been the subject of a 
continuous debate. Most scholars however agree that the application of self-determination in the 
treaties cannot be restricted to colonial independence any more. As Crawford alleges, art.1 refers to 
all peoples and paragraph three specifies that the phrase is to be interpreted as including colonial 
peoples. Hence, art. 1 cannot be narrowed only to colonies. Further support for this assumption can 
																																								 																				
106 See D. Shelton: “Self-Determination and Secession: the Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals”, cit., 
pp. 47-71. 
107 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16 1966, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200 
(XXI), UN Doc. A/6316, reprinted in International Legal Materials, 1967, vol. 6, p. 368 ff. 
108 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16 1966, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2200 (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316, reprinted in International Legal Materials, 1967, vol. 6, p. 360 ff. 
109 Para. (2) and (3) recites as follows: “2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-
Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that 
right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”. 
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be found in paragraph two: if self-determination was an entitlement of colonial people only, one of 
the consequences would be that only those people would have the right to permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources. Admittedly, this view has not found any confirmation in practice or doctrine 
so far.110 
The wording of para. 1 further suggests that people should be free to choose their political 
status, not only in the form of external self-determination, but also by having a government without 
external interference or manipulation. In fact, art. 1 addresses the political as well as the cultural and 
social status, those being notably typical elements of internal dimension of the right to self-
determination. Thus, it could be inferred that the Covenants open the door for a focus on internal self-
determination in the aftermath of colonialism.111 
As it can be inferred from art. 1, the link between other human rights and self-determination is 
twofold: on the one hand, enjoyment of self-determination is connected to political rights, such as 
freedom of expression, the right to vote, or freedom of association. On the other hand, self-
determination requires pursuing personal, social development, benefiting from the natural resources 
and gathering economic stability.112 Pursuant to art. 25 of the ICCPR, then, every citizen has the right 
to, inter alia, “vote and be elected […] and to have access to public service in his country” thus 
confirming the strong reliance on government by consent. Lastly, to a certain extent the wording of 
art. 25 can be combined with the one then used in the Friendly Relations Declaration because it 
implies a right to have a government representative of the population.113 Such a broad understanding 
of the right to self-determination outside the colonial context is to be regarded as a great victory for 
the UN system, taking into account the strong opposition of many States manifested during the 
drafting and after the adoption of the Covenants. Indeed, some States tried to make reservations to 
art. 1 in order to limit its scope of application. India for example made a reservation to art. 1, to the 
effect that the right to self-determination pertains only to peoples under foreign domination and it is 
not relevant to “sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation”.114   
This additionally corroborates the idea that the Covenants were deemed to have set some rights 
and duties not established before. Despite this strong contribution, from a pure legal stand point the 
wording used in the Covenants is not clear on self-determination of peoples. The Covenants leave 
unanswered the questions concerning the modes of exercising self-determination and the meaning of 
																																								 																				
110 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, cit., p. 112. 
111 See S. F. van den Driest, Remedial Secession. A Right to External Self-Determination as a Remedy to Serious 
Injustices?, cit., pp. 39-45; A. Cassese, Self-Determination of People. A legal Reappraisal, cit., p.101. 
112 See Art. 1 supra note 37. See contra J. Crawford, The Creation of States, cit., who argues that internal self-
determination is a “summary of other rights”, although he comes to the same conclusion with respect to the broad sphere 
of application of internal self-determination. 
113 M. Suksi: “Keeping the Lid on the Secessionist Kettle”, cit., p. 201. 
114 See on the website of the Permanent Mission of India to Geneva http://www.pmindiaun.org/pages.php?id=867 
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people. The right to self-determination is not explicitly narrowed down to its internal or external 
dimension and the travaux preparatoires reveal that clear terms were avoided for purpose. Many 
proposals to include clear phrases such as “the right to establish an independent State or to choose 
its government” were presented,115 but the member States opted for leaving the notion of self-
determination open. Secondly, the formulation of self-determination as a right possessed by all 
peoples continues to raise daunting questions, since the definition of peoples is not fixed 
independently of the entitlement to self-determination. In other words, it remains open when a group 
can be labelled as a people. 116 Not surprisingly, taking into account the events undergone by the 
continent, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights is the only document championing self-
determination as a basic human right. Art. 20 (1) sets forth the unquestionable right to self-
determination belonging to peoples, though what is meant by peoples is not specified. The article 
encompasses also an internal dimension of self-determination when it reads “shall freely determine 
their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy 
they have freely chose”. As remarked by Raic, the formulation of art. 20 (1) of the African Charter 
represents a major supportive point in the characterisation of self-determination as an inalienable and 
continuing right. The right to self-determination is in fact disentangled from its dependence on 
colonialism and recognised in its entirety, so that it can be deemed to be a continuous right inseparable 
from the exercise of the other human rights. 117     
3.1 The role of case-law in establishing a legal right to self-determination 
The consecration of self-determination as a legal entitlement of people is to be found in the ICJ 
and Human Rights Bodies’ case-law.  
For the ICJ, it took some time to recognise the nature of self-determination as a norm of positive 
international law. Sometimes, indeed, the Court avoided any reliance on self-determination even in 
cases in which one party had explicitly invoked this right in its memorial.118 The first reference to 
self-determination was made in the Advisory Opinion on Namibia. The General Assembly 
(hereinafter also GA) had requested the ICJ to give an opinion on the right of South Africa to maintain 
																																								 																				
115 For a commentary on the ICCPR see S. Joseph, J. Shoultz, M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, 2nd edition, Oxford, 2005, pp. 497-511. 
116 B.R. Roth: “Secession, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control 
Doctrine”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2010, n.11, pp. 393-396. 
117 See D. Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit. pp. 232-235; citing also A. Rosas: “Internal self-
determination”, C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination, cit., p. 225. Furthermore, art. 21 takes 
inspiration from common Art. 1(2) of the Covenants in that it guarantees all people the right to freely dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources.  
118 In the case Right of Passage over the Indian territory, for example, India had invoked the right to self-determination 
in its memorial, but the Court ignored that allegation. See ICJ, Right of Passage over the Indian territory (Portugal v. 
India), ICJ Reports 1960, p.6 and S. Oeter: “Self-Determination” in B. Simma (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations, 
Oxford, 2002, pp. 324-325. 
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a governmental authority on Namibia. The Court confirmed the existence of the right to self-
determination in modern international law, but it did not take a stand on what the components of the 
right were.119  
 In the Western Sahara120 Opinion, the ICJ further clarified the forms and procedures for 
realizing the right to self-determination. The Court did not use the word right, but opted for the term 
principle. Nevertheless, by claiming that self-determination was an entitlement of peoples, the Court 
went short of delineating the content of the right. Although it was more concentrated on the 
proceedings for the realization of the right121 rather than on its content as a legal entitlement, the 
Court referred to the application of the right to self-determination. The views expressed in the 
Namibia Opinion with respect to non-self-governing territories were confirmed122 and the right to 
self-determination of peoples was affirmed notwithstanding claims of control brought by Morocco 
and Mauritania in the specific case.123 
The East Timor124 judgment is a striking case for the impact of the pronouncement of the Court 
on the international community. The Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the case, 
yet the approach of the ICJ to the right to self-determination of the East Timorese, coupled with the 
strong efforts of the international community towards establishing self-government for the East 
Timorese undoubtedly paved the way for the referendum for independence of the island under the 
UN supervision. As far as the Court’s decision is concerned, it took the chance to distinguish between 
holders and duty bearers of the right to self-determination under international law. The Court 
maintained that the right to self-determination of peoples is one of the essential principles of 
																																								 																				
119 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 267, Advisory Opinion, 1971, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16. 
120 ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 16 October 1975, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 6. The case originated from the 
irredentism of Morocco and Mauritania against Spain that was the major power involved due to its control over Western 
Sahara. The Court was asked to provide an opinion on two main questions: (i) whether Western Sahara was a terrae 
nullius – not belonging to any sovereign authority- at the time of Spanish arrival and (ii) what, or if there, were legal ties 
between the region and Morocco or Mauritania. 
121 This is demonstrated i.e. by taking Recital 55 of the Advisory Opinion. The Court focuses on the fact that the 
application of the right to self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned 
but does not specifies who these people are.  
122 At para. 54 the ICJ recalls its main views expressed in the Advisory Opinion on Namibia by direct reference to the 
Opinion, at p. 31: “the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to al1 of them”. 
123 The principle that self-determination is firmly established in international law in particular in relation to former 
colonies is further supported by the Separate Opinions annexed to the Judgment. See. J. Crawford, The Creation of States 
in International Law, cit., p. 121-124, citing the opinion of Judge Dillard. 
124 ICJ, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, para. 29. See also C. Drew: “The East Timor Story: 
International Law on Trial”, European Journal of International Law, 2001, vol. 12, pp. 651-684. 
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contemporary international law125 and inferred from it that it had evolved into an erga omnes126 right. 
Nevertheless, the ICJ did not qualify what the implications of such erga omnes nature were. The 
Opinion on the Legal consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory sheds some light on the matter, because the Court stated that “given the character and 
importance of the rights and obligations involved, […] all States are under an obligation not to 
recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the occupied Palestinian 
territory”.127 The Advisory Opinion is of particular relevance, indeed, because the case falls outside 
the framework of decolonization. The standing issue was the legality of the armed attack, occupation 
and subsequent events caused by the Israeli presence in Palestine, which resulted in a denial of the 
right to self-determination to the Palestinians. The Court reaffirmed its previous jurisprudence on the 
status of self-determination, confirming that: “the principle of self-determination of peoples has been 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2625 
(XXV) cited above, pursuant to which “Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action 
which deprives peoples referred to [in that resolution] of their right to self-determination”.128 Again, 
the Court did not provide a comprehensive account on the right to self-determination, but it is 
interesting to observe that neither the lack of definition of people nor the cumbersome substantive 
nature of self-determination outside colonialism were considered to be major impediments to the 
existence of the right. In other words, notwithstanding the debate on its peremptory character,129 the 
respect and realization of the right to self-determination seem to be considered a condicio sine qua 
																																								 																				
125 ICJ, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, at para. 29 reads as follows “[…] The principle of self-
determination of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court (see 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I. C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 31- 32, paras. 52-53; Western 
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 31-33, paras. 54-59); it is one of the essential principles of con- 
temporary international law” 
126 The categorization of some international rules into erga omnes obligations belongs to the ICJ Judgment in the 
Barcelona Traction case. According to the Court, there are two sets of norms under international law: (i) norms which 
arise only in relationships between parties and are reciprocal in nature and (ii) norms which put on States obligations 
incumbent towards the international community taken as a whole. Those latter must be fulfilled regardless the behavior 
of the other parties and above all they give rise to a claim for execution which belongs to all the other members of the 
international community. ICJ, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) 1970, ICJ 
Reports 1970, para. 33-34. The ICJ did not expressly said that the right to self-determination had acquired the status of 
jus cogens norm, yet the International Law Commission in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts confirmed its qualification as a peremptory norm of international law. See International Law Commission, 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, July 26, 2001, 
p. 113. However, the debate on the jus cogens nature of the right to self-determination is not exhausted among 
international scholarship. See M. Saul: “The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A Formula 
for Uncertainty in the Scope and Content of the Right?”, Human Rights Journal, 2011, n.11, pp. 609-644. 
127 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (hereinafter Construction 
of a Wall), Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, para 159. 
128 ICJ, Construction of a Wall, cit., para .88 
129 See footnote 74. 
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non for the respect of human rights, to a certain extent an unquestionable130 right as recalled by the 
African Charter. In this framework, the right to self-determination acquires an overarching 
importance for the realization of the individual and acts as a precondition for the fulfilment of the 
other fundamental human rights. Although one could conclude that as such the right to self-
determination cannot be limited in its application, the real caveat for its realization is the uti possidetis 
juris doctrine, which guided the process of decolonization by ensuring that boundaries established 
during the colonization period would be maintained, as stated by the Court in the Frontier Dispute.131  
 
To conclude, the role of the ICJ has been fundamental in determining the nature of self-
determination under international law: it is considered an international legal rule and obligations 
flowing from it are of an erga omnes nature. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the ICJ still has a 
cautious attitude towards the consequences of the application of the right. A common feature of the 
majority of the cases handled by the ICJ is that self-determination was never spelled out in clear 
words, despite the fact that it was the subject of extensive debate in the cases presented and in the 
opinions submitted to the Court. While there is an area – decolonization- where the bearers of and the 
context for the right are set without dispute, there are no clear-cut answer to the questions concerning 
the contemporary meaning of self-determination. This is confirmed by the approach adopted by the 
Court in the case of the Declaration of Independence issued by Kosovo,132 in which the Court 
considered that there was an evolution in international law “in such a way as to create a right to 
independence for peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation”, but did not go further.133  
Moreover, it should not be underestimated that in legal scholarship some argue that the human 
rights approach to self-determination is not consistent with practice. For Castellino, there is a clash 
between self-determination included in the ICCPR and States’ approach to this right. Hence, 
considering self-determination an individual human right is highly risky. In the Covenants, self-
determination has been framed as a human right on the basis of which the other rights can be built 
upon. On the contrary, the approach undertaken by States’ is tied to the classical interpretation of 
self-determination characterized by the linkage between self-determination and independence, or 
more generally, claims to statehood. Therefore, although the right to self-determination has been 
																																								 																				
130 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at Art. 20: “All peoples shall have the right to existence. They 
shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination”. 
131 ICJ, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Fasu v. Mali), 22 December 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, paras. 520-
525. 
132 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403. 
133 See S. Oeter: “Self-Determination”, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, cit., p. 328. 
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included also in the international human rights’ discourse, one has to bear in mind that State practice 
remains traditional.134 
3.2 Human Rights Bodies and Self-Determination 
Moving to human rights bodies, the UN Human Rights Committee acting on the basis of art. 
40 of the ICCPR has provided some interpretative guidelines on the right to self-determination, with 
a view to promote the implementation of the Covenant. In its General Comment n. 12, in particular, 
the Committee maintained that art. 1 recognizes a right to self-determination to all peoples and 
claimed that its implementation is “an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance 
of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights”.135 By virtue of 
the right to self-determination, the Committee continues, all peoples can freely pursue their economic, 
political status and social development. On the other hand, States have an obligation to allow the 
exercise of the right, by taking positive actions to further the realization of and respect for self-
determination.  
Further comments given by the body specify that the right to self-determination belongs to 
peoples, but cannot be exercised by everyone. In the General Comment n. 23, the Committee called 
upon State parties and individuals filing complaints under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant not 
to interpret art. 1 as referring also to minorities.136 Since minorities’ rights are set forth by art. 27 of 
the ICCPR, complaints concerning minorities can be submitted only when a violation of art. 27 is at 
stake and not when art. 1 is violated. It is important to observe that whilst art. 27 lists a set of rights 
that in principle do not prejudice State sovereignty and territorial integrity and are individually 
enforceable, self-determination (i) is exercised by a people and (ii) inevitably hinders the status 
quo.137  Hence, the need to narrow as much as possible its legal enforceability. The rationale 
underpinning the reasoning of the Committee has to be found in the different legal nature and the 
ultimate ratio of the rights. Self-determination acquires the status of human right in the Covenants, 
																																								 																				
134 J. Castellino: “Territorial Integrity and the Right to Self-Determination: an examination of the Conceptual Tools”, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2007-2008, vol. 33, p. 503 ff.  
135 General Comment n. 12, para.21, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f822.html [accessed 23 April 
2015]. 
136 General Comment No. 23(CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5), para. 50: “In some communications submitted to the Committee 
under the Optional Protocol, the right protected under art. 27 has been confused with the right of peoples to self-
determination proclaimed in Art. 1 of the Covenant” See General Assembly Official Records, 1994, Supplement n. 40, p. 
107. 
137 Ibid.: “Art. 27 of the Covenant ( on Civil and Political Rights) provides that, in those States in which ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other 
members of the group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their language. 
The Committee observes that this article establishes and recognizes a right which is conferred on individuals belonging 
to a minority group and which is different from, and additional to, all other rights which, as individuals in common with 
everyone else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant […].The Covenant draws a distinction between the 
right to self-determination and rights protected under Art. 27. The former is expressed to be a right belonging to peoples 
and is dealt with in a separate part of the Covenant”. 
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yet it is a special human right. Individuals are in principle the bearers of the right, but it can be 
exercised by people, therefore its nature is more collective than individual. Minorities’ rights, on the 
contrary, have a collective nature but are individually enforceable. Therefore, they can only submit 
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4 Controversial issues on self-determination: (too) many claimants? 
In the previous sections it was showed that although self-determination has been addressed to 
all peoples, thus going beyond the colonial context, the strong linkage to that period hinders its full 
exercise outside colonialism. In other words, the international community seems to have never come 
to terms with self-determination as a general right along clear lines. The main dilemma lies in 
determining who else, apart from colonies’ inhabitants, can exercise the right to self-determination.  
This section will put the stress on the position that there is an issue on minorities and indigenous 
peoples undergoing the debate on self-determination. For minorities it seems less problematic to 
affirm that they do not enjoy a right to self-determination, as already hinted at in the previous section. 
The interplay between self-determination and indigenous people is more intricate because the notion 
of indigenous people is in itself controversial. That is to say that the notion shares some features with 
the that of minority and some other with that of people. However, case-law and international 
documents point out that indigenous people are entitled to exercise the right to self-determination, at 
least in its internal dimension of self-government within their own State. 
4.1 Still in search for a definition of people 
A distinguished contribution to the inquiry on new trajectories of self-determination has been 
given by Summers, who focused on the role of peoples in international law through an extensive 
perusal on current doctrine and practice. As he argues, there is no current definition of people138 in 
international law, although people has been referred to as the basic unit entitled to exercise self-
determination since the development of Wilson and Lenin’s proposals. 
Due to the lack of clarity surrounding the application of self-determination, it may be useful to 
look at official declarations given by States. An important chance for stating their views is given to 
States during oral proceedings in front of the ICJ.139 States submission have a great significance in 
																																								 																				
138 A further clarification is necessary. At the risk of redundancy, the term used is always people, not population. In fact, 
the term people cannot be confused with population, which is a broader concept encompassing groups of individuals not 
necessarily identified within a territory. That is to say that the term does not carry a national value within itself. 
139 When the ICJ is asked to provide an Advisory Opinion, it usually invites States to submit written observations as well 
as to participate to the oral phase in order to express their views on the legal questions raised by the request. Written and 
oral submission can help the ICJ in ascertaining where international law stands with respect to the issue at stake. Being 
so important as they are, one could expect that those States in favor of a progressive interpretation of international law 
take the chance to provide as much and detailed information as possible. Indeed, for the Advisory Opinion on the 
independence of Kosovo, declarations were vague in terms of the exercise of external self-determination and limited 
themselves to recognize a right of secession only as a remedy. See Written Statements from Albania, Denmark, Estonia, 
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the discourse about self-determination, not only because there is no international norm which defines 
the scope and context of application of the right, but also because even among legal scholars the 
debate is a never ending one.140 As already referred to above, the ICJ has been called several times to 
express its views on the status of self-determination under international law, the latest being when the 
General Assembly requested an opinion on legal issues linked to self-determination for the 
construction of a wall in the Palestinian territory141 and for legality of the unilateral declaration of 
independence issued by Kosovo.142 In the latter case, the issue of self-determination and the right to 
secession came into play prominently: a specific section will dwell with the case of Kosovo in the 
Chapter about secession, but for the purposes of this Chapter it is interesting to observe that States 
referred to the inhabitants of Kosovo as people without substantiating their assumption on 
international legal grounds. Instead, they relied on previous agreements: i.e. the Netherlands claimed 
that the word people has been used in the Rambouillet Agreements or in UN documents, while 
Albania referred to the constitutional framework for provisional self-government of Kosovo 
promulgated by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.  
  
Even outside of the UN framework, no definition of people has been adopted. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the African continent has been directly concerned with issues of self-determination, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not provide a definition of the term. 
Interestingly, in the Comments to the Charter the absence of a definition was justified by claiming 
that it was “to avoid a difficult discussion for the drafters”.143 However, the African Commission has 
had the chance to clarify what has to be understood by people. In the case Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et 
al v. Cameroon144 people from Southern Cameroon claimed that they had suffered a denial of their 
right to self-determination during the 1961 UN plebiscite for independence and the process of 
																																								 																				
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Switzerland, 19 April 2009, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=1. See also J. Vidmar: “Remedial Secession in 
International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice”, St Anthony’s International Review, 2010, vol. 6, p. 37. 
140 As it has been underlined by the representative of the Netherlands during oral statement in front of the ICJ in the 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, in such cases “There is an abundance of literature on the law of self-determination. It 
provides a wealth of material, including on the exercise of the right to external self-determination. It is informative, but 
it may not be authoritative”. See Oral Statement by the Representative of the Netherlands, 10 December 2009, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15734.pdfat, para. 9. 
141 ICJ, Legal Consequences the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 
2004, ICJ. Reports 2004, p. 136. 
142 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, cit. 
143 Report of the Secretary General on the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, CM/1149, 1981, at para. 
13, cited by M.K. Addo: “Political Self Determination within the Context of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights”, Journal of African Law, 1998, n. 32, p. 184. The author regards the choice as an “aberration of responsibility”. 
However, it may have been also an attempt not to limit the scope of application of the right to self-determination envisaged 
by Art. 20 in times when many different communities were struggling for independence. 
144 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v. Cameroon, case n. 266/2003, 
decided on 27 May 2009, available at http://caselaw.ihrda.org/doc/266.03/view 
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adoption of the Constitution which followed. In its counter-claim Cameroon addressed the issue of 
whether the inhabitants of the South were a people and relied basically on an ethno-anthropological 
argument. Cameroon maintained that Southern inhabitants could not be considered a people since no 
“ethno-anthropological argument can be put forward to determine the existence of a people of 
Southern Cameroon, the Southern part being of the large Sawa cultural area, the northern part being 
part of the Grass fields’ cultural area”.145 Accordingly, Cameroon took advantage of the cultural 
differences within national sub-units in the southern region to develop its argument. However, 
cultural differences are not a prerogative of southern Cameroon only, but are very common in the 
African continent. This is why on a more general scale, the argument does not seem to be so powerful, 
and perhaps it should not have been presented as the main reason justifying the definition of people 
for the purposes of the right to self-determination. 
In its judgment, the Commission embraced an approach similar to that of Cameroon, but ended 
up with a different assessment, by opting for a broader interpretation of the term people. In line with 
previous statements given in the context of the UN Agencies, in particular by UNESCO, the 
Commission found that the Southern Cameroonians could be considered a people “because they 
manifest numerous characteristics and affinities, which include a common history, linguistic 
tradition, territorial connection and political outlook. More importantly they identify themselves as 
a people with a separate and distinct identity”.146  
One of the major merits of the definition is probably that it combines two kinds of elements: 
objective elements – such as common language and territory – and subjective ones, the most peculiar 
being the will to live together. A group can qualify as the bearer of the right to self-determination as 
long as it has a common self -consciousness of belonging together. In this line, the definition 
suggested by the Commission manages to combine requirements of the will to live together and form 
a distinct political unit, with common history. As a result, the Commission escapes from the need to 
clarify whether the territorial or the ethnic link point out if subgroups such as minorities or indigenous 
can be considered people. 
 
4.2 Minorities and indigenous peoples: do they have a right to self-determination? 
The undergoing tensions between a colloquial and a possible legal understanding of the term 
people is best exemplified by the debate on the interpretation of what constitutes a minority or an 
indigenous group. Neither of the two, again, have a generally accepted definition. However, scholarly 
																																								 																				
145 Supra para. 168. 
146 Ibid. para 179. 
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literature and international practice help shed some light on the issue. For minorities’ rights, many 
scholars have adopted the definition given by Capotorti.147 Minority within international law means 
“a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, 
whose members – being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”. Hence, minorities are 1) 
individuals sharing specific characteristics with respect to culture and national origins; 2) numerically 
a small group, recognized as such by their own parent State. Arguably, the key passage of the 
definition lies in the shift from a collective approach to an individual one: the focus is not on the 
group taken as a whole, but on the individual who enjoys rights as part of a minority. Moreover, the 
HR Committee accepted claims based on art. 27 but not on art.1, as it was seen before. The common 
denominator vis-à-vis the approach to the term people seen in the 1966 Covenants in our view is that 
minorities’ rights are perceived as individual in nature. Being self-determination a collective right, as 
such minorities are not the bearers of this right. Instead, the members of a minority enjoy specific 
rights such as the right to use their own language, or preserve their own traditions. As Meijknecht 
aptly notes, rights are granted to the members of the minority group taken singularly. In spite of the 
fact that the rights belonging to minorities under international law can be exercised by the minority 
group as such, from a legal stand point those rights are individual human rights.148 
This rather confused panoramic is mirrored by the legal status of indigenous people. While 
minorities’ keep on struggling to be the bearers of the right to self-determination in international law, 
indigenous’ claim has succeeded, though with many safeguard requirements.149 On a purely legal 
basis, indigenous people might be considered a hybrid subject, because they share some characters 
with minority groups, but they are also called people and the term inevitably raises questions related 
to self-determination. The Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous populations150 
– commissioned by the UN to Martinez Cobo does not help in clarifying if indigenous people are 
entitled to self-determination. It focuses on “indigenous communities, peoples, and nations” but then 
																																								 																				
147 F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, New York, 
1991, p. 96, cited by J. Castellino: “International Law and Self-Determination. Peoples, Indigenous Peoples and 
Minorities” in C. Walter (eds.), Secession and Self-Determination in International Law, cit., p. 35.  
148 A. Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: the Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International 
Law, Antwerpen/Groningen/Oxford, 2001, p. 171. 
149 For the sake of clarity, it can be underlined that reasons for different outcomes for indigenous and minorities stand 
outside the realm of the law. As it often happens with international law, different perceptions of a certain topic by the 
States lead to different outcomes under the international legal order. In particular, minorities’ issues have always been 
conceived as being more dangerous and too difficult to dwell with, but this argument goes beyond the scope of the present 
study. See for an updated analysis W. Kymlicka: “Beyond the Indigenous/Minority Dichotomy?” in S. Allen and A. 
Xanthaki (eds.), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Oxford, 2011, pp. 183-208. 
150 Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous populations. Conclusions, Proposals and 
Recommendations by J. R. Martinez-Cobo, 1986, UN Doc E./CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4. 
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alleges that indigenous people form a “non-dominant sector of the society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems”.151  Neither do 
help the two major documents that set forth the main legal features of indigenous rights under 
international law, notably the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries adopted in the framework of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
The ILO Convention provides a definition of indigenous people in art. 1(2), which relies on 
two major elements: 1) the historical descent from the populations of a certain country or region at 
the time of conquest or colonization and 2) preservation of some or all of their own peculiarities.152 
However, the Convention has been ratified by a few States, due to the difficulties in formulating a 
definition which would generate general consensus. Therefore, it cannot be viewed as a contribution 
to the crystallization of corresponding international customary rules. 
In 2007 the UN adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples153 (UNDRIP).  
The adoption of the document was championed by the UN as a great achievement due to the length 
of time it took to reach an agreement. However, many voices argue that the general provisions of the 
Declaration cannot capture the new developments regarding the role of indigenous peoples in the 
international community.154 
Art. 1 grants to indigenous peoples the right to “the full enjoyment, as a collective or as 
individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law”, and art. 3 
states that “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. 
If read together with art. 4 establishing that indigenous may enforce their right to self-determination 
																																								 																				
151 Ibid, at p. 29. 
152Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, International Labour Organization, 
adopted 27 June 1989, art. 1(2): “peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their 
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154 Fitzmaurice for examples alleges that to understand the legal position of indigenous peoples it would be better to shift 
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International Law, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 349- 376. 
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in matters related to their internal affairs,155 the Declaration clearly puts emphasis on the internal 
dimension of self-determination. In other words, indigenous people are bearers of the right to self-
determination, but for them the content, the substance of the right is limited to the internal dimension 
of self-determination. In particular, in art. 4 the right to autonomy figures as the principal means of 
implementing self-determination for indigenous people and even more clearly it reiterates the 
principle of respect for territorial unity of the State. Indigenous’ right to negotiate their political status 
and access to political institutions of the State, in fact, embodies the right to internal self-
determination.  
As regards external self-determination, the strong emphasis on territorial integrity and peace 
provided by art. 46 of the UNDRIP does not support an interpretation in favour of such a right for 
indigenous peoples. Avoiding any impairment of existing States’ “territorial integrity or political 
unity”, the UNDRIP does not leave much space for external self-determination. This conclusion is 
further supported by looking at word order of articles 3 and 4. Since indigenous people are provided 
with “the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to internal and local affairs”, it is 
unlikely that reference to political status in art. 3 can be read as meaning sovereign independence.156 
 
 Turning to case-law on indigenous and minorities’ rights, it remains inconsistent, albeit some 
remarks can be made. In the 80ies the Inter-American Commission established under the American 
Convention on Human Rights (IACHR) dealt with the right to self-determination of the group of 
Miskito Indians leaving in Nicaragua.157 Miskito filed a complaint to the Commission in which they 
claimed the central government was depriving them of access to natural resources and was denying 
their right to self-determination. The Commission acknowledged the status of self-determination as 
a right of people in international law, but concluded that this is not tantamount to say that each and 
every ethnic group may advance claims against the parent State.158 International practice shows that 
liberation struggles are acknowledged to colonial peoples, while groups living in metropolitan areas 
are entitled to other forms of protection. Interestingly however, the Inter- American Court on Human 
Rights (IACtHR) has taken the chance to develop a notion of individual self-determination with 
																																								 																				
155 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Art. 4: “indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions”. 
156 See B.R. Roth; “Secession, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control 
Doctrine”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2011, vol. 11, pp. 1-47. 
157 AS, Inter American Commission, Report of the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population 
of Miskito Origin, OEA/Ser. L/V/II, 29 November 1983. See B.H. Creston, A. Grea (ed.), Human Right in the World 
Community: Issues and Action, III edition, Philadelphia, 2015, pp. 231-233. 
158 OAS, Inter American Commission, Report of the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan 
Population of Miskito Origin, in part II, at para. B (8): “…this does not mean that it recognizes the right of self-
determination of any ethnic group as such”. 
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respect to indigenous peoples’ right. In Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, the Court acknowledged the 
existence of an individual right to have a life plan (proyecto de vida) which can be discerned into the 
right to self-determination. In fact, it entails both the self-actualization of the person concerned and 
the possibility of reaching his/her goals without unjustified obstacles.159 
  
In light of the above, it can be safely concluded that the entitlement and content of self-
determination for minorities and indigenous people is another sign of the fact that there is still much 
ambiguity surrounding the definition of peoples entitled to claim the right to self-determination. The 
structure of the ICCPR is revealing of the ambiguity surrounding self-determination as an individual 
and group right. While art. 1 champions the collective nature of self-determination – notably by 
reference to all peoples- art. 27 contains a provision on minorities which is constructed in individual 
terms by the use of persons. Within the same international Covenant, two different understandings 
coexist and neither of them is further clarified in the text.160 Arguably, this is one of the major 
obstacles to the consolidation of a clear international rule. Nonetheless, considering self-
determination as a collective right, international law seems to distinguish between the entitlement of 
indigenous people and minorities. Unlike minorities rights which are individual in nature – albeit they 
are enjoyed in community with others- indigenous rights are accorded within the framework of 
peoples’ rights. Thus, indigenous people are entitled to exercise the right to self-determination, 
though in its internal dimension only. In other words, the distinguishing feature is the legal character 
of the rights at stake and this depends on the purport of the rules considered. On the one side, the 
purpose of minorities’ rights is to enable individuals belonging to a minority to preserve and protect 
their identity within the community of the State. On the other side, indigenous rights are granted to 
allow them to develop their specific society and social structures alongside that of the parent State.161 
Given this reappraisal on current ambiguities surrounding the bearers of the right to self-
determination, it remains to be seen what self-determination has ended up to be outside its “natural 
environment” of decolonization. 
5. Self-determination beyond decolonization: contemporary meanings 
The more the decolonization was about to end, the more there was a gradual shift in 
international legal documents towards a different understanding of self-determination.162 Two trends 
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160 S. Mancini: “Rethinking the boundaries of democratic secession: liberalism, nationalism, and the right of minorities 
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can be distinguished: (i) the increasing attention paid to the internal dimension of self-determination; 
(ii) the focus on the link between internal self-determination and principles of democratic governance.  
 
Within the European area, legal issues related to self-determination and minorities’ rights came 
to the forefront later than in the international arena. It was the division of Germany that brought the 
matter in the European political and legal debate. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) was the first body involved, when the Federal Republic of Germany proposed that a 
provision on self-determination be included in the 1975 Helsinki Declaration.163 The rationale 
underpinning the German proposal was “to help create a state of peace in Europe in which the 
German nation can regain its unity in free self-determination”.164 The Helsinki Declaration in 
principle VIII refers to self-determination by affirming the obligation of the State parties to “respect 
the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination”. Moreover “by virtue of the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, 
when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and 
to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development”. Accordingly, three 
features may be discerned: (i) due to the absence of colonial dominions in the European area, the right 
to self-determination envisaged in the Helsinki Declaration applies to peoples living in independent 
States; (ii) by affirming that the right always applies to people, the Helsinki Declaration stresses its 
continuing nature. In addition, (iii) special emphasis is put on the requirement of full freedom of 
people to choose their own political status. The ultimate purpose of the formulation in this sense 
becomes the development of a pacified European area, as it was proposed above by the Federal 
Republic of Germany. In particular, attention should be given to the word order with respect to “full 
freedom to determine”, as it seems to refer to the internal as well as the external status of a sub-unit. 
The Helsinki Declaration has been read in literature as introducing elements of democratic process 
and respect for the rule of law in the debate on the exercise to self-determination in both its internal 
and external dimension.165 It does so by extending the limits of the interpretation of self-determination 
to cover human rights law, that was developing in that period.  
Arguably, the greatest achievement of the Declaration is that it “drew a clear connection 
between the exercise of self-determination and the existence of other human rights in a more forceful 
																																								 																				
163 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 August 1975, art. 8, from now on Helsinki 
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164 See Helsinki Declaration, Doc. CSCE/I/PV.3, p. 26.  
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way than previous documents”.166  The interconnection between self-determination and human rights 
law has progressively been expressed through the relationship between self-determination and 
democracy. The common argument is that there exists an intrinsic linkage between self-determination 
and certain principles of democratic governance.167 In particular, some scholars maintain that the right 
to self-determination in its internal dimension “may require that governments generally have a 
democratic basis”.168 In other words, it is argued that self-determination claims are basically claims 
for exercising people sovereignty through a democratic form of government. This also in light of the 
process of dissolution of the SFRY and the dismemberment of the USSR which helped the 
dissemination of democracy as a system of government.169  
Nevertheless, for another group of scholars the establishment of a democratic government is 
not covered under the umbrella of the right to self-determination.170 It would be too pretentious to 
claim that democratic governance and especially its procedural elements are necessary for the 
realization of self-determination. A quest for democracy may well be the main desire of a community 
– the 2011 Arab Spring points in this way indeed.171 However, international law leaves to the 
discretion of states the choice of their form of government. Nonetheless, we can agree that internal 
self-determination is related to constitutional principles of government exercised by the people and 
respect for fundamental human rights. An argument in this line can be found in the judgment of the 
Canadian Constitutional Court on the secession of Quebec:172 the Court’s definition of self-
determination reads as follows “a peoples’ pursuit of its political, economic and social development 
within the framework of an existing State”.173 Hence, self-determination is assimilated to the 
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enjoyment of individual human rights which are guaranteed “within the framework of an existing 
State”, that is to say the domestic legal order, in particular by the constitution. In a like manner, it 
can be argued that the right to self-determination can be enforced by means of democratic governance 
– the latter being also regulated by constitutional norms. 
 
What about external self-determination? For the crystallization of a customary norm about 
self-determination, the combination of the resolutions of the United Nations, the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, the Helsinki Final Act, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights play 
a pivotal role. These last three documents just-mentioned do not limit the right to self-determination 
to situations of decolonization only. External self-determination is presented as an entitlement of 
people of existing sovereign States and of sub-groups. Nevertheless, the main features of the right are 
not detailed. It was already explained that this vagueness finds its roots in the clash between territorial 
changes brought by self-determination claims and the principle of territorial integrity. This is not 
tantamount to say that no conclusion can be drawn: the Declaration on Friendly Relations, for 
instance, is quite clear in considering all the inhabitants of a State as the bearers of the right and adds 
that decisions about the means to associate or integrate with another State should be based on 
consultation. Outside colonialism, the inhabitants of a State have a right to self-determination and 
international law will not question any form of dissolution, association or integration decided by all 
inhabitants of the State. By contrast, the issue whether also sub-units of the State have a right to 
external self-determination is controversial. As Driest explains “ in these instance, there appears to 
be a clear conflict between the exercise of this right, which is aimed at territorial change, and the 
principle of territorial integrity and uti possidetis, which are aimed at maintaining the territorial 
status quo”.174 
6. Conclusion 
The principle of self-determination was not born under the luckiest stars. It is well known that 
when Wilson proposed to re-draw the map of Europe after World War I on the basis of self-
determination, the USA Secretary of State Lansing expressed his concern about the proposal, 
claiming that it was “loaded with dynamite”.175 It is also obvious that self-determination is appealing 
for people, because it is rooted in the idea of government for and by the people. As Berlin puts it, its 
attractiveness can be explained by “our desire to be recognized as free and, somehow, authentic 
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humans. Being governed from the outside would imply being less than fully free and, therewith, being 
less than fully human”.176  
In this Chapter it was demonstrated that Lenin and Wilson’s ideas of self-determination can 
still be found in the contemporary meaning of self-determination. On the one hand, the right to self-
determination is a collective right strongly inspired by the idea of government by consent. It is this 
idea that guides peoples’ claims for participation in domestic affairs and eventually for statehood. On 
the other hand, in contemporary practice about territorial disputes, self-determination is not confined 
to political rights, but has a broader area of application, i.e. enjoyment of economic rights and access 
to natural resources in a very similar manner to its original formulation after World War I. Then, it 
was shown that self-determination has evolved from a political principle to a legal tenet inside and 
outside the frame of colonial domination. This goal was achieved thanks to the combination of 
practice (GA resolutions and States’ declarations) and human rights treaties, notably the 1966 
Covenants and the Helsinki Declaration. International jurisprudence, especially from the ICJ, further 
attempted to clarify the contours of the right to self-determination. However, although the ICJ 
maintained that the right to self-determination is one of the essentials principles under contemporary 
international law, the borders of its application beyond the colonial context remain mostly 
unsettled.177 This is confirmed by the fact that while doctrinal debate on the definition of self-
determination is huge, States refrain from reaching an agreement on the definition. Arguably, States 
take advantage of the vagueness of the law because it permits a broader range of interpretations and 
can therefore be applied to different situations.178 In sum, the right to self-determination is widely 
viewed as part of the jus cogens179 bulk of norms, but only as far as its core meaning is concerned, 
namely when it is applied to colonial and non-self-governing territories. The external dimension is 
established as an exception to the doctrine of territorial unity and therefore is very narrow in its 
application. While self-determination “enjoyed a period of relative conceptual stability during the 
Cold War, its content, especially when it comes to the formation of territorial polities, remains heavily 
contested”.180  
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 The background of the emergence of the legal right to self-determination – notably 
colonialism- still exercises control over its current enforcement. The fact that self-determination was 
championed by the movement for decolonization of the 1960s helps in understanding why self-
determination still finds its core meaning in freedom from subjugation. The phrasing of most of 
international documents addressing self-determination confirms this view in that by virtue of this 
right people “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development”.181 When taken to the extreme, the linkage between self-determination and 
decolonization has led scholars to argue that outside of the colonial context self-determination 
becomes a procedural right, rather than a substantial right. It does not entail a right to self-government, 
not at all to secede, but it confers to communities a right to be heard.182 In support of these 
assumptions, Klabbers notes that when judicial or non-judicial bodies have been instructed with cases 
involving self-determination, they have refrained from addressing the point in punctual terms, 
although they have sometimes clarified its purports. From the Advisory Opinion on Namibia183 
onwards, the ICJ has ascertained the substantial nature of the right to self-determination, but no clear 
conclusions have been drawn from such a strong affirmation. The Separate Opinion of Judge 
Ammoun confirms this view: although the right to self-determination is considered a substantial right, 
the Judge recalls that on the basis of this right no less than fifty States gained independence after the 
II World War, which is a clear reference to the link between self-determination and the end of 
colonialism.184 In Klabbers’ words “while it was unproblematic to think of a right to self-
determination to support decolonization, the postcolonial world would warrant a different 
approach”.185 The ones who would find support for their self-determination claim by the international 
community would be (i) colonies genuinely understood, (ii) peoples under foreign occupation – see 
the non-self-governing territories enlisted by the UN- and (iii) peoples under a racist regime i.e. South 
Africa. In addition, Weller refers to secondary colonies, to mean units that could be genuinely defined 
colonies but which exercised their right with delay, due to external intervention, such as East 
Timor.186  
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The major problem with self-determination is that the main rationale underpinning its 
affirmation, the idea of freedom, clashes with domestic and international stability since it favours the 
breakup of States and thus hinders the balance of power among the members of the international 
community. Cassese explains this point in clear terms when he affirms that “self-determination is 
attractive so long as it has not been attained; alternatively, it is attractive so long as it is applied to 
others. Once realized, enthusiasm dies fast, since henceforth it can only be used to undermine 
perceived internal and external stability”.187 These contrastive features do not seem to be doomed to 
change: according to Summers the dichotomy between internal and external self-determination best 
serves the interests of the international community in that it avoids the domain of one single 
interpretation and weakens the existence of a right to secede.188  
However, as this Chapter has tried to outline, if one can distinguish between internal and 
external aspects of the right, it is still possible to support the existence of the right to self-
determination, albeit mainly in its internal dimension.189 It was demonstrated that the preference for 
internal self-determination finds its rationale in the wish to consolidate and preserve the domestic 
legal system, democratic governance and constitutional guarantees. This trend is supported by 
reference to the case of secession of Quebec, when the Canadian Supreme Court affirmed that the 
Quebecers had the right to self-determinate in the sense of negotiating the adoption of appropriate 
rules for their participation to the Canadian political life.190 As a consequence, external self-
determination is relegated to hypothesis of denial of fundamental human rights, a form of violence 
that justifies the will of the people to establish a new State rather than to negotiate a new form of 
autonomy. It will be seen in the next Chapter that this hypothesis is the focus of the remedial right 
theory. By contrast, recent practice - such as in the cases of Scotland, Catalonia or Crimea - might 
suggest that if one wants to argue that self-determination can still be in evolution, the argument has 
to be framed along different lines. In particular, a broader interpretation of self-determination in its 
internal dimension seems to take place. The realisation of a community of individuals within the 
borders of the State is not limited to participation to the management of public affairs, but 
encompasses social inclusion, fiscal benefits and property rights. In other words, a human rights 
oriented understanding of the internal dimension of self-determination seems to arise, with an 
emphasis on a broader bulk of rights, such as participatory rights, social inclusion and property rights. 
As it will be seen in Chapter 3, the “right to decide” claimed by the people of Catalonia can be said 
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to reflect the new pattern followed by the right to self-determination in liberal and democratic 
contexts.191 
Nevertheless, from a purely legal perspective the exact nature of internal self-determination 
remains controversial, and whether there is a positive right in international law to internal self-
determination may be disputed.192 What can be pointed out is that there is an increasing number of 
international documents making direct or indirect reference to democracy, as if this principle lies at 
the heart of internal self-determination.193 In a statement before the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly dated 1984, the representative of the UK, referring to the apartheid regime, maintained that 
“The issues of racism and self-determination are related. […] The South African system is 
particularly obnoxious […] because the majority of South Africa's people are denied any effective 
role in running the society in which they live. That is, they are denied the right of self-
determination”.194 Moreover, the European experience with the application of the right to self-
determination in former Yugoslav republics has been considered as having “modernised” the 
principle of self-determination stressing its internal dimension.195 Interaction between democracy and 
self-determination has increased with the progressive developments in human rights law and is 
considerable with respect to certain democratic principles, such as that of politic participation 
pursuant to art. 25 ICCPR. However, this is not tantamount to say that democracy is a necessary 
condition for the realisation of self-determination.196 The absence of clear limits between self-
determination and democratic expression of the will of the people, in particular, may lead to a 
misinterpretation of self-determination: units seeking separation instrumentally use the self-
determination argument, but they are not entitled to self-determination. What they seek, in fact, is a 
legal title to secede. 
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Chapter 2 
 The Contested Right to Secede   
 
 The first issue that arises when dealing with secession is the question “what are we really talking 
about?”. Conceptual quarrels are frequent for international rules on territorial changes and in this field 
different interpretations may lead to different attributions of rights and duties to the parties. When a 
State dissolves, e.g. it disappears as a legal entity, succession to the treaties to which it was a party 
has to be decided either on the basis of the tabula rasa principle or throughout negotiations between 
the post dissolution entities. For secession, a new entity comes into being without the disappearance 
of the parent State. Succession to treaties will be managed between the newly formed entities and the 
pre-existing State. Moreover, withdrawal of a portion of territory can be also followed -in principle- 
by the request by the seceding entity to be incorporated into another State, instead of becoming a new 
entity on its own.  
 From the above, it would be easy to conclude that scholars are using different terms to refer to 
the same thing, since the final outcome of secession and dismemberment is the same. Here lies the 
claim that semantic quarrels weight a lot in this field of international law. One of the differences 
between the two above-cited phenomena lies in the process, not in the outcome. While 
dismemberment usually originates from a decision of the government, secession often originates at a 
lower level, notably from people. Then, it can be accepted or opposed by the central government. It 
is not tantamount to say that secession cannot stem from a governmental decision. As it will be shown 
below, Eritrea in 1979 or the attempt by Scotland in 2014 are typical examples of agreed secession. 
However, before the signature of the agreement, secession began from the will of the people who 
rebelled against the denial of autonomy by the Ethiopian central government, and from the Scottish 
long-standing independence claims respectively. 
1. Secession in international law: a word in search of a definition 
 The parallel between secession and dismemberment serves to introduce our approach to 
secession: for the purposes of the present research, secession will be viewed both as a fact and as a 
process, but the focus will be on the latter. Interestingly, Judge Yusuf in his Separate Opinion 
appended to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the independence of Kosovo refers to the declaration of 
independence as “part of process to create a new state” and continues “the Court was asked to asses 
whether or not the process by which the people of Kosovo were seeking to establish their own state 
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involved a violation of international law”.197 Arguably, the Judge seems to understand creation of 
statehood as a process, albeit the acquisition of statehood by Kosovo remains a factual instance. As 
such, the separate opinion goes against the position expressed by leading scholars, i.e. Pellet, that 
“secession is, however, a fact”198 with no reference to the process of secession. The procedural 
approach, presented by distinguished scholars,199 is in our view more accurate than the one focusing 
only on the outcome of secession. As anticipated in the Introduction, the phenomenon of secession 
straddles the distinction between domestic and international law. Due to the varied circumstances 
surrounding secessionist struggles, secession has been studied on a case-by-case basis. With a view 
to determine what we are talking about, it is useful to recall some of the definitions anticipated in the 
Introduction. For Kohen, secession is “the creation of a new independent entity through the 
separation of part of the territory […] of an existing State, without the consent of the latter”.200 The 
distinguishing factor is the consent of the State. Admittedly, apart from neutral territories – such as 
Antarctica- nearly all portions of the globe are subject to the sovereign power of a State. It is easily 
predictable then, that territorial changes occur at the expenses of an existing State. That is why it has 
been contented by many authors that consent is the distinguishing element for secession. When the 
central government consents to a redefinition of its boundaries, struggles of secession do not come 
into question, but this is probably a too simplistic summary.   
 Although it could be argued that when the central government consents to the reapportionment 
the case falls into the domestic sphere of sovereignty of the parent State, this consideration in our 
view should not impede to label that process as one of secession. That said, it could be better 
understood as a “secession by consent” or as a “separation”. In these case, anyway, when the kin State 
consents to loose part of its territory, there is few space for international law. Undoubtedly, if the 
parent State consents to the creation of a new entity and recognizes it, questions of legal personality 
in international law triggered by the newly born entity are less complicated. Since the former parent 
State is the most witnessed by the establishment of a new entity, once it has accepted it, it would be 
less cumbersome for the other members of the international community - at least from a political 
standpoint- to recognize it.  
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In this framework, Anderson has suggested that once the outcome of secession is separated 
from the process, it is possible to distinguish between two basic types of secession: consensual and 
unilateral.201 Consensual secession occurs when the parent State consents to the withdrawal of the 
territory, either by following a specific procedure provided for by national law, or by negotiations in 
absence of specific provisions regulating secession. In the case of Quebec, i.e., the Canadian Supreme 
Court stated that future decisions on the status of Quebec would have to be based on a constitutional 
amendment about secession to be negotiated thereinafter.202 For the Court, however, it was the 
referendum in Quebec in which an overwhelming majority expressed the wish to separate that 
triggered an obligation to negotiate a new territorial settlement.203 In this case, secession started as a 
unilateral demand, but after the referendum it was deemed to be negotiated in case of a positive vote 
towards separation. This topic belongs to the next Chapter, where it will be showed that the use of 
referendum blurs the line between unilateral and consensual secession. Nevertheless, the example 
stresses the fact that if secession is studied from a procedural perspective, it may well be the case that 
the process begins as unilateral and then changes into a negotiated one. In this process, international 
law might be involved as indicated further in this Chapter- section 3. 
Despite the fact that a first glance the possibility that secession be carried out following 
negotiations seems a rare find, it is feasible and indeed not so unconventional. It has actually happened 
that secession is foreseen during negotiations between the parties: it happened for the separation of 
Southern Ireland from the UK in 1922204, and for the attempt by Scotland in 2014. Before the Scottish 
referendum on independence was held in September 2014, the representatives of Scotland and UK 
committed themselves to accept the result of the vote cast, whatever this would be. Although the 
majority of voters eventually were in favour of staying within the Union, in case of a clear vote cast 
for independence London would have been bound by the agreement to accept the Scottish 
secession.205 The Scottish case sounds similar to the separation of Norway from the Union with 
Sweden in 1904, indeed. In the latter, the Norwegians were called to approve separation through a 
plebiscite, whose turnout was clearly in favour of seceding. Sweden, on its part, had pledged to respect 
and give effect to the outcome of popular consultations.206 In light of the above, practice about 
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negotiations following a unilateral quest for secession are not so unusual, so that one could even 
wonder whether there is already a consolidated practice at the international level in this sense. To 
further support the argument presented so far, it is necessary to have a deeper look at practice. First, 
with the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and secondly with the Scottish attempt to secede from the 
UK. 
1.1 Agreed secession in the federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
Eritrea207 had been placed under British trusteeship after World War II. In 1953, the UN 
managed to set a federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but coexistence was difficult to put in 
practice.208 Eritrea considered itself autonomous; it had its own Constitution and its elected 
government. On the other hand, Emperor Selassie never accepted Eritrea’s autonomy and 
championed a centralized control by Addis Ababa. After the decision to abolish the federal status of 
Eritrea in 1962, violent guerrillas broke down. At this point, further developments were shaped by 
the Cold War balance of power: when Selassie was replaced by Menghistu, the American presence 
in the federation was replaced by the USSR, which supported the fight of Addis Ababa against 
Eritrea’s rebels.  
It took thirty years to Eritrea to gain secession from Ethiopia. The success of the process was 
highly dependent on the Cold War out comings and the approach taken by Addis Ababa after 
Menghistu was overthrown. In fact, when the Front for the Liberation of Tigri, the biggest Ethiopian 
movement, managed to replace Menghistu (May 1991), the party adopted a favourable approach 
towards Eritrea’s claims. Thus, a phase of dialogue between the parties started: with the London 
Agreement dated 27 May 1991 Ethiopia de facto accepted the independence of Eritrea. Nonetheless, 
at the Conference for Peace and Democracy held on July 1991 it was agreed to hold a referendum 
under UN supervision within two years, to confirm the London Agreement. In 1993 a clear vote cast 
in favour of independence led to the formation of a transitional government in the hand of the political 
party “Peoples’ Front for Democracy and Justice” (PFDI).209 The new status quo received 
international recognition when the OAU accepted Eritrea as a member. However, the independence 
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acquired in the nineties has not pacified the country, which is still troubled by internal conflicts for 
access to natural resources.  
From this brief historical reappraisal, how can we frame the case of Eritrea? It could be 
maintained that Eritrea is a post-colonial secession example achieved by means of agreement. It could 
be opposed that the case originated from the Italian renunciation of all its rights and duties vis-à-vis 
the Eritrean colony. Hence, Eritrea could still be viewed under a colonial lens. This argument does 
not take into account that from the very beginning the liberation movement challenged the withdrawal 
of autonomy ruled by Selassie and did not rely on colonial arguments during the seceding process. In 
other words, the secession of Eritrea cannot be included among the latest examples of exercise of 
colonial self-determination. Rather, the distinguishing character of the case is that there was an 
agreement between the parties. Once it was reached, the international community pushed for a further 
legitimisation through a referendum to be conducted under international supervision. In this sense, it 
can be argued that the Eritrean case is one of consensual secession in which the people wanted to gain 
independence as a reaction to the denial of autonomy on the part of the federal government. Moreover, 
it cannot be ignored that the agreement was put under the scrutiny of the people. Pushed by the 
international community to adopt an agreement to this aim, it was the manifestation of the will of the 
people that made effective the reapportionment. More than 30 years after, the Scottish referendum 
gives even more emphasis to popular consultations.  
1.2 The Scottish example of secession by consent 
Since one of the distinctive features of the case is that there was an agreement to hold a 
territorial referendum on independence, the Scottish attempt to secede from the UK will be tackled 
in the Chapter devoted to practice on territorial referendum. Nevertheless, given that it involves 
secession, in this section the basic features of the case will be presented. 
The end of the Kingdom of Scotland dates back to 1707, when the Acts of Union declared the 
territory part of the United Kingdom. The Union Act abolished the Parliament of Scotland, yet the 
Scottish preserved their different administrative system, distinct civil society, legal system, thus in 
broad terms their own sense of nationality.210  
Nationalism emerged in the late 19th century, but in the first phase it was aimed at increasing 
self-governing powers or to a certain extent a federal United Kingdom. Divergences between 
supporters of the above mentioned “gradual” independence view, and those ones calling for a radical 
solution, have been a characteristic feature of the Scottish National Party since its constitution in 
1935. This internal struggle influenced the relationship with the UK. There were phases of strong 
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opposition due to a revive of nationalism – such as in the 80ies- followed by times of peaceful 
coexistence with London. The latters were made possible by a series of power-concessions made by 
the British Government, the most important one being the devolution process.211 The process of 
devolution was marked by the referendum hold in 1997 by which the people of Scotland voted for 
the establishment of a Scottish Parliament, granted with powers on tax law. The UK answered to this 
strong manifestation of the will of the people with the 1998 Scotland Act. The act was aimed at 
conceding more autonomy with a model similar to the subsidiarity one developed by the EU. Not 
only was the Parliament established, but also the new Scottish Executive. The Scottish Parliament 
can legislate on certain matters such as administrative issues or health, whilst London retains the 
authority for, inter alia, fiscal matters and foreign policy. Moreover, the UK continues to be the only 
one enjoying international legal personality, thus representing the interests of Scotland abroad. 
Territorial integrity issues should be retained by the British Parliament, for the Union with the UK is 
a reserved matter. That is why it was necessary to negotiate a further agreement on possible 
independence.  
The attempt to independence by Scotland has been described as a consensual process towards 
statehood. To be more accurate, one should observe, as it was explained in the previous pages, that it 
begun as a unilateral attempt to secede but it was eventually framed as an hypothesis of negotiated 
secession/separation.212 At the very beginning and for a long time, in fact, the UK opposed any 
question of legality of the Scottish secession. Under Section 5 of the Scotland Act 1998,213 the Scottish 
Parliament is not vested with the authority to hold a referendum for independence.214 The Scottish 
government in fact went on cautiously to affirm that the Parliament had the power to authorise a 
consultation. In January 2012 a Draft Referendum Bill215 was adopted by the Scottish Parliament – 
commonly referred to as Holyrood. The United Kingdom initially challenged the legitimacy of the 
decision, arguing that Holyrood had no power to authorise a referendum and blending the possibility 
of adjudication in front of the Supreme Court. However, negotiations between the Governments were 
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Law Review, 2013, p. 94 ff. 
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section 29, Under Section 29 (Legislative competence), “an Act of Scottish Parliament is not law so far as any provision 
of the Act is outside the legislative competence of the Parliament”. 
214 M. Goldoni: “Il referendum sull’indipendenza scozzese”, Quaderni Costituzionali, 2012, n. 3, p. 632 ss.  
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‘Your Scotland, Your Referendum: A Consultation Document’, Scottish Government, 25 January 2012 
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fruitful and in October 2012 they signed the Edinburgh Agreement.216 Attached to the agreement 
there is a Draft Order in Council, whereby the Scottish government was authorised to legislate on a 
referendum to be held by the end of 2014. According to the Edinburgh Agreement, Great Britain 
committed itself to accept the turnout of the referendum. Thus, in case of a vote in favour of 
independence, the UK would have had the duty to recognise the new independent Scotland. That was 
not the case because the Scottish voted to remain within the United Kingdom.  
Although Scotland chose not to secede, the case shows at least three elements. Firstly, the 
Scottish claim can be labelled unilateral, to mean that it originated from long lasting popular 
manifestations in support of independence without the consent by the parent State. Nevertheless, the 
Scottish case is also one of secession by consent if one wants to follow the terminology used above. 
Both parties committed themselves to respect the terms of the agreement they have signed. Secondly, 
the fact that secession was conceived in the absence of a domestic rule for this purpose is per se a 
good sign. Absent an internal rule, it could be held that by allowing the people of Scotland to decide, 
the UK seemed to think that secession is not contrary to international law. Thirdly, there is the 
emphasis put on popular will. It drives us back to the exercise of free will pointed out by the ICJ when 
dealing with self-determination217 and reiterated by the international community in the Ethiopian 
case. In sum, Scotland is another case in which a unilateral claim to secession was dwelt with 
procedures of democratic governance, with a focus on popular participation.  
However, it does not seem that the parties felt the need to resort to a territorial referendum 
because international law asked for that. In fact, there is scarce reliance on international legal 
arguments. In this sense, the case of Scotland cannot be viewed as a contribution to the establishment 
of a customary rule about the use of territorial referendum by seceding entities.218 Anyway, it may 
have a great significance from a procedural point of view, not only for the process of secession, but 
also for the modalities for holding a territorial referendum, that will be studied in Chapter 3 and 4.  
1.3 Defining unilateral secession 
 Given the complex panoramic displayed above, where it is sometimes difficult to consider a 
case either a negotiated or unilateral secession – e.g. Scotland in 2014- we can move back to 
Anderson’s argument.219 Unilateral secession takes place when the parent State opposes the seceding 
																																								 																				
216 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on independence 
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217 See Chapter 1 at. pp. 29-34. 
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attempt of its citizens, but it does not necessarily have to involve the use of force. According to 
Crawford, secession is the “creation of a State by the use or threat of force without the consent of the 
former sovereign”.220 Arguably, unilateral secession may occur by resorting to military means or 
threatening to use them, but that should not be considered a conditio sine qua non for unilateral 
secession. Suffice it to refer to Katanga, Biafra, or Bangladesh that have been labelled by the majority 
of scholars221 as cases of secession and all implied the use of force. Attempts to secede such as those 
carried out in Tibet with respect to China also support this view.  
 However, there were other cases of seceding quests that did not involve the use of force. Indeed, 
over the last decade the number of unilateral secessions attempted to or carried out without the use of 
force has been increasing and cannot be underestimated. Bougainville, the current situation in 
Catalonia or the requests from Hong-Kong, to mention the most famous, consist of popular 
manifestations where military means are avoided.222 Few cases may not be enough to support the 
existence of a general rule, but there are only a few cases of secession by military means as well. 
Therefore, one should not underestimate that even unilateral secession can be developing through 
new lines and take place without military means. Furthermore, the breakup of a State, or simply of 
part of its territory, is a protracted process during which the attitudes of different stakeholders like 
the government may vary a lot.223 In particular, in the next Chapter it will be seen that the referendum 
can impact on the lack of consent by the parent State: it may well happen that once a referendum has 
been carried out, the government consents to embark on negotiations to find a solution to the seceding 
requests, such as in the case of Scotland or Canada.  
In light of the different approaches mentioned above, for the present study it seems accurate to 
take the definition of secession advanced by Dahlitz, with some changings taken from Kohen and 
Crawford’s approach. Hence, secession can be viewed as “the process by which a portion of the 
																																								 																				
Herzegovina, Montenegro. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, it does not seem to be a case of secession. As it will be 
shown in Chapter 3, the Badinter Commission defined it a case of dissolution, whereby the SFRY ceded to exist. See G. 
Anderson: “Secession in International Law and Relations”, cit., p. 354. 
220 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, cit., p.375. 
221 See: J. Crawford, supra., pp. 403-418; A. Pavković and P. Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of 
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population of a given territory, being part of a State, expresses the wish by word or by deed to become 
a sovereign State in itself or to join with and become part of another sovereign State”.224 
 This kind of definition avoids to consider secession only a factual instance, by which a new 
subject of international law arises.225 Rather, it acknowledges the complex nature of this phenomenon 
and leaves a room to all the possible subsequent developments, in particular following the consent by 
the parent State. The main point of this Chapter is that the process by which a portion of territory 
“expresses its word …or deed” can be regulated by international law. The normative due process of 
secession, as it has been labelled by Tancredi,226 goes in this direction. 
2. Legal approaches to secession 
The starting point for the study of the legal approaches to secession is the theory of neutrality 
of international law towards secession.227 The neutral approach has gained much support in literature, 
whilst among states the picture is more fragmented, given the clash between secession and territorial 
integrity. The neutral approach is not the only possible one. At least three positions may be 
distinguished: (i) international law prohibits secession; (ii) international law does not regulate 
secession; (iii) there is a right to secede as a remedy of last resort from serious injustices. Alongside 
the second group, which is the one advocating for the neutrality of international law, it is possible to 
distinguish the normative due process approach. This approach postulates that there is a trend on 
consolidation in general international law aimed at regulating the process of secession, albeit as a fact 
secession rests outside the realm of the law.  
2.1 Prohibition of secession under international law 
At the extreme side of the spectrum lies the argument of those scholars who maintain that 
international law prohibits secession. The assumption is rooted in two arguments: first, States are the 
masters of the international legal order which has been built up to help the relations between the 
members of the international community, so it could never allow for disaggregation of one entity. 
Second, given the first point, one of the basic principles of international law is that of territorial 
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in International Law, cit., p. 390.  
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integrity, that prevails over the attempts to secede. The attitude of States towards secession supports 
this view, in that they rely on a wide range of arguments – from GA resolutions to human rights’ 
protection – to justify their opposition to secession. In other words, there is an ex post facto resort to 
international law in this field.228 The argument is persuasive, but only to a certain extent. The lack of 
rules on secession could be interpreted as a prohibition, but secession is not prohibited under 
international law. Absent a rule prohibiting secession, in principle an entity may seek to secede, do 
so and give birth to a new State with its own legal personality. In other words, claiming that an entity 
created through secession is unlawful is a mistake.  
However, this is not tantamount to hold that an entity would never come into being in violation 
of international law. Unlawful entities try to establish themselves quite often in international practice. 
If an entity comes into being in violation of the fundamental rules of the international community, 
that entity can be considered unlawful. In particular, an entity would be unlawful if it is formed after 
a process entailing the use of force; violations of fundamental human rights; an apartheid policy; a 
genocide or ethnic cleansing policy. Although entities born out of one of the violations could display 
the requirements for statehood, all the other states may be under an obligation “not to recognise this 
illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic relationship with it”. This statement is an excerpt 
of Security Council resolution 217 of November 20, 1965.229 The resolution addressed the situation 
in Rhodesia and after having condemned the spread of violence in the region, it called upon the 
member states not to recognize the usurpation of powers carried out by the Southern Rhodesian 
authorities. In Rhodesia, the minority government established between 1965 and 1979230 was 
conducting a racist policy against the majority of the population. The strong denial of the right to self-
determination led the Security Council to label the Smith Government as an illegal authority,231 
considering the 1965 declaration of independence unlawful. Another example is Northern Cyprus. 
On 20 July 1974 the Turkish Republic deployed its forces in Cyprus with the aim of protecting the 
Turkish minority after the coup d’Etat organised by Greek military officials of the Cypriot army232. 
Admittedly, Turkey intervened with military means to support the formation of the Northern Republic 
of Cyprus.233 In 1983, the Security Council addressed the Declaration of the Turkish Republic of 
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of independence and ended in 1979 with the return of the British governor.  
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Northern Cyprus in resolution 541 and considered it “as legally invalid and calls for its 
withdrawal”.234 International disapproval can be seen also in the attitude taken by the international 
community towards the Republic Srpska, for alleged commission of acts of genocide. The variables 
upon which the fate of the nascent entity depends are both the effective possession of the requirements 
of statehood and recognition by the other members of the international community.235 This is because 
international law does not provide for a clear regulation of seceding attempts: here comes the theory 
of neutrality of international law towards secession. 
2.2 Neutrality of international law towards secession 
A consistent group236 considers international law neutral to secession, to mean that the 
international legal order does not accept neither prohibits it. In other words, groups may resort to 
secession, anyway international law does not accord to them any privilege. In other words, neutrality 
implies that the entity has no privilege whatsoever, that it enjoys no legal right.237 That is not 
tantamount to say that international law does not have to face seceding instances. Rather, neutrality 
of the international legal order means that there is no rule on secession that can be contravened by an 
entity seeking separation from the parent State. The rationale underpinning this position is that 
secession is still a matter of internal, or international politics. The right to secede is beset by too many 
questions to be easily managed in modern international law terms. It is a collective right but what 
constitutes a people defies definition. Moreover, after the right has been accomplished there comes 
the question of how to redistribute rights and duties.238 Therefore, it seems that assessing the problem 
of secession in legal terms would lead to an impasse. In this view, secession should rest in the realm 
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of power politics, where there is a case by case analysis. Against this assumption, the development 
of international human rights law –with particular emphasis on democracy and the rule of law – has 
led to the elaboration of a theory opposing the neutral approach. The so called remedial right theory, 
analysed below, aims at filling in the normative gaps left by the theory of the neutrality of 
international law towards secession, notably by distinguishing (i) the bearers and (ii) the conditions 
for the exercise of, the right to secede.	 
 2.3 The remedial right theory 
Secession has been framed along different lines, ranging from law to morality. This is due to 
the fact that the will to secede is rooted in the people’s perception of their government, and it is shaped 
by moral considerations as well. The remedial right theory postulates that a sub-unit has the right to 
secede from the parent State as a remedy to the serious breaches of its human rights.  Although very 
popular, the remedial right theory generates contrastive reactions. The cause-effect relationship 
between violations of human rights of a collective of individuals located in a territory and the right 
to separate that territory created by the theory is to be taken with caution.239 Many critiques have been 
advanced, from its misleading moral value to its scarce application in practice. Christakis for example 
opines that the theory is idealised, claiming that remedial secession is a sort of security exit for 
unjustified claims to self-determination.240 In the next pages, firstly the theoretical framework and 
the normative ground surrounding the theory will be developed. Lastly, its application will be tested. 
It is assumed that the existence of a right to remedial secession in international law is questionable, 
albeit there are some sporadic signs in international practice which could support the application of 
the right.  
Starting from the theories, for remedial right theorists241 secession may be justified and may 
be feasible for a segment of the population as a response to serious and continuous violations of 
human rights. The remedial secession theory aims at overcoming the normative vacuum left by the 
neutral approach. It does so by arguing that 1) the condition for the exercise of a right to secede is the 
serious and continuous breach of fundamental rights of the individuals on the part of the parent State. 
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The subjects entitled to exercise the right are 2) those groups settled in a territory that has been 
unjustly taken by the parent State. In sum, secession may be justified as a response to serious and 
continuous violations of human rights.242 Thirdly, 3) secession has to be a remedy of last resort. For 
Buchanan in particular, the right to secede as a remedy mirrors the Lockian approach to revolution, 
albeit the latter was carried out by the population as a whole. The rationale underpinning the remedial 
right theory is that secession is a remedy of last resort in response to serious injustices. Recalling the 
dichotomy between the internal and external dimension of self-determination presented in the 
previous Chapter, in the remedial right theory the two aspects are deeply intertwined. The injustices 
taken into account in fact amount to persistent denial of internal self-determination. Denial of internal 
self-determination serves as a ground to justify secession, which is presented as a form of self-
determination.243 If a State fails to include all different collectives of individuals in the government 
and carries out human rights abuses against a certain group, the theory postulates that the State’s 
entitlement to territorial integrity falters and the collective of individuals can carry out a secession. 
As Buchanan explains, it is a sort of remake of the concept of independence assisting colonies.244 
Two of the leading theorists of secession as a remedy are the above-mentioned Buchanan and 
Buchheit. The reasoning of Buchheit originates in the assessment of the condition of the group 
seeking secession. He argues that as long as a very serious threshold of violations of fundamental 
rights is not reached, States keep enjoying their privileged position vis-à-vis the secessionist entity, 
due to the combination of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Besides, the parent 
State may still solve the dispute with the rebellious unit by grating them a different form of autonomy. 
When a serious threshold is passed, secession becomes the legitimate tool to protect the fundamental 
rights of the group concerned.245 Although Buchheit’s reasoning never denies the prominent role of 
the State in territorial changes, it seems as if the distinguished author opts for an individual-centred 
than for a State-centred approach. It is a persuasive account, because it looks at the increasing role of 
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individuals in international law – already in 1993. Anyway, part of its power is lost due to the lack of 
clarity in explaining which groups can invoke this remedial right to secede. In a theory that focuses 
on serious human rights abuses, the prospect of who is entitled to claim a violation is of the most 
importance.  
At a first glance, the argument coming out from the remedial right theory is very persuasive, 
at least from a moral point of view. It might appear too drastic, but it is not. Supporters of the remedial 
right theory do not neglect that a right to secede may be justified on other grounds. Buchanan opines 
that there might be some “special rights to secede”:246 secession may find its legal basis in example 
in the grant of autonomy by the parent State to the sub-unit, or in an agreement between the State and 
a federated entity. The main assumption of the remedial theory is that outside the above mentioned 
exceptions, there is no general right to secede. Only secession as a remedy is possible. The right is 
not triggered unless the State is unjust.  
In sum, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) serious breaches of fundamental rights of the 
individuals potentially threatening the existence of the group itself (2) the group is settled in a territory 
that has been unjustly taken by the parent State and (3) it has to be a remedy of last resort. In addition, 
there are some collateral conditions to be satisfied by the new entity, such as giving guarantees that 
it will respect human rights and will cooperate with the parent State for succession to treaties, debt 
recovery etc. However, the legal characterisation of the requirements mentioned above is all the more 
problematic. In a situation of conflict between a sub-group and the central government, it may be 
very difficult to assess who is carrying out violations, because the seceding entity can be violent as 
well. Moreover, the notion of last resort is per se subject to exploitation, if a critical date to secede is 
not clearly established.247  
a)   Law references for the remedial right theory: only a a contrario reading? 
To find elements on a remedial right to secession in international law four different layers have 
to be considered: (i) treaty law and acts of international organisations,248 (ii) decisions and opinions 
from domestic and international judicial bodies, (iii) State practice and to a certain extent (iv)scholarly 
literature.249 One of the main root causes of the critiques to the remedial right theory is that the 
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reasoning developed by legal scholars to support it is based on a a contrario reading of international 
documents. In particular, the remedial right theory stems from the inverted interpretation of the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and the extensive interpretation of the Vienna Declaration and 
Program of Action. For case law, the report of the Committee of Jurists for the Ålaand case and the 
judgement of the Canadian Supreme Court on the secession of Quebec are the main references, 
together with practice related to Bangladesh.  
(i) Treaty law and acts of international organisations 
Starting from treaty law, treaties do not help in demonstrating an entitlement to remedial 
secession vested on sub-units within a State, because none of them set a clear definition of, or prohibit 
secession. Although scholars focus extensively on the Declaration on Friendly Relations and on the 
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, these are acts adopted by international organisations, not 
treaties. Nevertheless, some commentators have found elements of a new trend in the practice of 
human rights bodies, such as the Committee on Racial Discrimination established in the framework 
of the Convention on the Elimination of Forms of Discrimination (hereinafter Convention).250 In the 
General Recommendation XXI the Committee stated that “in the view of the Committee, international 
law does not recognize a right of peoples to unilaterally declare secession from a State […] This does 
not, however, exclude the possibility of arrangements reached by free agreements of all parties 
concerned”.251  The wording suggests a denial of the right to secede, yet by looking at the Report on 
the implementation of the Convention by the Commission on Human Rights, the statement delivered 
by one member stresses a different view. It was affirmed that if a sub-unit within a State wants to 
change its status, it could do so in three established cases, namely 1) when the Constitution established 
a right to self-determination; 2) when all parties concerned agreed to secession and 3) when that part 
of the population was denied their basic economic, cultural, social and political rights.252 The latter 
point seems to hint at remedial secession, yet one voice does not make a rule. The main legal basis 
for the development of the remedial right theory is the Declaration on Friendly Relations adopted 
with resolution 2625 of the General Assembly, on 24th October 1970. In the previous Chapter, the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations was analysed with a view to prove how it extended both the sphere 
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of application and the meaning of the right to self-determination of peoples beyond the borders of 
colonialism. In this section, it is appropriate to focus on Principle VII,253 commonly referred to as the 
safeguard clause.  
The principle reads as follows: 
“Nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity 
of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
right and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour”. 
Preliminary reference to territorial integrity is a sign of the Declaration’s attachment to the 
preservation of the status quo. However, the principle applies to “sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour”. The inverted reading of the 
safeguard clause gives one chance to underscore the primacy of territorial integrity: territorial 
integrity can be set aside every time a State does not possess “a government representing the whole 
people without distinction of race creed or colour”. Hence, Cassese argues that secession might be 
warranted where, “the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently refuse to grant 
participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon their 
fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement […] there must be 
gross breaches of fundamental human rights”. 254 Compared to the description of remedial secession 
given by Buchheit, it can be observed that they share the same conclusion, but Cassese approaches 
the theory from the opposite perspective. Cassese takes as a focal point the State and focuses on the 
safeguard clause of the Declaration on Friendly Relations adopting a text-oriented interpretation. 
This is not tantamount to say that he underscores the role of the individual, right the opposite actually. 
Individuals remain the subjects of non-discrimination issues, the nucleus of the provision, but 
territorial integrity is the starting and the ending point of the safeguard clause. This interpretation 
given seems to fit better the realm of international law and relations, for it acknowledges a role of the 
																																								 																				
253 Interestingly, the wording of the principle is the result of a huge debate among the representatives in the GA. Many 
proposals were presented but they were all colliding. On the one side there were States – the UK and USA sponsored a 
resolution-, which supported a universal definition of the right to self-determination as to include also a right to 
democracy. On the other side, representatives of Poland, Kenya or Burma strongly opposed the Anglo-Saxon proposal 
because it would have opened the way to secession every time there is a different form of government. All the drafting 
proposals were superseded by the Italian draft at the end. The wording elaborated by the Italian delegation gained 
consensus due to its “balancing” character, in that it affirmed the duty of the States to give representation to all peoples, 
but preservation of territorial integrity had to remain the main concern of the community of States. See UN Doc. A/AC. 
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people, whilst remaining linked to the primary interest of the States. The preservation of territorial 
integrity, in fact, opens the paragraph.255 Other scholars have followed the same pattern: Weller i.e. 
suggests that a right to remedial secession will arise where “the central government persistently and 
systematically represses a territorially organised, and perhaps also constitutionally recognised, 
segment of the population […]”or subjects that group to “persistent and discriminatory exclusion 
from governance”.256 
 
The 1993 Vienna Declaration adopted at the UN World Conference on Human Rights257  
insists on the principle that territorial integrity can be set aside under specific circumstances. While 
at a first sight the Declaration could be viewed as a copy and paste of the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, a closer look reveals some differences. Firstly, there is a clearer distinction between the 
right to self-determination of peoples under colonial dominion or foreign occupation and all the other 
hypothesis. The paragraph devoted to the right to self-determination of people under colonial 
dominion is constructed as a specification of the general affirmation that “the World Conference on 
Human Rights considers the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human 
rights”.258 Secondly, the subject is the whole people, not only people under domination, but 
communities in general. Moreover, it applies a larger human rights approach since it refers to any 
kind of discrimination. Paragraph 2 of Part I recalls the Declaration on Friendly Relations and the 
Charter of the United Nations, when it provides that the right to self-determination “shall not be 
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal right and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction of any kind”. The high level of protection given to the individual vis-à-
vis the sovereign power of the State may be interpreted as a sign of the boost of human rights’ law, 
with a strong emphasis on non-discrimination and on citizens’ participation in the domestic affairs. 
However, pretending that the saving clause permits remedial secession would be overly expansive.259 
The assumption that the two Declarations leave the message that people has a right to participate to 
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the management of domestic affairs and that there are values fundamental for the international 
community is to be shared, but there are no sufficient elements to go so far as to a right to secede. 
Therefore, the most convincing interpretation seems to be that of Cassese, who underlined that only 
under exceptional circumstances the Declaration on Friendly Relations could be interpreted as 
linking external to internal self-determination.260  
(ii) Case-law 
In looking at case-law supporting the remedial secession theory, the pronouncement of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in the case Re Reference Secession of Quebec plays a pivotal role.261 For it 
is the only case a Supreme Court ruled on an explicit claim to secede and tackled all the questions 
presented without reservations, even after 20 years it remains the masterpiece in this field. The Court 
does not accept the remedial secession theory, but still takes a stand in favour of exceptions to the 
respect of territorial integrity. In the words of the Court, “a right to external self-determination (which 
in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only 
the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. […] The other clear 
case where a right to external self-determination accrues [apart from colonial situations] is where a 
people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context”. The 
common view is that the Canadian Supreme Court is opening the way to secession when it 
acknowledges that for many commentators “when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise 
of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as last resort, to exercise it by secession”.262 
Nevertheless, the Court does not embrace fully this position and further clarifies that “it remains 
unclear whether this […] proposition actually reflects an established international law standard”.263 
Vidmar, however, contends that one should not overestimate the Court’s view, since in the 
economy of the judgement the paragraph concerning the remedial right to secede remains an obiter 
dictum. The Court concluded that the hypothesis of serious violations did not apply to the case of 
Quebec, therefore a remark was not necessary to reach a decision. Given the rarity of case law dealing 
with secession, the fact that in the judgment the Supreme Court is sceptical about this possibility 
leaves few space to the hypothesis of remedial secession. Although  reference to secession can be 
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found also in international case-law of the ECtHR, such as in Loizidou vs. Turkey264, the observations 
fall in the category of obiter dictum. Therefore, Vidmar maintains that the real existence of case-law 
surrounding a remedial right to secede is doubtful. The analysis of the documents shows that if one 
wants to find a right to secede, the focus shall be on customary law. However, the opinio juris is too 
fragmented and State practice does not leave open much space for clarity.  
b)   Practice test for the remedial right theory 
 For Buchanan, State practice demonstrates that territorial integrity is not absolute, but it applies 
only to States conducting themselves legitimately. The reaction of the international community to 
cases of violations of peremptory norms of international law is the main supportive argument. 
Condemn for the Apartheid Regime in South Africa was one of the first proofs that a government 
might lose its legitimacy if it engages in serious violations of international law. The establishment of 
a safe zone for the Kurds during the Iraqi war on April 1991 was justified on the grounds of alleged 
genocide policies carried out by Iraq against the Kurds. In both cases, States’ behaviour has not been 
considered legitimate when they (i) deprive the population or part of it of their fundamental rights, or 
(ii) exhibit racism.265 In these cases, territorial integrity is not absolute because the State is not 
conducting itself legitimately. However, the examples mentioned before do not involve directly issues 
of secession. A good point thus is presented by claiming that State practice does not help that much 
in shedding light over the remedial right to secede.266 Lack of practice is usually justified on the 
grounds that each case is different. Admittedly, it does not come as a surprise that each case is 
different, due to the fact that secession stems from the interrelation between State and its people. This 
interrelation is peculiar of every single attempt to secede because it is influenced by social factors, 
history and a number of considerable variables which go against normative generalisation. States take 
advantage of the case-by-case argument to avoid the consolidation of practice towards secession.  
 Nevertheless, it is in our view important not to underestimate critics to the remedial right theory. 
For instance, Shaw warrants about the consequences of devoting a big power in the hands of a State 
sub-unit on the basis of an a contrario reasoning only.267 The special nature of the case at hand was 
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one of the major arguments used for the case of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, against the 
application of the remedial secession theory. Anyway, before being engaged in the legal analysis of 
secession of Kosovo, it seems more appropriate to give a reappraisal of the secession of Bangladesh. 
Going back until the events that struggled Pakistan in 1971 is necessary because both the community 
of States and majority of scholars label this as a remedial secession example.268  
(i) Bangladesh 
 The facts originating the secession of Bangladesh can be summarised briefly as follows: 
Bangladesh constituted the east part of Pakistan, but it was a region detached from the rest of the 
country by a portion of Indian territory of about 1000 miles. Separation from Pakistan was not only 
a matter of territory, indeed. East and West Pakistan used different languages, had different traditions 
and social structures. In sum, they could be considered different sub-units within a State. From 1947, 
when Pakistan became independent from the UK in the first phase of the de-colonization, the central 
government adopted discriminatory provisions towards the Bengalese. In fact, there were no Prime 
Ministers of Bengalis origins – the only one was substituted after three days- and the population could 
not participate to the public affairs management, i.e. only 10% could serve in the army. The will to 
gain more autonomy on the part of the Bengalese became clear when the democratic party -Awami 
League- received huge support in the parliamentary elections and presented some proposals for a 
federal structure of Pakistan. The answer of the central government was suspension of the National 
Assembly’s inaugural session in March 1917. Perception by the Bengalese of being excluded from 
the management of public affairs converted their desire of autonomy into independence struggles. In 
an escalation of violence that culminated in West Pakistan launching air attacks against civilians, the 
Awami League on 10 April 1971 proclaimed the independence of Bangladesh.269  
 Interestingly, the international community did not take a clear stand against the use of force by 
Pakistan. While the UN focused on humanitarian aid, the answer of the member States was given on 
a singular basis, in that many decided to suspend trade agreements with Pakistan.270 No resolution of 
condemn by the Security Council was adopted.271 This element from a legal stand point supports the 
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thesis that events in Bangladesh were considered a purely internal issue.272 However, secession of 
Bangladesh acquired an international character when a third party, India, intervened to protect the 
Bengalese. Arguing that military intervention was justified under the grounds of 1) legitimate self-
defence in response of some attacks received on its territory and 2) protection of the Bengalese 
population whose fundamental rights had been seriously breached, the Indian intervention was the 
key factor for the success of the secession.Without such an involvement by a third power, the small 
population of East Pakistan could not have manage to defeat the Pakistani army.273 Again, on the part 
of the UN there was no formal condemn due to the Russian veto.274 The General Assembly met to 
adopt resolution 2793275 which called for the withdrawal of the Indian forces, but did not refer to 
secession. Neither the Security Council adopted binding resolution that condemned the use of force 
by India, due to the veto by Russia. Bangladesh succeeded in seceding, it was immediately recognized 
by India and other members of the international community, albeit most of the States waited until 
Pakistan itself had recognized the newly born entity. Even the UN admitted Bangladesh in 1974276, 
few months after recognition by Pakistan.  
 
 From the above, some conclusion on international responses towards secession may be 
elaborated. Firstly, in principle the case of Bangladesh satisfies the requirements set forth by the 
remedial secession theory. The Bengalese were settled in a well-defined portion of territory, suffered 
from serious injustices and were deprived of their right to participate in the public life of the State. 
Further, the human rights violations carried out during the civil war support the hypothesis of 
remedial secession. However, difficulties in framing the case from a legal stand point stem from the 
armed intervention by India. On the one hand, the international community did not seem to be prone 
to recognise a right to unilateral secession of the Bengalese, as it is demonstrated by the fact that 
secession and self-determination were not mentioned in the UN documents on the case. On the other 
hand, the majority of the States recognized Bangladesh after recognition from Pakistan as if they were 
merely acknowledging a fait accomplì. The argument in favour of a fait accomplì is supported also 
by the fact that the Indian intervention was not condemned, even though it lasted until after Pakistan 
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had recognised Bangladesh.277 In other words, it could be argued that the secession of Bangladesh 
can be used instrumentally to support both remedial secession and the suspicious approach by States 
towards this hypothesis. While academia considers it a case of successful unilateral claim to remedial 
secession, States’ approach remains vague, albeit many elements point in the direction of remedial 
secession. Within this twofold approach, it has already been argued that it seems more precise to 
focus on states’ attitude instead of scholarly literature. Arguably, the fact that Bangladesh was 
admitted to the UN only after Pakistan recognised it in 1974 does not leave much room for an 
entitlement to secede to remedy the state’s unlawful behaviour. This view is further supported turning 
to the case of Kosovo. 
(ii) Kosovo 
 The case of Kosovo adds further uncertainty to the debate over remedial secession and states 
creation in international law. The international community has in fact supported the argument of the 
suis generis nature of the case not to make it a precedent in the field of the exercise of a right to 
secede. Even after the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the declaration of independence dated 2010, Kosovo 
continues to raise contrasting opinions as to whether statehood stemmed from an instance of remedial 
secession or it has to be considered only a special case in light of the singular history of the Balkan 
area and the role of the UN.278 
 The prominent view among States is that Kosovo’s experience is inapplicable as a precedent to 
other secessionist movements. The distinctive feature of the making of Kosovo is its uniqueness. 
Interestingly, neither the Kosovar authorities issuing the independence declaration pretended it to be 
an established precedent in international law. During ICJ proceedings they expressly affirmed that 
Kosovo was a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual break-up and it was not a 
precedent for other situations. Such express denial of any validity as a precedent is a clear indicator 
of the absence of a shared opinio juris in this field and from the international legal standpoint it runs 
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against the consolidation of custom.279 Admittedly, it is difficult to take a position. International legal 
scholars lack sufficient elements to claim that Kosovo amounts as a precedent. In particular, the fact 
that the combination of NATO intervention and UN administration has not been replied elsewhere 
weights against its applicability in other contexts. In the next paragraph the case will be presented 
and then commented, but at this stage only for the purposes of the inquiry on the right to secede. 
Although having been recognised by 111 States, Serbia has not yet recognised Kosovo. The case, 
thus, intertwines also with legal issues surrounding recognition. Therefore, the analysis of the ICJ 
Opinion will be narrowed to the sections concerning self-determination and remedial secession.280  
1)  From the former Yugoslavia to independence: a brief sketch on the Republic of Kosovo 
A brief sketch on the birth of the Republic of Kosovo is unavoidable in order to frame the case into 
appropriate legal categories. 
 After the II World War Kosovo was deemed to be an autonomous region, although it was 
acknowledged that there were strong ethnic ties with the Albanians. The same argument was put for 
Vojvodina that was considered autonomous but strictly linked to Hungary. Despite bids made by 
Macedonia and Montenegro, Kosovo was put under Serbia’s control through an act of the Serbian 
Parliament.281 In 1974, the SFRY recognized Kosovars’ quests for autonomy by declaring Kosovo 
and Vojvodina provinces within the SFRY. This meant that Kosovo was not under the legal 
jurisdiction of Serbia any more. Thus, Kosovo was granted with representation and voting rights on 
federal decisions, albeit it remained located within the Republic of Serbia.282 The turning point for 
the status of Kosovo is represented by the constitutional changes enacted in 1989. Under emergency 
rule, Kosovo’s legal and economic capacity was restored under the Serbian control. Then, in 1990 
Serbia revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo. The legality of this decision was highly debated 
within the international community, because under art. 302 of the SFRY Constitution a change of 
status could only result from mutual agreement within the parties.283 The provision suggests that any 
modification to the status of Kosovo should have been taken giving priority to the relationship with 
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SFRY and only after to that between Serbia and Kosovo. In other words, Serbia’s claim over Kosovo 
was only partly legitimate. In fact, it is surprising that at the Dayton peace process the relationship 
between Kosovo and Serbia was all left in the hands of the Serbs, rather than being cautiously 
analysed in light of the status of Kosovo under the SFRY Constitution.284  
 As said, the conflict broke down in March 1989 in response to the constitutional amendment 
voted by Belgrade, which transferred the autonomous powers of the territory to Belgrade. The auto-
convened provincial Kosovar Assembly on 2 July 1990 proclaimed the independence of Kosovo 
within the framework of the Confederation of Yugoslavia, entitled to the same constitutional 
protection of the other constituent republics. On September 7, 1990, a provisional Constitution for 
Kosovo was drafted and approved by members of the former representative Assembly. Former 
representatives then managed to organise a referendum, whose turnout expressed a clear vote cast in 
favour of independence from Belgrade. The referendum was championed by Kosovo as the 
legitimizing element of the secessionist struggle, but only Albania recognize its independence.285   
 In light of the above, some early remarks might be useful: in the nineties, secession was seen 
among the Kosovars as a tool to withdraw from the control of the Serbs, but they wanted to remain 
within the Federation of Yugoslavia. It was only in 2008, after the dissolution of FY, the escalation 
of human rights violations, NATO intervention and the establishment of international administration 
under the UN that the region declared its independence. At this point it remains to be proved whether 
the declaration of independence stemmed from a unilateral secession claim of last resort. 
 
2)  Self-determination, unilateral secession and the remedial right theory: which one applies in 
Kosovo? 
 
 States participating in the ICJ proceedings for the Opinion on Kosovo often defined it a suis 
generis case,286 a formula which runs against the application of remedial secession in the case at stake, 
as well as against its consolidation among general international law rules.287 The remedial right theory 
could apply to Kosovo on the grounds that the people of the province have suffered from serious 
injuries and have been deprived of their autonomous status within the SFRY by Serbia. It is assumed 
that the situation of Kosovo is a special case, in particular due to NATO intervention and the UN 
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descriptive rather than normative”. 
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interim governance under res. 1244.288  However, it cannot be denied that some elements run in favour 
of the application of the remedial secession theory. In particular, the fact that people of Kosovo were 
organized under an established authority, that they were displaced by Serbia289 and that so far Kosovo 
has been recognized by 111 States. In this sense, questions may be raised on the appropriateness of 
critiques made by some commentators, who pointed out that the Kosovar population did not exhaust 
all the other possible remedies before claiming secession. According to this view, Kosovo cannot rely 
on the remedial right to secede, because it claimed independence and resorted to referendum early in 
1989, when other solutions such as negotiation with Serbia had not been explored.290 The argument 
is lacking for two elements. Firstly, when a country is facing internal struggles the line between 
effective measures provided for by the law and political discourse in very liable. The parent State 
may always claim that it is willing to grant autonomy rights, but this political strategy might not be 
followed by effective action towards negotiations. Moreover, if the parent State is carrying out 
violations of human rights against the seceding entity, proposals for autonomy on its part appear less 
legitimate.291 In addition, when the situation was about to collapse the UN guided the negotiations 
between the parties with a view to establish a form of autonomy for the Kosovars within Serbia. 
However, given the risk of spread of violence in all the Balkans and Eastern Europe, it was clear that 
that solution was not feasible any more.292 That was the time when the idea of secession and 
independence of Kosovo started to gain wide support. On the same pattern, it cannot be affirmed that 
res. 1244 of the Security Council mandated the return of Kosovo to Serbia. As noted by Weller, not 
only the resolution recalled the principle of respect for territorial integrity solely in the preamble293 
and not in the operatives, but also it did not establish a future settlement. Rather, it was concerned 
																																								 																				
288 After NATO bombings to force the Serb government to withdraw its forces from Kosovo, the Security Council met to 
address the situation and finally referred to it as a threat to peace and stability of the international community. Adopting 
res. 1244, the SC authorised an international civil and military presence in the territory through the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO’s Kosovo force (KFOR). The resolution dealt with the final 
political status of Kosovo: firstly, it fixed to nine years the presence of UN administration and in the meantime, it provided 
for negotiation between the parties to determine what would be the final status of Kosovo. 
289 For an account of human rights violation undergone by the Kosovars see Un General Assembly Resolution 48/153 
dated 20 December 1993 on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, paras 17-19. 
290 W. R. Slomanson: “Legitimacy of the Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia Secessions: Violations in Search of a 
Rule”, Miskolc Journal of International Law, 2009, n. 6, pp. 20-22. 
291 See on this point T.W. Simon: “Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, From Katanga to Kosovo”, 
cit., p.128. 
292 In this sense, negotiations led by UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari concluded that Kosovo would gain 
supervised independence, having considered and rejected all other option like, among the others, returning to Serbian 
sovereignty or forming a union with Albania. When Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008, it committed to 
implement the Ahtisaari Plan which also included the appointment of an International Civilian Representative (ICR).  
293 UN Security Council S/RES/1244, adopted 10 June 1999, preamble: “Reaffirming the commitment of all Member 
States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.  
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with a pro-tempore solution in advance of a final solution294. In the words of Borgen, “resolution 
1244 neither promotes not prevents Kosovo secession”.295  
 
 Looking at States responses to the secession of Kosovo, explicit mention of a right to remedial 
secession are a rare find. As mentioned before, States are very reluctant to label a case as an example 
of secession, given its potential to be a precedent for other sub-units. This argument was clearly 
presented by Serbia during Security Council meetings, when it was pointed out that “there could be 
dozens of Kosovo in the world, and all of them are lying in wait for Kosovo’s act of secession to 
become reality”.296 Moreover, some States considered that the primacy of principles of international 
law such as State sovereignty and territorial integrity excluded in any case an acknowledgment of a 
right to unilateral secession.297 
 No support for the Kosovars’ claims of self-determination or remedial secession is found in 
statements by those States that recognised Kosovo. In fact, the recurrent reasons adduced were of a 
political nature - i.e. considering stability for the Balkans-298 or concluding that recognition of the 
State was the only feasible solution at that point. Thus, statements by States avoided support from 
international law rules. Even for highly sensitive matters such as human rights violations or the 
chance to interpret res. 1244 in favour of secession of Kosovo, legal issues where not explored in 
depth. As noted by Driest, however, Albania and the United Arab Emirates expressly claimed the 
existence of a right to self-determination for the Kosovars and based their statement of recognition in 
light of their right to self-determination. 299 
Proceedings300 at the ICJ provide a good insight on the remedial secession theory. Many States 
touched upon the legal standing of a right to secession as a response to serious injustices, albeit 
																																								 																				
294 M.Weller, Escaping the Self-determination trap, cit. p. 140. 
295 C. J. Borgen: “Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence:  Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition”, American 
Society of International Law: ASIL INSIGHT, Februray 2008, p. 3, 
<http://www.asil.org/insights/2008/02/insights080229.htm 
296 Statement by President Tadic at the UN Security Council 5850th meeting, 11 March 2008, UN Doc. S/PV.5850, cited 
by S. F. van den Driest, Remedial Secession. A Right to External Self-Determination as a Remedy to Serious Injustices?, 
cit., pp. 236-237. 
297 See i.e. statements by the Russian Federation and Vietnam at the 5839th meeting of the SC, in UN Doc S/PV.5839 
298 See for instance the statement made by Germany which claimed that further negotiations would have been useless. 
“The German Government is convinced that after so many years, further negotiations would not have resulted in a 
breakthrough”. On the same pattern, the Turkish representative hoped that “the independence of Kosovo will present an 
opportunity for the enhancement of stability and confidence among the countries in the region”. 
299 Statement by Prime Minister of Albania, Berisha: “the Government of Albania considers the creation of the State of 
Kosovo as a historical event, sanctioning the right of Kosovo citizens for self-determination”, 24 April 2008. See also 
statement by the United Arab Emirates: “recognises Kosovo in accordance with its firm support for the principle of the 
legitimate right to self-determination”, 14 October 2008. See for references Driest p. 242 
300 Advisory Opinions are envisaged by artt. 65-68 of the ICJ Statute. According to Art. 66 (2) “The Registrar shall also, 
by means of a special and direct communication, notify any state entitled to appear before the Court or international 
organization considered by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the President, as likely to be able to furnish 
information on the question […]”. Moreover, any State willing to participate may ask to do so. In practice, after a request 
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framing the case of Kosovo as a special one.301 The argument that Kosovo was a special case was 
supported by many intervening States302 and opposed not only by Serbia, but also by Cyprus 
Argentina and Bolivia. The common position of the latter three states was that no matter how the 
majority of States labelled the case, the existence of Kosovo proved that the international community 
consented to the fracturing of a State.303 Alongside written comments, the Dissenting Opinion 
annexed to the judgement by Judge Koroma pointed in the same direction, stressing the chance that 
“the Court’s opinion will serve as a manual for secessionist groups”.304 In addition, interestingly 
enough, Kosovo itself brought the secessionist argument only after it had been mentioned by many 
States. It claimed to be entitled to secede given “the decade of deliberate exclusion for governing 
institutions and violations of basic human rights”.305 The wording suggest that secession was 
conceived as the last measure to be taken in light of continuous violations suffered by the unit. 
With respect to the arguments adduced to justify secession by Kosovo, scholarly literature has 
distinguished between two groups of States submitting written and oral statements. Those that 
presented arguments in favour of the remedial secession theory all justified their position on the 
grounds of an a contrario reading of the Declaration on Friendly Relations, or on the Vienna Action 
Plan and on case-law related to the Åaland case and the secession of Quebec. However, no State 
considered the right to self-determination to include an unconditional right to secede. Germany is an 
exception in this sense, since it took a stand towards a right to external self-determination outside the 
colonial contest. In its written statements it stressed that “there would be no remedy for a group which 
is not granted self-determination that may be due to it under international law. The majority in the 
State could easily and with impunity oppress the minority, without any recourse being open to that 
minority”.306 This is not tantamount to recognise a general right to secede. Germany claimed - as 
many other countries like Estonia, the Netherlands, Finland on Ireland, although giving different 
																																								 																				
for Advisory Opinion is filed, the Court draws up a list of entities entitled to participate in the proceedings by submitting 
written statements. Usually those statements are published at the beginning of the oral proceedings. 
301 See Arcari M., Balmond L. (eds.), La déclaration d’indépendance du Kosovo à la lumière de l’avis de la Cour 
Internationale de Justice du 22 juillet 2010, Milan, 2011. 
302 The uniqueness of the case was expressly presented as an argument by Saudi Arabia, Austria, Denmark, France, 
Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. In the report of the USA State Department, the uniqueness of the case affects the 
legality and legitimacy of the secession of Kosovo to the extent that no other seceding entities can rely on this precedent. 
303 See, inter alia, Written Comments of Serbia, 17 July 2009, paras. 128-139; Written statement by Bolivia, 17 April 
2009, para. 1; Written Comments by Argentina CR 2009/26 December 2009, paras. 30-31; Cyprus, Records, CR 2009/29, 
7 December 2009, para. 57.  
304 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Declaration of Independence by Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, cit., 
Dissenting Opinion by Judge Koroma, para. 4. 
305 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Declaration of Independence by Kosovo, cit., Further Written Comments of Kosovo, 17 
July 2009, para. 4.40 
306 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Declaration of Independence by Kosovo Written Statement of Germany, 15 April 2009, 
p. 34. 
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explanations307 – that under exceptional cases denial of internal self-determination may justify quest 
for independence.308 Interestingly, Russia was the only one to argue in express words that there is a 
right to remedial secession, albeit subject to tough restriction. Para. 88 of the Russian written 
statements reads: “the “safeguard clause” ... may be construed as authorizing secession under certain 
conditions. However, those conditions should be limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an 
outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question.”309 
 
How did the ICJ respond? In the Judgment, the ICJ never resorted to self-determination and 
consciously avoided all possible references to Kosovars’ right to self-determination. For the Court, 
proceedings demonstrated that no opinio juris can be found on the contemporary scope of self-
determination and the existence of a right to secede. It was observed that written and oral submissions 
by States taking part in the proceedings “showed radically different views”310 on the purport and 
application of self-determination beyond decolonisation and on a right to unilateral secession.311 The 
silence of the ICJ has been criticised both in literature and by judges312  taking part in the case. If in 
the idea of the Court, parsimony in the legal reasoning was the best solution to avoid conflict, in 
reverse the reticence of the ICJ has ended up in boosting secessionist attempts. As Peters claims, “the 
Advisory Opinion did have the reverse effect of a bad precedent through its silence”.313 Some remarks 
are reasonable, given that the ICJ really had one of the best opportunities ever to express its view 
about secession and self-determination. Nevertheless, it should be born in mind what the role of the 
Court is. Notably, it is called by the Statute to decide on disputes between states and to answer the 
																																								 																				
307 The Written Statement of the Netherlands, i.e. revolved around State responsibility for breaches of peremptory norms 
of international law. Along this line, a serious breach of the right to self-determination would lead to justify unilateral 
secession. In other words, the latter would be the consequence of a violation of a particular peremptory norm- self-
determination. See ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Declaration of Independence by Kosovo, Written Statement of the 
Netherlands, 17 April 2009, para 3.11. 
308 Nevertheless, the linkage between internal self-determination and secession may be misleading, in that it may lead to 
believe that the holders of holders of the right to self-determination are the same of those of the right to secede. See on 
this point this chapter, para. 6. 
309 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Declaration of Independence by Kosovo, Written statement of Russia, p. 31, para 88. 
The statement strengthens the link between secession and self-determination by stating at para. 90 “outside the colonial 
context, international law allows for secession of a part of a State against the latter’s will only as a matter of self-
determination of peoples, and only in extreme circumstances, when the people concerned is continuously subjected to 
most severe forms of oppression that endangers the very existence of the people”. 
310 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Declaration of Independence with respect of 
Kosovo, cit., para. 82. 
311 Ibid. 
312 See Declaration of Judge Simma, paras. 2-3 and Separate Opinion of Judge Sepúlveda-Amor, para. 35 claiminig that 
“the scope of the right to self-determination, the question of ‘remedial secession’ […], the effect of the recognition or 
non-recognition of a State in the present case are all matters which should have been considered by the Court, providing 
an opinion in the exercise of its advisory functions”.  
313 A. Peters: “Has the Advisory Opinion's finding that Kosovo's Declaration of Independence was not Contrary to 
International Law Set an Unfortunate Precedent?”, M. Milanovic and M. Wood (eds.), The Law and Politics of the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Oxford, 2015, p. 11. Moreover, express mention of the case of Kosovo as a bad precedent 
during the proceedings came from Argentina, Cyprus and Azerbaijan. 
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legal question submitted to it in case of a advisory opinion. Thus, it is not supposed to act as a scholar 
– tackling issues because they are very much disputed.314  
 Although it can be aptly noted that the Court has lost one of the most important chances to shed 
light over the legal framework surrounding territorial changes, one can hardly find a shared opinion 
on the topic among the international community. Hence, the case of Kosovo neither denies nor 
confirms the acceptance of the remedial right theory in international law. On the one side, the Court 
has not dismissed the remedial secession theory; on the other side, the argument of the suis generis 
nature of the case cannot be rejected as such. Serious breaches of human rights and denial of 
autonomous powers by the central government occurred in Kosovo, but the interim governance 
established by the UN internationalised the issue. Hence, from the legal stand point the administrative 
power of the then State of Kosovo was put in a grey area. This makes the case an unicuum, which can 
hardly be used to support or dismiss the consolidation of a rule. 
 
3. International due requirements for secession  
 In the opening of this Chapter, particular emphasis has been put on the advantages of 
distinguishing between a procedural study of secession and secession as a factual instance. Moreover, 
it was observed that although one could expect that secession hijacks only the territorial integrity of 
multi-ethnic states with a troublesome past, recent examples of attempts to secede show that separatist 
movements currently affect also well-established democracies.315 It was also pointed out that when 
international law looks at secession as a process, it might be interested in regulating it. It is time to 
see why it would be interested and how it would do so. This argument has been presented by Tancredi, 
who has elaborated a normative due process for secession316 by discerning what he sees as the 
permanent features of practice and opinio juris about secession at the international level. Before 
entering into the details, some preliminary remarks are necessary. Firstly, the normative due process 
																																								 																				
314 See A. Pellet: “Kosovo: the Question not Asked”, M. Milanovic and M. Wood (eds.), The Law and Politics of the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, cit., p. 269. 
315 Some independence movements aimed at secession have developed also in the Hawaii Island. Legal issues stemming 
from the definition of the Hawaiian people have been brought in front of the Supreme Court in the case Rice v. Cayetano, 
528, US SC, (495) 2000. The Court was called to render its judgement on the distinction between native and non-native 
Hawaiian provided for by the Congress in the Joint Resolution adopted at the first session in 1993. A native Hawaiians is 
“any individual who is a descendent of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in 
the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii”. The Hawaiians contested the validity of the referendum held on 1959, 
which declared that the island would be part of the USA. The grievance relied on the fact that individuals settled in the 
island from one year were allowed to vote, thus the election would have been vitiated. The Supreme Court found that 
there could be a contrast between the fifteenth amendment and the definition of the natives. The main argument was that 
in order to let the natives exercise their right to internal self-determination – that is to saty to participate in the affairs of 
the community- the community was holding an election on racial discrimination. See B. M. Lusignan: “One of These 
Things is Not Like the Others? A Comparative Analysis of Secessionist Movements in Vermont, Quebec, Hawaii and 
Kosovo”, 15 April 2009, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1385764. 
316 A. Tancredi, La Secessione nel Diritto Internazionale, cit., pp. 669-714 and the contribution “A Normative Due Process 
in the Creation of States through Secession” in M.G. Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives, cit., pp. 171-207.  
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does not aim at being a set of rules providing a legal entitlement to statehood. It is rather “a normative 
course”.317 Secondly, the theoretical premise adopted in this study with respect to the substance of 
the phenomenon of secession – i.e. whether there is a legal title to secede and which are its contours- 
is different from that defended by Tancredi in his monograph. The distinguished commentator refers 
to secessionist self-determination, that is to say that separation occurred through secession can still 
be considered a form of external self-determination.318 By contrast, this study attempts to disentangle 
secession from self-determination from a purely ontological perspective and from an international 
legal one, as will be illustrated in section 5. In so doing, the normative due process will be used to 
describe how international law might step in in the process of secession by sub-units which do not 
enjoy the international right to self-determination. The normative due process is applied as a 
normative course to explain the current developments about secession in the international community, 
outside of the hypothesis of serious violations of human rights. Hence, in this framework the emphasis 
will be on the potential use and impact of the free expression of the will of the people through a 
referendum. In the next Chapter, then, it is verified whether there are sufficient elements to claim that 
according to international law a referendum may legitimise per se a secession or whether there is an 
international obligation to conduct a referendum to secede. Thirdly, claiming that secession is better 
studied as a process does not entail that secession is not a fact. It was already pointed out that secession 
is often viewed as a political fact. If so, the argument continues, the international legal order does 
only take for granted the formation of a new entity, provided that it is able to effectively establishes 
itself.319 
 If one were to fully agree with this argument, however, some precedents in the international legal 
arena could not be explained. The recognition requirements set by the Badinter Commission for the 
Former Yugoslavia,320 or the reaction of the international community to the Crimean referendum go 
against a complete absence of international rules in this field. In those cases, as well as in the case of 
Abkhazia or South Ossetia, the international debate always resolved around themes of human rights 
respect, denial of the use of force and the expression of will of people, while remaining anchored to 
the principle of effectiveness.321 Although it is not free from ambiguities, the normative due process 
																																								 																				
317 A. Tancredi: “Some Remarks on the Relationship between Secession and General International Law in light of the ICJ 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion”, P. Hilphold, The Advisory Opinion of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, cit., p. 
80. 
318 In the first elaboration of the normative due process, it seems that the distinguished commentator supported the 
adoption of the remedial secession theory, although a precise scrutiny of the pitfalls of the theory is provided. Recently, 
the position of the author vis-à-vis the legal soundness of remedial secession has been more critical. See on this point 
A.Tancredi: “Secessione e diritto internazionale: un’analisi del dibattito”, Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, 
Aprile-Giugno 2015, n.2, pp. 449-478. 
319 See this Chapter para 2.2. 
320 See Introduction to this study, pp. 1-16 and Chapter 3 pp. 136-143. 
321 This argument was put forward already in front of the Canadian Supreme Court, see. A. Buchanan (ed.) Self-
Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned, cit., p. 269. The cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
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has the prize of capturing the three above mentioned issues, which repeatedly arise in the analysis of 
states’ reactions against secessions. Therefore, the model meets the purposes of the present study.  
 Anyway, given that much of the process of secession takes place at the domestic level, why 
should international law be interested in it? Tancredi observes that the international community has 
become more and more concerned with those events which may seriously endanger its common 
values, such as international peace and stability.322 Human rights violations and foreign intervention 
have been shaping the reactions of the international community to instances of secession. It holds true 
for Bangladesh,323 but also for Kosovo. Here in particular the intervention by NATO has casted many 
doubts and the normative framework of the actions taken by the Atlantic alliance as well as by the 
SC is still debated. The 2014 secession by Crimea has triggered again the questions of international 
law just mentioned. It is not surprising that one of the most striking arguments brought by Russia to 
justify the increase in Russian militias in Ukraine was the necessity to secure a free referendum 
protecting fundamental human rights of citizens holding a Russian passport and/or Russian speaking 
citizens living within Ukraine.324 Therefore, even without clear international rules on unilateral 
secession, it seems that some guidelines on how secession should proceed are provided by the 
international legal order, with the aim of avoiding that secessionist struggles lead to an escalation of 
violence.  
 The ultimate purpose of the international action would be to avoid that further divergences 
between the parties give rise to an escalation of violence which could threaten the peace and stability 
of the international system.325 In other words, the basic idea is that secession has such a strong 
potential to destabilise the international community that it would be in the interests of the States to 
set up rules to guide this process. 326 Secession in fact threatens the existing territorial balance and the 
																																								 																				
will be scrutinized in Chapter 4 due to their relevance for legal questions surrounding recognition in international law. At 
this stage, it suffices to mention that the two regions have been struggling for independence from Georgia since 1992. 
South Ossetia declared independence after the end of the 1991-1992 South Ossetia war against Georgia. Abkhazia 
followed after two years, in 1994. Although Georgia considers them a part of its sovereign territory, both regions enjoy 
the support of the Russian Federation. In 2008, the international recognition of Kosovo led to a revival of tensions 
culminating in a conflict, involving also Russian militias sided with the separatist regions. With the help of the Russian 
Federation, the 2008 war ended with the expulsion of the Georgian militias from both territories and with Russia’s 
recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia as independent entities. Nevertheless, recognition by the Russian Federation has 
remained mostly isolated, so that it is common to refer to Abkhazia and South Ossetia as unrecognised States.  
322 A. Tancredi, “A Normative Due Process in the Creation of States through Secession”, in M.G. Kohen, Secession: 
International Legal Perspectives, cit., p. 188-190. 
323 See this Chapter, para. 2.3(b)(ii). 
324 See V. Tolstykh: “Reunification of Crimea with Russia: a Russian Perspective”, Chinese Journal of International Law, 
2014, vol. 13, pp. 879-886. For the purposes of secession, the case of Crimea will be tackled in the next para 3.4.   
325 A. Tancredi: “A Normative Due Process in the Creation of States through Secession”, cit., pp. 171- 207. 
326 A. Tancredi: “A Normative Due Process in the Creation of States through Secession”, in M.G. Kohen, Secession: 
International Law Perspectives, cit., pp. 171- 207. The position does not deny that that secession retains a strong domestic 
dimension. As Tancredi underlines, in the context of self-determination a normative due process is not new to 
international law, given that decolonization was guided by the uti possidetis principle. Normative regulation of the making 
of new States therefore is rather a novelty for the international legal order. 
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geopolitical assessment of the international community. Even though struggles occur at the domestic 
level, they have the potential to endanger the international community. This results in international 
law guiding the process of secession from the parent State. Here is the normative due process theory.  
 If one embraces the due process theory, it is not surprising that the attempted secession by 
Scotland was managed by the parties with a step-by-step process, based on negotiations and popular 
consultations. In this case in fact the UK pledged to accept secession, proving that there could be 
cases in which states might be prone to rule on secession and even to recognise it, in particular 
throughout a referendum. Support for a normative understanding of seceding processes could come 
also from the ICJ method of approaching the question posed by the General Assembly in the Kosovo 
case: the Court analysed separately the questions of if, and how, states are created in international 
law. The ICJ evaluated the question from the point of view of legality and refrained to use notions of 
legal nullity or invalidity. The opinion is developed on a double path: on the one side the ICJ claims 
that declarations of independence are not per se in breach of a specific international rule.327 Just 
before, the ICJ at para. 81 had claimed that a declaration may be illegal if held in connection with a 
violation of a peremptory norm of international law. The Court in fact stated that “the illegality 
attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed […] from the fact that they were, or would 
have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general 
international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)”. The idea therefore 
could be that a fact – notably the creation of a State- could be also legally characterised. In the model, 
Tancredi enucleates three due requirements: 1) the ban on the use of force; 2) respect of the principle 
of uti possidetis juris and 3) resort to popular consultation. 
 
3.1 The ban on the use of force 
 The main argument is that secession cannot take place through a breach of the jus cogens norm 
prohibiting military action. This view is supported by looking at (i) general international law, law of 
treaties and international documents; (ii) case-law and (iii) State practice. We have already come 
across the rule prohibiting the use of force several times in the previous pages: military support was 
tolerated by international law in the context of decolonisation but is prohibited in non-colonial 
situations.  
																																								 																				
327 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Declaration of Independence with respect to Kosovo, cit., para. 88 “the 
Constitutional framework would not be part of the international law applicable in the present instance and the question 
of the compatibility of the declaration of independence therewith would thus fall outside the scope of the General 
Assembly’s request”. 
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 The prohibition to military intervene during secessionist conflicts stems from the combination of 
jus cogens rules and the ban on interference in domestic foreign affairs.328 The principle of territorial 
integrity reinforces the prohibition, in that, using the words of the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion on 
Kosovo “it addresses inter-State relations”.329 Prohibition of armed intervention is acknowledged by 
many international instruments: not only by the Declaration on Friendly Relations mentioned before, 
but also by the declaration on the Definition of Aggression. At art. 5.3 the Declaration reads “no 
territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as 
lawful”.330 Support for the illegitimacy of secession carried out with the use of force by third parties 
can be found also by looking at the law of treaties, in particular to succession to treaties. Article 6 of 
the Convention on Succession to treaties331 reads “the present Convention applies only to the effects 
of a succession of States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”. The same provision 
can be found in the Convention for the Succession to Archives, Property and Debt332 at art. 3. Hence, 
rules on succession apply to new entities created in compliance with general rules of international 
law, in application of the principle ex inuria ius non oritur. 
 For case-law, international courts have been confronted with legal questions about the use of 
force many times and scholarly literature analysing international decisions is huge.333 While focusing 
on the issue at this point would shift the attention from the subject of the present research, it is 
interesting to mention some latest pronouncements. Firstly, the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo 
could run in favour of the regulation of secessionist processes. The Court explicitly focused on the 
unlawful use of force in international relations. The fact that the creation of new entities should not 
occur with the use of force is not to be intended as a statement of purpose, as the ICJ further 
																																								 																				
328 For the sake of clarity, it has to be pointed out that in international law aggression and foreign intervention are subject 
of two different rules, albeit the two are sometimes closely linked. Here non-intervention is used to ease the reading with 
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questions de droit international soulevée par le renvoi”, in A. Buchanan (ed), Self-Determination in International Law, 
Quebec and Lessons Learned, cit, para. 19, T. Christakis: “Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and fait accompli in 
the Case of Crimea”, cit. 
330 UN General Assembly, Definition of Aggression, annexed to resolution 3314, adopted by consensus on 14 December 
1974, http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1552411.61584854.html 
331 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 August 1978. Entered into 
force on 6 November 1996. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1946, p. 3 ff. 
332 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to State Property, Archives and Debts, done at Vienna, on 6 
April 1983, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, 
Archives and Debts, vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.V.6). 
333 See for international law and the use of force the latest contributions: M. Weller (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the 
Use of force in International Law, Oxford, 2015; C.D. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, III ed., 2008. For 
the role of the International Court of Justice’s case-law on the use of force: C.D. Gray: “The International Court of Justice 
and the Use of Force”, C.J. Tams and J. Sloan (eds.), The Development of International Law by the International Court 
of Justice, Oxford, 2013, pp. 237-262; J.A. Green, The ICJ and Self Defence in International Law, Oxford-Portland, 2009. 
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substantiates its position. The Court’s view is supported by reference to practice, in particular with 
res. 787334 addressing the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.335 Secondly, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has recently confronted itself with issues of military support and armed conflict too. 
Called to judge upon cases involving Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on the individual right to 
access to property, the Court has reinforced the interpretation of the general international law rule on 
military support and on independent entities in armed conflicts. The Court analysed the military 
involvement of Armenia within the attempt to secede carried out by Nagorno-Karabakh and 
concluded that, although the composition of the forces that occupied Nagorno-Karabakh could not be 
clearly established, “it is hardly conceivable that Nagorno-Karabakh […]was able, without the 
substantial military support of Armenia, to set up a defense force […] that […] conquered the whole 
or major parts of seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts”.336 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque qualifies 
the responsibility of third states giving military support to the seceding entity in the following terms: 
“the presumption against secession is even more forceful if it came about by means of the use of force, 
since this contradicts the customary and treaty prohibition of the use of force acknowledged by the 
1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Article 10 and 11 of the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States and Article 2 § 4 of the UN Charter”.337  
 
3.2       The respect of the uti possidetis juris principle  
The principle of uti possidetis juris338  postulates that the creation of a new State must occur 
within the previous existing administrative boundaries. This rule was consistently applied during the 
decolonisation period, yet part of the academia has put forward the argument of an unsolvable conflict 
between self-determination and uti possidetis. How can the right to self-determination, which is based 
on freedom of choice by the people, come to terms with the maintenance of boundaries established 
																																								 																				
334 See SC/RES/787, dated November 16 1992 
335 A. Tancredi: “Some Remarks on the Relationship between Secession and General International Law in light of the ICJ 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion”, P. Hiplhold, The Advisory Opinion of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, cit., p. 
81. 
336 European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR), case of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, Grand Chamber, 16 
June 2015, application no. 13216/05, and of Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, Grand Chamber, 16 June 2015, application no. 
40167/06. 
337 Ibid, Separate Opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, p. 151. 
338 The principle of uti possidetis juris has been the subject of a huge literature. See among the others: G. Nesi, L’Uti 
Possidetis nel Diritto Internazionale, Padova, 1996; M.N. Shaw: “The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis 
Juris Today”, British Yearbook of International Law, 1996, n. 67, pp. 97-101; S.R. Ratner: “Drawing a Better Line: Uti 
Possidetis and the Borders of New States”, American Journal of International Law, 1996, vol. 90, p.590 ff.  For our 
purposes, it is useful to recall its basic characteristics. The principle concerns the limits of (i) the countries belonging to 
the same colonial empire and (ii) the countries which already enjoyed an international status, disentangled from the 
colonial contest. It has been derived from the practice established by former Spanish colonies of Latin America, but 
subsequent practice and case-law has extended its scope of application to contests of dissolution as well as of secession. 
The ICJ in Frontiers Dispute, (Burkina Fasu v. Mali) at para. 20 confirmed its overall application by stating that: “it is a 
general principle which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence wherever it occurs”.  
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by the colonial powers? In this view the principle would even favour the spreading of secessions, 
because sub-units would be more prone to rebel against unjustified persistence of colonial 
boundaries.339 However, the argument is not persuasive. Arguably, the different purport of uti 
possidetis and self-determination might avoid conflicts between the two. While self-determination 
revolves around the choice of external and internal status, uti possidetis concerns the territory of the 
nascent State only.340 This should not lead to claim that the principle of uti possidetis comes into the 
arena only once the right to self-determination has been put in practice, as a sort of consequence to 
the exercise of the right to self-determination.341 Such approach would be too restrictive. Territoriality 
is an inextricable component of the right to secede as well as of the exercise of external self-
determination. Sub-units seeking independence advance claims on a portion of territory, in light of 
historical or cultural link swith that portion of land. Although we have already showed that the notion 
of people cannot be constructed on the basis of territory only, secessionist movements are territorial 
in nature. Arguably, the territory under which the secessionist struggle develops is often the one 
internally devoted to the group by the Constitution or by an international treaty – see Scotland and 
the UK or South Tyrol for Italy.342 It is a domestic border that could become the new international 
border.343  
In this line, Vidmar aptly underlines that “new international borders are not colonial-like 
arbitrarily drawn boundaries, but rather are historically realised lines delimiting self-determination 
units […] and for this reason it cannot be expected that such a State could be newly created”.344 By 
contrast, the approach illustrated before seems to fail to capture the role of guidance that the uti 
possidetis offers during the development of the process of secession and for State creation. If uti 
possidetis was not in force, whenever a separatist unit located within established administrative 
																																								 																				
339 S. R. Ratner: “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States”, cit., pp. 616-617. 
340 Of this view: A. Peters: “The Principle of Uti Possidetis”, C. Walter (ed.), Secession and Self-Determination in 
International Law, Oxford, 2014, pp. 130-133; S.F. van der Driest, Remedial Secession. A right to external self-
determination as a remedy to serious injustices?, cit., p. 93; M.N. Shaw: “The Heritage of States. The Principle of Uti 
Possidetis Juris Today”, cit., pp. 97-101. 
341 T. Frank, R. Higgins, A. Pellet, M Shaw and C. Tomuschat: “The territorial integrity of Quebec in the Event of 
Attainment of Sovereignty”, in A. Buchanan (ed.), A.F. Bayefsky, Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and 
Lessons Learned, The Hague-London-Boston, 2000, pp. 241-304. 
342 See Chapter 1, pp. 35-37. For the Italian region of Trentino South Tyrol, at the end of the I World War the actual 
province of Bolzano saw a clear majority of German speaking inhabitants, whilst in the part of Trento the majority was 
Italian. The peace treaty of Saint-Germain established the cession to Italy of both Trentino and South Tyrol. For the latter, 
in particular, geographical reasons were at the basis of the incorporation and were counterbalanced by the pledge by the 
Italian government to take particular measures to protect the German speaking minority. The South-Tyrolese separatist 
movement grow up during the fascist period, when the regime adopted repressive measures towards the German speaking 
minority. Regardless of the quests for separation, South Tyrol remained Italian even after the II World War. The autonomy 
statute adopted in 1949 was considered inadequate by the minority and a long period of tensions characterized the years 
between 1960 and 1990. The quarrel was solved only when the parent State in the late 90ies granted a large form of self-
government to the region. See for an overview O. Peterlini, Autonomia e Tutela delle Minoranze nel Trentino Alto Adige, 
Bolzano-Trento, 2000. 
343 A. Tancredi, La Secessione nel Diritto Internazionale, cit., p. 639. 
344 J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., p.14. 
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borders manages to extend itself – through whatever means, including conquest- to other parts of the 
parent State’s territory, those extended frontiers would be the borders of the new entity. Interestingly 
enough then, the principle of territorial integrity would enhance instability, because it would protect 
the new frontiers. This possibility is clearly dismissed by the jurisprudence of the ICJ on the uti 
possidetis principle. In the dispute Burkina Fasu v. Mali the ICJ held that the purpose of uti possidetis 
“is to prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles 
provoked by the changing of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power”.345 When 
addressing the principle, the Court confronted itself with one of the major questions surrounding uti 
possidetis, notably the time for its application. One may argue that the frontiers should be frozen from 
the moment a new entity is formed. But then, determining when a new State is actually born is difficult 
in practice. Following the ICJ Judgement in Burkina Fasu v. Mali, the uti possidetis rule should be 
applied to the State “as it is”.346 However, if we look at practice in the case of dissolution of the 
Former Yugoslavia, deviations from the approach of the ICJ can be found. The Badinter Commission 
was more cautious in applying uti possidetis juris to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, albeit 
it reaffirmed its application in case of dissolution of States.347 Given the difficulties intrinsic in 
approaching the dissolution of a federation, in particular in framing into clear legal categories 
different situations of (i) secession, (ii) dismemberment and (iii) succession of States, the Commission 
felt the need to justify the application of uti possidetis by relying on the Yugoslav Constitution.348 
The uti possidetis principle was encapsulated into the domestic level and linked to public 
consultations. The Constitution in fact stated that modification of boundaries within the Republics of 
the Federation might take place based on the consent of people concerned.349 Moreover, the frontiers 
not to be modified were considered the initial ones and not the ones standing at the moment of 
independence.  
As Tancredi maintains, the Badinter Commission declared that Croatia was established as a 
sovereign State from 8 October 1991,350 after a three-months suspension of the declaration of 
independence (from 25 June 1991) for the Brioni cease-fire Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
																																								 																				
345 ICJ, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Fasu v. Mali), Judgment, cit. p. 554. See also ICJ, Case Concerning the Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 1992, ICJ Report 1992, p. 383 ff. 
346 ICJ, Frontiers Dispute (Burkina Fasu v. Mali), para. 23, p. 566, referring to the photograph of the existing State. 
347 See Badinter Commission, Opinion n.3, 11 January 1192, reprinted in International Legal Materials, 1992, vol. 31, p. 
1499. 
348 Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 3, cit., p. 1500 “ the principle applies all the more readily to the Republics since the 
second and fourth paragraph of the Constitution of the SFRY stipulated that Republics’’ territories and boundaries could 
not be altered without their consent”. 
349 According to Art. 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY the Republics’ territories and boundaries could not be altered 
without their consent. See. C. Navari: “Territoriality, Self-Determination and Crimea after Badinter”, International 
Affairs, 2014, vol. 90, pp. 1299-1318; P. Radan: “Post-Secession International borders: a Critical Analysis of the Opinion 
of the Badinter Arbitration Commission”, Melbourne Law Review, 2000, vol. 24, pp. 50-76. 
350 Badinter Commission, Opinion n.11, 16 July 1993, International Legal Materials, 1993, vol. 32, p. 1588. 
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By contrast, statehood was formally acquired only after the results of the independence referendum, 
notably on 6 March 1992. The borders of the States were those established before the 
acknowledgment of statehood by the Commission. In fact, at the time of acquisition of statehood, 
Croatia had lost control of part of its territory, while on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
Republic Srpska had been created. This confirms the hypothesis that for the international community 
the borders to be guaranteed by the uti possidetis principle are fixed once the process of dissolution / 
secession or other territorial reapportionment begins.351 It does not come as a surprise that the 
international community rejected the secessionist claims advanced by the Serbians living in the 
Republic of Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina respectively. States’ support for internationally 
recognized borders implied respect for the pre-existing federal boundaries of the SFRY. In sum, 
although sometimes the application of uti possidetis has casted some doubts – e.g. the critical date 
for application in the case of dissolution of SFRY- the principle remains a guide for territorial changes 
and its application supports the assumption that “the emergence of a State – at least from a procedural 
viewpoint- does not happen in a law-free zone but is embedded in international prescriptions”.352 
 
3.3      The role of territorial referendum 
 
The last requirement can be found in the tendency of secessionist movements to legitimate 
their claim to independence by resorting to referenda – such as in cases of Eritrea, South Sudan, 
Crimea and Scotland. At this point it would be premature to gather insight into the legal status of 
territorial referendum in international law. This Chapter is aimed at giving a legal reappraisal about 
secession, with a view to engage in the discussion about the role of referenda in the context of 
seceding claims in the next Chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that according to the 
normative due process theory, the referendum is a procedural step which adds legitimacy to the quest 
for secession. One element which further corroborates this view is the fact that when it was not held, 
the international community requested territorial referendum, thus confirming the importance 
attributed to it. An example of this trend can be seen in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 
between Sudan and South Sudan that was drafted under the support of the UK and USA with a view 
to secure popular consultation for any territorial change. Before that, the EU area saw the increase in 
importance of territorial referendum with the work of the Badinter Commission. Opinion n.4353 in 
																																								 																				
351 A. Tancredi, La Secessione in Diritto Internazionale, cit., pp. 701-703. 
352 A. Tancredi: “In search of a fair balance between the inviolability of borders, Self-Determination and Secession in 
International Law”, in M. Nicolini, F. Palermo, E. Milano (eds), Law, Territory and Conflict Resolution: Law as a 
Problem and Law as a Solution, Leiden, 2016, p.100. 
353  Opinion n.4 on Bosnia Herzegovina (B-H) it states that “[…] the will of the peoples of B-H to constitute B-H as a 
sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established. This assessment could be reviewed if 
appropriate guarantees were provided by the republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum of all 
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fact indirectly requested a referendum for territorial reapportionment between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as will be explained in the next Chapter. 
Questions about the legal value of territorial referendum in international law arise prominently 
in the aftermath of the 1st October 2017 referendum in Catalonia, but have already jumped at the top 
of international law debates in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014. The residents of the 
Ukrainian region of Crimea decided through a referendum to be incorporated into the Russian 
Federation, after having issued a declaration of independence to secede from Ukraine. While the 
debate in Catalonia is ongoing at the time this research is finalised, the case of Crimea is a good test 
for the normative due process, because it involves all the normative requirements mentioned so far, 
notably the use of force, territorial boundaries and popular will. 
 
3.4 Crimea 
 Internal turmoil that have evolved in Ukraine since 2014 have led to a renewal of the debate over 
secession, self-determination and territorial changes in international law.354 Among scholars, the case 
has been the chance for some commentators to re-affirm that there is no right to external self-
determination outside the colonial contest.355 Others instead have contended that there could have 
been a legitimate claim to self-determination, but that the alleged use of force by Russia, being a 
violation of a peremptory norm of international law, has rendered unlawful all the subsequent 
developments of the case.356 During debates at the Security Council for example, not only Russia but 
also Kyrgyzstan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea argued that Crimea had not been 
annexed by Russia.357 Rather, on the basis of historical ties with Russia, it was held that the latter 
could not but take into consideration the genuine will of self-determination expressed by the citizens 
of the region. This argument can be contested from a legal standpoint, not only because it does not 
provide for a legal basis for secession, but mainly because it is subject to manipulation. To rely on 
																																								 																				
citizens of B-H without distinction, carried out under international supervision”. See Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 
4, cit.p. 1491. 
354 The secession of Crimea did not put an end to internal instabilities in Ukraine, indeed. In fact, separatist leaders in the 
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk organized a referendum on 11 May 2014 and on the basis of a clear vote cast (89%) in 
favour of incorporation asked to the Russian government to take the necessary steps for the annexation of the Popular 
Republic of Donetsk. Russia has not accepted the request so far. 
355 T. Christakis: “Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and fait accompli in the Case of Crimea”, cit. 
356 G. Wilson: “Crimea: Some Observations on Secession and Intervention in Partial Response to Müllerson and 
Tolstykh”, Chinese Journal of International Law, 2015, vol.14, pp. 217-223; J. Vidmar: “Crimea’s Referendum and 
Secession: Why it Resembles more Northern Cyprus than Kosovo”, Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 
20 March 2014, http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-referendum-and-secession-why-it-resembles-northern-cyprus-more-
than-kosovo/ 
357 See statements during the discussions at the SC for the then failed adoption of SC res. 189/2014, in UN Doc. 
S/PV.7138, 15 March 2014 as well as the reactions to to the referendum in Crimea in UN Doc. S/PV. 7144, 19 March 
2014. 
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historical roots raises compelling questions as to how far back in time one has to go to justify a  self-
determination claim, or what kind of linkage would justify the claim.358 
 Before looking at the Crimean crisis in light of the normative due process model, a brief summary 
of the case is necessary. Crimea is an autonomous region within the republic of Ukraine, whose 
special status is constitutionally guaranteed. The Constitution grants the region the right to legislate 
through the Crimean Parliamentary Assembly, though autonomy is granted mainly for administrative 
matters. Art. 132 of the Constitution expressly states that Ukraine is a unitary and indivisible State.359 
Moreover, it has to be born in mind that in 1992 Crimea voted for remaining with Ukraine. The debate 
on the historical Russian roots of the people of Crimea was further closed with the sign of the Minsk 
Agreement between Russia and Ukraine in 1992.360 The agreement provided for a military basis of 
Russia in Crimea, but affirmed the will of the parties to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, 
thus closing any hypothesis of a claim of the territory on the part of Russia. 
 During a serious domestic crisis originating from the impasse in the signature of the Association 
Agreement with the EU, which led to the destitution of President Yanuckovich,361 the rising of 
protests in Crimea led to an escalation of violence with the involvement of Russian military. March 
2014 was marked by Crimea’s rush for secession. On the 11th of March 2014, a declaration of 
independence362 was issued and within only five days the population of Crimea was called to decide 
on its status. On 16 March 2014 the referendum was held at the presence of Russian military forces. 
Arguably, the declaration of independence was a necessary step in order to circumvent the 
constitutional provisions on territorial changes. According to art. 73 of the Ukrainian Constitution, 
changes to the territory could be decided only by a vote of the whole population. By declaring 
independence unilaterally instead of reverting to the government to apply art. 73, Crimea aimed at 
excluding itself from the application of the proviso and then vote to join Russia. The clear vote cast 
																																								 																				
358 The French representative at the Security Council session commented that, i.e., “After all, Crimea was Russian for 170 
years but a vassal of Turkey for three centuries. We know only too well that anything can be justified by history, 
particularly the unjustifiable”. See S/PV.7138, 15th March 2014, cit. fn. 354. 
359 Constitution of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, June 28, 1996, amended on December 8, 2004 by Law n. 2222-
IV, Art. 132: “The territorial structure of Ukraine is based on the principles of unity and indivisibility of the state 
territory”, available in English on the web site of the Ukraine Constitutional Court 
www.ccu.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=12084 
360 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, May 31, 1997. 
361 The procedure by which Yanuckovich was overthrown has been labelled by many legal scholars as being 
unconstitutional. While the Constitution required a qualified majority of the votes in the Assembly, the decision was taken 
with a simple majority. See among the others A. Peters: “Sense and Nonsense of Territorial Referendums in Ukraine, and 
Why the 16 March Referendum in Crimea Does Not Justify Crimea’s Alteration of Territorial Status under International 
Law” published by the blog of the European Journal of International Law, http://www.ejiltalk.org/sense-and-nonsense-
of-territorial-referendums-inukraine-and-why-the-16-march-referendum-in-crimea-does-not-justify-crimeas-alteration-
of-territorial-status-underinternational-law/. 
362 See P. Hilpold: “Ukraine, Crimea and New International Law: Balancing International Law with Arguments Drawn 
from History”, Chinese Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 14, pp. 237–270 and B.R. Roth: “The Neglected Virtues 
of Bright Lines: International Law in the 2014 Ukraine Crises”, ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
2014-2015, vol.21, pp. 317-323. 
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in favour of joining Russia was followed by the adoption of the treaty of adhesion on 18 March, 
further ratified by the Russian Assembly on 20 March 2014. 
 Given this brief sketch, it is possible to test the application of the normative due process in the 
case at stake. Many elements prove that the secession of Crimea generated in the international 
community the reaction foreseen by the model. However, the outcome of the seceding attempt by 
Crimea also highlights some pitfalls of the due process approach. The use of force by a third party 
combined with the violation of territorial integrity were the arguments used to support condemn for 
the secession of Crimea and non-recognition of the unlawful territorial reapportionment. On the one 
hand, before the referendum some members of the Security Council sponsored resolution 
189/2014.363 After reference to art. 2.4 of the UN Charter in the preamble, the resolution continues 
as follows: “no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or the use of force shall be recognised 
as legal”. In the operative, the SC reaffirms its commitment in guaranteeing the independence and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine “within its internationally recognised borders”. Recalling the ICJ 
advisory opinion on Kosovo, the principle of territorial integrity is addressed to inter-State relations. 
Hence, non-State actors are not bound by it, but the same does not hold true for States. This is why 
Russia was under the obligation not to deploy armed forces to ensure the conducting of the 
referendum. Alongside this argument, it is interesting to observe how the SC addresses the status of 
the Ukrainian sub-units: the Council refers to “rights of persons belonging to minorities”.  In the 
previous Chapter it was demonstrated that minorities have not succeeded in their struggle for self-
determination, as opposed to a right to internal self-determination for indigenous people.364 Hence, 
the wording suggest that the drafters were indirectly taking a stand against the secession of Crimea, 
regardless of issues of use of force by third parties. 
 On the other hand, the draft resolution was not adopted due to the veto of Russia, but the General 
Assembly on 27 March 2014 passed a very similar resolution - n. 68/262365-, which resembles the SC 
draft in its main operative clause. In fact, it calls upon the States:  1) “ to desist and refrain from 
actions aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders through the threat or use of force or 
other unlawful means”, and 2) “not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and 
to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered 
status”. In principle, all these elements confirm the applicability of the normative due process 
																																								 																				
363 UN Security Council Draft Resolution S/2014/189 dated 15 March 2014. 
364 See Chapter 1, para. 4.2. 
365 UN General Assembly, A/RES/68/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, adopted on 27 March 2014. 
http://www.un.org/eng/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262 
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approach to the case of Crimea. However, given the breach of one of the due process requirements, 
secession should not have been recognised. More than three years after the referendum, what is the 
status of Crimea? Crimea has been incorporated into the Russian Federation. Although the annexation 
has not been formally recognized by the members of the international community,366 it seems as if 
the territorial reapportionment has been accepted as a fait accomplì. It is in this sense that Crimea 
puts seriously into question the validity of the due process model.	The theory postulates that the effect 
of the violation of one of the due process requirements is the non-recognition by the international 
community. However, in the case of Crimea, public denunciation of the annexation has turned into 
acceptance over time.  
 Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to claim that the current status of Crimea confirms the 
the neutral approach of international law towards secession. The impact of the referendum in Crimea 
is controversial, indeed. Overall, the case confirms that often the absence of international legal rules 
results in a situation of indeterminacy. It also shows the relationship between law and power in the 
international arena. Pragmatically, it might be the case that a territorial dispute is solved by States 
through the use of force, albeit this is in contravention to one of the pillars of international law. For 
the purposes of this research it is nonetheless important to remark that the case runs in favour of the 
consolidation of an international law rule according to which the referendum is a due procedural step 
towards secession. Notwithstanding that the referendum was carried out with the alleged support of 
Russian forces, the fact that this precise tool was used to “hide” annexation may confirm that 
territorial referenda are conceived as the means to overcome the legitimacy gap of secession in 
international law. As it will be seen in the next Chapter, further developing this line of thought to 
claim that the referendum alone can create a legal title to secede would be too extreme. However, the 
case of Crimea puts the emphasis on (i) the role of a referendum when carried out properly in a free 
and fair manner and (ii) the fact that the referendum is used as a means to build a legal title to secede 
as such. In this sense, the next section will attempt to outline that secession cannot be equated with 
the title to self-determination.  
 
4. Dis-entangling secession from self-determination: a proposal 
 
 In the section dedicated to the secession of Kosovo, it was observed that the ICJ was reluctant to 
touch the issue of the application of the right to self-determination in the instant case. In fact, the 
Court seems to consider that the case does not involve the exenrcise of the right to self-determination. 
																																								 																				
366 The only formal declaration came from the Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Russian Federation, but it has been 
reported by Russian sources only. See http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/nicaragua-recognizes-crimea-as-part-
of-russia-341102.html. 
89 
 
Para. 82 mentions cases outside the context of application of the right to self-determination, notably 
reading as follows: 
“The Court has already noted […] that one of the major developments of international 
law during the second half of the twentieth century has been the evolution of the right 
of self-determination. Whether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories 
and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the 
international law of self-determination confers upon part of the population of an 
existing State a right to separate from that State is, however, a subject on which 
radically different views were expressed by those taking part in the proceedings and 
expressing a position on the question”367 
 
 In this sense, it does not seem to be problematic to claim that the Court avoided to face the case 
of Kosovo as an exercise of self-determination. Although the question of how to label the creation of 
Kosovo is left unanswered by the Court, the question submitted by the General Assembly is not 
approached from the perspective of a self-determination dispute. The Court states “during the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth, there were numerous instances of declarations of independence 
often strenuously opposed by a State from which independence had been declared. Sometimes a 
declaration resulted in the creation of a State, at other it did not”.368 Interestingly enough, the Court 
does not mention independence as the result of a self-determination struggle. It could be further 
observed that the Court mentions the Western Sahara Opinion and the Namibia case with respect to 
self-determination only in the opening of the part on general international law.369 By contrast, the ICJ 
case-law in the same field demonstrate a consistent quotation of the two cases each time that the Court 
was approaching a self-determination claim,370 as it was i.e. in the 2004 Advisory Opinion on the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.371 
 To further complicate the picture, the discourse used by seceding sub-units and by scholars often 
presents the right to self-determination as including also secession in its external dimension.372 
Moreover, it was showed before in the text that the remedial secession theory links self-determination 
to secession.  One can find that the groups in Catalonia consistently referred to their right to self-
determination,373 so as the people from Abkhazia or from Crimea.374 However, reference to the right 
																																								 																				
367 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence with Respect of Kosovo, cit., 
para. 82. 
368 Ibid. para 79. 
369 Ibid. 
370 J. Summers: “The Kosovo Declaration”, C. Walter (ed.) Self-Determination and Secession in International Law, cit., 
p. 250. 
371 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, cit., para. 88. 
372 M. Weller, in example, advocates for a right to remedial self-determination. See M. Weller, Escaping the Self-
Determination Trap, cit., p. 59. 
373 See the declarations by the Podemos group at https://plaza.podemos.info/debates/753 and the attitude of the Secretary 
General towards the issue http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/10/30/actualidad/1446231111_709046.html  
374 See for Abkhazia, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/07/here-what-the-research-
reveals-about-the-violence-in-nagorno-karabakh/ and for Crimea: http://www.jurist.org/forum/2015/05/Larry-Eaker-
self-determination.php. 
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to self-determination is not always supported by conclusive arguments; in particular, there is scarce 
reliance on international law, the focus being on how the domestic system of the parent State 
addresses groups’ rights as human rights.375 If one looks at the outcome of the Scottish attempt to 
separate from the UK, the claims were not based on international law arguments.376 They were a 
mixture of identity issues and calculations of self-interest.377 It would be reasonable at this point to 
question if resort to the self-determination argument is only instrumental. In other words, is it possible 
to disentangle self-determination from secession and to try to outline two different entitlements? 
 Before engaging in this effort, some points need to be clarified. The attempt to outline an 
autonomous title to secede aims at re-framing territorial claims in the context of the current challenges 
to the international community. The following lines do not aim at demonstrating the existence of a 
right to secede in international law. It was already showed that such a claim can be supported only 
with arguments based on moral rather than legal considerations. While this would serve the needs of 
the political discourse, it does not serve the purpose of the present study.378 Instead, this section aims 
at underlining that currently, territorial changes are justified on the basis of other grievances – such 
as broader social participation or fiscal control procedures- alongside the major role of identity claims. 
It is assumed that international law might be in the way of acknowledging this trend by paying due 
regard to attempts to separation carried out throughout a clear manifestation of the will of people. In 
fact, the way claims are brought is also changing, with a strong reliance on rights to be exercised 
within democratic regimes, like the above-mentioned social participation. Along this line it could be 
possible to leave aside self-determination as it has been generally understood, all the more so self-
determination in the sense of a right to secession. 
																																								 																				
375 See on this point N. Torbisco Casals, Group Rights as Human Rights, Dordrecht, 2010, pp.147-201. 
376 See the opinion elaborated by Crawford and Boyle upon request of the UK Government, in which the authors observe 
that the issue of a new Scottish State would depend on an arrangement between the governments. See J. Crawford and A. 
Boyle: “Opinion: Referendum and Independence of Scotland, International Law Aspects”, Annex to HM Government’s 
Paper, Scotland Analysis: devolution and the Implications of the Scottish Independence, February 2013, para.1. 
377 T. M. Waters argues “We can expect that future independence movements – as past ones – will be governed in 
significant part by calculations of economic and social self-interest”, in “For freedom alone: Secession after the Scottish 
Referendum”, cit., p. 137. 
378 A remarkable contribution which takes into account morality, but is well developed around legal arguments is given 
by Koskiennemi. Koskiennemi has developed a theory of self-determination which looks at secession as a component of 
self-determination. According to the author, there are two theories of self-determination: one is the classical understanding 
of self-determination and the other is a more romantic approach. While the former is guided by the idea of creation of 
States and State structures, the latter is a secessionist model in which the individual is fighting for himself. The difference 
lies in the purpose of each model. The romantic outlook, in particular, seeks self-fulfilment. If that can be achieved by 
secession, that would be the way. In other words, the romantic model aims at reaching a form of identity. The more the 
world has become multipolar, the more people feel the need to have a new form of identity. The State-centred system is 
endangered by these claims. Arguably, this is a sound reasoning justifying secession as an element of self-determination, 
but it lacks enough legal supportive points. Rather, it seems to rely on the huge literature on the moral need to have a right 
to secede, which goes back to the idea that the individual shall try to pursue its wishes even though it implies separation 
from an existing state. See M. Koskiennemi: “National self-determination today: problems of legal theory and practice”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1994, vol. 43, p. 250-257.  
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Hereby is an attempt at outlining two main differences between self-determination and 
secession, notably a) their ontological meaning; b) their application rationae personae. 
4.1 Secession and self-determination: different terms with different meanings 
Tomuschat argues that “knowing that the substance of self-determination invariably implies the 
right to establish a sovereign and independent State […] no one would have to engage in difficult 
legal arguments to draw the conclusion that the right to secession constitutes a necessary component 
of the right to self-determination”.379 The distinguished author takes a stand in favour of the existence 
of a right to secede, but refers to the substance of self-determination. Admittedly, what is the 
substance of self-determination, is not that clear from a legal standpoint.  
The argument developed by Tomuschat can be dwelt with from two points of view. On the 
one side, one can assume that the meaning of self-determination corresponds to that developed 
throughout the UN-led decolonisation process.380 However, it is generally understood that the 
struggle for independence was not an example of secession.381 Relying on Scharf’s382 contributions 
on secession, Sterio383 recalls that independence of colonial territories is not secession. In practice 
self-determination has been exercised by units which were part of European overseas dominions to 
gain independence. A self-determination unit in colonial times is a territory separated from the 
mainland (according to the so-called salt-water theory), governed by the motherland but distinct from 
it by history and social structures. Once the colonial period ended, the principle of self-determination 
became closer to the basket of human rights, operating mainly within the territory of an existing 
State.384 The inclusion of the right to self-determination in the 1966 Covenants had the potential to 
justify groups’ claims. There is a growing literature arguing that the substance of self-determination 
has evolved over the last decades and that its legal contours have changed.385 This line of thought has 
																																								 																				
379 C. Tomuschat: “Secession and Self-Determination”, in M.G. Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives, cit., 
p. 24. 
380 See Chapter 1, pp. 22-33. 
381 M. Weller, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, cit., p. 23; U. Burten, Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-
Determination, London-Dordrecht-New York, 2015, p. 194; A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, a Legal 
Reappraisal, cit., p. 50; M.G. Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives, cit., pp. 1-5 
382 M.P. Scharf: “Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 2003, 
n.31, p. 379 ff.  
383 M. Sterio: “On the Right to External Self-Determination: “‘Selfistans’, Secession, and the Great Powers’ Rule”, 
Minnesota Journal of International Law, 2010, vol. 19, pp. 137-176. 
384 Suffice it to recall here that the Human Rights Committee in 1984 in its General Comment n. 12 stated that “the 
realisation of the right to self-determination is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of 
individual human rights”. See “General Comment n. 12 on Self-Determination”, in Compilation of general comments and 
general recommendations adopted by human rights treaty bodies, 1994, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 12. 
385 See for references J. Castellino. “International Law and Self-Determination. Peoples, Indigenous Peoples, and 
Minorities”, C. Walter, A. von Ungern-Sternberg et al. (eds.) Self-Determination and Secession in International Law, cit.; 
M. Suksi: “Keeping the Lid on the Secession Kettle – a Review of Legal Interpretations concerning Claims of Self-
Determination by Minority Populations”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2005, vol. 12, pp. 189–
226.  
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been championed in particular by scholars addressing minorities and indigenous’ rights’ issues and 
in principle it is not erroneous. The evolutive interpretation is an established practice in international 
law. Suffices to mention here the interpretation of the ECHR as a living instrument.386 In example, 
the interpretation of the right not to be discriminated under art. 14 has been extensively enlarged to 
cover discrimination purported on the basis of sexual orientation, which surely was not envisaged in 
the drafting of the Convention in 1950.387  A human rights oriented understanding388 of self-
determination puts emphasis on a broader bulk of rights, such as participatory rights, social inclusion, 
property rights,389 which can be satisfied within the borders of a State. The consequences of this trend 
are clear: whenever there are cases where domestic policies systematically work to the disadvantage 
of one sub-unit within a State whilst benefiting another, the understanding of self-determination as a 
classic human right could lead that group to claim independence. Therefore, States have tried to avoid 
the danger of groups’ claims by focussing on other arrangements which could preserve territorial 
integrity while satisfying sub-units’ needs, i.e. enhancing the internal dimension of self-determination 
through granting autonomy or a federal structure. This way, a collective of individuals does not need 
to seek secession in order to realise itself. Each individual can pursue his/her personal development 
at best also within the borders of the State.  
Moreover, international documents and states’ practice about self-determination support the 
idea that self-determination and independence were interchangeable for colonies, whilst the current 
interpretation of self-determination is better conceived as the self-realisation of the individual within 
																																								 																				
386 The first mention of evolutive interpretation of the Convention was given by the Court in Tyler v. United Kingdom 
(Appl. N. 5856/72), Judgment, 25 April 1978, Series A. no.26, para 31. See in general on ECHR as a living instrument 
G. Letsas: “The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legitimacy”, A. Foellesdal, B. Peters, G. Ulfstein, The 
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v. Austria (Appl. No. 19010/07), Judgement, 19 February 2013; Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, (Appl. No. 29381/09 
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388 This is not tantamount to say that there are two different rights of self-determination. There is only one self-
determination, still it can be exercised in different contexts. See Chapter 1 pp. 15-16. In this sense, scholars often mention 
the declaration of the ICJ Judge Khan in the Namibia case, to claim that there is no internal dimension of the right to self-
determination. Referring to the hearing of a South African official on the possibility that south west Africans’ self-
determination be restricted to autonomy and self-government within the State, the Judge affirmed that “this in effect means 
a denial of self-determination as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations”. Although purposely vague, the 
declaration offers useful points for debate. Arguably, it shows how the right to self-determination has been established as 
a contextual-dependent right in international law. As already stressed, colonialism weight in its definition. Therefore, it 
could be maintained that self-determination has ended its era. However, the inclusion of this right in the 1966 Covenants 
invalidate such a conclusion. Self-determination exists, but, as Judge Khan leads us to think, its understanding has 
changed. As it was showed in the previous chapter, the self-realisation of the individual has been boosted by the 
development of human rights law and has affected self-determination as well. In ultimate analysis therefore, the wording 
of the declaration corroborates the idea that if self-determination has changed to the extent that there is no need to separate 
from the parent State, then secession follows a different path. See ICJ, Legal Consequences for states of the continued 
presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), cit., Declaration of 
President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, p. 63, cited by U. Burten, Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-
Determination, cit., p. 194. 
389 In this sense N. Torbisco Casals, Group Rights as Human Rights, pp. 43-58; see also W. Kimlycka, Politics in the 
Vernacular, Oxford, 2011. 
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the borders of the State. In the Canadian Supreme Court’s judgement on the secession of Quebec, the 
report prepared upon request of the government of Quebec developed an argument towards the 
separation between self-determination and a right to independence.  Equivalence between self-
determination and right to independence has been opposed by claiming that “while the ability to 
exercise a choice undoubtedly lies at the very heart of the principle of self-determination, it does not 
at all follow that sovereignty constitutes in every case one of the elements of this choice”.390 In the 
report, self-determination is labelled as a context-dependent principle, to mean that outside of colonial 
situations it is inappropriate to use it as the basis of a right to achieve independence at the expense of 
the parent State’s integrity. Rather, its main implication is found in the right of a people to “participate 
in its future”.391 
Secession, by contrast, seeks to break the relationship between people and sovereign power at the 
basis of self-determination, both theoretically and pragmatically. For the latter, territory is the primary 
factor for secession.392 The territorial element is fundamental for seceding  claims, whilst it acquires 
a different value in self-determination claims. Quite often, it has been underlined that internal self-
determination aims at fostering the rights of a group, therefore the internal dimension is usually 
referred to as the non-territorial approach to self-determination.393 Members of national sub-units may 
claim their right to participate in the political and social affairs of their country, albeit they are spread 
over the whole territory of the State. In example, people belonging to the roma ethnicity in Hungary 
are sparsely settled in the country, but this does not prevent them from seeking to be recognized by 
the parent State as the bearers of specific protection. By contrast, the rationale underpinning the 
attempts to secede is different. Secession stems from the group’s premise that they do not possess a 
State on their own, therefore contested territory is a major issue.394 In the case of secession, 
international law puts emphasis on the territorial element by opposing the principle of territorial 
integrity to the alleged right of the group to secede. Contested territory is therefore the main point of 
reference for secession.  
The argument can be further supported by revolving to the French expression for self-
determination. The term “droit des peuples à disposer d’eux mêmes” suggests that the right to self-
																																								 																				
390 Expert Report elaborated upon request of the government of Quebec prior to the Reference by T. Frank, R. Higgings, 
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392 M. Shaw: “Self-Determination, Human Rights and the Attribution of Territory”, U. Fastenrath, R. Geiger, A. Paulus, 
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determination is above all a right to choose. It empowers its bearers to decide on their status, both 
internally and externally. Secession, by contrast, implies the creation of a new entity from a pre-
existing State or the incorporation into another entity, but the kin State continues to exist as a legal 
entity in international law. The making of the new nation is often considered a one-shot opportunity, 
to mean that there is only one succeeding attempt to secede.395 By contrast, self-determination has 
been addressed as a continuous right: Rosalyn Higgins, i.e., has extensively argued that self-
determination is a constant entitlement. It could only be so, in her view, given that it is the right 
necessary to ensure a free choice by the people on their social cultural and economic development396. 
On the basis of the aforementioned, the intrinsic nature of secession and self-determination 
appears to be different. Being self-determination the droit des peuples à disposer d’eux memes, it can 
be implemented also through a series of different arrangements. Self-determination conflicts do not 
have to end up necessarily with independence. In fact, the idea that self-determination conflicts can 
be resolved with autonomy settlement has been finding growing support in practice and scholarship, 
above all in Europe. It is not by chance that the international community quickly accepted the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which occurred through agreement among the 
central authorities397. Many EU countries- Italy; Belgium or Spain398- have been trying to reconcile 
groups claims i.e. minorities claims, by forms of autonomy. This has led scholars to claim that “State 
practice with regard to secessionist movements witnessed in Europe does not support the existence 
of a right to secession as an aspect of self-determination”.399 The General Recommendation XXI of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination400 does not link secession to self-
determination. Rather, it distinguishes between secession, which is not recognised under international 
																																								 																				
395 See M. Weller: “there is no secession from secession” in M. Weller: “Settling Self-Determination Conflicts: Recent 
Developments”, European Journal of International Law, 2009, vol. 20, p. 113. The assumption, however, is not fully 
convincing: it was already observed in the text that one risk of the application of the remedial secession theory is that by 
giving to a sub-unit the chance to separate form the parent State, small collective of individuals located in the sub-unit 
may claim the same.  
396 R. Higgins, Problems & Process – International Law and How We Use It. Oxford, 1994, p. 120. On the opposite side 
of the spectrum see Hannum, claiming that once self-determination has been exercised, it cannot be claimed again. H. 
Hannum: “Rethinking Self-Determination”, cit., p. 23-34. 
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law, and other arrangements “reached by free agreements of all parties concerned”.401 Weller lists 
nine different categories of self-determination settlements402: 1) trading self-determination for 
autonomy or enhanced local self-government;4032) regionalism, federalisation or union with 
confirmation of territorial unity; 3) deferring a substantive settlement while agreeing to a settlement 
mechanism;404 4) balancing self-determination claims;405 5) agreeing on self-determination but 
deferring implementation406; 6) establishing a de facto State;407 7) supervised independence;408 8) 
conditional self-determination;409 9) constitutional self-determination. The mise en practice of 
secession and self-determination read along these paths could not be more different. Secession and 
self-determination have different intrinsic features and lead to different results: these two elements 
alone would suffice under strict legal scrutiny to affirm that the overlapping of the notions is 
misleading, yet the other major difference lies in the application rationae personae. 
4.2 Possible units entitled to seek secession 
Absent a binding definition of people, international legal practitioners drive their attention on 
practice. As it was observed in the first Chapter, in the definition of people the territorial element 
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407 This kind of settlement consists in creating an entity without an acknowledged de jure status. In other words, two cases 
can be summarized: 1) an agreement about the de facto configuration of the State or 2) an third party offers to act as 
guarantor for territorial stability of the de facto entity, like the role of the EU in the preservation of the territorial 
boundaries of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
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comes first, alongside language, culture or ethnicity, which count more in the self-conceptualisation 
of the unit per se. It does not come as a surprise that “colonial peoples” claiming independence lived 
in a territory detached from the mother land. In other words, it seems as if the maxim “un État, un 
people” is still valid.410  
If the bearers of self-determination are difficult to determine precisely because there is no 
established definition of people, for secession the issue is worse. There is no legal international 
document recognizing a right to secede in international law, so there cannot be an international agreed 
definition on the bearers of the right to secede. Interestingly enough, it can be observed that the unit 
entitled to claim secession is defined after secession has been exercised. Looking at secessionist 
claims, the process of validation of the new State is unique since international law does not give a 
group the right to separate from the parent State. Secession seems to follow an inverse process of 
recognition compared to that of self-determination. Unlike the latter, if a group succeeds in seceding, 
it will be acknowledged as a people of a new State only after the State has been already constituted, 
to mean that it satisfies the requirements of statehood in international law and it has established 
relations with the other members of the international community.411  
Since many contrasting elements can be found both in State practice and in international 
documents, should we simply acknowledge that there is no unit which can claim a right to secede? 
Here practice and law seem to follow different paths. In the previous pages the study has recalled the 
rationale underpinning the grievances of recent movements seeking secession. In Catalonia, for 
instance, the people feel impeded to realise themselves because, i.e., the Catalan language is not 
taught in school, there are no Catalans in the main governmental position, etc. These claims differ 
from those based on serious violations of human rights. 
Therefore, we can distinguish two paths. On the one side, there is secession in response to 
massive violations of basic human rights of a certain group, but the remedial secession theory is 
questionable under strict legal terms. While the a contrario reading of the Friendly Relations 
Declaration is considered an authoritative interpretation of the Charter by distinguished scholars,412 
the way the majority of states which submitted written or oral statements in the ICJ advisory opinion 
on Kosovo recalled the remedial secession theory was not consistent.413 The ICJ in fact acknowledged 
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differences in the opinio juris. By contrast, the case-law of the African Commission of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights mentioned above acknowledges that human rights violations create situations where 
the persecuted group becomes entitled to create its own sovereign entity.414 In light of the purpose of 
this section, a potential danger resulting from this interpretation is the blurring line between secession 
and the internal dimension of self-determination. The written statement by Germany in the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on the independence of Kosovo is revealing in this sense. In particular, the 
statement reads as follows: “There are those who say that outside a colonial context which is not at 
issues here – a right to secession never exists. This, however, would also render the internal right of 
self-determination meaningless in practice. There would be no remedy for a group which is not 
granted self-determination that may be due to it under international law. The majority in the State 
could easily and with impunity oppress the minority”.415 The statement resumes the basic 
misunderstanding surrounding legal inquiry on territorial changes based on self-determination. Self-
determination does not generate an exceptional entitlement to secession outside the colonial context 
as we have just explained, but rather gives the right to choose a status, be it independence or not. 
Internal self-determination violations may trigger as a response a right to secede, but only as a last 
resort and when connected with massive human rights violations, if one embraces the theory of 
remedial secession.  
On the other side, recent claims to secede such as those presented by the Catalan region, by 
Scotland, Crimea or Quebec suggest a slightly different understanding of self-determination in its 
internal dimension. In particular, claims to secede more and more originate from a combination of 
identity issues – which remain the basic pillar- and minor grievances such as lack of social inclusion 
or fiscal benefits. From the legal standpoint, no indication of the subjects of a right to secede in this 
framework can be found. Only a people exercising a right to self-determination could choose to give 
birth to a new nation. What can be proposed, on a speculative plan, is to refer to what Weller defines 
an “unprivileged unit”. For Weller, a privileged unit is assisted by international law in gathering 
independence, since it is entitled to self-determination. That is the case of classical self-determination 
units – colonies- or people subject to foreign occupation or racist regimes. The international legal 
order not only recognizes the claim of these groups, but it safeguards their struggles by e.g. 
prohibiting third states to provide military support to the parent State.  
																																								 																				
414 See in particular: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (i) Kevin Mgwangwa v. Cameroon, n. 266/03, 
2009, para. 199; (ii) Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, n. 75/92, 1995, at para 6 “In the absence of concrete evidence 
of violations of human rights to the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question and in the 
absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in government as guaranteed by Article 
13(1) of the African Charter, the Commission holds the view that Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-
determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire”. 
415 ICJ, German written Statement no. 54 for the Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, cit., 15 April 2009, pp. 34-35. 
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This is not to say that the unprivileged unit is against international law. The unprivileged unit 
is not in itself internationally unlawful. The point made by Weller is that the unprivileged unit does 
not possess the requirements to claim a right to self-determination. The international legal order does 
not oppose its claim, but is silent to them.416  The entity does not enjoy any right in its attempt to 
obtain statehood.417 Although international law lacks a formal definition of what constitutes a colonial 
unit, General Assembly resolution 1541 could guide the research. According to principle IV, 
territories entitled to decide on their status are those “geographically separate and (is) distinct 
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it”.418 By contrast, the unprivileged unit 
is situated within the State and often it already enjoys a proper internal status that in principle does 
not justify its struggle. It might coincide with a minority, but it is not necessarily a minority group. 
Weller aptly observes that claims by the unprivileged unit are not in breach of a norm of international 
law, but it rests within the domestic jurisdiction of the State to deal with the unit.419 Here comes the 
issue of how claims are brought. The increasing linkage between international law and concepts of 
democratic statehood and human rights theory could serve the purposes of linking secessionist claims 
to democratic participation and human rights in general.420 Along this line of thought, the most 
important tool to foster the autonomous title to secede would be a territorial referendum, carried out 
in compliance with basic international standards. In sum, territorial referenda would render less 
unprivileged the secessionist entity.421 The collateral effect of the referendum would also be that of 
strengthening the legitimacy of secession in the eyes of the international community, given the role 
recognition plays in case of secession.  
However, the existence of an unprivileged unit remains at the moment only an academic 
hypothesis. While it convinces on a pragmatic level, it lacks enough legal supportive arguments. 
International law sides only on the side of the privileged unit, to mean the group that proves itself to 
be a people. This happens, in example, when the Constitution of the parent State recognises the 
presence of more than one people in its territory.422 In all the other cases, international law does not 
offer any sort of protection to the group that seeks to separate from the kin State. We have 
demonstrated that secession cannot be perceived as a dimension of self-determination, thus a sub-unit 
																																								 																				
416 See M. Weller, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, cit., pp. 23-45. 
417 Ibid. at p. 33 
418General Assembly, GA/RES/1541 dated December 15 1960, Principles which Should Guide Members in Determining 
whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information called for under art. 73, Principle IV “ prima facie there is 
an obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate and (is) distinct ethnically 
and/or culturally from the country administering it”. 
419 M. Weller, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, cit., p. 25. 
420 See A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., 
pp. 255-280; J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., pp. 151-168. A. Pellet: “Democratic Secession 
from a Multinational State”, Journal of Ethics, 2002, pp. 558-586.   
421 A. Buchanan: “Democracy and Secession”, M. Moore, Nationalism and Self-Determination, cit., pp. 14-25. 
422 As it was shown for Eritrea and Ethiopia. See this Chapter pp. 52-53. 
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claiming to separate from the kin State cannot in principle resort to the self-determination argument, 
unless the State consents or the unit is recognised – by the Constitution, by domestic Courts- to be a 
people. From the point of view of international law, there is no other unit entitled to secede or claim 
a territorial reapportionment. Caution should be used when linking secession and democratic 
principles. It would be erroneous to argue that a State is legitimate only if it is a democratic one.423 
The last assumption has been attracting consistent support in the international community, but from 
the point of view of the law it remains far from being verified. It should be born in mind that neither 
the oldest democracies are immune from secessionist claims – e.g. the UK. The Arab spring, then, 
shows that people may rebel against an established power without necessarily wishing to have 
democracy after. Nevertheless, the practice of associating legitimate statehood with democratic 
statehood cannot be simply wished away.  If the principles of democratic statehood together with the 
broader understanding of self-determination referred-to so far will gather more strength through State 
practice and international binding documents, this development might boost the acknowledgement of 
new established procedures to carry out a territorial change, even when secession is at stake. In that 
case, international law might be on the side of movements calling for a territorial change by relying 
in particular on the value of the referendum.424 
 
5.    Conclusions 
 This Chapter has tried to develop a systematic approach about the contested issues surrounding 
secession in international law. It was showed that (i) neutrality of international law is not the only 
possible choice for legal scholars approaching secession and (ii) the normative due process model 
helps in understanding the ongoing trends in international law on secession because it enables the 
researcher to overcome the neutral approach of international law vis-à-vis secessionist struggles. 
However, the model is not totally free from ambiguities, so that secession still in 2017 rests in a legal 
vacuum. Among scholars, the remedial right theory has gained support over the time, due also to the 
impact it has on human rights law. As regards states’ approach to the theory, the picture is more 
blurred. The international community has proven not to be blind to massive violations occurring 
																																								 																				
423 See D. Copp: “Democracy and Communal Self-Determination”, J. Mac Mahan and R. McKim (eds.), The Morality of 
Nationalism, New-York-Oxford, 1997, p. 16. D. Philpott: “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Journal of Ethics, 1993, 
vol. 105, p. 352-355. See also A. Peters: “ The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial 
Referendum”, cit.,  arguing that the unit of the right to self-determination in the end is the individual. The latter argument 
will be presented in the next chapter. 
424 The logic consequence of the proposal elaborated thus far would be analysing what happens once an entity has been 
created throughout a unilateral secession. The issue of recognition plays a pivotal role in the success of a secession. 
However, since the subject of this thesis is the interrelation between secession and territorial referendum, it seems more 
accurate to deal with recognition at the end of the research. Introducing the topic at this stage and the ncoming back to it 
elsewhere in the text would be overly confusing. 
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within the territory of a State. Anyway, the idea that under specific circumstances these violations 
may trigger a right to secede cannot but be opposed by the majority of the states. In this Chapter some 
critics have been advanced to the theory: overall, the rationale underpinning the remedial secession 
theory has some backsides, in that the theory offers a solution for separation, not for cohesion, even 
thought secession was actually the result of lack of social cohesion. Arguably, difficulties in applying 
the remedial right theory originate from different grounds: on the one hand, there is no agreement on 
who is the bearer of the right to secede, given that for self-determination itself there is no definition 
of people. Legal inquiry on these topics is quite rare, indeed. There are few documents upon which 
scholars could rely and the issue is inextricably linked with minorities’ and indigenous rights, so that 
it is difficult to restrict the scope of the analysis. Good insights could come from the description of 
people developed in a 1989 report of UNESCO. At the International Meeting of Experts the 
discussants elaborated a description – not a definition- of the main requirements a group should 
possess to consider itself a people. A people can be found when there is a group of individual human 
beings 1. “who enjoy some or all of the following common features: (a) a common historical tradition; 
(b) racial or ethnic identity; (c) cultural homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological 
affinity; (f) territorial connection; (g) common economic life”. The group has to be 2. “of a certain 
number which need not be large (e.g. the people of micro States) but which must be more than a mere 
association of individuals within a State; 3. the group as a whole must have the will to be identified 
as a people or the consciousness of being a people - allowing that groups or some members of such 
grows, though sharing the foregoing characteristics, may not have that will or consciousness; and 
possibly”. Lastly, 4. “the group must have institutions or other means of expressing its common 
characteristics and will for identity”.425 States have not embraced the description probably due to the 
fact that many groups could rely on it. Although the third requirement of self-consciousness is 
difficult to be proven by a claimant, the others -if interpreted broadly- would allow many sub-units 
to call themselves “people”. On the other hand, the obstacle is the lack of practice. As it was showed, 
Bangladesh was admitted to the UN only after Pakistan had recognised it. For Kosovo, the critical 
date for claiming a right to secede casts doubts on the applicability of the remedial right theory. 
Nevertheless, critiques as to the lack of practice and the concentration of the precedents over a brief 
period – the 90ies with the end of the Cold War- should be taken with caution too. It would be 
pretentious to expect abundant practice in an area as exceptional as that of secession and creation of 
statehood. While domestic conflicts in which the right to self-determination or to secede are invoked 
are frequent, the success of those struggles is not as common due to the competing factors influencing 
																																								 																				
425 UNESCO, Report of the International Meeting of Experts on further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples, 
Paris 27-30 November 1989, SHS-89/CONF.602/7, p. 8. 
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the final outcome. By contrast, some authors have even contended that the cases of Kosovo - or 
Abkhazia and Ossetia could show the inexistence of the theory:  Oeter for instance, uses the maxim 
“hard cases make bad law” to mean that the uniqueness of these cases does not change the law, but 
even worsen it. Cases study cannot help in proving the applicability of the remedial secession as they 
are too specific and generalisations are not practicable.426 Even when secession is justified by 
exceptional causes, third States have pushed for a concerted answer with the parent State by means 
of negotiation.427  
 In light of the above, this Chapter has found the normative due process theory persuasive. The 
theory presents a convincing alternative to the neutral approach towards secession, without totally 
refusing it. In fact, the normative due process focuses on the procedure of secession, but it confirms 
that the respect of procedural requirements does not create a legal title to establish a new subject of 
international law. In other words, the analysis does not touch upon the validity of the principle of 
effectiveness and the fulfilment of the criteria for establishing statehood. International practice 
supports the soundness of the model, in that seceding units consistently resorted to referenda to justify 
their claim, compliance with the uti possidetis principle was ensured as well as the prohibition of the 
use of force. Even though the case of Crimea puts into question the soundness of the normative due 
process, the legality of secession in the case at stake is superseded by what qualifies as an unlawful 
annexation.  
 In this Chapter, the procedural set of requirements for secession at the international level was 
applied to recent cases of secession. The decision was grounded on the premise that secession is not 
a declination of self-determination. Disentangling secession from self-determination is not only 
appropriate, but also necessary with a view to better frame the current trends about secession and self-
determination in practice. Secession and self-determination are not only ontologically different, but 
they are also covered by different rules. More and more, claims for separation are based on arguments 
of respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights, especially in the context of minority 
rights, which have never lost their importance for territorial changes, due also to the consolidation of 
the role of the European Union.428 In this framework, one requirement of the due process of secession 
arose prominently: the referendum. Hence, it is now time to see whether the referendum is a necessary 
and sufficient conditions for secession. 
 
																																								 																				
426 S. Oeter: “Recognition and non-Recognition with regard to secession”, in da C. Walter (eds.), Secession and Self-
Determination in International Law, cit., pp. 59-61. 
427 S. Oeter: “Recognition and non-Recognition with regard to secession”, in da C. Walter (eds.), Secession and Self-
Determination in International Law, cit., p. 64; J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., pp.734-740. 
428 P. Pazartis: “Secession and International Law, the European Dimension”, M.G. Kohen, Secession in International 
Law, cit., p. 371. 
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Chapter 3  
Territorial Referenda: Will of the People and Statehood in International Law 
 
In the Introduction, it was contended that territorial referenda lie at the intersection between 
international and domestic law. Political scientists too have focused their attention on the use of 
referendum, merely from the point of view of the decision-making process leading to a referendum 
for territorial changes. In light of the interrelation between peoples’ wishes and creation of statehood, 
it can be argued that territorial referenda trigger legal principles of both international and 
constitutional law, notably with respect to self-determination and sovereignty. As regards the former, 
self-determination gets into the arena due to the continuous reliance on this right by sub-units seeking 
to organise a territorial referendum.429 As regards sovereignty, the constitution of a State might itself 
define the terms and conditions for resort to referendum in cases of territorial reapportionment. This 
is what happened in the case of Burma,430 whose Constitution envisaged a possible reapportionment 
validated by a decision of the people. This Chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the international 
legal aspects and not directly to the legal inquiry about referenda in the domain of constitutional law: 
the aim of this Chapter is to inquiry on whether according to international law a referendum is 
sufficient to legally justify, or rather it has to be held every time a territorial change in the form of 
secession occurs without being a sufficient condition for secession. A norm legitimising secession is 
absent in international treaty law, all the more so a norm legitimising secession through a referendum. 
Therefore, to answer the research questions it is necessary to look at custom: in particular, it has to 
be found if referenda have historically been consistently used to legitimise a secession or at least a 
territorial change as well as whether a opinio juris already exists.  
Scholarly literature has considered the existence of a custom in the use of referenda rooted in 
plebiscites established under the 1919 Versailles Treaty.431 The present Chapter will begin from this 
period, but will end up disregarding the position just mentioned. As a preliminary remark, the number 
of plebiscites and referenda carried out since the end of WW I is so big that it could be as such the 
																																								 																				
429 This view was presented in the Introduction, with the example of Moldova.  It was recalled that Art. 11 of the 
Constitution of Moldova recognizes the autonomy of the Gagauz region. The Gagauz Autonomy Act enables the 
establishment of the autonomous region, albeit still an integral part of Moldova ex art. 1(1). According to the same 
provision, the granting of autonomy is a “manifestation of the right to self-determination”. See P. Järve: “Gagauzia and 
Moldova: Experiences in Power Sharing”, M. Weller, B. Metzger (eds.), Settling Self-Determination Issues, cit., pp. 320-
323 and D. Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., p. 286.  
430 In the Introduction to this study – pp. 6-7- it was claimed that the Constitution of Burma, dated 1947, granted the right 
to secede to minorities settled within the Union of Burma. In particular, minority groups were entitled to exercise their 
right to secede ten years after the entry into force of the Burmese constitution 
431 See next section. 
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object of a research. For the purposes of the study at stake, a selection of post World War I 
consultations is thus required. Needless to say, conducting a selective analysis will inevitably leave 
some readers with perplexity and is subject to criticism, even when selection criteria are provided. 
The criteria used for choosing plebiscites in this research is grounded on an analysis of the monograph 
by Wambaugh, who gave an exhaustive perusal of all the plebiscites conducted on the basis of the 
Treaty of Versailles and Saint Germain.432 The guideline is choosing  those consultations which had 
either (i) a very negative effect on the communities within the area and on the definition of the external 
borders of States or (ii) resulted in a success and ended up to constitute a model of best practices for 
popular consultations about territorial changes, as precisely documented by Wambaugh. From the 
analysis it will be discerned that there is no sufficient proof to claim that the use of popular 
consultations is compulsory for territorial changes. As a consequence, referenda are not a compulsory 
requirement for unilateral secession. Nevertheless, in light of the similarities shared by referenda and 
plebiscite, there are elements to claim that referenda may become a necessary step for secession, 
although for the formation of a general rule more practice and opinio juris is needed. 
International law discourse about territorial referenda is relatively recent, given that before the 
“waves” of independence undergone in the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, the main issue 
at stake was the resort to plebiscites. Indeed these terms – plebiscite and referendum- are often 
mentioned interchangeably when referring to popular consultations on territorial issues under 
international law.433 The present study rejects this tendency. In the next pages, it is assumed that 
consultations conducted between 1918 and 1935 should be considered plebiscites, which are different 
from referenda in terms of 1) legal basis; 2) majority requirement; 3) effects of the consultation. 
Moving forward in time, over the last two decades, preference has been given to the word referendum 
on a twofold basis. The increase in democratic forms of government has fostered the use of 
referendum worldwide. The referendum, in fact, has been considered the principal means of direct 
democracy. Secondly, and by contrast, the word plebiscite echoes the resort to popular consultations 
typical of dictatorial regimes.434 
 
 
																																								 																				
432 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, Carniege, 1933 and for an up to date account of the referenda carried 
out worldwide see the database of the Centre for Direct Democracy related to the Law School of the University of Zurich 
in Switzerland, at https://www.c2d.ch/inner.php?table=dd_db&link_id=61&parent_id=61  
433 See i.e. the reappraisal about the referendum given by Y. Beigbeder for the Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, last updated June 2011, available online through the Oxford Public International Law browser, at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1088  
434 Ibid. 
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1. Plebiscites and referenda: two terms for two types of popular consultations 
 
The difference between plebiscites and referenda is subtle. In fact, as anticipated, historically 
the terms have been used interchangeably. A first semantic distinction can be found in the words of 
de Visscher. Referring to the different modalities to ascertain the will of the people, de Visscher 
argues that the term plébescite international belongs only to a specific type of popular consultation. 
It includes consultations that find their legal basis in either a multilateral or a bilateral treaty. 
Plebiscites held following a decision of an international organisation also fall in this category. 
Moreover, according to de Visscher, the distinguishing feature of a plébescite international should 
be the control by an international committee composed by representatives of States not affected by 
the territorial change at stake.435 For Muller, then, plebiscites usually are non-binding polls, whilst a 
referendum with an overwhelming majority “automatically brings the government to enact laws”.436  
The term referendum has become the main expression of direct democracy, especially through 
the huge practice within the Swiss legal system.437 When Switzerland became a Federation, the 
referendum was introduced as the tool to support the government. Regulated by the Constitution, the 
referendum is the device used by the people to (i) make political decisions, or (ii) deny consent about 
the adoption of a norm.438  In fact, it can be initiated by the people in accordance with the terms and 
conditions established for by the Constitution.439 Moving to another example, in Australia, referenda 
are regulated by the Constitution, while plebiscites can be organized on the basis of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 in combination with specific regulations adopted by the 
Parliament. A referendum under art. 128 of the Australian Constitution is used to approve a proposed 
revision of the Constitution, once the Parliament has passed the resolution.440 Referenda are structured 
on a yes or no basis and require a double majority, notably a positive vote by both the majority of the 
																																								 																				
435 P. de Visscher : “Le Plébiscite International”, F. Delpérée (Ed.), La Participation Directe du Citoyen à la Vie Politique 
et Administrative, Travaux des XXIIes Journeés d’études juridiques Jean Dabin, Bruxelles, 1986, p. 144, cited by I. G. 
Sen, Sovereignty Referenda in International and Constitutional Law, New York- Dordrecht-London, 2015, p. 72.  
436 R.A. Muller: “Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy”, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 2003, vol. 41, p. 631. 
437 Alongside referenda established under each cantonal system, the Constitution of the Swiss Confederation envisages 
three types of referenda. The intiative popularire referendaire under art.139 allows 10000 citizens to request a partial 
modification of the Federal Constitution. The referendum facultatif gives Swiss citizens the right to express their views 
about a law adopted by the federal Assembly. It requires a minimum threshold of 50000 signatures to be reached within 
50 days form the publication of the act. Lastly, the referendum obligatoire at art. 140 calls Swiss nationals to vote before 
the Parliament proceeds with a constitutional modification. On the average, Swiss nationals vote four times per year. See 
www.eda.admin.ch. 
438 L. Leduc, The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referenda in Global Perspective, Petersborough, 2003. 
439 K.W. Kobak, The Referendum: Direct Democracy in Switzerland, Aldershot, Brukfield, 1993, pp. 20-35. N. 
Abdelgabar: “International Law and Constitutional Making Process: the Right to Public Participation in the 
Constitutional Making Process in post-Referendum Sudan”, Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, 2013, vol. 46, n. 2, pp. 
131-151. 
440 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 9 July 1901 as amended by the Constitution Alteration (Referendums) 
Act 1977.    
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voters in States and the majority of the voters of the country.441 Plebiscites, instead, can be organized 
by the Australian Electoral Committee under sec.7A of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, as 
amended by 2007 Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Democratic Plebiscites) Bill.442 The 
amendment allows the Electoral Committee to undertake any plebiscite on the amalgamation of any 
local government body in Australia, as well as on issues of public interest, such as social rights or 
public utilities, i.e. transportation.  
Although this study supports their differentiation, the interchangeable use of the terms 
plebiscite and referendum at the domestic level can be partially justified by the fact that in some 
countries a combination of plebiscites and referendum is used. Another example is the already 
mentioned UK’s referendum required to carry out the devolution of powers to Scotland and Wales. 
The decision to hold a referendum was taken in the process of adoption of the Devolution Act443 and 
the entry into force was subject to popular approval, albeit referenda are not envisaged under the 
British system since they are perceived as infringement of the sovereignty of the Parliament. Turning 
to the international level, instead, the roots of the interchangeable use of the terms plebiscites and 
referenda for territorial changes date back to the end of World War I. A summary of the main 
differences between these two types of consultation can be found below. 
2. At the origins of popular consultations on territorial changes: the plebiscites 
 
Practice on popular consultations about territorial changes dates back to the French Revolution. 
Between 1791 and 1792 many territories were incorporated among France’s possessions after a 
plebiscite: Comtat-Venaissin and Avignon, Savoy, Mulhouse and Rhineland are only a few 
examples.444 Plebiscites were carried out also for the unification of Italy (1860-1870) and for the 
transfer of the Swedish island of Saint Benthèlemy to France in 1877.445 In this general overview, 
further proof of the role played by popular consultations can be inferred from the Draft Constitution 
of France of 1793. It reads as follows : “La République française renonce solennellement à réunir à 
son territoire des contrées étrangers, sinon d’après le vœu librement émis de la majorité des 
habitants, et dans le cas seulement ou les contrées qui solliciteront cette réunion ne seront pas 
incorporées et unies à une autre nation, en vertu d’un pacte social, exprimé dans une constitution 
																																								 																				
441Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, cit., section 128, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/elections/referendums/Referendums_Overview.htm 
442 Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Democratic Plebiscites) Bill, Act. N. 157, 24 September 2007, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r2868 
443 See Chapter 2 pp. 53-55. 
444 See Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections, Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 
1994., pp. 78-80. 
445 Y. Beigbeder: “Referendum”, Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, cit. 
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antérieure et librement consentie”.446 Although the paragraph puts emphasis on the free will of the 
people, during the French Revolution plebiscites did not occur in a pacific atmosphere. Popular 
consultations were organised with military troops standing in the territory, thus it is hard to imagine 
that the people could express their choice freely. Besides, as noted by Beigbeder, before World War 
I, many annexations – such as those carried out by the USA in Louisiana, Florida or Texas and by 
Prussia in Schleswig in 1867 – did not take place with a plebiscite.447 Hall’s comment on the utility 
of plebiscites in international law is illuminating in this sense. The distinguished commentator 
observed that “the principle that the wishes of a population are to be consulted when the territory 
which they inhabit is ceded has not been adopted in International Law, and cannot be adopted into 
it until title by conquest has disappeared”.448 German lawyers such as Hotzendorf and Liever 
maintained that plebiscites were wrong because they subjected the minority to the rule of simple 
majority without protection.449 Other commentators pointed out that for cession of territories, the 
consent was not needed: Alvarez opposed the use of plebiscites by stressing that each time they were 
used in European countries, it was because the concerned annexing State felt confident about the 
result of the vote. Whenever there might be chances of adverse result, the population of the territory 
concerned was not consulted.450 New trends emerged after the end of the First World War, albeit the 
issue of consent will be a constant within the debate over territorial changes.  
2.1 Main requirements of the Plebiscites carried out after World War I  
 
After World War I the debate over popular consultations revolved around setting the borders of 
the defeated powers. The relevant peace treaties signed at the end of the war are the Versailles Treaty 
between the victorious powers and Germany, and the Treaty of Saint-Germain between the Allies and 
Austria. In particular, plebiscites developed with regard to the redrawing of boundaries with France, 
																																								 																				
446 Art. 2, Title XIII of the Draft Constitution presented by the Condorcet to the National Convention on 15 February 
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447 Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., p. 79. 
448 W.E. Hall, International Law, Oxford, 1880, p. 40. 
449 B. He: “Referenda as a Solution to the National-Identity/boundary Question: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical 
Literature”, Alternatives, 2002, vol. 27, at p.67 citing P. Goodhart, Referendum London, 1971, pp. 107-108.  
450 See F.L. Jones: “Plebiscites”, Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 13, Problems of Peace and War, Papers before 
the Society in the Year 1927, p. 167, referring to the Circular by the Peruvian Foreign Office on the Arica and Tacna 
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the American Arbitrators J.J Pershing and W. Lassiter appointed by the USA President C. Coolildge. The arbitrators 
picked up the rules of the Ancon treaty and proposed a new plebiscite. See the Report of International Arbitral Awards at 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_II/921-958.pdf. Once again the parties were not able to agree on the terms for the 
organisation of the plebiscite. A solution to the dispute came only with the negotiations conducted by F. Kellogg, who 
managed to bring the parties to sign the Lima agreement in 1929. See on the dispute J.F. Wilson, The United States, Chile 
and Peru in the Tacna and Arica Plebiscite, New York, 1979. 
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Belgium and Poland. At the Paris Peace Conference, resort to popular consultations to settle frontiers 
dispute was considered the corollary of the principle of self-determination introduced by Wilson.451 
The premise was that the peoples’ right to decide their international status could be put into practice 
through plebiscites. In the first Chapter, it was showed that while for Lenin self-determination 
involved secession through the use of force, Wilson’s approach focused on peaceful achievement of 
self-determination. For Wilson, self-determination was to be realised by means of a plebiscite and in 
conformity with reports issued by international commissions of experts.452 In sum, the issue between 
the parties was whether a popular consultation was needed to support the territorial change, not the 
redefinition of the boundaries as such.453 The Wilsonian being the prevailing view, territorial 
realignments found their basis in an international agreement, be it a multilateral treaty, a peace treaty 
or even a bilateral agreement.454  
In light of the above, plebiscites consisted in the approval of a decision. Thus, they were not 
directly the expression of a wish by the population which the parent State had to accept and resulting 
in a new territorial status.455 In fact, it could well happen that territorial changes were not formally 
included in the peace treaties. The fate of many territories was decided with secret treaties between 
the major powers, albeit those same territorial allocations were discussed during the peace 
negotiations.456 This holds true for Schleswig, Allstein, Upper Silesia and Saar Basin, but also for the 
attempted plebiscites in Teschen and Vilna. In addition, it seems as if plebiscites were not considered 
definitive pronouncements on the borders of the State, since the final binding decision was left to a 
body apart, notably the Council of the League.457 Thus, they were practically merely consultative.  
The basic requirements for holding a plebiscite can be derived from the third part of the Versailles 
Treaty. As anticipated, the Versailles Treaty required frontiers “to be fixed in conformity with the 
																																								 																				
451 See Chapter 1 pp. 17-18. 
452 A. Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 21. 
453 See F.L. Jones, Plebiscites, cit., p. 169; A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of 
the Territorial Referendum”, C. Callies (ed.), Staat und Mensch im Kontext des Völker- und Europarechts. Liber 
Amicorum für Torsten Stein, Baden-Baden, 2015, p. 265. 
454 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, cit., pp. 440; A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse 
of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., pp. 255–280.  
455 On this point A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, 
cit., pp. 255-259 and the contribution to the EJIL Blog, “Sense and Nonsense of Territorial Referenda in Ukraine, and 
Why the 16 March Referendum in Crimea Does Not Justify Crimea’s Alteration of Territorial Status under International 
Law”, April 16, 2014, http://www.ejiltalk.org/sense-and-nonsense-of-territorial-referenda-in-ukraine-and-why-the-16-
march-referendum-in-crimea-does-not-justify-crimeas-alteration-of-territorial-status-under-international-law/. 
456 For example, between 1915 and 1917 Russia signed with the Allies a Treaty by which it was promised Constantinople 
and the Dardanelles. In exchange, Russia promised to leave the Alsace-Lorraine to France and the Saar Coal Basin. 
Moreover, Russia the UK and France would divide among themselves Syria and Mesopotamia. See for reference V. 
Mainetti: “Les traités secrets en Droit International”, P. Zen-Ruffinen (ed.), Le secret et le Droit, Zurich, 2004, pp. 399-
420. 
457 M. Suksi, Bringing in the People, cit., p. 245.  
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wishes of the population”458 for: 1) Schleswig and Holstein,459 the borders between Germany and 
Denmark; 2) Allstein, Marienwerder, Sopron and Upper Silesia, the borders between Poland and 
Germany460 and 3) the region of the Saar, which was put under the administration of the League of 
Nations.461 Plebiscites established by the Versailles Treaty should i) take place in a neutralised 
territory; ii) be held under the supervision of neutral international forces, that is by States not directly 
interested in the territorial re-apportionment; iii) be formulated through a multi-choice question; iv) 
be conducted with the establishment of an international commission for monitoring the plebiscite.462 
In fact, the task to organise popular consultations was given to an international commission.463   
a) Neutralisation of territory and appointment of an International Commission 
 
Plebiscites were realised thorough the neutralisation of the territory at stake, by means of 
withdrawal or reduction of the presence of the troops of the concerned States. While the idea of 
drafting a provision on the holding of popular consultation in a bilateral treaty dates back to 1857, 
when the plebiscites in Wallachia and Moldavia were established by agreement between the 
victorious powers and Turkey464 - the neutralisation of a territory was a novelty. Each plebiscite 
established under the Versailles Treaty asked for the evacuation of the German troops so that the 
																																								 																				
458 Versailles Treaty, signed at Paris, July 5, 1920. The formulation is reiterated in the provisions regulating the holding 
of each plebiscite. In particular at art. 35 “The League of Nations shall decide on the sovereignty under which the territory 
is to be placed, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed by the voting” referring to the Saar plebiscite; 
art. 47 “In order to make in due time permanent provision for the government of the Saar Basin in accordance with the 
wishes of the populations, France and Germany agree to the provisions of Chapter III of the Annex hereto”; section five 
ruling on the Alsace Lorraine, at the preamble reads as follows “The High Contracting Parties, recognising the moral 
obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population 
of Alsace and Lorraine”; art. 94 for East Prussia: “In the area between the southern frontier of East Prussia, as described 
in Article 28 of Part II (Boundaries of Germany) of the present Treaty, and the line described below, the inhabitants will 
be called upon to indicate by a vote the State to which they wish to belong”.   
459 Versailles Treaty, cit., artt.109-110. 
460 Ibid. artt. 88, 94-97 with annexes. 
461 Other plebiscites, such as that of Klagenfurt, were established under the Treaty of Saint-Germain. Lastly, there were 
two attempts to hold popular consultations in Teschen and Vilna. See Treaty of Saint-Germain, signed at Saint-Germain-
en-Laye (Paris), September 10, 1919, entered into force on July 16, 1920, art. 50. 
462 See M. Suksi, Bringing in the People, cit., 1993, pp. 242-243; I. G. Sen, Sovereignty Referenda in International and 
Constitutional Law, cit., pp. 79-82. 
463 The system used for Eupen and Malmedy derogated to this model. According to the Versailles Treaty, cit., art. 34: 
“During the six months after the coming into force of this Treaty, registers will be opened by the Belgian authority at 
Eupen and Malmedy in which the inhabitants of the above territory will be entitled to record in writing a desire to see 
the whole or part of it remain under German sovereignty. The results of this public expression of opinion will be 
communicated by the Belgian Government to the League of Nations, and Belgium undertakes to accept the decision of 
the League” The voters were required to choose between two registers to be signed in, one for Germany and one for 
Belgium respectively. However, transcriptions were controlled by the Belgian authorities only. Indeed, the Versailles 
Treaty stipulated that “Germany renounces in favour of Belgium all rights and title over the territory comprising the 
whole of the Kreise of Eupen and of Malmedy”. In practice, the population was called to register once sovereignty over 
the territory had already been transferred to Belgium. Moreover, no period of pre-election silence was envisaged.  See-
F.L. Jones: “Plebiscites”, cit., p. 169 
464 S. Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites (with a Collection of Official Documents), Oxford, 1923, pp. 110-130; E. 
Brahm: “Election Monitoring”, G. Burgess and H. Burgess (eds.), Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium, 
University of Colorado, Boulder, 2013, available online http://www.beyondintractability.org/eric-brahm.jsp. 
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territory could be placed under the authority of an international commission.465 For Wambaugh, the 
insistence of the international community on the evacuation of armies from the occupied territories 
before the proposed vote was a “proof of how definitely the world repudiated the idea that a plebiscite 
should merely sanctify a fait accomplì”.466 
As far as the establishment of the international commission is concerned, the body was tasked 
with general powers of administration, that is to say with all necessary tools to ensure the freedom, 
fairness and secrecy of the vote.467 According to Wambaugh,468 three fundamental principles 
governed the commissions established to administer plebiscites. First, they should not change the 
status quo of the territory, thus being as much discrete as possible. Second, they should “leave as 
much as possible to local citizens”.469 Finally, they should ensure that third parties acted as “possible 
guardians of their own interests”.470  It can be concluded that international commissions for 
plebiscites were conceived as temporary, ad hoc bodies, tasked only with the powers necessary to 
ensure an effective and expeditious consultation. The general powers granted to the commissions 
should not lead to underestimate their role. For instance, in highly contested territories such as for the 
plebiscite in Upper Silesia, the commission “enjoy all the powers exercised by the German or the 
Prussian Government, except those of legislation or taxation”.471 The powers given to the 
commission seem very extensive, to the extent that it could also remove officials from office in case 
of maladministration. The commission in fact removed two judges, one public prosecutor and some 
low-ranked officials.472 The powers attributed are the expression of a considerable credit given to the 
Commissions, and is a sign that they were considered essential to guarantee the avoidance of frauds.  
b) Eligibility to vote and legal value of the vote 
Twenty years old was the minimum age requirement, thus, regardless of gender, all those who 
resided in the concerned territory at the date of the signature of the treaty which set the border dispute 
could vote.473 Nevertheless, the universal suffrage should not lead to think that the wishes of the 
																																								 																				
465 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, cit., p. 451. 
466 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the War, cit., p. 445. 
467 Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring on Plebiscites, cit., p. 81. 
468 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, cit., p. 450. 
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid. 
471See Versailles Treaty, cit., annex to Section VIII. By contrast, the Treaty of Saint-Germain did not give to the 
established commission for plebiscites general powers of administration. Thus, the commission nominated for the 
plebiscite in Klangenfurt had only the duty to control that the territory was administered impartially. However, given that 
the Saint Germain treaty called the commission to ensure freedom and secrecy of the vote, in practice the Commission 
enjoyed huge powers as well. See on this point S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, cit., p. 453-455. 
472 Ibid.  
473 Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., p. 81; G.S. Kaeckenbeeck: “Upper Silesia Under the League 
of Nations”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,1946, vol. 243, pp.129-133. 
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people were considered the decisive element for setting the disputes. Votes were, as mentioned above, 
consultative. This characteristic can be seen by taking the example of Upper Silesia. Access to natural 
resources in the region was the underpinning reason of the quarrels between Germany and Poland. 
Germany claimed that historically the region had never been under the authority of Poland, 
notwithstanding the fact that part of the population spoke Polish. The Allied powers had to 
acknowledge that Poland had no legal claim for cession of Upper Silesia, but in order not to give to 
Germany a considerable source of power for reconstruction, they declared that the destiny of Upper 
Silesia should be decided on the basis of a plebiscite.474  
The plebiscite of 20 March 1921 was in favour of Germany, but figures were so varied among the 
communes that the Allied Council deferred the case to the Council of the League. Political 
considerations, such as the need to ensure some possessions to Germany with a view to avoid the 
development of revenge policies, weighted more than the final results of the plebiscite. The Allied 
powers wanted to punish Germany, but were well aware that with a view to guarantee a lasting peace 
some concessions to the defeated power needed to be accepted. Basing its decision on a combination 
of geographical and economic arguments as well as on the results of the plebiscites, the Council 
established that Germany would be assigned the industrial area, while Poland the rural one, notably 
the biggest portion of territory.475 Admittedly, the results of the plebiscite were taken into 
consideration, but they were not the decisive element.  
In addition, there were also cases in which the international community failed to hold popular 
consultations. In this sense, the main pitfall of the Versailles system is exemplified by Vilna and 
Teschen. For Vilna, the League of Nations was meant to be involved in the organisation of the 
plebiscite, but the vote did not take place.476 After the independence of Lithuania, Vilna had been 
declared the capital of the country, but Poland had a claim over it and advanced its troops until the 
city was occupied. In September 1920, the Council of the League managed to bring the parties to sign 
a cease-fire and establish a demarcation line, together with a “demarcation force”.477 During the 
negotiations the Council proposed a plebiscite for Vilna to set definitely the dispute. A peace 
agreement was signed, yet Poland and Lithuania made it last briefly due to divergences on how to 
execute it and on the holding of a plebiscite, that Poland accepted with resistance. Fights between the 
parties gain momentum again in 1925. In 1927 the Council managed to pacify the area, but the price 
																																								 																				
474 Versailles Treaty’s art. 88 and the six regulations annexed to laid down the conditions for the organisation of public 
consultation in Upper Silesia. See also H.F. Armstrong: “Versailles: Retrospect”, Foreign Affairs, 1 October 1932, vol. 
11, pp. 173-189. 
475 F.L. Jones: “ Plebiscites”, cit.,  p. 169. 
476 M. Suksi, Bringing in the People, cit., pp. 242-243. 
477 See Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., pp. 190-192. In particular, the author refers to the 
demarcation force as the ancestors of the peace-keeping operations. 
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to pay was the cancellation of the plebiscite. Diplomatic means superseded any prospect of popular 
consultation for the area.478  
Indeed, Vilna was not the only example of failed plebiscite. Teschen is another example. The 
area was contested between Poland and Czechoslovakia for historical, economic and ethnic reasons. 
When World War I ended, Czech and Polish authorities signed a temporary agreement479 with a view 
to sign a final treaty on the issue. Territorial borders were supposed to mirror the division between 
ethnic communities, but the exercise resulted in an economic advantage for Czechoslovakia, that had 
the best areas in terms of resources. Frictions between the parties developed after the decision by the 
government of Poland to hold parliamentary elections in the area under its control, opposing the 
existing delimitation of frontiers. Troops by both parties were mobilized at the frontiers and three 
days before the elections the Czechoslovak troops invaded the Polish territory. The affair was 
resolved at the Paris Peace Conference, when the issue was deferred to the Supreme Council of the 
League. Unsurprisingly, an international plebiscite commission was appointed, tasked with 
organizing a popular consultation. Polish and Czechoslovak troops were withdrawn and they were 
replaced by troops of States not affected by the dispute, notably France and Italy. However, 
withdrawal of the troops together with the chaotic situation created by the collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire led to internal riots which the Allies were not able to quell. As a result, it was 
impossible to hold the plebiscite and the matter was referred to the Council of the League.480 Like for 
Vilna, a diplomatic solution was preferred to the holding of a plebiscite. What do the cases just 
mentioned show? They demonstrate that although plebiscites were envisaged by the Versailles treaty, 
they were conceived as one among the possible tools to be used to solve frontiers disputes. In fact, 
they were not universally organised for frontiers disputes and their results were balanced with foreign 
politics needs. Therefore, it might be argued that there was no perceived legal obligation concerning 
plebiscites about territorial changes. However, this is not tantamount to say that the at the international 
level they gradually disappeared. In fact, the organisation and management of the plebiscite in the 
region of the Saar, dated January 1935, was a success for the League of Nations as will be showed in 
the next paragraph. 
2.2 The League of Nations and popular consultations: the Plebiscite in the Saar Basin 
In the introduction to this Chapter, it was pointed out that except for the Saar Basin plebiscite, 
consultations were not carried out under the League of Nations auspices. Moreover, it was just 
																																								 																				
478 Y. Beigbeder, ibid. See A. E. Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question 1920-1928, Leiden, 1966, 
pp. 47-60.  
479 The agreement was signed on November 5 1918, before Poland declared independence on the 28th of October 1918. 
480 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, cit., p. 550-554. 
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anticipated that the experience of the Saar plebiscite was successful. The fact that the international 
community managed to solve a dispute by requiring the expression of the wishes of the population 
has to be highlighted. On the one hand, it is a sign of the changes occurring within the international 
community, which started to work on a multilateral rather than bilateral basis - as it was seen with 
the other plebiscites involving the redefinition of borders. On the other hand, the success of the Saar 
Basin exercise supports the view that international monitoring, when carried out properly, can 
effectively ensure a peaceful territorial change.481  
Firstly, a brief reappraisal of the facts: France had demanded that Saar Basin should become 
part of its territory as compensation for the losses sustained during the War. The Allies decided that 
the Saar region should be placed under the international supervision of the League of Nations.482 
After fifteen years, the question of sovereignty would be solved by calling the Saarlanders to a 
plebiscite. The vote was carried out under the auspices of the League with a huge organisation. An 
international commission of five members was nominated to supervise the vote, together with a 
plebiscite commission of experts.483 The plebiscite commission was made of States not affected by 
the dispute, notably Sweden, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. The same countries deployed 950 
officials to safeguard the conduct of the vote under a British commander. It was, indeed, the first and 
last time an international monitoring mission under the aegis of the League of Nations was 
instructed.484 Besides, a Supreme Plebiscite Tribunal and eight district tribunals were put in place. 
The district tribunals in particular were created to protect the inhabitants against injustices on account 
of their attitude during the electoral campaign. 
The vote took place on 13 January 1935. The plebiscite’s question was made of three 
alternatives. The Saarlanders were asked to choose between 1) maintenance of the trusteeship regime; 
2) union with France and 3) union with Germany. The results showed a preference for Germany. As 
																																								 																				
481 Beigbeder however observes that the success of the Saar Plebiscite was counterbalanced by a big failure for the League 
in the Sanjak case between 1937 and 1938. Sanjak was a district in the north of Syria that was claimed by Turkey in light 
of the presence of a considerable Turkish minority. Following quarrels with France – the trustee country- Turkey asked 
the Council of the League to consider the situation in the Sanjak. The League decided that the area should remain part of 
Syria, but that it should enjoy substantial autonomy. The League of Nations was supposed to organise elections for the 
Sanjak government, but the Turkish minority with the help of Turkey made the work of the League impossible by several 
boycotts. As a result, France and Turkey organised their own commissions to replace the League’s one and conducted the 
elections in 1939, whose turnout was in favour of the Turkish party. Therefore, the role of the League was superseded. 
See Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., pp. 88-89. 
482 Art. 39 of the Versailles treaty established: “Germany renounces in favour of the League of Nations, in the capacity of 
trustee, the government of the territory defined above. At the end of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present 
Treaty the inhabitants of the said territory shall be called upon to indicate the sovereignty under which they desire to be 
placed”. 
483 S. Wambaugh, The Saar Plebiscite, Harvard, 1940, pp. 316-325. See also G. Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of 
Nations, New York, 1973, pp. 60-63. 
484 For a comprehensive account of the plebiscite in the Saar Basin see S. Wambaugh, The Saar Plebiscite, cit., p. 316-
325. 
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observed by Wambaugh, although the process leading to the plebiscite was not perfectly managed – 
there were interferences by the German supporters to boycott the election campaign - the Saar 
experience has to be considered a success for the League and the whole international community. 
Some features contributed more than others to guarantee the successful organisation of the plebiscite: 
the process was not controlled by the Allies, but by neutral parties; police forces were also nominated 
from neutral countries, to ensure the free and fair conduct of the plebiscite. In fact, Wambaugh reports 
that the absolute secrecy of the ballot and domestic order were guaranteed.485 The plebiscite in the 
Saar Basin in fact may be taken as a model for a free and fair plebiscite and is the closest to modern 
territorial referenda, where the requirements of freedom of expression and fairness of the vote play a 
fundamental role. 
2.3   The plebiscites under the Versailles Treaty: a critical assessment 
Overall, it can be argued that the plebiscite system set by the treaty of Versailles presented 
many pitfalls but had also some merits, such as the emphasis put on international monitoring and the 
neutralisation of the territory. Several reasons justify a partial criticism: firstly, whilst the treaty of 
Versailles called for the organisation of the plebiscites, the whole process was carried out on a case-
by-case basis. Moreover, the Versailles treaty itself provided for hybrid forms of plebiscites, such as 
in the case of Eupen and Malmedy.486  
Anyway, the main feature which comes out of the analysis of plebiscites is their consultative 
nature. Having a look at scholarly reactions to the use of plebiscites for territorial changes 
corroborates this view. Proceedings of international law conferences of that time highlight that 
plebiscites were looked at with suspect by legal scholars, who took a stand in favour of other methods 
of setting frontier disputes.487 In principle, the idea of following the wishes of the population was not 
rejected, but its possible outcomes raised adverse reactions. Minority treaties together with an 
increase in domestic law guarantees were considered more effective in favouring peaceful relations 
among the nations. Moving forward to the second World War, President Roosvelt when referring to 
the possible popular consultation for Croatia claimed that they were a “method not of necessity a final 
one. The whole point of this is that peaceful determination is a continuing process”.488 
																																								 																				
485 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites after the First World War, cit., p. 506. 
486 See fn. 463. 
487 Alongside those related to international monitoring, contemporary scholarship has awarded some merits to the 
plebiscite system outside of frontiers disputes. In particular, Knop has aptly observed that plebiscites contributed to 
enhancing the participation of women in domestic political affairs, given that they were given suffrage in all the Versailles 
popular consultations. See. K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, 2002. 
488 The text is an extract of a Letter wrote by President Roosevelt to the American Representative to the Vatican, printed 
in Papers of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary’s File (box 76), Hyde Park Library, quoted by R. A. Miller: “Self-
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Nevertheless, a positive stance can be taken with respect to some procedural requirements 
emerging from practice about plebiscites. Wambaugh in particular summarised the main features 
which, according to her, should be used with a view to ensure a free and fair consultation.489 Firstly, 
plebiscites must be held with the formal agreement of the interested parties. The agreement must also 
clearly rule on the neutralisation of the territory at stake: 1) the area should be put under international 
control and 2) all the troops of the interested states should be withdrawn. The voting should be 
controlled by a plebiscite commission, and suffrage must include men and women, illiterates and 
prisoners. According to Wambaugh,490 the vote would be better secured if the plebiscite commission 
had full administering powers. These powers should be granted in considerable advance to increase 
among the people the “confidence that a sovereignty change is possible”.491 Besides, ad hoc police 
force could safeguard the activity of the commission. By contrast, when this requirements are not 
respected, the plebiscite is probably going to exacerbate the conflict and unlikely to leave to a long-
standing territorial reapportionment.492  
3. The UN and plebiscites held during the decolonisation period   
The existing mistrust towards the holding of popular consultations for territorial disputes was 
increased by the widespread use of plebiscites by totalitarian regimes.493 Hence, the immediate 
aftermath of World War II marked a step backwards in the use of popular consultations. No provision 
on popular consultations either in the form of plebiscite or of referenda can be found in the Paris 
Peace Treaties. Between 1945 and 1960 only two plebiscites were conducted: one for the Oder-Neisse 
area and the second Saar plebiscite, both concerning territorial reapportionments linked to the second 
World War.494  
																																								 																				
Determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy?”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2003, vol. 
41, p. 629.   
489 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, cit., p. 506. These same standards have been utilised also to describe 
the main features of the decolonisation’s popular consultations by Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, 
cit., p. 87 
490 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, cit., p. 506 
491 Ibid. See also table 3.1 providing the full list of requirements, in Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, 
cit., p. 87. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Examples of plebiscites held under the dictatorial regimes were the Anschluss plebiscite in Austria (10 April 1938); 
the plebiscites held in Italy on 24 March 1924 and 24 March 1934 where the voters were asked to say yes or no to a list 
of deputies elaborated by the Prime Minister. Other plebiscites were held after WW II, i.e. on 1968 in Greece the 
dictatorship of Colonel Papadopoulos held a consultation to legitimise his coup d’Ètat. See C. Cassina: “Alle origini del 
plebiscito ‘dei moderni’”, Giornale di Storia Costituzionale, 2009, vol. 18, p. 90. 
494 The latter, in particular, was a decisive consultation that shaped the fate of the region. In 1954 France and Germany 
agreed on a Statute for the administration of the Saar, according to which the area was to be administered under the 
auspices of the Western Union. The status was submitted to the population for consent, but the ballot’s turnout was against 
the new statutory settlement. The results of the ballot therefore forced Germany and France to negotiate a new agreement, 
whereby France ceded the Saar to the Federal Republic of Germany. See the Treaty between France and Germany, 27 
October 1956, BGBI, 1956, vol. II, S. 1587 cited by M. Suksi, Bringing in the People, cit., p. 249. 
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It was with the strengthening of the action of the UN in the decolonisation process that popular 
consultations gain momentum again. According to the UN Charter, popular consultations might occur 
for: (i) non-self-governing territories495 and (ii) trusteeships as established under Chapter XII of the 
Charter.496 In principle, the ultimate aim of popular consultations differed from one system to the 
other. Whereas for trusteeships independence was the ultimate aim, elections in non-self-governing 
territories were a tool to secure consent about a certain level of autonomy and independence as such 
was not clearly envisaged.497 However, the more the UN engaged in guiding the decolonisation 
process, the more the duality blurred, as the right to self-determination was affirmed for all peoples.498 
The position of the UN with respect to territorial referenda changed over the decolonisation period. 
Shortly after the end of WW II, the organisation was not much concerned with the status of non self-
governing territories, so sometimes it failed to act as a supervisor, such as in the cases of PuertoRico499 
																																								 																				
495 UN Charter, Chapter XI, artt. 73-74. 
496 UN Charter, artt. 75-85. 
497 Art. 73 of the Charter applies to all territories subject to sovereignty of another country regardless of the will of the 
people concerned, as those people are considered unable to govern themselves, it does not mention independence as it 
addresses “peoples (who) have not yet attained a full measure of self-government”. By contrast, States acting as trustees 
according to art. 76 had the duty to “promote […] their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence as may appropriate to the particular circumstance of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned”. The vague character of Chapter XI has been attributed to the influence of France and 
the UK in the drafting due to their necessity to safeguard colonial possessions. See U. Fasternarth: “Chapter XI. 
Declaration Regarding Non Self-Governing Territories” in B. Simma (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Oxford, 
2002, pp. 1089-1091.  
498 I. Sen, Sovereignty Referendum in International and Constitutional Law, Cham-Heidelberg- New York- Dordrecht- 
London, 2015., pp. 55-56. 
499 The model chosen by the USA to deal with the former Trust Territories of the Pacific Island – including also New 
Caledonia- has been commonly referred to as “Freely Associated States”. That is to say that these territories can become 
independent nonetheless they may leave to the USA the control of certain sovereign competencies such as defence and 
security. In other word, the premise was the continuation of control by the administering State, albeit with different 
sovereignty arrangements The inhabitants of Puerto Rico have been called repeatedly to express their choice on their legal 
status, notably in 1967, 1991, 1993, 1998 and 2012. However, the status of Puerto Rico is somehow still in a vacuum, as 
demonstrated by the fact that it is the subject of reports of the GA issued on February 2016. The status of the island has 
been shaped by a series of popular consultations. In 1993 a plebiscite was held, almost with the same requirements of the 
previous dated 1967. It envisaged three options: the commonwealth association with the USA, a limited form of statehood 
and independence. Only 4% of the vote casts was in favour of the latter, whilst the commonwealth was the most popular 
choice. However, the majority was not above 50%, so that on 13 December 1998 another consultation was held. This 
time the options were four, because there was also the possibility to choose the “non of the above” option. This was 
ultimately the choice of the majority of the voters: in other words, people from Puerto Rico did not want to be in 
partnership with the USA, neither to be independent. However, the movement towards independence took strength and 
in July 2005 with another election 84% of the voters called for a unicameral legislature for Puerto Rico. The Supreme 
Court however stopped the process by ruling that a constitutional amendment on the composition of the Assembly could 
not be imposed by an election. Although the Court impeded the reform, the vote was a clear sign for the government of 
the USA, which put pressure on the Task Force for Puerto Rico established in 1998 in order to monitor the bilateral 
relationship. The Task Force has been firm in claiming that only two paths are possible: 1) full independence of Puerto 
Rico; 2) a limited form of statehood with the USA. It was on this basis that the Task Force recommended to resort to a 
plebiscite no later than in 2006. Delays in the implementation of the report by the USA – probably de to the feeling that 
Puerto Rico was more in favour of independence- lasted until 2012, when a popular consultation was finally held. This 
plebiscite was structured through multiple questions: two main choices were presented: a) stay with the USA in 
Commonwealth of Association; b) indicate another form of statehood between 1) independence; 2) a limited form of 
participation to the commonwealth or 3) a different status within the commonwealth. The 55% of the vote casts was 
against statehood, but there was no agreement on the alternative. This is why the status of Puerto Rico is considered to be 
in vacuum both from an international and a domestic law standpoint. However, the issue is considered a domestic one. 
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or the Netherlands Antilles.500 However, in the middle of the sixties the big push for the 
decolonisation required a change of approach by the organisation. The UN did not accept new status 
of territories decided without UN-led consultations:501 the referendum in French Somaliland was 
refused by the UN on the ground, inter alia, that France had not accepted the UN supervision. Practice 
on the UN monitoring activity is huge502 and would fall outside the scope of the present research, 
because Un-monitoring concerns self-determination popular consultations. The previous Chapter has 
already explained that (i) only secession and not self-determination is the main theme of the research, 
all the more so since (ii) it was demonstrated that secession is not a form of self-determination. 
However, if one wants to investigate whether a customary norm on territorial referenda in 
international law could be at least in the way of consolidation, it is important to prove that popular 
consultations have preserved their basic features through time. Therefore, at least some brief critical 
remarks on the practice of UN-led popular consultations are unavoidable. 
 In the context of the decolonisation, the will of the people and creation of statehood raised 
complex legal questions. The United Nations, guided by the principle of self-determination enshrined 
in the Charter, attempted to build a system of territorial changes based on popular consultations. In 
the next section it will be showed that the international organisation partly failed to do so, because its 
approach was not always consistent. Popular consultations held under the auspices of the UN find 
																																								 																				
Although the UN remains seized on the issue, through the activity of the General Assembly, the issues has been 
approached de facto as a purely internal one. Geo-strategic considerations weight in the analysis of the legal status of 
Puerto Rico, due to its position for the control of the pacific area by the USA. The case of Puerto Rico therefore 
demonstrates that even for the pillars of the UN activity in the decolonisation process – such as the management of trust 
and non-self-governing territories- the organisation has failed to act as a supervisor. See. I. Sen, Sovereignty Referendum 
in International and Constitutional Law, cit., p. 64 and p. 85 and the report by the GA Special Committee, dated 22 June 
2015 on the Status of Puerto Rico, A/AC.109/2016/L.13, published on February 26, 2016. 
500 The UN did not supervise the passage to self-government of the Netherlands Antilles. Already in 1951 the government 
of the Netherlands expressed at the UN their desire that the Antilles not been considered a self-governing territory any 
more. Delisting of the Antilles from the list of non self-governing territories occurred in 1955, with resolution 955 of 15 
December. Further change of status in the Antilles did not involved the UN either. In 2010 there was a serious change 
since the Antilles dissolved and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is now made of four countries: the Netherlands, St 
Martin, Curacao and Aruba. For Curacao and St Martin, however, a transitional period was envisaged to acquire complete 
independence, therefore they continue to be assisted by the Netherlands. 
See A.B. Van Rijin: “Dimensions under International Law Linked to the Dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles”, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 2009, vol. 15, pp. 75-119; A.J.P. Tillema, The Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba, a Study in Self-Determination, The Hague, Institute of Social Studies ,1989. 
501  In the case of French Togoland, France had scheduled a referendum for 28 October 1956, which took place under its 
supervision. However, the ballot was not endorsed by the UN due to the questions put to vote. The choices were on the 
one side (a) remaining a trust territory and on the other side (ii) stay with France enjoying a wider level of autonomy.  
Thus, there was no option for independence. The vote cast was in favour of remaining with France with a percentage of 
93%, but the UN opposed the vote because of the lack of the option on independence. See A/RES/1046, dated 23 January 
1957. Togoland remained a trust territory until the UN-led election of an Assembly which was tasked to decide on the 
future status of Togoland. The country became independent in 1960. See on the topic: A. Cassese, Self-Determination of 
Peoples, cit., p. 76; I.G. Sen, Sovereignty Referenda in International and Constitutional Law, cit., p. 98. 
502 Plebiscites under the auspices of the United Nations hold between 1956 and 1991 include: Togoland, Gilbert and Ellis 
Island; British Cameroon; Equatorial Guinea; the Mariana Islands; French Somaliland; Western Samoa; the Trust 
territories of the Pacific Islands; the Marshall Islands; Palau; Ruanda-Urundi, the Federated States of Micronesia and 
Namibia. See Y. Beigbeder: “Referendum”, Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, cit. 
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their rationale in one of the purposes of the UN Charter, as expressed by art. 1(2). According to the 
provision, the UN has to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination. For this purpose, as we have seen in Chapter 1, when the UN 
dealt with the status of colonies and non-self-governing territories, it required that free association of 
colonial territories or integration with an independent State occur through a free and voluntary choice, 
in compliance with the principles of sovereign equality and self-determination.503 
In the next pages the analysis will be narrowed to only four cases – West New Guinea, Western 
Samoa, Western Sahara, East Timor- presented in chronological order. The selection criteria is the 
role of the popular consultation in the process towards independence. The cases tackled are in fact 
those in which the referendum was considered fundamental, or those in which the UN easily gave up 
on its use. Needless to say, it could be counter argued that some cases are omitted because they do 
not support the argument. Quite the opposite, the case of Western Samoa precisely serves as a 
counterexample. Moreover, the selection itself will show a blurred panoramic: although the UN-led 
popular consultations are best qualified as plebiscites, it is argued that they also share many features 
with referenda used by the modern systems of democracy. Hence, in the next pages the term plebiscite 
will be preferred, but it is important to recall that the related legal documents make a frequent use of 
the term referendum too. 
3.1 West New Guinea and Western Samoa504  
The status of West New Guinea has remained unresolved ever after Indonesian independence 
from the Netherlands.  In 1954 Indonesia brought the issue of the legal status of West New Guinea 
before the General Assembly. In 1961, the Netherlands announced that it would allow the inhabitants 
to decide on their sovereignty by a plebiscite and asked the UN to administer it. However, Indonesia 
refused the proposal. The UN Secretary General Thant acting as a mediator managed to bring the 
parties to sign an agreement in 1962, by which the UN was entrusted with temporary executive 
authority until 1963, when powers would be transferred to Indonesia. This was the first time in history 
that the UN had extensive executive authority through the UN Temporary Executive Authority. 
Nevertheless, the agreement did not include the holding of a plebiscite. Instead, it was established 
that the population could express its wishes by consultations with the appointed representatives in 
																																								 																				
503See Chapter 1 pp. 27-32. 
504 The studies of West New Guinea and Western Samoa are tiny file reports in the big volume of UN practice about non 
self-governing and trust territories. It was decided to group them under the same heading, however, because they can be 
seen as the two sides of the same coin. Focusing on the role of popular consultations in the UN-led decolonisation process, 
it can be observed that for West New Guinea the UN renounced to resort to popular consultations although there was all 
the need to do so. While for Western Samoa the organisation insisted on the necessity for the people to express their 
choices by referendum, albeit the wishes of both the people of the island and the parent State were almost clear and 
convergent. 
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councils. In July 1969, lastly, 1026 delegates were selected to vote for the legal status of West New 
Guinea and chose the exercise of authority under Indonesia. As pointed out by Beigbeder, it could be 
argued that the UN accepted and was part of, a passage of authority which was not in compliance 
with self-determination as generally understood with universal and secret suffrage.505 Quoting again 
Beigbeder, “the UN appeared at times more concerned with its goal of decolonisation […] than about 
the options of self-determinations to be offered to the people”.506 
To further complicate the picture, the attitude of the UN towards Western Samoa’s 
independence lies at the opposite side of the spectrum. Although the will of the people and the 
expectations of the trust State soon converged to independence, the UN asked for a popular 
consultation. Besides, the consultation shares more characters with referenda rather than plebiscites. 
Samoa was included among the UN Trust Territories in 1946,507 when the GA consented to its 
administration by New Zeeland. Independence claims were brought to the UN and to the government 
of the New Zeeland by Western Samoa early in 1947. Although the proposal was substantially 
ignored by the International Organisation and the trust State,508 New Zeeland undertook substantive 
steps to guide Western Samoa to independence, such as the creation of the Samoa High Commission 
to promote the interests of Samoa in several fields, from economics to security.  
 This brief review of facts should suffice to demonstrate that New Zeeland did not want to 
impede Samoa’s path to independence. One could thus predict that New Zeeland would continue to 
grant Western Samoa further autonomy until it became independent. That was what actually 
happened, but the UN was not persuaded by the relationship between New Zeeland and the trust 
territory.509 The 1959 UN Mission underlined that under the UN system self-government 
independence should be attained in compliance with the freely expressed wishes of the people. In 
other words, for the UN a plebiscite was desirable even though there were clear manifestations from 
both parties towards self-government. The attitude of the UN could be justified by looking at the 
modalities for electing the representatives for the Legislative Assembly of Western Samoa. The 
restricted suffrage undermined the principle of freely and universal expression of the will championed 
by the UN. As such, the “mistrust” displayed by the UN and the request to hold a plebiscite with 
universal suffrage confirm the approach of the organisation towards issues of self-determination, such 
as it was with French Togoland. The Trusteeship Council had refused to monitor the French proposed 
																																								 																				
505 Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., p. 141. 
506 Ibid. p. 144. 
507 Trusteeship Agreement n. 115, 13 December 1946, UN Treaty Series vol. 8, 1947, pp. 72-88. See for an overview of 
the texts on mandates and trusteeships R.M. Chowdhuri, International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative 
Study, 1955, Leiden-Boston.  
508 Report of the Trust Council by the UN Mission to Western Samoa and Annexes, T/46/add.1, repository.un.org 
509 Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., pp. 136-138. 
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plebiscite, arguing that the vote was not valid because the question referéndaire did not include the 
option of independence.510 In order to implement the request of the GA, New Zeeland supervised the 
elections in consultation with the UN Plebiscite Commissioner511. The question put to the voters was 
thus framed: “Do you agree with the Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Convention on 26 
October 1960? Do you agree that on 1 January 1962 Western Samoa should become an independent 
state on the basis of the Constitution?”.512 Elections took place on 9 March 1961 and 82.8% of the 
people voted for independence as well as for the new Constitution.513 On the basis of the result of the 
ballot, the UN resolved that the Trust Agreement would cease to be in force and Western Samoa 
acceded the UN as a new member State.514 
To sum up, it seems as if popular consultations in Samoa share many feature with referenda 
envisaged by the legal systems of modern democracies recalled at the beginning of this Chapter. The 
question envisages clearly the option of independence as territorial referenda usually do. Moreover, 
the importance given to the necessity of a public consultation might be interpreted as a sign of 
attention to the people’s wishes and not only as a formality. In addition, questions concerning the 
Constitution were never dealt with in plebiscites’ practice. Plebiscites, indeed, concerned the change 
of sovereignty and not constitutional questions. Referenda on the contrary are often expressly 
prescribed to ascertain the will of the people about constitutional reviews.515 From the cases above, 
some early conclusions can be drawn. West New Guinea and Western Samoa testify the ambivalent 
attitude adopted by the UN. West New Guinea testifies that the concern of the UN was primarily 
decolonisation and less importance was paid to the modalities to reach this goal. By contrast, with 
Samoa the UN seemed to really care for popular consultations. These difference is rooted in the 
specificities of each case: on the one side, the attitude of the Netherlands was so contrastive that 
probably the international organisation found the only practicable way in supporting the path towards 
independence without a referendum. On the other side, in the case of Western Samoa the UN seemed 
to be intransigent towards the parent State, as if it did not trust its conduct. The plebiscite in this 
framework provided a hard evidence of the wishes of the people, which could not be ignored. So far, 
therefore, a common pattern is difficult to see.  
 
																																								 																				
510 See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, cit., pp. 75-76. 
511 UN, GA resolution 1569, 18 December 1960, operative 4 establishing a UN Plebiscite Commissioner. 
512 Ibid. operative 2. 
513 Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., p. 139. 
514 With SC/RES/399, 1 December 1976, the Security Council requested the General Assembly to vote for the admission 
of Western Samoa. The GA with resolution 31/104 dated 15 December 1976 admitted Western Samoa as new UN 
member. 
515 See section 1of this Chapter. 
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3.2 Western Sahara  
  For the purposes of this study, the importance of Western Sahara lies in the fact that the ICJ was 
called to render an Advisory Opinion on the situation and developed an interesting argument on the 
respect of people’s wishes. Although this case too falls in the cluster of the exercise of the right to 
self-determination, it is interesting for the way the ICJ conceived the use of popular consultations 
outside the decolonization context. 
As regards the background of the case516, both Morocco and Mauritania claimed a title over 
Western Sahara, in particular on ethnic and historic grounds. Western Sahara had been a colony of 
Spain from 1884 until 1966, when Spain consented to start a process of decolonization in application 
of the right to self-determination of peoples.517 The GA took advantage of Spain’s favorable attitude 
and by res. 2229518  invited Spain to “determine at the earliest possible date, in conformity with the 
aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara […] the procedures for the holding of a 
referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the 
territory to exercise freely their right to self-determination”. Therefore, the question was how the 
principle of self-determination should operate, if it could only result in the political independence of 
the territory or in integration into one of the two claimants. Morocco and Mauritania pushed against 
the referendum, and General Assembly in 1976 approved resolution 3292 on the future status of 
Western Sahara. The General Assembly called upon Spain to hold a referendum and requested the 
ICJ to give an Advisory Opinion answering the following question: “Was Western Sahara at the time 
of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no-one? And if so, what where the legal ties between 
this territory and the kingdom of Morocco and Mauritania?” 
The main questions of international law arising from the request were 1) the application of the 
principle of self-determination, 2) legitimacy of third parties claims over a territory and 3) legal issues 
pertaining to the terrae nullius status of a territory. For the first question, the wording used by the 
Court suggests that the ICJ meant to promote the interpretation of the principle of self-determination 
as embraced by the UN for the decolonization process. The Court acknowledged the “important place 
																																								 																				
516 The outcomes of the situation in Western Sahara have been the subject of a extensive research, still active among 
scholars. For the historical background see S. Simon: “Western Sahara” in C. Walter, A. von Ungern-Sternberg, and K. 
Abush (eds.), Self-Determination and Secession in International Law, cit., pp.256-272. Whereas, for the ICJ Judgment as 
well as for legal issues arising from the status of Western Sahara see G. Zyberi, The Humanitarian Face of the International 
Court of Justice, its contribution to interpretation and developing of international Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
Rules and Principles, School of Human Rights Research Series, vol. 26, Antwerp- Oxford-Portland, 2008, pp. 100-134. 
517 Although Western Sahara deposits of phosphates were a fruitful resource for Spain, the power of the independence 
movement, the Polisario Front have become too strong that for the colonial power the administration had many drawbacks. 
518 General Assembly Resolution 229 dated 1 December 1966, para. 4. The proposal was reiterated, as Cassese reports, 
in several further resolutions, in particular in resolutions 2354; 2438; 2591; 2711. See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of 
Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 214-217 as well as at pp. 88-95. 
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of decolonisation, under the aegis of the United Nations, in the present evolution of International 
Law”519 and inferred that a law of decolonization was in formation. This law of decolonization found 
its main guide in the principle of self-determination, yet certain aspects of its application remained 
unclear and de lege ferenda.520 Given this uncertainty, the Court did not engaged thoroughly in setting 
the standards for the application of self-determination.521 This view is supported by the absence of 
specifications both about the meaning of people and – above all - of the exceptional circumstances522 
that in the view of the judges justify the avoidance of popular consultation. The Court observed that 
the GA enjoyed discretion with regard to the modes of application of the right to self-determination 
(para. 71) and then moved to the modalities for conducting popular consultations. The Court 
contended that “the validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard 
to the freely expressed will of peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the General 
Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those 
instances were based either on the consideration that a certain population did not constitute a 
“people” entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation was totally 
unnecessary, in view of special circumstances”.523 Regardless of the modalities used, the Court 
clarified that for self-determination to be realised, people’s expression of the will has to be a) free i.e. 
(either said to be “expressed without interference”) and b) genuine, thus it should be only the will of 
the people concerned.524  
However, it is hard to claim that the ICJ considered popular consultations in the form of 
referendum essential for the exercise of the right to self-determination. Otherwise, it could be well 
expected that the judgement had spent some more sections on the legal value of referenda. Rather, 
popular consultations were conceived as one of the tools to resort to when facing territorial disputes. 
That said, was the ICJ referring to a plebiscite or to a referendum? The model used for Western Sahara 
is closer to that of plebiscite more than referendum. Nearly all the requirements discerned for 
plebiscites can be found in the Secretary General implementation plan drafted pursuant to resolution 
621 of 20 September 1988 and approved by the Security Council. The plan provided for (i) a 
transitional period (2) under the UN auspices, which would end up with (3) a referendum in which 
																																								 																				
519 ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, cit., Judge Petren’s Separate Opinion, p. 110. 
520 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, cit., p. 124. 
521 In this line, A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal reappraisal, cit., p. 89: Y. Beigbeder, International 
Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., p. 120. 
522 ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, cit., p. 73: “…such exceptional circumstances are possible and could exist, 
but they do not appear to be present in this case so as to do away the salutary principle of ascertaining of the freely 
expressed will of the people”. 
523 ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara, cit., para 59, p. 25. 
524 Ibid. para 55: “The above provisions, in particular paragraph 2 [defining self-determination], thus confirm and 
emphasize that the application of the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the 
peoples concerned”. See also D. Raić, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., p. 212. 
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the inhabitants of Western Sahara would be called to choose between independence and integration 
with Morocco.525  
In the framework of the decolonisation, the Advisory Opinion contributed to establishing 
territorial referenda as an accepted tool to ascertain the will of the people, but at the same time it 
acknowledged that there might be some exceptional circumstances justifying the avoidance of a 
consultation. The affirmation of referenda as a method to determine the will of the people does not 
lead to its affirmation as a compulsory means to resort to in cases of territorial reapportionments.526 
In this sense, it is interesting to look at Judge Boni’s concurrent opinion, as the Judge took a different 
stand with respect to the role of referendum. In his view, it would have been better to consult the 
Western Saharawi people by a UN-led referendum.527 Hence, it would have been upon the people 
themselves to decide whether to stay with Morocco or Mauritania. Other scholars528 shared this 
position, criticising the “mild” attitude of the UN towards Western Sahara.529 
Looking at the current legal status of Western Sahara, one could regret that neither the UN, 
nor the Court expressed in strong terms the need for a referendum, since the status of the territory has 
remained in a vacuum ever since. Following the Advisory Opinion, Spain renounced all the claims 
of sovereignty over the territory. From there on, Morocco and Mauritania have been in dispute to 
acquire control over Western Sahara. In 1979, however, Mauritania gave up its claim, leaving the 
territory under the effective control of Morocco. The self-proclaimed government of the Polisario 
Front has proclaimed itself the legitimate authority of the region and as of 2017 it has been recognised 
by nearly 90 countries. On a pragmatic level, the situation in Western Sahara is still unresolved; 
regardless of the action of the UN in the region and the call for a popular consultation. Therefore, the 
Western Sahara status allows us to point out that when a referendum is not held, the territory is likely 
																																								 																				
525 Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, cit., p. 193; I. Sen, Sovereignty Referendum in International 
and Constitutional Law, cit., pp. 100-102. 
526 A. Cassese: “The International Court of Justice and the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination”, pp. 351-353 and J. 
Crawford: “The General Assembly, the International Court of Justice and Self-Determination”, pp. 585-606, V. Lowe 
and M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice, Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jeggings, 
Cambridge, 1996. 
527 ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, cit., Judge Boni Separate Opinion, p. 165: “the solution which I advocate […] 
obligation of consultation of the inhabitants in pursuance of GA resolution 1514”. 
528 See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, cit., p. 218, A. Gardner: “Self-determination in the Western Sahara: 
Legal opportunities and Political Roadblocks”, International Peacekeeping, 2000 vol. 7, pp. 115-138 and M. Sterio, The 
Right to Self-Determination under International Law. Selfistans, Secession and the Rule of Great Powers (hereinafter 
Selfistans, Secession and the Rule of Great Powers), London-New-York, 2015, p. 92. 
529 As regards the second question asked to the ICJ – what legal ties existed between Western Sahara, Morocco and 
Mauritania- the Court found that although some ties could be verified, such as the historical ones, they were not enough 
to support the Spanish position. The court refused to consider Western Sahara a terrae nullius and recognised the role of 
Spain as administration power. Hence, it called upon Spain to organise the referendum in Western Sahara as required by 
the GA resolution 2229 para. 8. By establishing that Western Saharans had a right to self-determination and that the 
territory was not a terrae nullius, the Court gave itself an exit door not to deal with the legality of Morocco and 
Mauritania’s claims. See M. Sterio, Selfistans, Secession and the Rule of Great Powers, cit., pp. 89-92. 
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to remain the object of an unresolved dispute. In spite of the fact that this argument would support 
the consolidation of a rule concerning referendum for the territorial changes, the absence of concrete 
steps to solve the situation does not allow for clear-cut conclusions. 
3.3 East Timor 
The case of East-Timor is remarkable for at least one reason: it lies at the crossing between 
different legal issues arising from the role of the UN during and after the decolonization period. 
Before becoming independent in 2001, East Timor had had several legal statuses.530 Colonial 
dominion of the Kingdom of Portugal, East-Timor was recognized as non-self-governing territory 
under the administration of Portugal. Thus, its status was monitored by the UN Committee of the 
24.531  
The question of self-determination of the East-Timorese officially acquired importance from 
the end of 1974, when Portugal decided to start a program for the decolonization of its territories. In 
July 1975,532 when the Portuguese Council enacted the Constitutional Law 7/75, according to which 
“the Portuguese State shall entrust the political future of East Timor to a Popular Assembly”, 
establishing that the legal status of the island was to be defined by a secret and universal referendum 
to be held in October 1976.533 However, the fight between the two main political factions in East 
Timor -  the Timor Democratic Union (UDT) and the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor 
(FRETILIN) - gave rise to a civil war and the FRENTILIN unilaterally declared the independence of 
East Timor on 28 November 1975. With the aim of preventing independence from taking place and 
considering that there were also groups calling for integration with Indonesia, Indonesia occupied 
East Timor on 7 December 1975.534 The UN condemned535 Indonesia’s formal incorporation of East 
																																								 																				
530 For M. Weller, the case of East Timor is one of self-determination exercised by a secondary colony. With the letter, 
the distinguished commentator refers to “entities that were entitled to colonial self-determination in the first place. 
However, when they were at the very point of administering the act of self-determination, they were forcibly incorporated 
into another State. The holding of a referendum in East-Timor and its independence are therefore an example of colonial 
self-determination in the classical sense”. See M. Weller: “Why the Legal Rules on Self-Determination Do Not Resolve 
Self-Determination Disputes”, M. Weller, B. Metzeger (eds.), Setting Self-Determination Disputes, cit., pp. 25-26. 
531 The Special Committee of the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence of colonial countries and Peoples is better known as Committee of the 24 due to the number of its members. 
It was tasked with the duty to guarantee the implementation of resolution 1514 – adopted on 14 December 1961- and can 
also make recommendations to the countries on the way to their independence. Every year it updates the list of the non-
self-governing territories. 
532 R. Clark: “The Decolonisation of East-Timor and the UN Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression”, Yale Journal 
of World Public Order, 1980, p. 2 ff.; K. Sutter: “East-Timor and West Irian”, Minority Rights Group Report n. 42, 
London, 1982; A. Tancredi, La Secessione in Diritto Internazionale, cit., pp. 579-596. 
533 Portuguese Council of the Revolution Constitutional Law 7/75, 17 July 1975, Portuguese Official Gazzete 1st Series 
No. 163. The text can be found in H. Krieger (ed.), East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents, 
Cambridge, 1977, pp. 34-35.  
534 I. Sen, Sovereignty Referendum in International and Comparative Law, cit., pp. 101-103. 
535 The UN expressed its deploration for what was considered an unlawful occupation with resolution of the General 
Assembly n. 3485, December 12 1975; 31/53 dated December 1, 1976; 32/34 dated November 28 1977. In these 
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Timor as its 27th province. Claims by Indonesia on the legality of the invasion justified on the grounds 
that the East-Timorese had freely chosen integration were rejected as well. Therefore, resolutions 
384536 and 389537 of the Security Council, while reaffirming the UN support for the peoples right to 
self-determination, called upon Indonesia to withdraw its troops.538 Although Portugal opposed the 
act carried out by Indonesia claiming that the East-Timorese had not been free to exercise their right 
to self-determination, the overall impression was that the change of status of East-Timor was already 
considered a fait accomplì.539 Thus, East-Timor’s status was dormant, occupied by Indonesia but still 
considered by the UN as a non-self-governing territory. The watershed of the situation in East- Timor 
occurred in February 1991, when Portugal presented a memorial to the ICJ. Portugal asked the ICJ to 
exercise its jurisdiction over the alleged violation by Australia of the right of Portugal over the so 
called Timor Gap.540 In particular, Portugal tried to challenge the admissibility of the Timor Gap 
Treaty between Australia and Indonesia, alleging that the agreement legitimized Indonesia’s 
annexation of East-Timor and violated the right to self-determination.  
As observed by Stahn, “neither the ICJ nor the international community finally resolved the 
issue”.541 The right to self-determination of East-Timorese and the popular consultation required for 
its realization found their basis in a bilateral agreement between Indonesia and Portugal. Due to 
domestic contingencies, the Indonesian government consented to start negotiations with Portugal. On 
5 May 1999 the two countries managed to sign the New York Agreement, which constituted the legal 
basis for the referendum on independence of East Timor.542 As it was stressed for post-war plebiscites, 
																																								 																				
resolutions it is clear that for the GA incorporation by Indonesia could not occur “inasmuch as the people of the Territory 
have not been able to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence”. 
536 SC/RES/384/1975 22 dated 22 December 1975, paras. 1-2. 
537 SC/RES/389/1976 dated 22 April 1976, para. 2. 
538 C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond, Cambridge, 
2010, pp. 334-338. 
539 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal reappraisal, cit., pp. 223-224. Some States recognised Indonesia’s 
sovereignty – such as Australia, Morocco, Bangladesh, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, India, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Suriname and Thailand. Other, like the EU member States, by contrast, denied Indonesia’s sovereignty 
over East-Timor. See C. Stahn, Law and Practice of international Territorial Administrations, cit., p. 335 
540 The Timor Gap is a gap in the Australian- Indonesian maritime border, with considerable petroleum resources. Once 
Indonesia invaded East-Timor, quarrels with Australia arose deeply because both claimed sovereignty over the area. 
Initially the dispute seemed to be settled with the signature of the Treaty between Australia and Indonesia on the zone of 
Cooperation in an area between the Indonesian Province of East-Timor and Northern Australia, the so called Timor Gap 
Treaty, signed on 11 December 1989, entered into force on 9 February 1991.However, Portugal intervened two weeks 
after the treaty came into force, by filing a request to the ICJ against Australia. With the request, Portugal asked the Court, 
inter alia, to: “adjudicate and declare that, inasmuch as it has excluded ad is excluding any negotiation with Portugal as 
the administering power of the territory of Timor, with respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf in the area of 
the Timor Gap, Australia has failed and is failing in its duty to negotiate in order to harmonise the respective rights in 
the event of a conflict on of claims over maritime areas”. See ICJ, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 
cit., para. 3, p. 8. See on the judgment in particular M.C. Maffei: “The case of East-Timor before the International Court 
of Justice- some tentative comments”, European Journal of International Law, 1993, vol. 4, p. 223 ff. 
541 C. Stahn, Law and Practice of International Territorial Administrations, cit., p. 336. 
542 The text of the Agreement is reproduced in UN Doc. S/1999/513, Annex I. For an analysis of the Agreement, see J. 
Marker, East-Timor, A Memoire of the Negotiations for Independence, London, 2003, p.194. 
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the request for popular consent was born out of a political compromise between sovereign States. 
This is clearly demonstrated by looking at the wording of para. 5 and 6 of the preamble of the 
agreement which, on the one hand recognized “Indonesian sovereignty over East-Timor”, and on the 
other acknowledged its status of non self-governing territory. With the agreement the parties 
authorized the Secretary General to organize and conduct a popular consultation. The population of 
East-Timor would be called to choose between independence and remaining with Indonesia with a 
special status.  
Conditions for holding of the referendum were established by two supplementary agreements: 
1) the Modalities Agreement, ruling about basic issues regarding the referendum question and the 
date of the consultation; 2) the Security Agreement focusing on measures to secure a good 
environment for the consultation which had to be implemented by Indonesia.543 Lastly, with art. 2 of 
the New York Agreement the United Nations was given competence on the organisation of the 
referendum through the mission UNAMET. 
According to the Modalities Agreement, the question to be put to the voters was: “Do you 
accept the proposed special autonomy for East-Timor within the unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia? Or do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East-Timor, leading to East-Timor 
separation from Indonesia? ”.544 Persons entitled to vote had to be at least 17 years old and be either 
a) born in East-Timor; 2) born outside East-Timor with one parent born in the island; c) have a spouse 
who falls in one of the two categories.545 The UN was put in charge of the campaign and registration 
process. However, the Security Agreement expressly stated that “responsibility to ensure a secure 
environment” as well as general maintenance of law and order rested within the appropriate 
Indonesian security authorities. No international police force was envisaged and the mandate of the 
Indonesian police was limited to the maintenance of law and order. Nonetheless, the UN Secretary 
General would make “available a number of civilian police officers to act as advisers”546 to the 
Indonesian police. But most importantly, the agreement further required “the absolute neutrality of 
the Indonesian armed forces”.547 With a view to ensure neutrality and free expression of the will of 
the people, a Commission on Peace and Stability was established on 21 April 1999. The Commission 
was supposed to work in cooperation with the UN to elaborate a code of conduct by which all parties 
should abide. Therefore, the UN was the international organisation given extensive powers of control, 
administration and supervision of the referendum. That is why the Security Council on 11 June 1999 
																																								 																				
543 I. Sen, Sovereignty Referendum in International and Constitutional Law, cit. p. 102 
544 Modalities Agreement, cit., point B. 
545 Ibid. point C.  
546 Security Agreement, cit., art. 4. 
547 Agreement regarding the security art. 1. 
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established the UNAMET with resolution 1246.548 The results of the August 1999 ballot showed a 
clear majority for independence, but were followed by episodes of violence undertaken by local 
militia groups with the support of the Indonesian army. President of Indonesia Habibe, facing this 
escalation of violence and under high international pressure, requested the UN to build up an 
international peace force in Timor.549 On 25 October 1999 the Security Council established the UN 
Transitional Administration in East-Timor (UNTAET),550 responsible for bringing peace and order 
in the post-referendum context. Issues concerning transitional justice would fall outside the scope of 
this research, therefore we will not get into detail on this aspect. However, it is worth mentioning that 
the mission was empowered with general administration responsibilities and executive powers. 
UNTAET was thus able to bring East-Timor to elections for the Constituent Assembly on 30 August 
2001, and the island finally became independent in 2002.551 
What conclusions can be drawn from the referendum in East Timor?  Firstly, from the facts 
reviewed so far it seems that the UN managed the case of East-Timor from the perspective of a 
decolonization process.552 Although no concrete steps were taken against the occupation by 
Indonesia, the resolutions devoted to the legal status of the territory championed the right to self-
determination of East-Timor.553  This is further supported by the fact that the territory was delisted 
from the list of non-self-governing territories only when it acquired independence in 2001. With a 
view to find practice in support of a general international law rule on referenda about territorial 
changes, one would expect the consultation in East Timor to be a referendum tout court. By contrast, 
in this case as well many elements of the popular consultation recall those of a plebiscite. First, art. 2 
of the New York Agreement allows the Secretary General to “ arrange for a popular consultation by 
means of a direct, secret and universal ballot”.554 It does not use the word referendum. Second, the 
																																								 																				
548 Resolution establishing the United Nations Mission in East Timor, SC/RES/1246, 11 June 1999. See I. Martin, A. 
Mayer-Reck, The United Nations and East-Timor: from Self-determination to State building, International Peacekeeping, 
2005, vol. 12, pp. 112-145. R. Narayan: “The East-Timor Crisis”, China Report, 2000, vol. 36, p. 93; G. Robinson: “East-
Timor. Ten Years on: Legacies of Violence”; Journal of Asian Studies, 2011, n. 70, pp. 1007-1020. 
549Tancredi mentions the letter of President Habibe, referred to in the UN doc S/1999/976 dated 14 Sept 1999. The 
document was a report of the mission envoyed by the SC in Jakarta and Dili.  A. Tancredi, La Secessione in Diritto 
Internazionale, cit., p. 592. 
550 To stop the escalation of violence the UN deployed 11000 troops in East-Timor in October 1999, whose action prepared 
the ground for the settlement of UNTAET. See for an in depth analysis J. Chopra: “Building State failure in East-Timor”, 
Development and Change, 2010, vol. 25, pp. 979-992. 
551 I. G. Sen, Sovereignty Referenda in Constitutional and International Law, cit., p. 105; J. M. Sorel: “Timor Oriental: 
un resumé de l’histoire du droit international”, Revue General de Droit International Public, 2000, pp. 37-51. 
552 K. Nordquist: “Autonomy, Local Voices and Conflict Resolutions. Lessons from East-Timor”, International Journal of 
Minority and Group Rights, 2013, vol. 20, pp. 107-117 at p. 111. 
553 See the above mentioned res. 3485 (December 12, 1975); 31/53 (December 13, 1976); together with res. 32/34 dated 
28 November 1977; 33/39 13 December 1978; 32/57 dated 11 November 1980, and the Special Committee on the 
Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, East-Timor Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/AC.109/2026 issued on 22 June 1995, 
554 Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal date 5 May 1999, cit., art. 2. 
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same agreement shows that the decision to ascertain the will of the people was taken by the interested 
powers under a bilateral agreement. In this line, recent studies on constitutional and independence 
referendum have focused on the lack of input by the East-Timorese, observing that “the negotiations 
that generated East-Timor’s referendum law lacked East-Timorese input and were dominated by 
Indonesian representatives”.555 Lastly, the referendum was championed by the UN as a free one,556 
but the role of the Indonesian authorities casts many doubts, given the acts of the military personnel 
allegedly responsible of practices of intimidation against the population. One of the results of the lack 
of participation by the people would have been the instability and escalation of violence during and 
after the popular consultation.557 Moreover, the fact that the security of the ballot was ensured by a 
country (Indonesia)  directly concerned by the territorial change does not help in guaranteeing a free 
and fair consultation.558  
In sum, there are too many undefined positions and counterarguments about the use of popular 
consultations in the field of decolonisation. Practice of UN-led consultation is partially undefined. 
Popular consultations held during the decolonisation period were not decisive in principle, passive, 
consultative and facultative. As Crawford observes: “in the vast majority of cases the progress to self-
government or independence was consensual. It occurred with the agreement of the State responsible 
for the administration of the territory, in accordance with law and pursuant to arrangements between 
the government of that State and local leaders.”559 Popular consultations could be considered a tool 
to implement the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence. However, their non-consistent 
application has prevented their affirmation as the established means to solve territorial disputes. In 
other words, plebiscites were not felt as compulsory for colonies reaching independence. It remains 
to be seen if and how the law evolved during the nineties. 
4. The focus of the research: territorial referenda 
A huge debate on the use of popular consultations for territorial changes arose in the 90ies. It 
began with the independence of the Baltic Republics and reached its peak with the independence of 
the other twelve Soviet Republics and the dissolution of SFRY, due to the widespread use of 
																																								 																				
555 See C. Stephens: “Maximising Consent: Operationalising Reciprocity in Secession Referenda”, University of 
Queensland Law Journal, 2015, vol. 34, p. 154. 
556 I. Martin, Self-Determination in East-Timor. The UN, the Ballot and International Intervention, Boulder- London, 
2001. 
557 Ibid. 
558 See on this point V. Epps claiming “Everyone now knows that the ballot was not free from violence and intimidation, 
but no one doubts that Indonesia would not have signed the May, 1999 agreement without such a provision, and the 
people of East Timor refused, often at great personal cost, to be intimidated”. V. Epps: “Self-Determination after Kosovo 
and East-Timor”, ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2000, vol. 6, p. 453. 
559 J. Crawford: “State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession”, cit., p. 9 
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referendum to justify the new borders settlement. It was during this period that referenda became an 
issue of research also for international legal scholars.560 In the previous pages, we attempted to verify 
if territorial referenda have been part of international practice since a long time. If so, in fact, there 
would have been elements supporting the existence of a general international rule based on practice 
and opinio juris. However, it was shown that popular consultations in the form of plebiscite were 
different from referenda, and that the attitude of the UN with respect to territorial changes and will 
of the people in the framework of decolonization was ambivalent. Hence, why currently there is a 
consistent practice about the resort to territorial referenda, and on the basis of which rule?  
Referenda concerning secession can have different legal basis:1) constitutional; 2) established 
by international agreement and 3) unilateral.561 As it was anticipated in the Introduction, examples of 
constitutional referenda on territorial changes allowing for secession are rare, yet some can be found 
in the constitutions of the USSR and Burma.562 Referenda on territorial changes established by an 
international agreement563 are more common, and may also be used to determine whether a territory 
should remain under the sovereignty of another State. e.g. the case of France with referenda in 
Mayotte.564 Finally, there are referenda carried out unilaterally by a sub-unit without a solid legal 
																																								 																				
560 See i.e. the Doctoral Thesis by A. Peters about territorial referenda dated 1994 “Dasgebietsbezogene Referendum im 
Völkerrecht im Licht der Staatenpraxis nach 1989”, Baden-Baden, 1995. 
561 I. G. Sen, Sovereignty Referenda in International and Constitutional Law, cit., pp. 42-44. 
562 See Introduction, pp. 6-7. Burma and the USSR are not the only cases of constitutionally guaranteed right to secede. 
Another example can be found in the constitutional provisions concerning the Uzbek autonomous region of 
Karakalpastan, which will be considered in section 7. 
563 These can be either multilateral or bilateral, such as in the case of the Memorandum between the UK and Scotland or 
of the Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea already mentioned. Agreements with a rebellious faction – i.e. the 
agreement between Sudan and South Sudan- fall in this group as well. See Chapter 2, at xxxx. 
564 After the adoption of the 1958 French Constitution, the Indonesian archipelago of Comoros – including Mayotte, 
Grande Comoros, Moneti and Anjouan- was confirmed as territoire d’autre mer. From there on, France gradually 
consented to greater degrees of autonomy to the territory, which culminated in a joint declaration dated 1973. By the 
agreement, it was foreseen that after a 5 years period of transition, the Comoros should vote on their future status through 
a referendum. The popular consultation actually took place earlier, due to the independent claim brought by the Comorian 
President Abdallah. With law 74-965 dated 23 November 1974, France agreed on holding a referendum one month later. 
Overall, the vote cast was clearly in favour of independence – 94.57% of the voters, but counting each island separately 
people from the island of  Mayotte voted for staying with France. This difference marked the beginning of a long-standing 
dispute between Comoros and France over Mayotte. Paris decided that a draft of Constitution would have been put to 
referendum in each island, and Grande Comoros reacted by declaring independence for the whole archipelago. In 1975 
France recognised the independence of Comoros island, with Law 765-560 dated 3 July 1975, except for Mayotte. In a 
double round referendum in 1976 Mayotte confirmed its choice of staying with France, albeit its status moved from that 
of collectivité territoriale to a collectivité départementale. Further referenda have not changed this status, which is highly 
debatable for international law. The General Assembly has given voice to the majoritarian opinion of the member states 
on the illegality of the link with France. After the two consultations held in 1976, the GA with resolution A/RES/31/4 
dated 21 October 1976 rejected all the subsequent referenda or popular consultations that France could further organise. 
Thereinafter, with resolutions A/RES/35/42 dated 28 November 1980 and A/RES/41/30 dated 3 November 1976 the GA 
considered the referendum “null and void”. The situation is still unresolved, unclear from a legal standpoint. In 2000 
France and representatives of Mayotte signed the Paris Agreement, according to which a referendum should be organised 
on the changing status of the island towards that of Departmental Collectivity. The new status was accepted by a 72.94 
% of the vote cast. Yet another changing occurred in 2009, when the Mahorais decided by referendum to become an 
Overseas French Department governed by Article 73 of the French Constitution. Although claims by the Comoros 
continue, several elements allow to argue that the territory is recognised as part of France: firstly, there has been a decrease 
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basis. These category includes the recent cases of Crimea and Catalonia, and for the purpose of this 
research, we may call these unilateral territorial referenda. Scholarly literature has engaged in many 
further classifications, which however are not essential for the research at stake.565 What deserves 
attention is that from the year 2014, referenda are back in the business of international law. The 
secession of Crimea from Ukraine, the attempt to independence of the people of Scotland and the 
worsening of the dispute between Spain and the region of Catalonia put on the table many legal 
questions again. Before this period, international legal scholars had seen a “wave” of independence 
referenda between 1990 and 1992 with the ex-soviet republics and the states born out of the former 
Yugoslavia.566 Then, the issue of referendum appeared seldom, with Montenegro’s independence in 
2006 and with the creation of South Sudan in 2011. Besides, the referendum was even missing in the 
cases of Czechoslovakia and Kosovo.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Tierney567 observes that there are two features about the creation of States which most 
contributed to make referenda so attractive for seceding entities. Firstly, with the referendum, the sub-
unit has the invaluable chance to gather attention on an issue of concern for itself. Secondly, the ballot 
implies showing the very identity of the people or the demos. The referendum has the potential to 
aggregate the people, thus reinforcing claims to statehood and popular sovereignty. As Tierney further 
observes “as an event the referendum seems to mobilise a sub-State group as a people. The 
aspirations for self-determination and the action of self-determination merge into one another”.568 
Perhaps the most important feature is what Tierney defines its moral force. That is to say that 
																																								 																				
in the attention of the GA to the topic as demonstrated by the fact that i.e. in 2014 the question on the status of Mayotte 
was not included in the agenda for the sixty–ninth session. See http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11551.doc.htm 
Secondly, form 1 January 2014 the EU considers Mayotte as outermost region, pursuant to the European Union Council 
decision 2012/419/EU, indirectly assuming that the territory is French. 
565 See in particular the classifications made by I. G. Sen, Sovereignty Referenda in International and Constitutional Law, 
p. 65-66 citing G. Sussman: “When the Demos Shapes the Polis. The Use of Referendum in Settling Sovereignty Issues”.  
www.iandriinstitute.org. Sussman divided referenda into six categories, to include those strictly territorial and those 
related to sovereignty. Three different kinds of territorial referenda are envisaged: 1) Independence Referenda; 2) 
Upsizing/Incorporation Referenda and 3) Border Referenda, the latter concerning popular consultations to solve territorial 
disputes. Then, there are 4) Status Referenda, to mean those used to deal with either colonial dominions or trustee 
territories; 5) referenda on transfer of sovereignty, organised in order to decide on transfer of state competences, i.e. to 
supranational entities such as the European Union or sub-national units as in the case of the devolution in the UK. Lastly, 
there are 6) secession/downsizing referenda, which are specifically conceived to facilitate the territorial change, also in 
the form of secession. 
566The dissolution of the Federation of Yugoslavia offers some examples of referenda about territorial changes. According 
to the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY, the federation was composed by six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Among the Republics, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence 
after a territorial referendum–Slovenia on December 23, 1990 and Croatia on May 19, 1991 respectively. Macedonia 
organised a referendum (September 8, 1991) asking whether the will of the people was in favour of independence or for 
an association of sovereign states of Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina hold a referendum after independence had been 
declared, following the Opinion of the Badinter Commission on its recognition. By contrast, no referendum was held in 
Serbia, which claim itself to be the successor of the SFRY and did not feel the need to ask for popular consent on 
independence. See D. Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., pp. 356-361. 
567 Ibid. p. 533. 
568 Ibid, p. 534. 
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referenda have an added value: the renowned importance they have as a tool to ascertain the will of 
the people adds a particular strength to claims of independence based on the result of a ballot. From 
a legal standpoint, however, the moral force has no bearing, at least de lege lata. The debate over the 
value of unilateral territorial referenda revolves around two questions: 1) the legal value of referenda 
used by seceding entities, which are not entitled to claim a right to self-determination,569 and 2) what 
requirements should those referenda comply with. This second point will be the subject of the next 
Chapter; it is now time to see which are the arguments adduced to justify the obligation to conduct a 
referendum to validate a secession. 
4.1 Arguments in favour of an international legal obligation to conduct a referendum to validate 
a territorial change 
 
A leading scholar supporting the legality of secession by a free and fair territorial referendum is 
Anne Peters, who has been studying practice on referenda in international law since the breakup of 
the former Yugoslavia.570  
Peters develops her argument beginning from self-determination. The key point is the 
individualistic interpretation she gives of the right to self-determination: it is this interpretation that 
justifies the inclusion of a democratic component into self-determination struggles and eventually 
justifies secession through referendum.571 On the same line, Philpott opines that self-determination 
understood as a right to secede is grounded in the value of individual autonomy. He argues that “self-
determination promotes democracy for a group whose members first claim to share an identity for 
political purposes, and second, seek a separate government, as opposed to a larger portion of 
representatives in their current State’s government”.572A thorough analysis of Peters’ position 
enables us to analyse the main legal arguments supporting the necessity to resort to referenda to 
validate a seceding attempt. In other words, two main issues underpin her argument: an individual 
																																								 																				
569 States that emerged between 1987 and 1993 sought to justify their movements with “self-determination referenda”, as 
observed by Beidbeger, who refers without distinction to plebiscites and referenda. Cassese however observes that the 
twelve Soviet republics did not have a right to self-determination because they have been illegally put under the 
sovereignty of the Soviet Union. Their case therefore was more one of restoration of the previous status. Quite a different 
avenue was followed in SFRY: the Badinter Commission in 1992 considered it a case of dissolution, yet it could be argues 
that Slovenia and Croatia carried out a secession by referendum because the declared independence in 1991 after a 
territorial referendum. See A. Cassese, Self-Determination in International Law. A Legal Reappraisal, cit., 143-145. 
570 Although not big, the group of scholars supporting this position includes also other distinguished commentators. For 
Scelle, i.e., referenda can be part of customary international law about territorial changes given the consolidated tradition 
of resorting to plebiscites. In other words, popular consultations have gradually become a constant in international 
practice. This idea leads Frank to speak about the “coherence” of the principle of self-determination in international law. 
See T.M. Frank: “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, American Journal of International Law, 1992, vol. 
86, pp. 52-55.  
571 A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., pp. 
263-264. 
572 D. Philpott: “In defence of Self-Determination”, Journal of Ethics, 1995, vol. 105, p. 357. 
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concept of self-determination and the democratic component of self-determination. The combination 
of the two results in the resort to democratic secession by sub-units. 
As it was mentioned in the Introduction, the concept of democratic statehood is gaining an 
important place in the international legal debate.573 The international community has progressively 
seen the flourishing of democracies worldwide. Regardless of the effective implementation of a 
democratic form of government, the international community has championed the value of 
democracy. The strengthening of the validity of democratic principles with respect to the law of 
statehood is the framework in which Peters develops an individualistic conception of self-
determination. This is not tantamount to say that self-determination is not conceived as a collective 
right. The argument, rather, rests on the acknowledgment that since there is no established definition 
of people in international law, any legal qualification remains vague.574 In normative terms, for Peters 
to make self-determination practically operable it is preferable to ascribe it to persons.575 At the very 
essence of collective rights, there is the idea that they are enjoyed by individuals in a community. As 
Peters claims, “any collective right is supportive and ultimately derivative of the individual group 
members’ interests, needs and rights”.576 Taken to the extreme, this line of thought would justify 
seceding attempts within territories born out of a secession. Peters does not deny the existence of 
possible deviations. Instead, she claims that once exercised, the individualistic conception of the right 
to self-determination has to be implemented with the creation of a new entity.  
Small minority groups are unable to build functioning political communities, since it would be 
practically very difficult for them to form an autonomous entity which possesses the requirements of 
a State. Mostly, it would be almost impossible in practical terms for small communities to claim to 
be states as political entities constituted with a population and a territory. With this caveat, for Peters 
the individual is the focus of the research, in that each member of a group has the right to be part of 
a community that guarantees his/her well-being.577 The modalities to exercise this right are 
summarised in this way “the international legal obligation to conduct a territorial referendum flows 
from the principle of self-determination of peoples”.578 Once the individual dimension of the right has 
been acknowledged, it remains to be seen how the democratic standards can kick in. The democratic 
																																								 																				
573 See for a full account on the topic J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit.; see also J.J. Paust: “Self-
Determination: a Definitional Focus”, Y. Alexander, R.A. Freidlander (eds.), Self-Determination, National Regional and 
Global Dimensions, Westview, 1980. 
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component according to Peters is incorporated in the concept of self-determination, given that the 
principle developed alongside that of popular sovereignty.  
In the first Chapter, the inquiry about the right to self-determination begun from the Wilsonian 
idea of the principle. It was showed that in its early understanding, self-determination concerned the 
principle “that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that 
no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty as if they were property”.579 Thus, 
external self-determination was strictly linked with popular sovereignty, although the democratic 
component was interpreted and applied only with respect to independence during the decolonisation 
period. The democratic principle, Peters contends, was already on stage after WW I, when plebiscites 
were hold in application of the Versailles Treaty.580 Piece by piece, state practice has in fact conceived 
the right to self-determination as linked to the principle of democracy. Thus, Peters contends that “it 
is generally acknowledged that the right to self-determination should be exercised democratically”.581 
Interestingly enough, Peters gives a prominent role to the secession of Kosovo in the definition of the 
democratic element of the right to self-determination, and in particular to the statement made by 
Switzerland. 
The basic assumption made by Switzerland concerns the status of Kosovo, which is that of 
“non self-governing territory as defined by Crawford”. 582 In the monograph on States creation in 
international law, Crawford outlines that alongside the re-known status such as non self-governing 
territories or trust territories, there is another unit entitled to self-determination. When an area is part 
of a metropolitan State, but it has been governed in such a way as to make it in effect non-self-
governing, it is a territory subject to “a carence de souveraineté”. 583  This kind of unit is entitled to 
self-determination, all the more so if it has suffered from human rights abuses According to 
Switzerland, the close ties between self-determination and fundamental rights are undeniable in the 
Kosovo affaire. Among the bulk of fundamental human rights, prevalence is given to the principle of 
equality and the consolidation of democratic statehood in international law. These principles are 
shaping the relationship between central governments and territorial sub-units. In the view of 
Switzerland, the first and foremost democratic principle is that the demand for self-determination has 
																																								 																				
579 W. Wilson, Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917, point 6, available at Woodrow Wilson library, 
www.woodrowwilson.org 
580 See A. Peters, The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., p. 
266. 
581 Ibid., p. 264. 
582 Written Statement by Switzerland for ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Independence Declaration of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, cit., dated 17 October 2008, (hereinafter written statement submitted by Switzerland) para. 
77. 
583 See Chapter 1 at xxxxx J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, cit., p. 126. 
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to be expressed with a majority vote. Taking advantage of its outstanding tradition of popular 
consultations, Switzerland claims that “the demand for self-determination can only be considered if 
the majority of the population living in the territory concerned declare that they are in favour of self-
determination”. 584 Hence, the main point in support of the declaration of independence was the 
democratic election of the representatives taken on 17 November 2007. The elections held in 
compliance with the principle of equality, ensuring participation of all the people concerned were the 
basis for the appointing of the representatives, and indirectly the legitimate basis for the declaration 
issued by Kosovo on 17 September 2008.585  
Although Peters is right in using this supportive argument, a careful scrutiny of the statement 
shows that Switzerland focussed on the democratically elected requirement of the representatives of 
Kosovo, without being crystal clear on the issue of the legal value of referendum. Peters herself shares 
the view that the democratic quality of the status laid in the election of representatives.586  Arguably, 
this argument belongs to the realm of domestic law, and it touches upon international law only to the 
extent that the international documents such as the ICCPR guarantee a right to multiparty system.587 
Therefore, it cannot as such support the democratic statehood argument. Moreover, in the opening of 
the Chapter it was opined that a referendum acquires an international value when it has consequences 
at the international level, notably in the creation of statehood, or when it finds its legal basis in the 
international legal order, e.g. when it is provided for by a treaty. In the case of Kosovo, the process 
started with the election of the delegates and ended with the declaration of independence. Although 
there is an issue for democratic secession, formally there was no referendum for territorial change in 
Kosovo as it was, in example, in Scotland or in Crimea. To conclude, the arguments presented by 
Peters are very persuasive because of their strong moral force. Identity issues as well as the role of 
the individual in the international legal order touch upon sensitive lines. However, from a legal 
standpoint the distinguished commentator’s claim is questionable, albeit it has to be championed for 
the attempt to favour the progressive development of international law.588 
 
																																								 																				
584 Written Statement by Switzerland, cit., para. 78. 
585 The People’s of Kosovo declaration read as follows: “We, the democratically elected leaders of our people, declare 
Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people”. The declaration is 
available at the official website of the Republic of Kosovo, with an updated list of the countries that have recognized 
Kosovo. See. http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/Dek_Pav_e.pdf 
586 A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., p. 266. 
587 As Vidmar opines “neither art. 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor art. 25 of the ICCPR specifically 
requires multiparty elections or establishes a specific link between elections and government formations”, J. Vidmar, 
Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., pp. 21-22 
588 In fact, the author herself opts for arguing for the emerging right to democratic referendum. 
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4.2 Arguments against the role of territorial referenda in international law 
In light of the above, the following pages begin with a) reference to international documents 
concerning widespread use of territorial referenda – i.e. the opinions of the Badinter Commission on 
ex-Yugoslavia; and proceeds with b) case law- with the judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Then, the inquiry will turn to the cases of Scotland, Catalonia and Crimea. The empirical approach 
of the study leads to conclude that referenda are not compulsory, nor there is an international rule 
pursuant to which they are a necessary step in the process of secession. However, for the latter point, 
there are some elements suggesting that referenda may become a necessary element for secession, 
when linked with the fulfilment of other conditions. In particular, it is observed that despite some 
differences, negotiations were constantly linked to referendum in practice about territorial changes.589 
In fact, the position presented will be that that the main legal effect flowing from the use of territorial 
referenda in the context of secessionist movements is to endorse negotiations. This is not tantamount 
to say that an international law norm in this sense is already consolidated. There is no sufficient 
practice and established opinio juris yet. Nevertheless, there is a trend in this direction which cannot 
be underestimated. In this sense, support for the position just taken will be found also by recalling the 
examples of few constitutions allowing for secession under particular circumstances. 
The possibility for territorial referenda to establish a duty upon the concerned parties to start 
negotiations for a new territorial settlement was advanced by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Opinion concerning the attempt to secede by Quebec.590 However, before the Supreme Court issued 
its opinion, the international community had already been confronted with a wave of territorial 
referenda during the dissolution of SFRY.591 It is therefore necessary to firstly have a look at the 
approach of the body entrusted with the task to answer legal questions concerning the events in the 
region. 
																																								 																				
589 It is rather symple to grasp the absence of the case of Montenegro (2006). Montengro is of a fundamental importance 
for any international law study on secession and referenda. However, the salient facets of Crimea and Montenegro concern 
the requirements of the popular consultation held thereto, in particular the establishments and the respect or violation of 
international standards for a free and fair territorial referendum. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to use Crimea and 
Montenegro as cases study for the analysis of the standards for a free and fair territorial referendum.  
590 See on Reference Re Secession of Quebec the huge literature: A. F. Bayefsky, Self-determination in International Law: 
Quebec and Lessons Learned. Legal Opinions Selected and Introduced by Anne F. Bayefsky, The Hague, 2000; R. Howse 
and S. Choudhry: “Constitutional Theory and the Quebec Secession Reference”, Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, 2000, vol. 13, pp.143-170; N. Verrelli and N. Cruickshank: “Exporting the Clarity Ethos: Canada and the 
Scottish Independence Referendum”, British Journal of Canadian Studies, 2014, vol. 27, pp.195-217. 
591 The research intentionally omits the USSR, in light of the legal qualification of the case. It could be argued that it is a 
case of dissolution just like the Jugoslav one. However, the case of the SFRY could be also viewed as a hybrid. It is a 
case of dissolution, but it is also possible to referrer to secession at least for the first two republics declaring independence, 
notably Slovenia and Croatia. The USSR was instead a typical example of dissolution of a Federation. Of this opinion, 
A. Cassese, Self-Determination in International Law, a Legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 131.  
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a) Referenda in the context of the dissolution of the SFRY 
Considering that many States coming out of the Federation resorted to a referendum to declare 
independence, and the support given by the international community through the Badinter 
Commission, it could be claimed that during this period the referendum has definitely become a 
compulsory tool with respect to international law on territorial changes. This position does not seem 
verified. Referenda were used in a period of severe breaches of fundamental rights, in an internal 
armed conflict between ethnic factions. A fundamental goal, therefore, was to reach the pacification 
of the area. The dissolution of the SFRY in fact boosted the affirmation of international law in the 
field of respect of minority rights and of democratic principles. Moreover, no binding document 
establishing an obligation to conduct a consultation was adopted. Nevertheless, it has to be 
acknowledged that the referenda carried out between 1991 and 1993 weighted considerably in the 
progressive formation of a procedural obligation to use the referendum to legitimise territorial 
changes, at least in the context of serious ethnic conflicts.592 
The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has been thoroughly 
analysed by social sciences scholars. From an international legal standpoint, secession and the 
democratically expressed will of the people widely interrelate in the making of the nations born out 
of the dissolution of the SFRY. Arguably, this interrelation belongs primarily to the realm of 
constitutional law. People living in one of the nations composing SFRY593 were entitled to the right 
of self-determination both in its internal and external dimension. The 1974 Constitution envisaged 
the option of secession, albeit a specific provision granting a right to secede was absent. The peoples 
of the  Federation were in fact entitled to self-determination “including secession”. 594 Interestingly, 
the constitution introduces the use of the term nation, to mark the difference from the two provinces 
included in SFRY, Kosovo and Vojvodina.595 Recalling the distinction introduced in Chapter 2 on 
units entitled to secede, it could be asserted that SFRY was composed by i) the population of the 
Republics that could be labelled as a privileged unit, entitled to seek separation in application of the 
appropriate constitutional provisions. Then there were ii) the autonomous provinces which could be 
																																								 																				
592 M. Qwrtrop, Referendum and Ethnic Conflict, cit., pp. 47-70. 
593 Constitution of the SFRY, art. 1: “The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal State having the form of 
a State community of voluntarily united nations and their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialists Autonomous Provices 
of Voyvodjina and Kosovo”. Text available in H. Krieger (ed.), The Kosovo Conflict and International Law, An analytical 
documentation 1974-1999, Cambridge, 2001. 
594 Constitution of the SFRY, 1974, preamble and General Principle I “The peoples of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the right 
of every people to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their common struggle and their 
will freely declared in the People's Liberation War and Socialist Revolution”. 
595 According to the 1974 Constitution, SFRY was made of six Republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia. Alongside the Republics, two provinces were included: Kosovo and Vojivodyna. 
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considered unprivileged units since they were not entitled to secede. It would be reasonable to expect 
a distribution of competences reflecting the different label of nation and province and republics, quite 
the opposite, in practice the autonomous provinces had wide powers including police control over 
their territory.596  
When the conflict in SFRY broke out, the international community had to face the problems 
arising from the different degree of powers referred to above. The body specifically established to 
deal with legal issues arising from the events in Yugoslavia was the Arbitration Commission founded 
by the European Commission (EC), also called the Badinter Commission.597 It was created under the 
auspices of the Conference on Yugoslavia, founded by the European Commission (hereinafter EC) 
on 27 August 1991.598 Its mandate was extensive and not clearly defined: it included answering to 
questions related to recognition of States, minority rights and succession to treaties. Although its 
opinions were not legally binding, the documents of the Badinter Commission are generally regarded 
as authoritative statements of international law on territorial changes and creation of statehood.599 
The Badinter Commission paid due regard to the role of referenda about territorial changes, but did 
not go that far as to support their binding role. Rather, the Opinions of the Commission had a pivotal 
role in the consolidation of general democratic principles in the creation of statehood. Hence, 
referenda in the discourse of the Opinions are considered one among the tools to increase the legality 
of a secessionist claim.  
The Commission was asked questions by Lord Carnington - President of the Peace 
Conference- by the Serbian Republic and by the Council of Ministers of the ECC. The questions 
concerned how to label the process of territorial change undergoing in Yugoslavia (Opinion 1); the 
																																								 																				
596 See D. Raic, Self-Determination and the Law of Statehood, cit., pp. 332-336. As it was observed in the previous 
Chapter, the high degree of autonomy boosted the claims of the provinces during the process of dissolution, in particular 
in the case of Kosovo.  
597 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, cit., pp. 270-273. 
598 With the spread of the crisis in Yugoslavia, the Ministers of the Member States of the EC met extraordinarily in 
Brussels on 27 August 1991 and adopted a Declaration on Yugoslavia. The Declaration established the EC Conference 
for Peace n Yugoslavia; at the same time the ministers announced their intention to establish an arbitration procedure 
within the framework of the Conference. Although in principle the Badinter Commission was meant to be an arbitral 
body, it acted as a consultation one. The need for the Member States of the European Community to favour the pacification 
of the region became impellent in June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence and an armed conflict 
spread out of the region. See on this topic R. Lukic and A. Lznch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, The disintegration 
of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1996, Oxford; S. Lawrence Eastwood: “Secession: State Practice and International 
Law after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Jugoslavia”, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 
1993, vol. 3, pp. 299-349. 
599 A. Pellet: “Note sur la Commission d'Arbitrage de la Conference Europeenne pour la Paix en Yougoslavie”, Annuaire 
Française de Droit International, XXXVII – 1991, pp.329-348; S. Oeter: “Dissolution of Yugoslavia” in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2011 available at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1370 (last visited 20 November 
2016); M.C.R. Craven: “The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia”, The British Yearbook of 
International Law, 1996, vol. 66, pp. 335-412. 
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identification of frontiers (Opinion 2); the right of the people of Serbian origins in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina to self-determination (Opinion 3); and the recognition of the Republics of Croatia, 
Macedonia and Slovenia (Opinions 4 to 7). The Badinter Commission was thus called to verify 
whether they satisfied the conditions laid down by the Council of Ministers. The Opinions could take 
advantage of the documents elaborated by the EC, in particular of the EC Guidelines on 
Recognition600 and on the Charter of Paris.601 Notwithstanding the different subjects of the Opinions, 
three main trajectories can be identified in the documents of the Commission: 1) the application of 
the principle of democracy; 2) rule of law; 3) human rights – in particular protection of minorities. 
The framework in which the opinions shall be included is given by the way the Commission 
itself labelled the creation of new entities from the SFRY. Before focusing on the role given by the 
Commission to territorial referenda, it is necessary to contextualise the use of referenda between 1991 
and 1993 in Yugoslavia. The Badinter Commission considered that the Yugoslav Federation was in 
the process of dissolution. Opinion no. 1 dated 7 December 1992 concerned specifically the issue of 
secession. Two different position were presented: for Serbia, the Republics which had declared 
independence had seceded from the SFRY. At the other side of the spectrum, there was the view of 
the other Republics, that no secession took place. The case was one of disintegration, so the Republics 
were to be considered equal successors of the SFRY.602  
Opinion 1 upheld the argument of the Republics, but gave its own interpretation as to how 
international law on territorial changes applied to SFRY. The Commission based its understanding 
on the situation undergoing in SFRY on several grounds. Relying on a factual interpretation of 
statehood, the Commission acknowledged that the creation of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia “is a 
question of fact”. 603 For the Commission, these facts originated from the failure of the parties to reach 
																																								 																				
600 The Council of Ministers had already drawn off a series of conditions that new entities had to satisfy in order to be 
recognised by the member states of the EU. On 16 December 1991 the member states of the European Commission 
adopted the Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Easter Europa and Soviet Union. The 
Declaration incorporated the pleadings of the members to accept the principles set in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and 
in the 1990 Charter of Paris. According to the latter, in particular, the signatories committed themselves to “build, 
consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations […] Democratic government is 
based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections”. Hence, the Badinter Commission 
could not but refer extensively to the document and base its Opinions on the bulk of principles laid down therein. See D. 
Raic, Self-Determination and the Law of Statehood, cit., pp. 165-167. 
601 Charter of Paris: for a new Europe: a new era of Democracy Peace and Unity, signed in the framework of the CSCE 
by thirty-four of its members, adopted on November 21, 1990.  The purport of the Charter was establishing a framework 
to enhance the respect for human rights and security in Europe. The text is available in International Law Materials, 1990, 
vol. 30, p. 190 and ff.  
602 Badinter Commission, Opinion 1, 7 December 1990, Introduction. See J. Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law, cit., pp. 336; 704-706. On the debate over dissolution or secession see also P. Radan: “Post-secessionist 
International Borders: a Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission”, Melbuorne 
University Law Review, 2000, vol. 24, pp. 54-58. 
603 Badinter Commission, Opinion 1, cit., para. 1(a). 
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a different territorial settlement.604 In particular,  Opinion 1 states that  “the authorities of the 
Federation and the Republics have shown themselves to be powerless to enforce respect for the 
succeeding ceasefire agreements concluded under the auspices of the European Communities or the 
United Nations Organization”.605  From this perspective, the option of dissolution comes  as the only 
available one and there is no need to talk about secession. In this framework, the Commission builds 
its opinions on the recognition of the Yugoslav Republics.  
(i) Slovenia and Croatia: referenda and secession in practice  
As regards Slovenia, on 23rd December 1990 a referendum about independence opened the 
way to the 1991 Declaration on Independence and the Adoption of the Foundational Constitutional 
Instrument.606 The referendum question was the following: “ Shall the Republic of Slovenia become 
a sovereign and independent State?”.607 Figures showed that the 88% was in support for 
independence. In light of its approach to the dissolution in SFRY, it is not surprising that the 
Commission considered the referendum a sort of reaction to the failure of Slovenia and SFRY to 
negotiate a different federal arrangement.608 The Opinion in fact recites: “Following the plebiscite, 
after various proposals and attempts to agree on changes in the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) had come to nothing, the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted a 
Declaration of Independence on 23 June 1991, based on 'a unanimous proposal by other parties, 
groups or delegates represented in Parliament.”609  The Commission puts emphasis on the various 
proposals and attempts to agree on changes to the SFRY and as a consequence, any reasoning about 
secession in international law – even a negotiated one-  becomes meaningless. It seems that the main 
concern is the respect for the rule of law and the principle of democracy, taken as a benchmark for 
assessing the legitimacy for the declaration of independence. This assumption is supported by the 
attitude of the Commission in evaluating the compliance of the declaration with the EC Guidelines. 
																																								 																				
604It has been argued that since the Declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia came before the 
acknowledgement by the Badinter Commission that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution, Croatia and Slovenia 
unilaterally secede from SFRY. For the purposes of the present chapter, this legal inquiry is not fundamental, because 
even if the independence of the countries had been the result of secession, the very fact that the Commission has 
considered it a dissolution decreases the importance – and the length- given by the Commission to the popular consultation 
as a tool for legitimising the territorial change. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the major concern for the 
Commission was the respect of minority rights and the creation of statehood through the rule of law. 
605 Ibid. para. 2(c). 
606 Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Slovenia, Foundational Constitutional Instrument on the Sovereignty 
and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 1/91-1, 25 June 1991 
available at www.uradni-list.sl/vip-akti/119-d-0007.pdf. See J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., 
pp. 176-178. 
607 Plebiscite on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia Act, 22 November 1990, art. 2. Art. 3 
clarified that the decision to establish an independent state was to be taken only with the positive vote of the majority of 
those eligible to vote. 
608 J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., p. 177. 
609 Badinter Commission, Opinion no. 7, 11 January 1992, para. 1. 
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Unsurprisingly, the Commission pays due regard to art. 81 “of the new constitution of 23 December 
1991 which provides for universal equal and direct suffrage”.610 The requirements of universal and 
secrete suffrage, which are a sign of respect for the principle of democracy, is the real concern.  
Attention for minorities is even more salient in case of Croatia. In its Opinion n.5 devoted to 
recognition of Croatia, the Badinter Commission had before it the chance to consider two attempts of 
creation of statehood: one carried out by Croatia one and the other by Krajina. On 5 April 1991 the 
President’s decree on the call for referendum on independence of the Republic of Croatia set the 
referendum date on 19th May 1991. The question référendaire was the following: 1. “Do you agree 
that the republic of Croatia, as a sovereign and independent state which guarantees the cultural 
autonomy and civil liberties of Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia, shall enter into 
an association of sovereign states together with other republics (according to the suggestion of the 
republic of Croatia and the republics of Slovenia for solving of the crisis in the SFRY)? 2. do you 
agree that the republic of Croatia shall remain in Yugoslavia as a unitary federal state (according to 
the suggestion of the republic of Serbia and the Socialist republic of Montenegro for solving f the site 
crisis in the SFRY?).  
In its Opinion n. 5,611 the Commission seemed to be prone to accept the results of the 
referendum, no matter if the community of Serbian origin boycotted the referendum. Thus, when 
called to render its opinion about the possibility to recognise Croatia as a sovereign an independent 
entity the referendum was taken in due account, but was not considered a crucial element. This is 
further supported by the fact that the Commission was by contrast concerned that Croatia adequately 
protected minority rights in order to be recognized as a sovereign and independent State, like it was 
with Slovenia.612 The value of territorial referenda was left aside, and the Commission seemed to be 
guided more by the results it wanted to achieve – secure recognition after independence- that it did 
not even complain about the fact that the referendum by Croatia was not as clear as that organised in 
Slovenia.613   
																																								 																				
610 Badinter Commission, Opinion no. 7, cit., para. 1. 
611 Badinter Commission, Opinion no. 5, 11, January 1992. 
612 D. Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., p. 349; J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International 
Law, cit., p. 179. 
613 In particular, the question was ambiguous because it called the voters to decide between independence and association 
with Slovenia. The prospect of an association was very unlikely, as demonstrated by the fact that Slovenia and Croatia 
were the first to declare independence Vidmar, i.e., opines that association probably was not desired by the two parties, 
but the option was necessary to counterbalance the strong independence propaganda supported by the Croatian 
representatives. See J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., p. 178. 
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Going back to Krajina, with the Brioni Agreement614 the declaration of independence of 
Croatia remained ineffective for three months, but internal quarrels between different ethnic factions 
never stopped. The population of Serb ethnic origin – being a minority of 10% - opposed the 
declaration and proclaimed itself the Kninska Krajina, whose main aim of Krajina was unification 
with Serbia. In dealing with recognition of Croatia, Opinion 5 of the Badinter Commission 
approached the Krajina problem from the side of protection of minorities. In other words, the 
Commission did not engage in an inquiry on the legality of the creation of Krajina. However, it 
affirmed that the Constitution of Croatia should incorporate the provisions of the Draft Convention 
of the Conference on Yugoslavia615 which relate to minorities’ protection.616 Arguably, protection of 
minorities included the treatment of the minority in the territory of Krajina. So far therefore, it can be 
concluded that the Banditer Commission did not consider referenda a crucial, let alone compulsory, 
passage towards independence. Opinion 4 described in the section below at a first glance could 
contravene this approach, but a more careful scrutiny suggests that the Badinter Commission’s 
concern remains above all the respect and application of the principle of democracy, rather than the 
use referenda. 
(ii) Bosnia-Herzegovina: a request for referendum to legitimise independence? 
 Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina described the 
republic as made of three constitutive nations: Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The Parliament of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina declared independence through a resolution on 14 October 1991, without resorting 
to a referendum.  
The Badinter Commission, asked to determine whether the Republic could be recognized in 
the framework of the EC Guidelines, had to deal with the thorny issue of minorities living within 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Firstly, the Commission recalled that on the basis of art. 1 of the Constitution, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was constituted of Muslims, Croats and Serbs respectively. Citizens of each of 
these three ethnic groups were considered a people on its own. However, the Commission said, the 
acknowledgment of a multi-ethnic composition in the Constitution did not entitle the population of 
Serbian ethnicity to constitute a State on its own. Arguably, the Commission was indirectly throwing 
a spear against the self-proclaimed Republic Srpska. Given the tensions between minority groups, the 
creation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not fully in compliance with international standards such as 
																																								 																				
614 See Chapter 2, p. 85. 
615 Draft Convention of the Conference on Yugoslavia, adopted at The Hague on 4th of October 1991, UN DOC S/23169. 
The Draft Convention was elaborated during the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia under the guide of Lord Carrington. 
The Convention encompasses respect of human rights and above all of ethnic groups and address also the quest for 
territorial autonomy within the federation. 
616 Badinter Commission, Opinion no. 5, 11 January 1992, para. 3. 
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protection of minorities or respect for the rule of law. Thus, the Badinter Commission called for a 
referendum to take place among the whole people of the Republic. In particular, it held that “the will 
of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to	constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State 
cannot be held to have been fully established.	 This assessment could be reviewed if appropriate 
guarantees were provided by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a 
referendum of all the citizens of the SRBH without distinction, carried out under international 
supervision”.617   
On the one side, the express request for a referendum shall not be underestimated. In light of 
the principles guiding the work of the Commission – rule of law, democracy and protection of 
minorities- explicit reference to referendum is important. Since there was no constitutional provision 
on the issue, the Commission has probably grounded its reasoning in international law and practice. 
It entails that this tool serves the purposes of guaranteeing that creation of statehood is in compliance 
with the principles guiding the work of the Commission. On the other side, the wording suggests that 
that of the Commission is an endorsement to possibly organise a referendum. If the Commission 
wanted to convey the idea that the referendum was the established tool to legitimise a territorial 
change, then it probably would have asked SRB-H to carry out a referendum. In this case, in addition, 
an exhaustive perusal would have been necessary to motivate its choice, but such perusal is lacking 
in the Opinion. In fact, Bosnia-Herzegovina implemented the request of the Badinter Commission 
and held a referendum. Nevertheless, doubts could be casted about how the referendum was 
organised, as well as about the value the government was really attaching to it. The referendum 
question was the following: “Are you in favour of a sovereign independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, a 
State of equal citizens and of peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina – Muslims, Croats, Serbs- and others 
who live in it?”.618 Moreover, the referendum was boycotted by the Serbian minority. The group -
30% of the population- was included in the quorum of those eligible to vote, but did not vote.  
Therefore, the figure of 63% that were in favour of independence does not take into account a 30% 
of the population non taking part to the vote. Is it really an example of universal and freely expressed 
popular consent as the Commission asked for in Opinion n.4? No, but the international community 
did not take measures nor criticised it. Why? Vidmar opines that the international community did not 
pay regard to the boycott of the Serbian minority because 1) prevalence was given to the principle of 
“ majority decides” and 2) even considering the boycott, respect for the uti possidetis prevented any 
																																								 																				
617 Badinter Commission, Opinion 4, cit., para. 4. 
618 Decree on the Call of the Republic’s Referendum for Affirmation of the Status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina No. 2, 1992. See J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, 
cit., p. 181. 
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modification of the frontiers from within to take place.619 In other words, the result to be reached was 
so important that the procedural requirement for a referendum could be left aside. 
(iii) Final remarks on referenda in Yugoslavia 
In sum, it would be too far stretched to claim that with the Badinter Commission’s opinions the 
referendum gained the role of an established tool to legitimise secession. A reasonable analysis of the 
Opinions as a whole, shows that the real issue of concern was that the new Republics were founded 
on the rule of law and upon a constitutional-based protection for minorities. The example of Bosnia-
Herzegovina allows for a two-fold conclusion: on the one side, the referendum with Opinion n.4 has 
gone a step forward from a mere consultation, which characterised most of the plebiscites in the 
aftermath of the first WW. However, the international community has not taken the necessary steps 
to make it the subject of an international law rule. There are, in fact, cases in which the referendum 
was not carried out but statehood was acquired. As already observed, the case of Kosovo does not 
fully support the necessary role of referendum for unilateral secession. The elected members of the 
provisional institutions of Kosovo issued the declaration of independence without any referendum.620 
Fleiner righty opines that not only there was no referendum in Kosovo, but the Serbian community 
was not consulted either. This has led some commentators to claim that the experience of Kosovo 
runs against any democratic model of secession.621 By contrast, Mc Corquadale opines that series of 
events undergone by Kosovo may fall in the category of “special circumstances” referred to by the 
ICJ in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion.622 Hence, a referendum was not necessary. The 
argument is not fully persuasive. It is quite difficult to include the specificity of the creation of Kosovo 
under the label of special circumstances for a self-determination unit. On the one side, in Western 
Sahara the principle of people’s consent has so far not been implemented. Rather, it could be observed 
that once the institutions of Kosovo started to be operative, the Constitution was drafted establishing 
in art. 2 that the sovereignty stems from the people and belongs to the people.623 Somehow therefore 
																																								 																				
619 J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., p. 96. 
620 In fact, Kosovo hold a referendum. It was a secret one and it took place from 26 to 29 September 1991. The question 
referéndaire was about the establishment of an independent State and rights to establish an alliance with sovereign 
Yugoslavia. The 87% of the population participated and 99.87% favour independence. Recognized by Albania and 
rejected by Serbia, this was for the people of Kosovo another proof of the Serbian refusal of their right to self-
determination. 
621 T. Fleiner: “The Unilateral Secession of Kosovo as a Precedent in International Law”, U. Fastenrath, R. Geiger, A. 
Paulus et. al (eds.), Form Bilateralism to Community Interest. Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma, cit., p. 877. 
622 R. Mac Corquodale: “Self-Determination: a Human Rights Approach”, International Comparative Law Quarterly, 
1994, vol. 43, p. 857 and ff.  
623 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, art. 2(2): “The sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo stems from the people, 
belongs to the people and is exercised in compliance with the Constitution through elected representatives, referendum 
and other forms in compliance with the provisions of this Constitution “, available only at http://www.assembly-
kosova.org/common/docs/Constitution1%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Kosovo.pdf H. Dijkstra: “The Planning 
and Implementation of the Rule of Law Mission of the European Union in Kosovo”, Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding, 2011, vol. 5, pp.193-210. 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the provision counterbalances the absence of a clear manifestation of the will of the people expressed 
through a vote and more in general the uncertainties as to how people’s consent may lawfully impact 
on a territorial reapportionments.624  
Overall, in the case of Yugoslavia the result was more important than the means used to reach 
it, just as we have explained for the attitude of the United Nations towards plebiscites organised 
during the decolonisation period. This is clearly showed by the fact that in Czechoslovakia there was 
no referendum. The decision was negotiated by the concerned governments. Hence, no input or direct 
participation of the people concerned was envisaged. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist on 31 December 
1992. The day after, Czech Republic and Slovakia were proclaimed independent and were both 
admitted to the UN on the 19th of January 1993. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ceased to 
exist after the political agreement between the Prime Ministers of each Republic was reached. 
Therefore, the process found its legal basis in an understanding between governments rather than in 
popular consultations. Although the terms of the negotiation remain largely obscure, the 
establishment of Czech Republic and of Slovakia did not raise oppositions by the international 
community. The process appeared to be quite short and straight forward, once the parties have reached 
an agreement. On 31 December 1992 the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that 
by the end of the day the Czechoslovak membership to the UN would cease, in light of the dissolution 
of the Federation.625 The two newly born states subsequently applied for UN membership and were 
admitted already in January 1993.626   
In light of this background, it is more accurate to affirm that the case of Czechoslovakia seems 
to fall outside the focus of this research. In particular, in the case of Czechoslovakia, there was an 
agreement among the governments, the element which was missing in the other cases above tackled; 
in fact, the lack of negotiations was one of the arguments used by the Badinter Commission to justify 
its approach to the Opinion on the legal status of the federation. Whilst from the bulk of Opinions the 
referendum arises at least as a favourite tool, the case of Czechoslovakia shows that practice is so 
varied and case specific that generalisations are difficult. Despite the fact that the creation of new 
states from the SFRY was the result of the “universally legally accepted position that the SFRY no 
longer existed”,627 anyway the Badinter Commission paid significant attention to independence 
																																								 																				
624 S. Tierney: “Sovereignty and Crimea. How Referendum Democracy Complicates Constituent Power in Multinational 
States”, German Law Journal, 2015, vol. 16, p. 532. 
625 M.P. Scharf: “Musical Chains: the Dissolution of States and membership in the UN”, Cornell International Law 
Journal, 1995, vol. 28, p. 192; J. Malenovsky: “Problèmes juridiques lié à la partition de la Tchéchoslovaquie”, A. F.D.I, 
1993, vol. 39, pp. 305-318. 
626 Security Council Resolutions 800/1993 and 801/1993 further confirmed by the resolution of the GA n. 47/221 and 
47/222 date 19 January 1993. 
627 J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., p. 176. 
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referenda. To sum up, there are no solid grounds to claim the consolidation of a general rule allowing 
secession via referendum, but two elements can be highlighted from the above: 1) when it seems that 
the will of the people has not been assessed, the referendum is deemed to be the best tool to guarantee 
access to statehood – see Opinion n.4. Secondly, 2) with Slovenia and Croatia –notably the only two 
cases which could be considered unilateral secession- referenda deeply interrelate with the resort to 
negotiations with the parent State. These same elements are doomed to come up in details in the next 
pages. 
5. Territorial referenda as the first step towards negotiations: the case of Quebec 
After the Opinions of the Badinter Commission, the topic of the interrelation between 
referenda and secession in international law became less relevant, at least at the international level. 
Needless to say, secession has not disappeared, not only in the context of heinous ethnic conflicts. In 
the Introduction, it was stressed that the majority of the constitutions do not grant a right to secede. 
Therefore, whenever a Court finds the need to face a quest for secession, it might also look at 
international law for some interpretative guidelines, absent a specific domestic provision on territorial 
changes. It has happened quite few times in the past, but in 1998 the opinion rendered by the Supreme 
Court of Canada on the secession of Quebec became a milestone in the analysis of secession and 
referendum both domestically and internationally. From an international standpoint, the 
pronunciation of a Constitutional Court is important for the consolidation of the opinio juris, all the 
more so in the field of secession where opinions are very rare. 
For the purposes of the present study, Reference re Secession of Quebec is important for a) 
the obiter dictum concerning the remedial right to secede; b) the role assigned to referenda and 
possible legal obligations descending from it and c) the analysis of the impact on the international 
community of a secession carried out by a referendum. The study has already dealt with the first 
point,628 whilst recognition will come in the final Chapter. Therefore, it is time to get deeper insight 
into territorial referenda in the Opinion of the Supreme Court. In particular, this section will advance 
the position that the Court derived from unilateral territorial referenda a duty of all the interest parties 
to negotiate a solution to the demands of the seceding unit. Although the focus is territorial referenda, 
a brief historical reconstruction of the relationship between Quebec and Canada cannot be avoided. 
This seems a reasonable choice with a view to give the reader all the basis to develop a critical 
approach to the argumentation and the model developed by the Court. 
																																								 																				
628 See Chapter 2, pp. 66-67. See also A. Tancredi, “A Normative Due Process in the Creation of States through secession” 
in M.G. Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives, cit., p. 157. 
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5.1 Quebec and Canada: between coexistence and secession  
Quebec’s separatist movement is rooted in a longstanding will to gain more autonomous 
powers, in particular to preserve its French heritage and in general its cultural distinctiveness. It has 
been opined that the history of the relationship between Quebec and Canada is a history of lost 
opportunities.629 In fact, the government of Canada could have involved the people of Quebec more 
actively during the salient moments of its constitutional history - i.e. for the issue of the repatriation630 
-  for the purpose of negotiating a specific settlement for the region.631  
The 1976 election to head of provincial government of the pro-secession party Parti 
Québécois (hereinafter PQ) marked the beginning of the revival of the idea of an independent Quebec. 
Several measures aimed at promoting the use of French language were enacted, such as those 
concerning the posting of signs in French.632 It should be born in mind that Quebec is granted a special 
status: its citizens benefit from a special legal system applying the French civil code, as well as of 
fiscal benefits. The regional government has extensive powers on immigration and the capacity to 
enter into international agreements. As Mac Millan opines, the separatist movement initially could 
not rely on a disproportionate treatment by the federal government.   
The trigger point was when Quebec felt that it had not been considered in the constitutional 
reform. Hence, it started to claim that the federal government did not care about the French 
province.633 The revision634 of the constitution concerned,  inter alia, the power of the region of 
Quebec to veto a constitutional reform. Quebec was denied the power to have a say in the adoption 
of constitutional reforms, neither it was empowered to enact laws on specific matters such as the 
teaching of languages. The PQ gained particular strength when the Act Respecting the Future of 
																																								 																				
629 M. Chevrier, “Le fédéralisme canadien et l'autonomie du Québec: perspective historique”, study for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs,1996, p. 160-168. http://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/bs43059  
630 The notion of repatriation refers to the relationship between Canada and the UK. Until the second half of the 90ies, 
Canada was not entirely sovereign, since the Westminster Parliament still had control over the adoption of constitutional 
amendments, which required its final adoption to be enacted. The process of repatriation consisted on amendments to the 
legislation concerning the relationship with the UK, in order to transfer full sovereignty upon Canada. For extensive 
literature on Quebec and Canada see D. Haljan, Constitutionalising Secession, Oxford, 2014, p. 300.  
631 M. Chevrier: “Le fédéralisme canadien et l'autonomie du Québec: perspective historique”, ibid. 
632 K. Mac Millan: “Secession Perspectives and the Secession of Quebec”, Tulane Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 1999, vol.7, p. 347; S. Dion: “Explaining Quebec Nationalism”, R.K. Weaver (ed.), The Collapse of 
Canada?, 1992, Washington, pp. 77-112. After the refusal by Canada to recognise a special status for Quebec, in 1980 a 
first provincial referendum was organised. The question did not envisage secession, but an economic association with the 
federal government. The people of Quebec were not asked whether they want to secede, but the referendum concerned 
the mandate to the government to negotiate with the rest of Canada an arrangement towards independence, beginning 
with an economic association. For an exhaustive perusal of the history and implications of the attempt to secede by Quebec 
see R.K Weaver (ed.), The Collapse of Quebec?, cit., pp. 20-35 
633 K. Mac Millan: “Secession Perspectives and the Secession of Quebec”, cit., pp. 349-350, S. Dion: “Explaining Quebec 
Nationalism”, cit., p. 116. 
634 Constitution Act, approved by HM Queen Elisabeth on 17 April 1982. 
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Quebec635 was adopted. The act marked the beginning of a procedure towards independence, marked 
by the attempt to establish an economic agreement with the rest of Canada. The bill provided for a 
referendum asking the people of Quebec the following question: “Do you agree that Quebec should 
become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new Economic and Political 
partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed 
on June 12, 1995?”. The results of the October 1995 consultation were against secession. 636 
Nevertheless, the separatist party embarked itself on a “neverendum campain"637 and at this point the 
government of Canada in September 1996 decided to ask the Supreme Court to render its opinion on 
three questions, ranging from the legality of unilateral secession in international law to the possible 
conflict between international and the domestic law.638 
5.2 Reference Re Secession of Quebec: the interplay between territorial referenda and 
negotiations 
 
The questions asked to the Supreme Court were the following:  
1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or government of 
Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 2. Does international law give the 
National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec 
from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international 
law that would give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect 
the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and 
international law on the right of the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect 
the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada?639  
 Hence, the Court was asked to ascertain, inter alia, whether international law granted directly 
to Quebec a right to unilaterally secede from Canada and precisely if this right derived from the right 
to self-determination of the people of Quebec. It is in this framework that the role of territorial 
																																								 																				
635 Bill n.1, Act Respecting the Future of Quebec, introduced in the National Assembly in Quebec in 1995. See H. W. 
Mac Lauchalan: “Accounting for Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Quebec Secession Reference”, Canadian Bar 
Review, 1997, vol. 76, pp. 155-185 as mentioned by J. Summers, Peoples in International Law, cit., p. 418. 
636 As noted by K. Mac Millan, the results put the light on a hidden debate among the citizens of Quebec: figures - 50. 
58% yes against 49.42% of the votes casted for the no side- show a deep debate about the future political status of the 
region. See K. Mac Millan: “Secession Perspectives and the Secession of Quebec”, cit., p.351.  
637 M. MacLaren: “Trust the People? Democratic Secessionism and Contemporary Practice”, German Law Journal, 2015, 
vol. 16, p. 638. 
638 Interestingly enough, the government of Quebec refused to take part in proceedings. Thus, the Supreme Court ordered 
that an amicus curiae was appointed. For the collection of documents and transcriptions of written statement of the parties 
see. A. Buchanan (ed.) Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned, cit. 
639 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 2. The questions were posed by the Governor 
in Council by way of the Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497, dated September 30, 1996. 
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referenda had to be scrutinised. The main steps of the ratio decidendi of the Court can be summarised 
as follows: firstly, the Court ascertained that there is no right to unilateral secession under the 
Canadian law. Secondly, looking at international law, the Court proceeded from the assumption that 
current international law considers the right of self-determination to be fulfilled in its internal 
dimension. From this point, the Court mentions the possible application of the remedial right 
theory.640 The argument rests on a hypothetic level: even assuming the validity of the theory of 
remedial secession, the latter could not be invoked in the case at stake. The people of Quebec cannot 
claim they do not have access to government, or cannot pursue their social and economic development 
within their region, or the whole state of Canada.641 Since Canada is a “sovereign and independent 
state conducting itself in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples“642, the wishes of people of Quebec are not justified vis-à-vis international law.  The Court 
does not take a stand in favour of unilateral secession, rather it supports negotiated secession. The 
triggering feature is that for the Court, secession is to be addressed by a revision of the Constitution.643 
Since unilateral secession per definition takes place bypassing any constitutional amendment, for the 
Court it is prohibited.644 One would expect the argument to end here, whilst it is noteworthy that the 
Court goes beyond this legal finding and approaches secession from a procedural point of view too.645 
Looking at the process, the Supreme Court addresses the issue of secession from the stand point of 
the legitimacy that territorial referenda could add thereto. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
necessarily has to ensure the balancing of competing interests under a constitutional perspective, thus 
the analysis of territorial referenda is carried out from this level. At para. 151 the Court states: 
																																								 																				
640 Ibid., para 126 “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people 
is normally fulfilled through internal self- determination — a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and 
cultural development within the framework of an existing state”. The Court then continues asserting that under some 
cases the external dimension may take the form of secession. This position seems to confirm the idea developed in Chapter 
2 of this study on the need to disentangle secession from self-determination.  Arguably, if secession and self-determination 
were the same right, there would have been no need to clarify this point. For the Court there is one case in which self-
determination in its external dimension may coincide with secession: the hypothesis of the right to remedial secession. 
The latter includes all those cases on which the “right to self-determination internally is somehow being totally frustrated” 
as already observed thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
641 Ibid. para 136: “The population of Quebec cannot plausibly be said to be denied access to government. Quebecers 
occupy prominent positions within the government of Canada. Residents of the province freely make political choices and 
pursue economic, social and cultural development within Quebec, across Canada, and throughout the world”. 
642 Ibid. The Court does not go as far as to clarify who is the subject of the right to self-determination, nor what is the 
definition of people.  See for an opposite view S. Epps: “Self-Determination after Kosovo and East-Timor”, ILSA Journal, 
2000, p. 445. 
643 Of this view S. Tierney: “Popular Constitutional Amendments. Referendums and Constitutional Change in Canada 
and the United Kingdom”, Queen’s Law Journal, 2015-2016, vol. 41, pp. 41-72 and S. Mancini: “Secession and Self-
Determination”, M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, cit., pp. 
499-300. 
644 S. Mancini: “Secession and Self-Determination”, cit., p. 497. 
645 Another proof of the fact that the court is looking at the process is the reasoning it develops on recognition, stating that 
recognition relies in part on the legitimacy of the process by which the emergent state comes into being. See on this point 
Chapter 4 of this study as well as D. Haljan, Constitutionalising Secession, cit., p. 331. 
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“Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations. Nor, 
however, can the reverse proposition be accepted. The continued existence and operation of the 
Canadian constitutional order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of 
Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada. The other provinces and the federal 
government would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec.”  
A democratic vote on its own cannot override the principles of the rule of law, federalism and 
in general the operation of the State apparatus pursuant to the constitutional mandate. Hence, on the 
one side territorial referenda can only have those effects assigned to them by the Constitution. On the 
other side, the Court itself acknowledges that since the Constitution grants democratic rights upon 
the individual, “the constitutional order could not be indifferent to the referendum”.646 The Court 
does not maintain that the referendum is compulsory with a view to secede, but certainly given that 
the enforcement of democratic rights has a primary importance in the legal order, the Court 
acknowledges that the referendum is the most effective choice if the sub-unit wants to be listened to.  
 In light of the above, it seems not too farfetched to claim that the Court is envisaging a legal 
obligation. By expressly referring to “reciprocal obligations”647 to negotiate a future settlement, the 
Court confers a legal value to territorial referenda. In other words, although it does not say that 
referendum legitimise secession per se, the Court brings the argument to the next level: provided that 
the vote on secession is “free of ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the 
support it achieves”,648 the vote triggers the duty of the parties to enter into negotiations. According 
to the Court, the territorial referendum is the first step of the negotiation process to be conducted in 
compliance with the Constitution and involving the seceding entity and the central government. The 
attempt of the Court to “constitutionalise” secession finds its rationale in the assumption that 
separation of territory in a State based on the rule of law and respect for the principle of democracy 
can be carried out only by respecting the rights and interests of the people of Quebec as much as those 
of the people of Canada living outside Quebec.649 In this sense, the parent State shall involve in the 
negotiations also the other provinces of the country , alongside its duty to enter into negotiations. 
Interestingly enough, the Court is precise in ascertaining that the success of negotiations about 
secession would depend on the parties involved. In other words, all the rights and duties of the 
interested parties must be guaranteed, be it the parent State, Quebec, the other provinces in Canada 
																																								 																				
646 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession, cit., para. 151. 
647 Ibid, para. 88. 
648 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession, cit., para 88. 
649 B. Levites: “The Scottish Independence Referendum and the Principles of Democratic Secession”, Brooklyn Journal 
of International Law, 2015, vol. 41, p.336. 
149 
 
or other minority groups which could be affected by the secession of Quebec. All the interested parties 
have to gather to the negotiation table to discuss the quest for secession by one territorial sub-unit.  
 The Court derives the duty to negotiate new territorial assessment from the underlying 
constitutional principles of federalism; democracy; constitutionalism and the rule of law and respect 
for minorities. These, the argument continues, are the pillars of the legal order of Canada. As Tierney 
contends, the Court has taken the constitutional principles, has invested them with normative force 
and transposed them into practical duties.650 Despite the fact that the Court does not assert that these 
principles are grounded in international law, the very fact of referring to general principles common 
to the democratic systems is a sign of an acknowledged trend in this direction within the international 
community. This is not tantamount to say that Reference Re legitimises secession via territorial 
referenda. Rather, it is the foundation of the constitutional order that demands that when a unilateral 
expression of the will is manifested, the government and the interested parties enter into negotiations. 
The Court states that in case of a vote in favour of separation, the procedure to be followed is that of 
a constitutional amendment.651 The aftermath of the negotiations then, belongs to the realm of politics. 
The role of the referendum is narrowed to a tool which confers further legitimacy on the province’s 
effort to initiate a procedure for secession.652 Lastly, the Court considered that it was not its duty to 
further indicate the terms of organization of the referendum, such as the quorum and the formulation 
of the referendum question, albeit it required the turnout to be based on a clear majority. The Clarity 
Act adopted by the Assembly of Canada will implement the decision of the Court.653  
																																								 																				
650 S. Tierney, “Popular Constitutional Amendment: Referendums and Constitutional Change in Canada and the United 
Kingdom”, Queen’s Law Journal, 2015-2016, vol. 41, p. 49. 
651 Ibid, para. 85: “It is of course true that the Constitution is silent as to the ability of a province to secede from 
Confederation but, although the Constitution neither expressly authorizes nor prohibits secession, an act of secession 
would purport to alter the governance of Canadian territory in a manner which undoubtedly is inconsistent with our 
current constitutional arrangements. The fact that those changes would be profound, or that they would purport to have 
a significance with respect to international law, does not negate their nature as amendments to the Constitution of 
Canada”. 
652 Ibid., para. 87: “[… ] considerable weight be given to a clear expression by the people of Quebec of their will to secede 
from Canada, even though a referendum, in itself and without more, has no direct legal effect, and could not in itself 
bring about unilateral secession”. 
653 Reference Re Secession of Quebec demanded the definition of a “clear question” and a “clear majority” to the 
legislative body. The Clarity Act establishes the control of the House of Commons over the question référendaire and the 
majority threshold. In particular, according to Section1(2), after the government of a province formally adopts an act 
providing for the seceding referendum, the Parliament has 30 days to evaluate the question and whether it will allow the 
formation of a clear expression of the will of the people. However, the Act does not establish a specific threshold for the 
referendum. See Canadian Clarity Act, an Act to Give Effect to the Requirement for Clarity as Set Out in the Opinion of 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the Quebec Secession Reference’, S.C. 2000, 29 June 2000, sections 1(1)-(2). See 
also N. Verrelli e N. Cruickchank: “Exporting the Clarity Ethos: Canada and the Scottish independence Referendum”, 
British Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 27, n. 2, pp. 195-215; S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums, The Theory and 
Practice of Republican Deliberation, Oxford, 2012, pp. 234-235. 
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From the analysis carried out so far, some general conclusions can be drawn. Overall, it can 
be observed that the principle underpinning the reasoning of the Court is the principle of democracy, 
as it was found in the opinions of the Badinter Commission. For the pro-secessionist party, the idea 
of democracy implies that in case the majority of the people in Quebec votes in favour of separation, 
the parent State is obliged to recognise the legitimacy of this action. By contrast, the interpretation of 
democracy advanced by the Supreme Court goes beyond the equation between democracy and 
majoritarian vote.654 Democracy must be balanced with the federal nature of the State of Canada, 
hence “no one majority is more or less legitimate than the others as an expression of democratic 
opinion”.655 Nevertheless, a clear majority voting for secession cannot be ignored and gives rise to a 
duty of negotiation. The issue of negotiation – notably the duty to embark on negotiations triggered 
by the referendum and flowing upon the seceding unit and the parent State- is the real novelty and 
the challenging affirmation of opinio juris. If one limits the focus for the analysis of the judgement 
to unilateral secession, it can be affirmed that the approach of the Supreme Court confirms the general 
aversion to the right to unilateral secession. In this sense, negotiations become fundamental, because 
they might serve as a mitigating factor against/for the dangers of an unilateral act. 656  
Arguably, the duty to negotiate a new settlement lies at the heart of the relationship between 
the central government and the territorial sub-units. However, one should not be tempted to interpret 
the position of the Court as an assurance of the success of secession carried out by a negotiation. The 
Court states that the interested parties should negotiate a future settlement, but it does not say that 
they are bound to agree to the request to secede, even if this stems from an overwhelmingly majority 
of votes. That is why the Opinion, whilst not running in favour of the consolidation of a substantial 
international law rule on secession and referendum, clearly weights a lot in the development of a 
procedural mechanism to carry out a secession in a well-established democracy.657 The fact that the 
main points defended in the judgement has been replied in other cases confirms its validity, as it will 
be seen in the next sections. 
6. Negotiating secession for Scotland 
The relationship between referendum and negotiations in the context of secession laid down in 
Reference Re Secession of Quebec has gain momentum again when the United Kingdom consented 
to the organisation of a referendum about the Scottish independence. The very decision of the UK to 
																																								 																				
654K. Mac Millan: “Secession Perspectives and the Secession of Quebec”, Tulane Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 1999, vol.7, pp. 354-355. 
655 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 66. 
656 S. Dion: “Secession and the Virtues of Clarity”, Ottawa Law Review, 2012-2013, vol. 44, pp. 405-418. 
657 D. Haljan, Constitutionalising Secession, cit., p. 326. 
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allow a referendum on the territorial change demonstrates that i) secession is not considered illegal, 
neither at the international nor at the domestic level; ii) territorial referenda carried out following an 
established procedure in compliance with determined standards are considered the appropriate tool 
for giving legitimacy to a secession. Moreover, the grievance put forward by the people of Scotland 
confirms the pattern referred to in the previous Chapters, where it was opined that self-determination 
has been framed along broader lines in comparison to its original understanding. For all these reasons, 
the present research cannot but analyse the Scottish attempt to secede, though it is not a pure example 
of unilateral secession. 
6.1 Scotland towards a devo-max option 
In Chapter 2 it was contended that the history of the Scottish nationalism is one of alternative 
waves of support for separatism. In light of the interpretation of self-determination advanced in this 
research, Scotland’s experience of attempted secession best exemplifies how the broadening of the 
bulk of rights included in the right to self-determination may impact on territorial claims.658 It can be 
recalled that the people of Scotland had profited from a process of devolution of powers, so that in 
1998 a Scottish Parliament and a Scottish Prime Minister were established. It was also observed that 
devolution per se was not deemed to open the door to secession, but rather it created legislative 
obstacles to secession.659 While Scotland acquired more legislative powers with respect to social 
policy and economy through the 1998 Scotland Act, decisions concerning the borders of the United 
Kingdom were outside of its legislative competence. Tierney opines that the 1998 Scotland Act 
envisages a “retaining model of devolution”,660 that is to say that even though the Scottish Parliament 
is granted legislative authority, Westminster preserves its authority to enact laws for Scotland. The 
matters falling within the competence of the Parliament of the United Kingdom are expressly listed 
in the Act, whilst all the others are subject to the law-making power of the Scottish Parliament. 
Among the other, the Scottish Parliament is empowered to, inter alia, implement international and 
EU legislation and the decision to hold a referendum is not per se reserved to Westminster.661 In  
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the grounds that denial of the Scottish identity was the main factor boosting for independence, see A.M. Piccard: 
“Justiciability of all Human Rights. Scottish Independence as Redress for British Human Rights Abuses”, Florida Journal 
of International Law, 2015, p. 333-356. Be it as it may, the Scottish example confirms that independence movements find 
their main rational on identity – the need to legislate autonomously is per se a function of a separate identity- but 
calculations of economic and social self-interest may be other valid grievances instead of grave breaches of human rights. 
659 B. Levites: “The Scottish Independence Referendum and the Principles of Democratic Secession”, cit., p. 394. 
660 S. Tierney: “Popular Constitutional Amendment. Referendums and Constitutional Change in Canada and the United 
Kingdom”, Queen’s Law Journal, 2016, vol. 41, p. 50. 
661 B. Giupponi; H. Hofmeister: “The day after the Scottish Referendum: Legal Implications for other European Regions”, 
Liverpool Law Review, 2015, vol.36, p. 213. 
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Section 5, the powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament are balanced by retaining in the hands of 
the British Parliament the responsibility to conduct external relations.662 Lastly, despite the fact that 
the Scottish legislative body has a wide range of devolved competencies, its legislation is conceived 
as subordinate, to mean that in case of non-compliance with EU law or with the ECHR the act enacted 
could be annulled by the British Supreme Court. 
6.2 Territorial referendum in the Edinburgh Agreement 
As previously noted, consent by the UK to a Scottish referendum on independence was 
preceded by a huge debate concerning the competence to call a referendum.663 The Parliament of the 
UK threatened to challenge the legality of the Referendum Bill664 adopted by the Scottish 
Parliament.665 However, the dispute between Westminster and Scotland was not resolved through 
judicial means, but by way of negotiation. Interestingly enough, the approach of the Scottish 
government between 2012 and 2014 gradually changed from an irredentist666 - which manifested 
itself in the bid to carry out a referendum without an authorization of the UK Parliament- to a 
conciliatory spirit.  
The governments of Scotland and the UK reached an understanding with the Edinburgh 
Agreement667 dated 15 October 2012. The salient facets of the treaty concern both the organisation 
and the requirements for a referendum about the secession by Scotland. A memorandum of agreement 
is annexed thereto, together with a draft Order in Council, that is to say the secondary legislation that 
needed to be adopted by the UK executive and Parliament to implement the decisions reached with 
																																								 																				
662 Scotland Act 1998, sec. 7(1) International relations, including relations with territories outside the United Kingdom, 
the European Union] (and their institutions) and other international organisations, regulation of international trade, and 
international development assistance and co-operation are reserved matters. (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not reserve—
(a) observing and implementing international obligations, obligations under the Human Rights Convention and 
obligations under EU law. 
663 See Chapter 2 p. 53. 
664 Scottish Parliament, Bill n. 25, Session 4, 2013. 
665 See Chapter 2 p. 54 and S. Tierney: “Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Independence for Scotland”, 
European Journal of Constitutional law, 2013, vol.9, pp n. 34.  
666 The 2009 report issued by the UK Commission on Devolution, called Calman Commission, already labelled the devo-
max option incompatible with the Union of Scotland and the UK. See “Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United 
Kingdom in the 21st Century”, Final Report of the Commission on Scottish Devolution (the Calman Commission), June 
2009, http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk. The 2012 Act granting further exclusive competence to 
Scotland was not enough to calm the wishes for independence, as it is confirmed by the publication at the end of the same 
year of the consultation paper “Your Scotland, Your Referendum: A Consultation Document”. The document aimed at 
defining the subsequent steps for holding an independence referendum as well as the procedural requirements to comply 
with. See Scottish Government, “Your Scotland, Your Referendum: A Consultation Document”, 25 January 2012 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/01/1006. Accessed 23 July 2016.  
667 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on independence 
for Scotland, 15 October 2012, available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-
independence. 
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the Agreement. The draft Order in Council,668 pursuant to section 30 of the 1998 Scotland Act, 
devolves to the Parliament of Scotland the competence to adopt the necessary legislative provisions 
for the organisation of the referendum in 2014.669The legal basis for the organisation of the 
referendum stems from the combination between the Edinburgh Agreement, the draft Order in 
Council and domestic implementing legislation adopted by Scotland. In the memorandum of 
agreement, the parties commit themselves to work together “to ensure that a referendum on Scottish 
independence can take place” and list the main features that the popular consultation is deemed to 
respect.670 Then, the agreement ends with a pledge to cooperate to accept the results of the ballot as 
it reads as follows: “The United Kingdom and Scottish Governments are committed,[…], to working 
together on matters of mutual interest and to the principles of good communication and mutual 
respect. […]. They look forward to a referendum that is legal and fair producing a decisive and 
respected outcome. The two governments are committed to continue to work together constructively 
in the light of the outcome, whatever it is, in the best interests of the people of Scotland and of the 
rest of the United Kingdom.” Therefore, regardless of the results, it is the Edinburgh Agreement 
which per se legitimises the referendum. As a consequence, the legal effects flowing from the 
territorial referenda in UK cannot be found in the international legal order. Rather, they belong to 
domestic law. Eventually however, that by the Scottish people remained only an attempt. The vote 
took place on 18 October 2014: nearly 85% of those eligible participated to the referendum, among 
which 55.3% chose the no option, while the pro-secessionist side got the 44.7%.671 
6.3 The Scottish referendum and international law on territorial changes 
From the standpoint of the consolidation of custom on referenda about secession, it is 
noteworthy that the legitimacy of the referendum has never been contested either by Scotland or by 
the UK. In fact, the parties discussed mainly on the requirements that the consultation should fulfil 
as well as on the principles of State continuity and succession arising from the then separation of 
Scotland.672 Even more important is the commitment of the parties to work together after the outcome 
																																								 																				
668 UK Parliament, Order in Council, modification of Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998, 2013 (S.I. 2013/242). The 
Order modifies schedule 5 to the 1998 Scotland Act concerning reserved matters. In particular, it amends the section 
providing an exception to the reservation on the calling and holding of a referendum on independence of Scotland. 
However, it does so at the condition that specific requirements are met, notably the time framing of the poll, the uniqueness 
of the ballot and supplementary provisions regarding the campaign broadcast and finance. 
669 Scotland Act 1998, cit., section 30 para. 30.  
670 See the next par. 
671 See for further information https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/scottish-independence-referendum/about 
672 See on this topic “Opinion: Referendum on the Independence of Scotland. International Law Aspects”, instructed by 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office and the Office of the Advocate General of Scotland to Prof. 
J. Crawford and A. Boyle on issues of international and EU law arising from the eventual secession of Scotland. The 
opinion is annexed to HM Government’s Paper, Scotland Analysis: devolution and the Implications of the Scottish 
Independence, 10 December 2012. 
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of the vote, whatever this would be. Regardless of the fact that the parent State consented to the 
independence option, the idea that after the referendum the parties may seat at the table of negotiation 
resembles that advanced by the Supreme Court of Quebec in Reference Re Secession of Quebec. 
It could be opposed that the case of Scotland is too influenced by the culture and political 
discourse of the UK, based on a consolidated consensus on the role of the people and the value of the 
rule of law.673 The position is convincing, but should not be overestimated. Despite the unique 
background of the consolidation of democracy in the UK, although the formation of the Union itself 
is peculiar, the fact remains that the procedure established by the agreement is negotiation-
referendum-negotiation in case of pro-secessionist majority of the vote cast. Notably, the Electoral 
Commission established to monitor the process towards the referendum had recommended the parties 
to agree on the terms of a future negotiation at the end of the referendum.674 Moreover, after the defeat 
of the pro-independence party a commission was appointed by the UK Prime Minister (“the Smith 
Commission”) to draft a framework agreement for further devolution of powers to Scotland. In this 
framework, what is noteworthy for international law scholars is the process towards secession and 
after. The Commission was appointed even though in principle the victory of the unionists made 
inessential the consultation between the parties. Accordingly, it is the procedural aspect which is 
taken in due consideration and in this context the resort to negotiations seems to be considered 
unavoidable, irrespective of the results of the vote. This cannot but run in favour of the consolidation 
of a procedural rule in international law on legal effects triggered by a territorial referendum. Quite 
interesting in this sense is to see how the process of secession through referendum was conducted. 
The next section is therefore devoted to the requirements established for the 2014 independence 
referendum in Scotland. 
6.4 A model for territorial referenda: requirements of the Scottish referendum 
The Edinburgh Agreement set the basic parameters for the organisation and holding of the 
referendum and left to the Scottish Parliament the adoption of the implementing legislation. Although 
Scotland had the duty to set the specific process rules for the referendum, para. 2 of the memorandum 
of agreement reads as follows: “principles underpinning the existing framework for referendums held 
under Acts of the UK Parliament – which aim to guarantee fairness – should apply to the Scottish 
independence referendum”. The government of the UK paid special regard to the question 
référendaire and relied on the role of the Electoral Commission established according to the 2000 
																																								 																				
673 N. Barber: “After the Vote: Regulating Future Independence Referendums” UK Constitutional Law Association, 21 
March 2014 http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/03/21/nick- barber-after-the-vote-regulating-future-independence-
referendums/ cited by T.M. Waters: “For Freedom Alone: Secession after the Scottish Referendum”, cit., p. 128. 
674 T.M. Waters: “For Freedom Alone: Secession after the Scottish Referendum, cit., p. 130. 
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Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act675 (hereinafter PPERA) to ensure a free and fair 
consultation.676 The Commission played a notable role in the definition of the question référendaire, 
leading to the revision of the first proposal by Scotland. On the basis of the Edinburgh Agreement the 
referendum should 1) have a clear legal base; 2) be conducted as to command the confidence of 
Parliaments, governments and people, and 3) deliver a fair and decisive expression of the views of 
the people in Scotland and a result that everyone will respect.677 In fact, as regards the requirements 
for a free and fair territorial referendum, the focus was on (i) the enfranchisement (ii) its territorial 
application and (ii) the question référendaire. The referendum was deemed to be a one shot 
opportunity to decide on Scotland’s future status, to mean a decisive expression of the will of the 
people. Needless to say that in practice after the vote the question of Scottish independence has 
remained one of the hot issues in the agenda of the government. Since the referendum about the 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU, proposals for a second referendum on independence of Scotland 
-applying the same implementing legislation- have come back in the political agenda.678  
Following the Draft Order in Council, Scotland adopted two implementing acts: the Scottish 
Independence Referendum Act679 and the Scottish Independence Referendum Franchise Act.680As far 
as the definition of the question is concerned, the Edinburgh Agreement states: “the question must be 
fair, easy to understand and capable of producing a result that is accepted and commands 
confidence”681. The early proposal by the Scottish Government was the following: “Do you agree 
that Scotland should be an independent country?”. It was contested by the Electoral Commission, on 
the grounds that it was framed in such a way to favour a positive answer.682  The final version was in 
fact clear and straightforward: “Should Scotland be an independent country? Yes/No”. In For the 
Referendum Act, a simple majority was necessary to validate the decision for secession. Following 
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, which required a clear majority of votes cast, the choice of a 
																																								 																				
675 UK, Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c.41. 
676 S. Tierney: “Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Independence for Scotland”, European Constitutional Law 
Review, 2013, vol. 9, n.3, pp. 359-390. 
677 Edinburgh Agreement, cit., “The governments are agreed that the referendum should: have a clear legal base; be 
legislated for by the Scottish Parliament; be conducted so as to command the confidence of parliaments, governments 
and people; deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland and a result that everyone will 
respect”. 
678 After the referendum of the UK resulted in the decision to withdraw from the EU, in October 2016 the Scottish 
government opposed the validity on the Edinburgh Agreement on the grounds of a significant and material chance of 
circumstances. Therefore, the Scottish government has elaborated a new consultation paper for the drafting of a new 
Referendum Bill. A draft proposal is available to the public, with a view to gather comments by the citizens of Scotland 
on how the referendum would run. http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0050/00507743.pdf 
679 Scottish Independence Referendum Act, ASP 2013, c. 14. 
680 Scottish Independence Referendum Franchise Act, ASP 2013, c. 13. 
681 Edinburgh Agreement, cit., para.5. 
682 See A. Black: “Scotland Independence: SNP Accepts Call to Change Referendum Question” BBC, 20 January 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21245701.  
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simple majority could be criticised, although as it was seen above, neither the judgement of the 
Supreme Court nor the Clarity Act define the threshold for a clear majority. Practice in Europe thus 
does not show a common pattern.683 The White Paper684 issued by the Scottish government asserts 
that from the international legal standpoint there is no binding requirement on a qualified majority, 
relying on the  Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice for Referendum, which did not require 
a specific majority.685 Therefore, in principle there were no obstacles for choosing a simple majority 
requirement. 
Instead, the issue of the enfranchisement is quite remarkable. The Memorandum of Agreement 
established that “all those entitled to vote in Scottish Parliamentary and local government elections 
should be able to vote in the referendum”.686 With the Franchise Act, Scotland decided to enfranchise 
all the voters from the age of 16, who resided in Scotland at the moment of the referendum. The 
extension of the minimum age to vote in the referendum can be subsumed from the will of the Scottish 
Government to allow all those concerned by the secession to have their say in the process. Therefore, 
the Scottish people residing abroad were not allowed to take part to the vote whilst EU and 
Commonwealth citizens residing in Scotland were allowed to vote.687 Participation to the consultation 
was massive and although the results were against independence, the referendum has had a huge 
impact on Scotland, more than expected. The pro-secessionist presence in the British Parliament has 
increased, so that the legislative process is expected to be more negotiated within Westminster.688 
Moreover, the Scottish Bill dated 2015 granted the Scottish Parliament more powers in major issues, 
such as taxation. Therefore, the referendum ultimately helped the people of Scotland to gain more 
autonomy. It also demonstrated the attitude of the parent State to follow a reasonable procedure to 
enhance internal self-determination in a way that secession became less appealing.689 It could be 
argued that the legal order of the UK guarantees more safeguards against secession, because it is 
flexible enough to answer positively to the demands of autonomy. The absence of a written 
																																								 																				
683 The legal questions arising from the adoption of different quorum will be tackled in the next chapter. Suffice it to 
mention here M. Qvortrup, who opines that qualified majorities may not be the most effective solutions and historically 
were used to hide obstructionist aims. Matt Qvortrup: “Referendums on Independence, 1860-2011”, Political Quarterly, 
2014, vol.85, p. 64.  
684 The Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Referendum, cit. 
685 Ibid., par. 1.21-1.22: “In 2006 the Venice Commission published a voluntary Code of Good Practice for Referendums 
setting out the views of this Council of Europe Commission on best practice for referendums. Article 7 of the Code states 
that minimum turnout requirements and abnormal majority thresholds are not advisable. In the Scottish Government’s 
view this is the correct approach”. 
686 Edinburgh Agreement, Memorandum of Agreement, cit., par. 9. 
687 B. Levites: “The Scottish Independence Referendum and the Principles of Democratic Secession”, cit., p. 398. 
688 B. Davies: “Popular Participation  and Legitimacy in Constitutional Change”, Liverpool Law Review, 2015, vol. 36, 
pp. 277-297; 688 B. Giupponi; H. Hofmeister: “The day after the Scottish Referendum: Legal Implications for other 
European Regions”, Liverpool Law Review, 2015, vol. 36, pp. 211-235. 
689 T.Y. Patrick: “The Zeitgeist of Secession amidst the March towards Unification: Scotland, Catalonia, and the Future 
of the European Union”, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 2016, vol. 39, p. 215. 
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Constitution and as a consequence the fact that in principle there is no constitutional procedure to be 
followed to change the boundaries of the kingdom is an important factor. Nevertheless, from the point 
of view of the process, the Scottish example supports the view that the referendum is conceived to be 
in a cause effect relationship with negotiations to be held between the parent State and the seceding 
unit. Frankly, the relationship between referenda and negotiations is also part of the legal tradition of 
UK and Northern Ireland. According to the Ireland Act690 Northern Ireland may not cease to be part 
of the UK unless the majority of the people of Northern Ireland so declares in a poll. If so, however, 
the proposal has to be submitted to the Parliament to be enforced “through negotiations between her 
majesty and the government of Ireland”. A brief sketch on those countries in which secession is 
possible confirms that the referendum is the tool chosen to validate a territorial change or to start a 
procedure of negotiations.  
7. Constitutionalising secession through referendum (I): the case of Uzbekistan   
Very few Constitutions expressly tolerate secession. Alongside those already referred to, 
namely Ethiopia,691 Burma,692 St. Kitts and Nevis,693 it is noteworthy to mention the example of the 
Republic of Karakalpakstan, the autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan, which is granted the right 
to secede in the Constitution of the parent State.694  
The republic of Uzbekistan declared independence from USSR in August 1991.695 As part of 
the USSR Uzbekistan was composed by 11 Oblast and one Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: 
the Karakalpastan ASSR. This structure was maintained after the independence. Despite being the 
																																								 																				
690 Northern Ireland Act, 19 November 1998, Chp. 47-1998 art. 1(1-2), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/contents. 
691 See Chapter 2, pp. 52-53. 
692 See Introduction pp. 6-7. 
693 As regards St. Kitts and Nevis, in the Introduction to this research it was anticipated that the island of Nevis had 
resorted to a territorial referendum in 1997 to achieve independence form Saint Christopher, but the majority of the votes 
cast refused such option. A further reference to the legal basis for the 1997 popular consultation in helpful in this chapter. 
According to section 143 of the Constitution “The Nevis Island shall cease to be federated with the island of St. 
Christopher and accordingly that constitution shall no longer have effects”. The Constitution of St Kitts and Nevis allows 
for the withdrawal of Nevis, but requires 1) a positive vote by the 2/3 of the Nevis Assembly and 2) a popular consultation 
of the population of Nevis whose turnout must be of 2/3 in favour of independence. Liechtenstein has adopted a similar 
model: according to art. 4(2) of the 1921 Constitution, any of the municipalities composing the country can secede on the 
initiative of the majority of the municipality itself. On the same line, sections 338-343 of the Constitution of Papua New 
Guinea provides for the possibility for Buganville to decide about its political status through a consultation involving the 
whole population. See P. Radan: “Secession in Constitutional Law”, The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession, cit., 
pp. 334-343. 
694 The panoramic on Constitutions granting a right to secede will continue with Montenegro. The case will be used as a 
linking point to move our attention to the standards for a free and fair territorial referendum, thus it is left to the next 
Chapter. 
695 The Supreme Soviet adopted a statement on the State Independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 31 August 1991, 
together with a Law on the Foundations of State. See A. K. Said (ed.) Constitutional Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
Collection of Normative Acts, Tashkent, 1995, I, pp. 94-97, cited by R. Mullerson; M. Fitzmaurice; M. Andeans (eds.) 
Constitutional Reform and International Law in Central and Eastern Europe, The Hague-London, 1998, p. 28. 
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biggest region of Uzbekistan – it covers 37% of the total area- Karakalpakstan is the one with the 
slightest majority of people of Uzbek origin.696 The variety of ethnic roots characterising the 
inhabitants of the region has boosted national claims, particularly as soon as Uzbekistan underwent a 
demographic growth. In this framework, the Karakalpak national movement697 – called Khalk Mapi, 
in particular, has gathered the attention by the central government, given its wide support among the 
population of Karakalpakstan.  
The 1993 Constitution698 of Uzbekistan recognises the special status of Karakalpakstan. The 
ensemble of the rules devoted to Karakalpakstan shows that although it is acknowledged as an 
Autonomous Republic, it is nonetheless part of Uzbekistan. As regards citizenship, for example, art. 
21 of the Constitution states that “a citizen of the Republic of Karakalpakstan shall be a citizen of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan”. Chapter XII of the Uzbek Constitution addresses the status and powers of 
the Republic of Karakalpakstan: pursuant to articles 70-75 as well as to the provisions envisaging the 
distribution of powers contained in the other chapters of the Constitution, Karakalpakstan enjoys wide 
autonomy. The Republic has its own government in place, Parliament, Supreme Council and a cabinet 
of ministers, thus it works as an independent country. Moreover, it has a separate judiciary.699 
According to art. 70, Karakalpastan is a sovereign republic with its own Constitution, but the latter is 
required to be in accordance with the Constitution of Uzbekistan.700 Hence, in practice the status of 
Karakalpastan rests ambiguous.701 Since it is defined as sovereign, one would expect it to have legal 
autonomy. By contrast, art 72702 of the Uzbek Constitution states that domestic legislation of the 
central government is binding on the territory of Karakalpastan, and the judiciary as well is supervised 
by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as established under art. 110.  
																																								 																				
696 Other non-Uzbek indigenous residents in the region are Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Turkmen. See S. L. Batalden, 
The Newly Independent States of Eurasia: Handbook of Former Soviet Republics, Phoenix,1993, p. 167. 
697 The specific character of Karakalpakstan is that it was not part of Uzbekistan historically. During the tsarist period the 
region was known as Turkestan, and granted independence only in 1925 as an autonomous Oblast, part of the Kazakh 
ASSR. It was incorporated into Uzbekistan in 1936, after 6 years under the jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic. See for the history of Uzbekistan till recent times N.J. Melvin, Uzbekistan, Transition to 
Authoritarianism, Singapore, 2005. 
698 Constitution of Uzbekistan, Bulletin of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1993, No. 1. 
699 R.R. Hanks: “A separate Space? Karakalpak Nationalism and Devolution in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan”, Europe-Asia 
Studies, 2000, vol. 52., pp. 939-953. 
700 Constitution of Uzbekistan, cit., art. 71: “The Republic of Karakalpakstan shall have its own Constitution. The 
Constitution of the Republic of Karakalpakstan must be in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan”  
701 R.R. Hanks: “A separate Space? Karakalpak Nationalism and Devolution in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan”, cit., p.941. 
702 Constitution of Uzbekistan, cit, art. 72: “Laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be binding on the territory of the 
Republic of Karakalpakstan”. 
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The Constitution of Uzbekistan grants to Karakalpkastan a general right to secede via 
referendum in art. 74.703 The entitlement to secede is framed under general terms, so that one has to 
look at the whole section of the Constitution to understand the relationship between the republic and 
the parent State.704 The decision towards secession has to follow the procedure laid down in art. 78, 
which states: “The joint conducting of the Legislative Chamber and the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan shall include:[…]  6.admission of new state formations into the Republic 
of Uzbekistan and approval of decisions to secede from the Republic of Uzbekistan”. Therefore, 
secession may take place provided that two conditions are satisfied: 1) there is a referendum pursuant 
to art. 74 and 2) the Government of Uzbekistan approves the decision. Interestingly enough, the 
Constitution mentions both the referendum and approval by the parent State. Is this another element 
in support of the duty to negotiate envisaged by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re 
Secession of Quebec? The answer is partly positive. Although clearly affirmed, the right to secede is 
balanced by the wording of art. 78 establishing that the borders and the territory of Karakalpakstan 
may not be changed unless the republic of Uzbekistan has expressed its consent. The right to decide 
is vested in the people of Uzbekistan, thus, only the republic taken as a whole can decide on the 
administrative and territorial structure, albeit according to art. 74 “the territory and boundaries of the 
Republic of Karakalpakstan may not be altered without its consent”. Moreover, art. 75 reads as 
follows: “disputes between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan shall be 
settled by the way of reconciliation”. Imagine the case of a dispute arising from the division of 
competences for the organisation of a referendum about secession, or on the results of the ballot: art. 
75 would apply, so the two parties should negotiate a solution. Therefore, it would be too pretentious 
to claim that the constitutional dictate in the case of Uzbekistan envisages the duty to negotiate in 
manner like the Supreme Court of Canada described it. Nevertheless, the example of Karakalpakstan 
adds credit to the broader assumption that referendum is the favourite tool to carry out a “legal” 
procedure for secession in countries based on the rule of law. At this point, it remains to be seen to 
what extent popular consultations can serve the purposes of a pure unilateral claim for secession. 
8. Constitutionalising Secession through Referendum (II): the secession of 
Catalonia 
Through the past few years, the political and legal debate in Spain has been shaped by the 
Catalan question. The Catalan question, indeed, is still ongoing and at the time this research is written 
the next scenario is almost unknown. On 1st October 2017 the 90 % of the people of Catalonia chose 
																																								 																				
703 Constitution of Uzbekistan art. 74: “The Republic of Karakalpakstan shall have the right to secede from the Republic 
of Uzbekistan on the basis of a nation-wide referendum held by the people of Karakalpakstan”. 
704 I.G. Sen, Sovereignty Referendum in International and Constitutional Law, cit., p.142. 
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to become independent, after several months of serious tensions with the central government in 
Madrid. The referendum took place pursuant to the Law on the Self-Determination Referendum –Llei 
del Referèndum d’autodeterminació705 – adopted in September 2017. In the explanatory 
memorandum, the decision to unilaterally call for a referendum is depicted as a democratic response 
to the frustration developed within the Catalan region. The quest for secession is considered the 
ultimate choice, in light of the failure of the previous attempts to negotiate with Madrid and of the 
breaking of the constitutional pact of 2006 occurred through the denaturing of the 2006 Autonomy 
Statute by the Spanish Constitutional Court.706  
The attempt to secede carried out by the provincia autonoma in fact has resulted in a bilateral 
quarrel with the Constitutional Court of Spain and the grounds for ruling on the unconstitutionality 
of Catalonia’s decision to separate are rooted in constitutional law. However, it would be inaccurate 
to stop at the domestic-law level. An accurate scrutiny demonstrates that the focus of the quarrel is 
within the notion of legality and respect of the rule of law, as Torbisco and Krisch707 observed. In this 
framework, part of the supportive points elaborated by the regional Government of Catalonia (also 
called Generalitat) to justify its right to decide its status originates in the principles of international 
and EU law. For instance, the 2017 Law on Referendum is deemed to find its legal basis in the 1966 
Covenants ensuring the right to freedom of expression as well as in the internationally consolidated 
principle of democracy.708 Besides, the judgments of the Spanish Constitutional Court are worth 
studying also from an international law perspective, in terms of consolidation of jurisprudence and 
opinio juris. In particular, it is interesting to highlight the similarities and differences with the 
arguments developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re Secession of Quebec. 
Ultimately this kind of reconstruction of the background of the case could help in better understanding 
the current developments in Spain. 
Both Catalonia and Quebec underwent periods in which the respective communities were 
looked at suspiciously by the central government. In the case of Catalonia, the dictatorship of Franco 
was characterised by a push for a single national identity, which resulted in a repression of sub 
																																								 																				
705 Departament de la Presidència. LLEI 19/2017 del referèndum d'autodeterminació, 6 September 2017. For the English 
version see the report The Catalan Independence Referendum: An Assessment Of the Process Of Self-Determination, 
Report of the International Group of Experts for the Institute of Research on Self-Determination of Peoples and National 
Independence (hereinafter IRAI Report), n.1, September 2017, pp. 75-89. 
706 Explanatory Memorandum to the Law on Referendum, annexed to the IRAI Report, cit., pp. 75-76. 
707 See the comment by N. Torbisco Casals and N. Krisch on EUROPP, the blog of the London School of Economics, 
titled “Using Spanish law to block Catalonia’s independence consultation may simply encourage Catalans to construct 
their own ‘alternative legality’”, 4 November 2014, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/11/04/using-
spanish-law-to-block-catalonias-independence-consultation-may-simply-encourage-catalans-to-construct-their-own-
alternative-legality/ ( last visited 3 November 2016) 
708 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Law on Referendum, cit., p. 75. 
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national cultures. Against this background, the perception of the citizens living in Catalonia of 
possessing a separate identity was solidified.709 Thus, Catalan nationalism silently acquired 
strength710 and when the regime ended, Spain found itself a deeply divided nation. In this framework, 
the drafters of the 1978 Constitution had to find a balance between the need of national unity and the 
wishes of sub-national groups.711 The normative solution was found with the establishment of the 
“communidades autonomas” including Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia.712 These self-
governing communities were nevertheless part of the indivisible nation under art. 2 of the 
Constitution.713  
Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, the region of Catalonia was granted 
autonomy through the 1979 Statute of Autonomy.714 The text of the Statute has to be approved by the 
people through a referendum. Since the adoption of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia715 the 
support for the Catalan nationalist coalition (Convergencia i Unìo) has grown constantly and the party 
has lead Catalonia to become an important actor, in particular in comparison to other regional entities 
in Europe. Therefore, the region has been able to extend its self-government powers to acquire 
exclusive competence in matters such as health, education environment and even police functions.716 
The separatist movement gain new momentum in 2006, when the revision of the Statute of Autonomy 
was adopted by the people of Catalonia and then partially declared unconstitutional by the 
																																								 																				
709 Until 1469 Catalonia was a sovereign political entity. Merging with the Spanish Crown ended up to be an unfavourable 
choice: initially Catalonia maintained its institutions of self-government, namely the Parliament and the Government. 
However, in 1640 the tensions between the Castilians emerged and Catalonia was defeated. As a result of the defeat, the 
citizens of Catalonia were gradually banned from participation in almost every significant sector of the public life. This 
brief historical account tells a lot of how deeply rooted the sense of autonomy has been in the community. In 1931, the 
struggle for autonomy led to the adoption of a special status for Catalonia under the Constitution of the new Spanish 
Republic. The Statute of autonomy gave the people of Catalonia self-government rights on sensitive issues, such as 
linguistic policies, until the overthrown of the government by Franco. See C. Mir: “The Francoist Repression in the 
Catalan Countries”, Catalan Historical Review, 2008, vol.1, pp. 133-147. For a historical review of the Catalan 
nationalism see M. Guibernau: “Secessionism in Catalonia: After Democracy”, Ethnopolitics, 2013, vol. 12, pp. 368-393. 
710 M. Castells, The Power of Identity, 2010, Oxford, pp. 47-48. 
711 J. Ruiperez Aramillo: “La nueva reivindicación de la secesión de Cataluña en el contexto normativo de la constitución 
española de 1978 y el tratado de Lisboa”, Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, 2013, n. 31, pp. 151-136.  
712 The 1978 Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain establishes a quasi-federal stated, composed of 17 communidades 
autonomas each granted with its own Parliament. 
713 Constitution of Spain, Constitutional Official Gazette (CEBOE) n. 311, 27 December 1978, art. 2: “the Constitution 
recognises the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, recognises and guarantees the right to self-government of the 
nationalities and regions of which it is composed. Translation available at Gobierno de Espana, www.lamoncloa.gob.ec 
714According to the Constitution of Spain the communidades are enabled to adopt their own statutes. Art. 143(2) reads as 
follows: “The right to initiate the process towards self-government lies with all the Provincial Councils concerned or 
with the corresponding inter-island body and with two-thirds of the municipalities whose populations represent at least 
the majority of the electorate of each province or island. These requirements must be met within six months from the 
initial agreement to this effect reached by any of the local Corporations concerned”. Public Diplomacy Council of 
Catalonia, Catalan History in 15 Episodes, report available at http://www.cataloniavotes.eu/history (last visited Nov. 20, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/E93E-WJF6]  
715 Generalitat de Catalunia, Estatuto de Autonomia de Catalonia, BOE n. 30178, 1979, hereinafter Statute of Autonomy 
of Catalonia, www.gencat/genelaritat/eng. 
716 M. Rosenfield, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject. Selfhood, Citizenship, culture and Community, 2010, 
Routledge. 
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Constitutional Court717. The revised statute clearly manifested the signs of the independence desires 
of the regional government, since early in the preamble Catalonia was in fact defined as a nation.718 
The allegations of sovereignty of Catalonia made by the regional government triggered the reaction 
of the Parliament in Madrid which challenged the revision in front of the Constitutional Court. 
Accordingly, this moment marked the formal beginning of the Catalan question.  
8.1 Catalonia in the storm: the years 2006-2017  
The dispute between Catalonia and the parent State acquired international relevance between 
2013 and 2015, but it dates back to 2010, when the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional 
several parts of the revised Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. The high relevance of the judgement 
can be observed by looking at the explanatory memorandum annexed to the 2017 Law on 
Referendum, which justifies the decision to schedule a binding referendum, inter alia, expressly 
referring to the “denaturing of the 2006 Statute […] by ruling 31/2010 of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court”.719   
The draft revised Statute was submitted to the Spanish Parliament, which partially amended it.720 
Then, the citizens were called to express their consent on the proposal through a referendum. 
Although the turnout was very low, the majority of the vote casted - 75% - accepted the text. 
Nevertheless, the Spanish conservative party challenged the Statute in front of the Constitutional 
Court. Four years after the constitutional challenge was filed, the Court with the ruling 31/2010721 
invalidated fourteen provisions of the Statute and gave its interpretation for other twenty seven 
provisions, thus fostering the irredentists feelings. Before the Court ruled on the constitutional 
question, the Parliament of Catalonia had already enacted law 4/2010 on new procedures for holding 
referenda pursuant to art. 122722 of the Statute of Autonomy, in particular on advisory and consultative 
referenda on major political issues, as foreseen by art. 22 of the Constitution of Spain. Law 4/2010 
																																								 																				
717 Revised Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, adopted by Organic Law 6/2006, 19 July 2006, official translation in English 
available at http://web.gencat.cat/en/generalitat/estatut/estatut2006/ 
718 Revised Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, Preamble: “In reflection of the feelings and the wishes of the citizens of 
Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia has defined Catalonia as a nation by an ample majority. The Spanish Constitution, 
in its second Article, recognises the national reality of Catalonia as a nationality”. 
719 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Law on Referendum, cit., p. 76. 
720 The adoption of the Catalan Statute was contrasted by the Partito Popular. The party collected 4 million signatures to 
ask for a referendum on secession of Catalonia which should involve all the citizens, but the government of Madrid 
refused the request. 
721 Spanish Constitutional Court, Sententia del Tribunal Constitutional, (hereinafter STC) 31/2010, 28 June 2010, 
available at https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/NotasDePrensaDocumentos/NP_2015_023/2010-02502STC.pdf 
722 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, art. 122: “The Generalitat has exclusive power over the establishment of the legal 
system, the modalities, the procedure, the implementation and the calling, whether by the Generalitat or by local bodies, 
acting within their jurisdiction, of public opinion polls, public hearings, participation forums and any other instruments 
of popular consultation, with the exception of those provided for by Article 149.1.32 of the Constitution. According to 
article 149.1.32 of the Constitution, the State has the exclusive competence of authorizing popular consultations through 
the holding of referendums”. 
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introduced the participatory public consultations, to mean non-binding consultations on sensitive 
political issues which did not require the prior authorization by the central government. Predictably, 
the Government challenged the law and the Court eventually decided for the interim suspension in 
application of art. 161 of the Spanish Constitution. Although law 4/2010 was found in compliance 
with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court declared that all popular consultation required the 
authorization of the Spanish Government.  
a) The very beginning: the Constitutional Court Ruling STC 31/2010 
Although not specifically devoted to the legal issues arising from a secession carried out through 
a referendum, the 2010 judgment of the Constitutional Court is important for framing better the case 
of Catalonia, as well as for understanding the various legal strategies that the regional government 
has tried in order to achieve independence. 
The Court in 2010 outlawed the use of the word nation in the preamble of the Statute of 
Autonomy.723 From the legal standpoint only Spain is a nation, thus it would be unconstitutional to 
label a provincia autonoma a nation. The declaration of unconstitutionality, in the view of the Court 
does not prevent the people of Catalonia to perceive themselves as a nation for their historical, 
economic and linguistic ties,724 provided that such perceptions are not translated into legally binding 
proposals. When examining the challenge brought against art. 7 of the Statute of Autonomy, the Court 
concluded that “the citizens of Catalonia should not be mistaken for the sovereign people, conceived 
as ‘the perfect unit to attribute constituent powers, underlying the Constitution and the legal 
order””.725 	Since the acknowledgement of nationality was included in the preamble of the Statute, 
the Court limited itself to reaffirm that it does not have legal effects, thus it does not endow the region 
of Catalonia with sovereign powers beyond those specifically established in the Constitution. The 
reaction of Catalonia was on the one side the implementation of the judgment, with the adoption of a 
new text. On the other side, the public opinion started to question the legitimacy of the Constitutional 
Court. In 2012 popular manifestations spread under the formula “Catalonia, the next European 
State”: the Catalan Parliament took advantage of this wave and managed to adopt resolution 5/X 
(either called Declaration on the Sovereignty of Catalonia), expressing the need for the people of 
Catalonia to decide about their legal status with a popular consultation.726 The Declaration on the 
																																								 																				
723 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 31/2010, 28 June 2010. The judgment is available at 
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/ResolucionTraducida/31-2010,%20of%20June%2028.pdf  
724 V. Ferreres Comella: “The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s Right to Decide”, European 
Constitutional Law Review, 2014, vol. 10, p. 575. 
725 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 31/2010, cit.  
726 Parliament of Catalonia, Resolution 5/X adopting the Declaration of Sovereignty and Right to Decide of the People of 
Catalonia, 23 January 2013. See M. Colomer: “La Declaració De Sobirania Ja Fa Via Al Parlament”, ARA.CAT, 22 
January 2013, http://www.ara.cat/politica/declaracio-sobirania- Parlament-CiU-ERC-ICV 0 851914901.html 
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Sovereignty of Catalonia sets out a process of transition towards a new independent State. For this 
purpose, in particular, it establishes the Advisory Council for National Transition, tasked with 
elaborating a report on the subsequent steps to be taken to achieve complete independence and 
after.727 On 8 March 2013, the Spanish Government challenged the resolution before the 
Constitutional Court. In May 2013, the Court decided on the temporary suspension of the Resolution 
pending a definitive decision. In March 2014 the Court rendered its decision, which partly upheld the 
Spanish Government’s claims 
b) Territorial referenda v. democracy in STC 42/2014 
 
Judgment 42/2014 of the Spanish Constitutional Court invalidated Resolution 5/X728 on several 
grounds, the most important of which are the ones on the principle of sovereignty and on the so called 
right to decide.729 Before engaging in the analysis of the judgement, it has to be stressed that 
international law is quite absent in the fundamentos juridicos elaborated by the Court. Nevertheless, 
the judgment is important for the study of secession and referenda from an international legal 
standpoint: by focusing on the similarities and differences with other examples of secession involving 
popular consultations, legal scholars can trace the contours of a trend in international law.  
As regards sovereignty, the Court insists on the interpretation of articles 1(2) and 2 of the 
Constitution, in the sense of an indissoluble unity of the Spanish people. In this framework, the 
constituent power lies in the hands of the people taken as a whole.730 A similar interpretation of 
sovereign power have been advocated by the Canadian Supreme Court,731 but the consequences 
derived in STC 42/2014 are different. The Spanish Court in fact infers that not only Catalonia shall 
																																								 																				
[http://perma.cc/FRH3-SKTP].  
727 Advisory Council for the National Transition, “The consultation on the political future of Catalonia”, report n. 1, July 
2013. Available at http://presidencia. gencat.cat/web/content/ambits_ actuacio/consells _assessors/ 
catn/informes_publicats/inf_1_ angles.pdf 
728 The decision of the Court to pronounce itself of the legitimacy of a resolution has been the object of severe criticism. 
It was highly questioned whether a Resolution could be the object of a constitutional challenge, given that it is unable to 
produce legal effects. The Court, however, stated that notwithstanding its political nature, the process envisaged by 
resolution 5/X could have such an important impact on the constitutional order of Spain, that the declaration had legal 
effects. See G. Marrero Gonzalez: “Catalonia’s Independence and the Role of the Constitutional Court: Recent 
Developments”, Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht, January 2015, p. 87; E. Casana Adam: “The Independence 
Referendum and Debates on Catalonia’s Constitutional Future”, Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht, April 2014, pp. 
162-171. 
729 With the notion “right to decide” it has to be intended the (political) formula which guides the national movement in 
Catalonia. The notion is rooted in a combination of historic and legal arguments. For the latter, in particular, it is argued 
that the principle of self-determination gives legitimacy to the right of the people of Catalonia to decide on their future 
status. As the secessionist movement gain momentum, the right to decide has been gradually disentangled from that of 
self-determination. This facet twill be tackled in the next pages, however for a general political and legal account see X. 
Cuadras- Morató (ed.), Catalonia: a new Independent State in Europe? A debate on Secession within the European Union, 
New York, 2016. 
730 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 42/2014, para. 7 “Art. 1(2) […] exclusively attributes national sovereignty to the 
Spanish people, the perfect unit to hold constituent powers” 
731 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 85.  
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not secede, but also it cannot hold a referendum. This is clear in fundamento juridico n. 3, where the 
Court asserts “an Autonomous Community in principle cannot unilaterally call a referendum of self-
determination to decide on its integration with Spain”.732 While in Reference Re Secession of Quebec 
a unilateral territorial referendum per se is not excluded, for the Court of Spain such a possibility is 
unwarranted.733 This is not tantamount to say that the Court has excluded a territorial change. The 
Constitution has been interpreted in the jurisprudence of the Court as amendable in all its parts,734 
provided that the whole people of Spain decides on it. A fragmentation therefore is not unconceivable, 
but it has to be conducted in compliance with the Constitution.735  As said above, the Court has already 
advanced this position when it was called to render a judgment on the proposal for referendum by the 
Basque country. In STC 103/2008 the Court declared unconstitutional the law adopted by the Basque 
Country that fixed a referendum on independence.736 The judgment clarifies the ratio decidendi of 
the Court vis-à-vis referenda in the Spanish legal order when it says that only the Spanish government 
can authorise a referendum pursuant to art. 149 of the Constitution.737 Therefore, a revision carried 
out with a different method, even though the Spanish government had consented to it, would be 
unconstitutional.738 No additional referenda can be introduced prior to the consultations already 
required by the constitution in order to adopt a revision. 
The Court adapts this approach to ruling 42/2014 about Catalonia: the main issue of 
disagreement is the assertion by the government of Catalonia that the people of the region has the 
right to decide because it is a sovereign subject. In resolution 5/X the Generalitat consents to “initiate 
the process to exercise the right to decide so that the citizens of Catalonia may decide their collective 
																																								 																				
732 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 42/2014, p. 7 cited by V. Ferreres Comella: “The Spanish Constitutional Court 
Confronts Catalonia’s Right to Decide”, cit., p. 582-583. 
733 J. Ruiperez Aramillo: “La Nueva Reivindicación de la Secesión de Cataluña en el Contexto Normativo de la 
Constitución Española de 1978 y el Tratado de Lisboa”, Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, núm. 31, 2013, pp. 151-136. 
734 See the Judgment STC 103/2008 related to the attempt to call a referendum by the Basque country, as mentioned by 
V.  Ferreres Comella: “The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s Right to Decide”, cit., p. 587. 
735 V. Breda: “La Devolution de Escocia y el Referendum de 2014: cuales son las Repercusiones Potenciales en Espana”, 
Teoria y Realidad Constitutional, 2013, vol. 31, pp. 85-86. Part X of the 1978 Constitution encompasses constitutional 
amendments. Art. 167 and 168 lay down two procedures for amendment, depending on the subject of the revision. 
Essential reforms of the Constitution, such as those concerning territory, are ruled by art. 168. Four successive steps need 
to be taken: firstly, i) the proposed amendment has to approved by a two/thirds majority of the members of the Spanish 
Parliament and Senate, then ii) the two houses have to be dissolved in order to have iii) new elections. Further, ix) the 
newly elected houses have to adopt the same proposal by another two/thirds majority. Lastly, the decision has to be 
ratified through the positive vote of the population with a referendum. Interestingly enough, the Constitution has ever 
been amended following the procedure established by art. 168. 
736Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 103/2008, 11 September 2008, 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2008/10/10/pdfs/T00003-00014.pdf 
737 Constitution of Spain, 1978, art. 149(1) 32nd: “The State shall have exclusive competence over (...) [the] authorisation 
of popular consultations through the holding of referendums’. Hence for the Court, matters which deeply touch upon the 
foundations of the State and its constitutional order cannot be decided through a referendum only. Rejecting the position 
of the Basque Country, the Court asserted that the fundamental pillars of the constitutional order can be modified only 
following the amendment procedure established in Part X of the Constitution. 
738 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 103/2008, cit., fundamento juridico n. 4. 
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political future”,739 in accordance with, inter alia, the principle of sovereignty. The people of 
Catalonia considers itself “a sovereign political and legal subject”.740 The right to decide can be 
constitutionally interpreted if it is narrowed to a political aspiration: the Court asserts that the people 
of Catalonia has a general right to decide, but not “as a manifestation of a right of self-determination 
not recognized in the Constitution, or as an unrecognized attribution of sovereignty, but as a political 
aspiration that may only be achieved through a process that conforms to constitutional legality and 
follows the principles of “democratic legitimacy”, “pluralism” and “legality”.741 However, the Court 
fails to explain in detail the rationale underpinning its opposition to all popular consultations 
organised outside of this framework, no matter if binding or not. While it recognises the entitlement 
of the people of Catalonia to exercise the right to decide, it refuses also those consultations which are 
deprived of legal effect. The latter was eventually the road the Generalitat went to follow. The pro-
secessionist front did not stop its activity during the period the challenge of admissibility for 
resolution 5/X was pending, neither once ruling 42/2014 was issued. In January 2014 the Generalitat 
adopted a “Draft Organic Act delegating to the Generalitat the power to authorise, call and hold a 
referendum on the political future of Catalonia”,742 then submitted it to the Spanish Parliament for 
approval. Predictably, the Congress refused to adopt the act. As a consequence, all the possible 
attempts to hold a referendum with the consent of the Spanish Parliament failed. Hence, from the end 
of 2014 the Generalitat tried to reach separation by way of a popular consultation rather than a 
binding referendum. 
8.2 From binding to non-binding referendum 
Two days after the results of the Scottish referendum were released, the Parliament of Catalonia 
adopted Law 10/2014 on popular non-referendum consultation and civic participation.743 In 
accordance with resolution 5/X, art. 1 calls for a popular consultation on the future of Catalonia to be 
held on the next 9 November 2014,744 exactly two months after the Scottish referendum. The question 
																																								 																				
739 Parliament of Catalonia, Resolution 5/X, cit., Preamble to the Declaration of Sovereignty. 
740 Ibid., art. 1. 
741 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 42/2014, cit., p. 10. 
742 Parliament of Catalonia, Resolution 479/X, 16 January 2014, published in the BOPC, No. 239, 17 January 2014 
743 Parliament of Catalonia, Law 10/2014, then Decree 129/2014, Official Gazette of the Parliament of Catalonia9 
(hereinafter BOPC) n. 6715, 27 September 2014. 
744 After the adoption of the Decree 129/2014 by Catalonia, the Spanish Government filed two appeals before the 
Constitutional Court both against the decree and the call for the referendum. The Court, quite quickly, suspended the 
Catalan provision and the popular consultation. Although the government of Catalonia seemed to be willing to continue 
the process for holding a referendum, one month before the elections the Prime Minister of Catalonia announced that 
there was no sufficient legal basis to hold the referendum as called for by the Decree. Therefore, the consultation took the 
form of a “survey without legal implications” that was called participatory process. Upon the subsequent request of appeal 
by the Spanish Government, the Constitutional Court suspended also the participatory process. Interestingly enough, the 
suspensive measure was extended to the popular consultation called by the Canaries on the repartition of competences in 
renewable energies, since the vote was felt as a tool to acquire more competences vis-à-vis the parent State. Nevertheless, 
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réferéndaire read as follows: “do you want Catalonia to become a state? If so, do you want that state 
to be independent?” Arguably, the phrasing of the referendum question did not help in legitimising 
the separatist goal of the regional government. As Lopez opines, “the inclusion of two questions 
locates the Catalan case in between an internal self-determination process that would create a federal 
state and external one that would create an independent state”.745 Contrary to the question posed to 
the people of Scotland, the non-binding referendum of 2014 asked voters if they want[ed] Catalonia 
to be a state and if so, if they want[ed] that State to be independent.746  
The question does not seem to be clear, nor immediately understandable. The results of the 
ballot demonstrated the flaws of the wording: as figures show, the independence option was chosen 
by 80% of votes casted, nearly 2.4 million out of 7.5 citizens participating. However, 10% of the 
voters were in favour of statehood, but they did not agree on Catalonia becoming an independent 
State.747 The reaction of the Parliament of Catalonia exacerbated the dispute with the central 
government. Following the elections of 27 September 2015, the pro-secessionist party acquired a 
large majority in Catalonia. On 9 November 2015, the Parliament adopted a resolution establishing a 
non-subordinated constituent process towards independence. Resolution 1/XI748 introduced a 
citizens-led participative process for the uncoupling of Catalonia from Spain, not subject to the 
decision of the institutions of the Spanish State.749 Needless to say, once adopted in Catalonia the 
government in Madrid has challenged the resolution in front of the Constitutional Court.750  
8.3 The Spanish Constitutional Court’s ruling 259/2015 
The submissions of the parties resemble those elaborated for STC 42/2014. In the view of the 
government, the main ground for admissibility is that the resolution is not simply a declaration of 
intent, but has legal enforceability, since it gives a clear mandate to start a process of secession.751 
The Resolution, the State Attorney continues, supports a unilateral attempt to dissolve the union of 
																																								 																				
the people of Catalonia went massively to vote on 9 Nov. 2014. See G. Marrero Gonzalez: “Catalonia’s Independence 
and the Role of the Constitutional Court: Recent Developments”, cit., p. 90. 
745 J. López: “A Catalan Perspective: Franchise in a Forbidden Referendum”, contribution to the Citizenship Forum, 
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence, 2014, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-forum/citizenship-forum-cat/1157-independence-referendums-who-should-
vote-and-who-should-be-offered-citizenship?showall=&start=5 
746 B. Levites: “The Scottish Independence Referendum and the Principles of Democratic Secession, cit., p. 402. 
747 Generalitat of Catalonia, Resultats Participa2014, 9 November 2014, http://participa 2014.cat/ (last visited November 
20, 2016) [http://perma.cc/GQ2Y-98MK]; Population 1900-2015, http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=245&lang=en  
748 Parliament of Catalonia, Resolution 1/XI, BOPC no. 7, 9 November 2015. 
749 Ibid., art. 3-5. 
750 Constitutional Challenge to enactments of the Autonomous Communities (Title V, Organic Law on the Constitutional 
Court, Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional, hereinafter “LOTC”) n. 6330-2015, 11 November 2015. 
751 The State Attorney asserts that the resolution is challenged because “it must be interpreted as a whole, as a systemic 
package, ordering secession from Spain by unconstitutional and undemocratic means”. Constitutional Court of Spain, 
STC 259/2015, 2 December 2015, BOE no 10, 12 January, 2016, para. 2 (a). 
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Spain, by declaring itself a sovereign people and considering the Parliament a constituent authority. 
For all these reasons, the resolution violates art. 2 of the Constitution.752 
The resolution expressly focuses on the beginning of a political process in Catalonia arising 
from the election results of 27 September 2015 and draws off the subsequent steps to be taken for 
achieving an independent Catalonia in the form of a republic.753 Interestingly enough, the process is 
described as “the democratic uncoupling from the Spanish State”.754  More nuanced notions – such 
as democratic un-coupling or citizens led participation process are preferred to secession and 
referendum. Arguably, it seems that the Generalitat has changed its legal strategy, going even beyond 
the borders of the Spanish legal order. As art. 6 of resolution 1/XI reads, the Parliament of Catalonia 
does not recognise the legitimacy of the Spanish Constitutional Court, since the latter has invalidated 
the Statute of Autonomy, approved by the people through a referendum. Again, the text puts emphasis 
on democratic principles. By art. 9 in fact the Parliament “declares its willingness to begin 
negotiations in order to implement the democratic mandate to create an independent Catalan State 
in the form of a republic, and it agrees to make this known to the Spanish State, to the EU and to the 
international community as a whole”.  
In this framework, territorial referenda have become less central in the decision of the 
Constitutional Court, whose focus rests the definition of sovereign people. In the words of the Court 
“the sovereignty of the nation, vested in the Spanish people, necessarily entails the unity of the 
Nation”.755 The Court reiterates the reasoning developed in 2014, but seems to embrace a stricter 
position, as it is showed by the repetitive use of terms such as “unequivocal meaning” or “indisputable 
unity” throughout the ruling. The rationale underpinning this approach can be found in the different 
wording of Resolution 1/XI itself. Unlike that of 2014, the Sovereignty Declaration of November 
2015 excludes any constitutional procedure of amendment. Therefore, the Court agrees with the 
argumentation of the Government that although the Resolution proclaims itself only a declaration of 
intent, it is capable of having legal effects.756 The fact that it is aimed at commencing a process of 
																																								 																				
752 Ibid., para.2(d): “the challenged Resolution is also irreconcilable with Article 2 CE, to the extent that it clashes directly 
with the very foundations of the Constitution, the indissolubility of the Nation, and the indivisibility of the homeland of 
all Spaniards. Attributing sovereignty to the Catalan people, as a constituent authority, means attributing to it the right 
to secession which it could exercise if it had the inclination to do so; i.e., it means conferring the power to dissolve, at its 
sole bidding, what the Constitution proclaims to be indissoluble, and divide what it declares indivisible”.  
753 Resolution 1/XI, cit., art. 2. 
754 Ibid.., art. 6: “The Parliament of Catalonia, as the depositary of sovereignty and the expression of the constituent 
power, reiterates that this Chamber and the process of democratic uncoupling from the Spanish State”. 
755 Ibid., para. 4(a). 
756 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 259/2015, cit., fundamento juridico n. 2 “Firstly, since the challenged Resolution 
“solemnly declares the beginning of the process to create an independent Catalan State in the form of a republic”, and 
“proclaims the opening of a ... constituent process to lay the foundations for the future Catalan constitution”, within an 
announced framework of “uncoupling” from the Spanish state, it is capable of producing legal effects, as these statements 
could be understood as the acknowledgement that the bodies and entities which the Resolution entrusts with carrying out 
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secession from Spain cannot be underestimated. The Court does not declare unconstitutional the 
simple manifestation of the separatist wishes by a sub-unit, nor the fact that the unit might seek 
secession. However, the process for reaching this goal has to be founded in the Constitution.757 In 
other words, the sub-unit may enter into a political dialogue with the central government, and then 
follow the constitutional provisions for the revision of the Constitution. Although the Constitution 
cannot be interpreted as permitting secession, the Court aptly re-proposes the interpretation given in 
STC 103/2008 in Ground 2, when it said that every single provision of the Constitution is amendable, 
provided that it is not issued/ proposed through an activity that infringes the principles of democracy, 
fundamental human rights, or the rest of the constitutional mandates. 758  
8.4 Territorial referenda, secession and the right to decide in the Catalan debate: elements in 
favour and against the consolidation of the opinio juris 
Judgment 259/2015 analyses the relationship between democracy and secession from a 
specific perspective. Quite often, the present research has presented the interplay between secession 
and democracy under positive terms. Already in the Introduction it was contended that 
constitutionalising secession by means of the rule of law and majority decision-making could in fact 
lead to a decrease in the tensions related to separatist movements.759 Against this background, the 
Spanish Court seems to consider the hypothesis of democratic secession a violation of the founding 
principles of the constitutional order, unless it is carried out as an amendment of the Constitution. 
Otherwise, for the Court the democratic secession proposed by the people of Catalonia amounts to a 
misleading, deceptive use of the principle of democracy on the part of the autonomous region. In par. 
5 of judgment 259/2015, the Court states that “democratic legitimacy cannot be placed at odds with 
constitutional lawfulness to the detriment of the latter […] in a democratic conception of power there 
is no other legitimacy than that established by the Constitution”.760 Although the Court has never 
rejected the right to decide per se, constitutional norms prevail, irrespective of the fact that the right 
to decide is vested in the people by the legal order itself. In other words, the infringement of the 
																																								 																				
these processes —the Parliament and the Government of the Autonomous Community in particular— have “powers 
inherent to sovereignty that go above and beyond the powers derived from the autonomy afforded by the Constitution to 
the different nationalities that make up the Spanish nation” (STC 42/2014, Ground 2)”. 
757  Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 259/2015, cit., fundamento juridico n. 7: “An Autonomous Community’s 
Parliament cannot set itself up as a source of legal and political legitimacy, unlawfully taking matters into its own hands 
in order to violate the constitutional system on which its own authority is based. In doing so, the Parliament of Catalonia 
would be undermining its own constitutional and statutory foundations” 
758 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 103/2008, 11 September 2008, cited in STC 159/2015, fundamento juridico n.7 
“‘only the citizens, acting necessarily on the completion of the reform process, can hold supreme power; in other words, 
the power to modify the Constitution itself without restrictions’ (STC 103/2008, of 11 September, Ground 2). Each and 
every constitutional provision is amendable, provided that the amendment “is not prepared or defended through an 
activity that infringes the principles of democracy, fundamental rights or the rest of the constitutional mandates”  
759 See Introduction pp. 7-8. 
760 Constitutional Court of Spain, SCT 259/2015, cit., fundamento juridico n.5. 
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Constitution stems from the attribution of sovereignty761 by an Autonomous Community, while the 
right to decide can be constitutionally interpreted.  
Considering the judgements delivered by the Court so far on the Catalan question, the 
argumentation is persuasive. An accurate legal scholar should refrain from interpreting the answers 
of the judiciary as a denial of secession. The issue of concern does not seem to be secession in itself, 
but the broader cause-effect relationship between sovereignty and the right to decide. While 
acknowledging the right to decide of the people of Catalonia, the Court refuses that this right is 
triggered by the sovereign nature of the people of the provincia autonoma. From an international 
legal standpoint, in fact, the position of the government of Catalonia could have been better framed. 
As the Court points out, the people of Catalonia wishes to detach itself from Spain. Sovereignty 
cannot be attributed prior to this step. This position is convincing: if secession is aimed at creating a 
new sovereign entity, it is difficult to see how the people of Catalonia can claim to be already 
sovereign. Unfortunately, the instances forwarded by Catalonia concerning the right to decide and 
sovereignty have not been extensively explained.  
a) Right to decide or right to self-determination? 
The white paper elaborated by the Consell Assessor (Advisory Council on National Transition) 
of Catalonia in 2013 is rather confusing when it comes to the legal basis of the right to decide. As 
																																								 																				
761 A similar reasoning based on the respect of the principle of popular sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State 
has been advanced by the Russian Constitutional Court. Given the instabilities following the dismemberment of the 
USSR, within the ex-Soviet Union there was a proliferation of separatist movement. In particular, constitutional 
challenges were issued against the laws adopted by Tatarstan in 1991 and against the attempt to secession by Chechnya. 
Both Tatarstan and Chechnya had refused to sign the 1992 treaty for the establishment of the Russian Federation, claiming 
that it did not granted to them enough decentralised powers.  As regards Tatarstan, between 1991 and 1992 the Republic 
adopted a bulk of legislation purported to a sort of confederative system with Russia. Not only a constitutional revision 
established Tatarstan as a sovereign State not subject to the authority of Russia, but also a referendum was scheduled for 
March 1992. The question asked to the citizens was whether they wanted Tatarstan to have relations with the Russian 
Federation and the other Republics on an equal basis. The call for the referendum animated the reaction of Moscow and 
a constitutional challenge was filed to the Court. The Constitutional Court declared the unconstitutionality of the 
provisions calling a referendum and establishing the sovereign State of Tatarstan. Irrespective of the judgment by the 
court, Tatarstan went on to hold a referendum, so that tensions with Moscow reached a peak at the end of 1992. While 
the Federation was undergoing serious challenges, Tatarstan in 1993 boycotted two popular consultations of the whole 
federation’s population. Hence, president Yeltsin decided to start negotiations with the representatives of Tatarstan. The 
turning point was the changed approach by Tatarstan, whose representatives become less keen on discussing on secession. 
Unlike Chechnya, Tatarstan chose to negotiate a solution for the highest degree of autonomy, and abandoned the purely 
separatist quest for being recognised independent. Therefore, on 21 March 1994 Tatarstan and the Russian Federation 
signed a treaty recognising the Constitution of Tatarstan and enumerating the areas in which the republic has exclusive 
competence, together with those subject to the joint authority by Russia and Tatarstan. See on Tatarstan D.A. O’Brien: 
“Lessons from Tatarstan and Chechnya”, in S. Ortino, M. Zagar et al (eds.), The Changing Faces of Federalism: 
Institutional reconfiguration in Europe from East to West, Manchester-New York, 2005, pp. 52-54. As regards Chechnya, 
the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Russia in the framework of the prosecution of the Chechen Conflict in 1993 
takes in due account international law, but focuses mainly on remedial secession and the law of armed conflict. While it 
is noteworthy that the Constitutional Court foresees the obligation for national institutions to comply with international 
Law, the merits of the case fall outside the scope of this section. See for references and for an analysis of the judgment P. 
Gaeta: “The Armed Conflict in Chechnya before the Russian Constitutional Court”, EJIL, 1996, vol. 7 pp. 563-570. 
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regards the role of popular consultations, the arguments advanced are confusing too. Ranging from 
historical legitimacy762 to domestic law, the paper approaches international law at distance. It gives 
explicit reference to post-communist practice of referenda on sovereignty or independence, but it does 
not engage in a clear legal analysis. It simply asserts that on the basis of these examples, “directly 
consulting the affected people is a widely accepted democratic procedure for resolving this kind of 
situation, which enables it to be done in accordance with the international parameters of non-violence 
and democratic appropriateness”.763 No mention is given of the sources of international law 
promoting these parameters, so that the argument is not fully persuasive. Moreover, in the section 
devoted to international and EU law, the Advisory Council clearly observes that there is no 
international rule prescribing compulsory referendum on territorial changes. The issue, the paper 
continues, is considered basically a democratic one.764 The most salient facet, then, is the stance that 
the use of referendum can be justified in light of several international and European principles, 
notably democracy, self-determination and protection of minorities. Although they are not judiciable, 
they “as contained in art. 10 of the Spanish Constitution, require the public authorities of the Spanish 
State to reinterpret the precepts that regulate referenda and popular consultation as such”.765 
However, the nexus between the norms that regulate referenda and the so called European principles 
is absent from the argumentation. All the more so, it has been opined that self-determination appears 
seldom in the discourse and is deemed to have been replaced by the right to decide.766  
In fact, it cannot but be observed that the propaganda of Catalonia on the right to decide shows 
some pitfalls: although the latest reports of experts767 seem to detach the right to decide from the right 
to self-determination, eventually, the right to self-determination has came back in the business of the 
Catalan question in the 2017 Law on the Self-Determination Referendum.768 In this framework it can 
be suggested to embrace an intermediate position: the proclamation of the right to decide is in line 
with the procedural approach adopted for secession in Chapter 2. In fact, it ascribes to a determined 
																																								 																				
762 Government of Catalonia, White Paper “The National Transition of Catalonia”, Barcelona, 2014, p. 24. According to 
the paper, the claim by the the people of Catalonia is particularily legitimate given the history of the nation, in parituclar 
on the graounds that the region was an independentend nation historically. 
763 Ibid., p. 25. 
764 Ibid., p. 26. 
765 Ibid., p. 27. 
766 P. Bossacoma; H.L.Bofill: “The secession of Catalonia: legal strategies and barriers”, in X. Cuadras-Morató 
(ed.). Catalonia: A New Independent State in Europe?, New York, 2016, pp. 107-148. 
767 See the latest report on the topic: “Catalonia’s Legitimate Right to Decide”, Report by International Experts (Levrat 
N., Antunes S., Tusseau G., Williams P.) invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Catalonia, 2017, 
exteriors.gencat.cat/web/..../FULL-REPORT-Catalonias-legitimate-right-to-decide.pdf The report also lists some cases 
of referendum for secession which are considered the expression of the right to decide. 
768 Ley del referéndum de autodeterminación (hereinafter Law on the Referendum), n. 19/2017, 6 September 2017, DOGC 
núm. 7449A de 06 de September 2017, English translation at 
http://exteriors.gencat.cat/web/.content/00_ACTUALITAT/notes_context/Llei-del-Referendum_ENGLISH.pdf 
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community the title to define its own juridical and political status, through a majority decision-making 
process.769 This way, the right to decide seems also in line with the understanding of self-
determination proposed in Chapter 1, as it should be better considered an evolution of the right to 
self-determination in its internal dimension.770 The rationale underpinning the right to decide is a 
political aspiration – i.e. to gain more autonomy, or to reach independence in case further autonomy 
is precluded. Yet, the notion is not only political, being intertwined with the right to freedom of 
expression and to participation in political issues. Although international law does not seem in the 
way of recognising such a right as such, it is worth to underline that the right to decide has a strong 
procedural connotation. It may not yet be equated to a concrete legal title, but it expresses the sub-
unit’s will to decide through a democratic vote. 
8.5 The October 2017 Referendum and the opposition of the Spanish central Government 
The manner in which the judiciary has faced the progressive affirmation of the right to decide 
might have contributed to the escalation of tensions with Madrid. At a first glance, the Constitutional 
Court of Spain seems to follow the line traced by the Supreme Court of Canada, when it considers 
that an indisputable wish for territorial change triggers the duty of the interest parties to negotiate an 
alternative territorial reapportionment.771 However, the different approach of the Spanish Court 
becomes striking when the ratio decidendi is developed. The overarching principle of constitutional 
loyalty requires to follow the mechanisms of review provided for by the Spanish Constitution. That 
is to say that, despite the possibility for the people of Catalonia to resort to a seceding referendum is 
not excluded, the only popular consultation practicable is that scheduled at the end of the 
constitutional procedure of revision, as confirmed by art. 168. This way, the Court seems to neglect 
every prospect of negotiated referendum. As Lopez opines, through its case-law the Constitutional 
Court is rejecting a broad interpretation of art. 92 and art. 150 of the Constitution, which would allow 
at least a consultative referendum about secession.772 According to art. 92, in fact, “political decisions 
of special importance" may be the object of a consultative referendum. Moreover, art. 150 establishes 
																																								 																				
769 J. Lopez: “From the Right to Self-Determination to the Right to Decide”, Quaderns de Recerca, 2011, n.4, UNESCO-
Catalonia, pp. 21-22. 
770 J.M. Vilajosana: “The Democratic Principle and Constitutional Justification of the Right to Decide,” cit., p. 61; D. 
Turp: “Catalonia’s “Right to Decide” under International, European, Spanish, Catalan and Comparative Law”, in The 
Catalan Independence Referendum: An Assessment Of the Process Of Self-Determination, Report of the International 
Group of Experts for the Institute of Research on Self-Determination of Peoples and National Independence, n.1, 
September 2017, pp. 55-72. 
771 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 259/2915, cit., fundamento juridico n.7: “As we made clear in STC 42/2014 
(Ground 4), there is room in our system for ideas to be put forward that seek to modify the foundations of our 
constitutional order, provided that this is not prepared or defended by way of an activity that violates the principles of 
democracy”.  
772 L. Payero Lopez: “The ‘Citizen Participation Process’ in Catalonia: Past, Present And Future”, Liverpool Law 
Review, 2015, vol. 36, pp. 252-253. 
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the possibility for the State to transfer or delegate legislative powers to Catalonia. Therefore, the 
flexibility demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Canada in approaching a sensitive issue such as a 
secession is not found in the reasoning of the Constitutional Court of Spain, albeit both Courts start 
from the same assumptions. While for the Canadian Supreme Court the referendum is an instrument 
of legitimacy in the quest to secede – because it is the expression of one of the four cornerstones of 
the legal order, notably democracy- the Court of Spain follows a different pattern. In the ratio 
decidendi of the Spanish Constitutional Court, the right to decide is detached from questions of 
sovereignty on the territory. At most, the right to decide could be triggered once the procedures for 
reviewing the Constitution have been implemented. In other words, the expression of the will of the 
people outside the framework of the constitutional provisions would not be an exercise of democracy, 
it would violate the principle of democracy itself.  
The position of the Court is perhaps too extreme. Holding a non-binding referendum cannot be 
considered a violation of the Constitution.773 By contrast, and notwithstanding the different 
constitutional architecture, the reasoning developed in Reference re Secession of Quebec is more 
convincing. Territorial referenda are a strong manifestation of the popular will which cannot be 
ignored, as is demonstrated by the widespread use of this tool in practice showed in the previous 
pages. Moreover, the continuous resistance by the government and the judiciary to let the people of 
Catalonia hold a non-binding referendum could even hint at the fact that these kind of consultations 
trigger legal effects, otherwise it is difficult to understand the refusal for non-binding consultations. 
Unfortunately, the response of the parent State to the exercise of the right to decide has been an 
implacable opposition, which in turn seems to have led to an instrumental use of the free expression 
of the will/ right to decide argument by Catalonia. The Constitutional Court suspended774 the Law on 
the Referendum, aggressive police actions and forcible closure of polling station characterised the 
period before the vote. By using violence against the exercise of fundamental democratic rights, the 
central government served the cause of the Catalan region.775 Ultimately, the heavy-handed response 
																																								 																				
773 J.M. Vilajosana: “The Democratic Principle and Constitutional Justification of the Right to Decide,” Revista 
d’Estudios Autonòmics i Federals, 2014, vol. 19, p. 70. 
774 For the latest developments of the case law see, ex- plurimis, Constitutional Court of Spain, Auto 114/2017, 18 July 
2017; Auto 127/2017, 21 September 2017; Auto 124/2017, 19 September 2017; Auto 123/2017, 19 September 2017 in 
BOE n. 229, 22 September 2017. 
775 See the critics by UN Human Rights represnetatives reported by the Guardian at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/28/un-rights-experts-criticise-spanish-efforts-to-block-catalan-vote and 
the high relevance of the issue among the public opinion at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/world/europe/catalonia-
independence-referendum-eu.html 
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by Madrid drove the people of Catalonia towards independence even more, an element which 
differentiates the case of the Spanish region from that of Scotland.776.  
Catalonia hold a referendum on independence on 1st October 2017 which resulted in a clear 
majority in favour of secession. At the moment this research is finished, the situation seems loaded 
with much more dynamite. The way the referendum was conducted casts some doubts over the real 
possibility by the autonomous region to use it as the basis for a declaration of independence, which 
was signed by Puigdemont on 10th October 2017, but immediately suspended.777 As far as procedural 
requirements are concerned, in fact, there are some merits and pitfalls. For the merits, the question 
was clear and precise, in sharp contrast to the one asked in 2014. The people of Catalonia were asked 
“ Do you want Catalonia to be an independence State in the form of a Republic?”.778  The question 
thus provides a model of clarity and requires a yes or no answer. Nevertheless, there are other 
elements for discussion. Firstly, the turnout was about lower than 50%, arguably not a satisfactory 
result although the Law on the Referendum does not provide for a qualified majority requirement. 
Furthermore, the franchise provided by the Law on the Referendum differs from common practice. 
Pursuant to art. 6, all those persons with the right to vote in the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia 
are entitled to vote.779 Even Catalans resident abroad were allowed to take part to the referendum, 
provided their most recent registration to vote was in Catalonia. Although in practice expats did not 
take part to the referendum, the formulation gives rise to some uncertainties, since it leaves open the 
question about who is a Catalan with recent registration. Other elements casting some doubts concern 
the administration of the Electoral Commission and the organisation of the vote. For the former, the 
fact that pursuant to art. 19 the Electoral Commission shall be appointed by absolute majority of the 
Catalan Parliament does not seem to be in line with the impartiality required for this body, recalled 
also in art. 1 of the Law on the Referendum.780 Moreover, it is fundamental for the referendum that 
both sides are equally represented, while the Law on the Referendum is silent in this sense, neither 
there is any reference to campaign financing.781 For the latter, i.e. organisation of the referendum, the 
																																								 																				
776 N. Caspersen: “The Catalan Independence Referendum: Conflicting Claims and International Responses”, The 
Catalan Independence Referendum: An Assessment Of the Process Of Self-Determination, cit., pp.21-36. 
777 See the Official Statement delivered by Puigdemont to the Catalan Parliament 
http://www.catalangovernment.eu/pres_gov/AppJava/government/news/303583/official-statement-president-political-
situation-catalonia.html 
778 Law on the Referendum, cit., art. 4.2. 
779 Law on the Referendum, cit, art. 6(1): “All those persons with the right to vote in the elections to the Parliament of 
Catalonia shall be able to vote. Those Catalans resident abroad whose most recent registration to vote was in Catalonia 
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780 See for the analysis of the compliance of the Catalan referendum with international practice concerning referenda M. 
Qvortrup: “A Comparative Perspective on Referendums on Independence and the Proposed Catalan Referendum of 
October 1st, 2017”, IRAI Report, cit., pp. 37-54. 
781 Ibid. 
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legality of the vote is also tainted by the measures undertaken by the government of Madrid. The 
seize of ballot boxes, voting papers and voting lists during the days prior to the referendum casts 
some doubts over the legality of the vote. In light of the turnout of the referendum, of the procedures 
followed for the organisation and administration of the vote, as well as the rather confusing approach 
by the Generalitat Catalana to the legal justifications for the independence, the case of Catalonia 
leaves many open questions. The most important one concerns the instrumental use of the referendum 
to cover the absence of a legal title for the territorial change. This kind of “manipulative” use of the 
referendum, due to the crucial role this tool has acquired for the expression of the will of the people, 
can be found also in the case of Crimea, although in a very different framework. 
9. The referendum in Crimea: an international legal perspective 
In Chapter 2 the factual background of the case of Crimea was explained. In particular, it was 
showed that March 2014 was marked by a serious domestic crisis in Ukraine, from which the rush of 
Crimea towards secession originated. In the previous Chapter the narrative of the events in Crimea 
was instrumental for testing the application of the normative due process model.782 From the analysis 
of the facts it was inferred that, at a first glance, the case puts seriously into question the normative 
due process. However, what happened in Crimea is better conceived as an annexation, rather than an 
example of secession.  Nevertheless, a section about the referendum in Crimea is unavoidable, if only 
because it was the latest case in which the referendum was practically carried out. Moreover, from 
the reactions of the international community to the vote it is possible to infer some conclusions over 
the value of territorial referendum in international law. For the sake of clarity, the Crimean experience 
can be distinguished in two distinct acts. On the one side, there is the adoption of the declaration of 
independence prior to the referendum, on 11 March 2014. On the other side, there is the referendum 
and its result supporting joining the Russian Federation, followed by an agreement for the 
incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.783  
The Supreme Council of Crimea had scheduled a referendum already at the end of February 
2014. In light of the powers devolved to it by the Constitution, the Council was empowered to propose 
normative acts also about holding a referendum on the status of Crimea. The escalation of the tensions 
between the Autonomous Republic and the parent State favored the rapid overflowing of the events. 
Before the referendum – which took place on 16 March 2014- on 11 March the Supreme Council and 
the Sevastopol City Council jointly issued the declaration of independence in Crimea.784 If one wants 
																																								 																				
 
783A. Pronin: “ Republic of Crimea. A two day State”, Russian Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 3, pp. 134-135. 
784 See C. Navari, Territoriality Self-determination and Crimea after Badinter, International Affairs, 2014, vol. 90, p. 
1135. 
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to consider Crimea an example of secession, probably has to limit the analysis to the five days which 
passed from the declaration of independence to the referendum of 16 March.785 On 6 March 2014 the 
Supreme Council of Crimea adopted the resolution “On the all-Crimean referendum”: the date of the 
referendum was anticipated to the next 16th March. The question posed to the people of Crimea was 
the following: “ 1) Do you support the reunification of the Crimea with Russia as a subject of the 
Russian Federation?; 2) Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 
as of 1992 and the status of the Crimea as part of Ukraine?”.786 Nearly all the voters – 96,77%- who 
participated to the referendum choose the first option to join Russia. On the side of the Russian 
Federation, the incorporation was legally grounded on the “Federal constitutional law no. 6-FKZ on 
the procedure on admission to the Russian Federation and on the creation of a new subject within 
the Russian Federation”787 dated 17 December 2001. The process was completed with the signature 
of the “Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Acceptance of the 
Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and on Creation of New Federative Entities within 
the Russian Federation” on March 18, 2014.788 At the domestic level, the Russian legislative body 
further had to adopt  two ad-hoc laws, namely the “The Federal Constitutional Law On Admitting to 
the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the 
New Constituent Entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol,” 
and the “Federal Law On Ratifying the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic 
of Crimea on Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within 
the Russian Federation New Constituent Entities”.789 
9.1 The (mis)use of referendum in Crimea 
From the above, it can be seen that the case of Crimea displays many different facets. It can be 
studied from the perspective of constitutional and international law. From the latter point of view, 
then, there arise a variety of different legal issues, since the case involves questions of secession, 
popular consultation, annexation and use of force. In this Chapter, the focus will be narrowed to how 
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different legal approaches and one unanswered question”, Questions of International Law, 11 May 2014, cit. 
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the referendum was used to secede from Ukraine and to the justifications adduced by the people of 
Crimea and by the Russian Federation, the other player involved in the events. The case will be 
tackled also in the next Chapter, on a two-fold basis: (i) to see whether the referendum meets the 
procedural legal standards applicable to territorial referendum and (ii) the relevance of Crimea with 
respect to the international law of recognition, by looking at the reactions of the international 
community to the referendum. 
Although the standards for a free and fair territorial referendum are the subject matter of the 
next Chapter, the first thing that lips out of the analysis of the Crimean case is the distinctive question 
referéndaire: if compared to the ones used for Quebec or Scotland, as well as to the question proposed 
for the 1st October referendum in Catalonia, the question does not contain a yes or no alternative and 
it is composed by a double option such as in the 2014 consultation in Catalonia. The voters were 
asked to answer yes to one of the two questions. In Reference Re Secession, the Supreme Court of 
Canada demanded that the question put to the voters had to be clear.790 The same line was followed 
in the Edinburgh Agreement, in which the UK conditioned the realization of the referendum to the 
use of a clear and straightforward question. The subject of the question in the Crimean referendum is 
even more peculiar, since the voters are asked whether they want to become part of another subject 
of international law. Arguably, these features bring us back to the model of the plebiscites, rather than 
to the referendum used by sub-units to seek secession. It is not by chance that the representative of 
Ukraine during an OSCE meeting in March 2017 claimed that in 2014 Crimea organized a “illegal 
plebiscite [which] violated the Ukrainian legislation, international norms and fell short of democratic 
standards, established by the OSCE and the Council of Europe”.791 Recalling that the search for 
popular consent was one of the basic features of plebiscites, the architecture of the referendum in 
Crimea is similar: the community was asked to confirm a decision which appears792 to have been 
already taken and confirmed by such a high majority that some doubts can be casted over the validity 
of the consultation itself.793 
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The second distinctive element is the bizarre relationship between the referendum and the 
declaration of independence. The extensive practice including the UN-led popular consultations 
supports the existence of a cause effect relationship between referendum and declarations of 
independence. That is to say that the referendum precedes the declaration of independence, since it is 
chosen as the sound legal basis for the acquisition of statehood. By contrast, Crimea already called 
itself independent. In a like manner, a confusing argumentation has been previously found in the case 
of Catalonia, where resolution 1/XI of the Generalitat Catalana already called the region a sovereign 
entity before having held a referendum about secession. Nevertheless, the criticism for Catalonia can 
be mitigated by the fact that the Generalitat has been seeking secession only after the failure of 
negotiations about increasing autonomy. By contrast, the case of Crimea is a very peculiar one, 
because it was instrumental in joining the Russian Federation. Hence, substantially the referendum in 
Crimea does not add many elements to the practice for the consolidation of the use of the referendum 
to legitimize secession. Rather, it has a high significance from a procedural perspective. The very fact 
that the community has decided to resort to a referendum corroborates the view that such a tool would 
have gained consensus also from the other members of the international community. In particular, the 
case of Crimea helps the consolidation of practice and opinio iuris about the resort to a referendum 
respecting certain conditions, as it will be seen in the next Chapter.  
9.2 Legal grounds for the referendum in Crimea: a difficult interpretation 
Moving now to the legal grounds adduced for justifying the 2014 vote794, these vary a lot. 
Alongside historical motivations, the people of Crimea as well as the Russian Federation have held 
that the freely expressed will of the people was (i) an application of the right to self-determination 
and/or (ii) a response to serious violation witnessed by the parent State.795 As regards the latter, even 
adopting a very progressive stance and claiming that the right to remedial secession exists in 
international law, it is quite difficult to demonstrate that it applies to Crimea. The use of referendum 
to justify secession as a remedy is unpersuasive. In particular, two criteria form the roadblock to 
Crimea’s right to legally secede from Ukraine: 1) the absence of massive violations against the 
Crimean minority and 2) the lack of exhaustion of all remedies to find a negotiated solution with the 
																																								 																				
794 The declaration of independence by Crimea mentions the advisory opinion of Kosovo to support the legality of the 
declaration. It reads “[…] taking into consideration the confirmation of the status of Kosovo by the ICJ […] which says 
that unilateral declarations of independence by a part of the country doesn’t violate any international norm” Still, the 
reference is misleading, because Crimea’s declaration of independence relied upon the use of force by a third party and 
was linked to the subsequent referendum. Whilst in the case of Kosovo there was no referendum to reach independence. 
795 The need to protect the Russian speaking population from grave violations of their right was expressed by President 
Putin in his speech dated 18 march 2014, at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889. See also V. Tolstykh: “Reunification of 
Crimea with Russia: A Russian Perspective”, cit., pp. 879–886; G. Wilson: “Crimea: Some Observations on Secession 
and Intervention in Partial Response to Müllerson and Tolstykh”, Chinese Journal of International Law, 2015, vol.14, pp. 
217–223.  
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parent State. Firstly, it has not been proven that the people of Crimea witnessed oppressive violation 
of their rights. In March 2014, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities reported to have 
found no evidence of violations or threats to the Russian-speaking population.796 The adoption of the 
Language Act797 by the central government whose main purport was reducing the use of the Russian 
language within the provinces of the country cannot alone reach the threshold of seriousness of human 
rights abuses required by the remedial right theory. Secondly, the remedial right theory postulates 
that all existing remedies have to be exhausted before secession takes place. By contrast, there was 
no genuine attempt by the government of Crimea to settle the dispute internally, albeit the Ukrainian 
government had manifested its willingness to negotiate a new form of extended autonomy.798 As 
regards the right to self-determination, the people of Crimea were not explicit in claiming they had a 
right to self-determination. It was rather the Russian Federation that labelled the referendum and 
declaration of independence inter alia, as an expression of the right to self-determination. In 
particular, the statement by president Putin in the aftermath of the referendum is remarkable. The 
President recalled that “as it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme 
Council of Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to 
self-determination”.799	Along the same line, the Russian representative in the SC declared that through 
the expression of the free will, the people of Crimea have exercised “what is enshrined in the Charter 
of the United Nations and a great number of fundamental international legal documents—their right 
to self-determination”.800 As a consequence, the Russian Federation could not but accept the decision  
by Crimea and sign a treaty of incorporation.  
 This study has already explained the ontological and substantial difference between self-
determination and secession.801 Positive international law does not encompass a right to secession as 
a dimension of the right to self-determination. Besides, the right to self-determination in its external 
dimension pertains to a people in case of subjugation, external intervention and racial discrimination: 
all these features do not seem to be realised in the case of Crimea. In this sense there is some coherence 
in the approach of the government of Crimea, which manifested its will to join Russia and did not 
claim explicitly a right to self-determination in its external dimension. By contrast, the instrumental 
																																								 																				
796 OSCE, “Developing situation in Crimea alarming”, Press release from the speech by the OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities, 6 March 2014, available at www.osce.org/hcnm/116180. 
797 The legislative architecture for protection of language differences can be found at Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: “On 
Principles of the State Language Policy”, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/anot/en/ 5029-17.  
798 S. van der Driest: “Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) 
Secession in International Law”, Netherlands Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 62, pp. 329-363.  
799Address issued by the President of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/ 
6889.  
800 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.7144, 19 March 2014, p. 8. 
801 See Chapter 2 at section 4. 
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use of the self-determination argument appears clear from the Russian position. Moreover, it remains 
highly questionable whether the people of Crimea actually qualify as a people in its international legal 
connotation.802 As it was explained in Chapter 1, the group shares some identifiable objective 
features, but within Crimea there are also some other groups such as Crimean Tatars which could 
qualify as a minority group, thus entitled to exercise the right to self-determination in its internal 
dimension only.803 More correctly, it could be claimed that Crimea typically qualifies as an 
unprivileged unit,804 that is to say that it is not entitled to self-determination. Thus, it tries to increase 
its legitimacy through democratic means, in order to gather international support. Following this 
view, the use of the referendum to secede in the case of Crimea would be of the utmost importance 
for the consolidation on an international rule. However, two elements hinder this position: 
unprivileged units seeking secession do not resort to the use of force, neither require the use of force 
by a third party. In fact, the annexation and the referendum by Crimea can be considered outlaw, 
being them an outcome of the illegal intervention by the Russian Federation. After the referendum 
was held and Crimea joined Russia, the international community condemned the popular consultation 
stating that it had no legal effect.805 Thus, the referendum was considered an invalid act, void of any 
legal consequence and the situation resulting from annexation to Russia was devoid of any legal basis. 
The fact that the referendum was considered null is not tantamount to say that territorial referendum 
per se do not have a value. Right the opposite, the value attached to the referendum can be 
demonstrated by comparing international reactions to the 2014 Crimean referendum with those after 
the 1991 Ukrainian referendum. In that case, the international community welcomed the exercise of 
democracy by the Ukrainian people and underlined the good practice in conduct of the referendum.806 
 In light of the above, it can be safely concluded that whilst the referendum was not organised 
because the Autonomous Republic of Crimea considered itself protected by an international 
customary rule, there was at least the idea that the international community would have been more 
prone to accept a secession if carried out through the democratic expression of the will of the people. 
Overall, the case of Crimea shows how states may use the fragilities of international law as an 
																																								 																				
802 S. van der Driest: “Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) 
Secession in International Law”, cit., p. 360. 
803 S. van der Driest: “Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) 
Secession in International Law”, cit., p. 350. 
804 See Chapter 2 at pp. 97-100. 
805 See, ex plurimis, the statement by the White House Press Secretary M. Fitzwater: “Ukrainians Vote for Independence” 
Washington DC, 2 December 1991, US Department of State Dispatch, 9 December 1991 and Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, Report: “Ukraine’s Referendum on Independence and Presidential Elections”, 01 December 
1991,  https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/report-ukraines-referendum-independence-and-
presidential-election?&&&&sort_by=field_date_value&page=4  
806 A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., p. 279. 
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instrument of their politics. Nevertheless, from a procedural point of view the referendum in Crimea 
has some role to play in the making of a general international norm. In the absence of a legal 
entitlement, a group may try to gather legitimacy from the procedure followed to obtain a new legal 
title. As it will be seen in the next chapter, the international community condemned the way the 
referendum was organised, not the use of the referendum per se. In other words, it could be held a 
contrario that the case of Crimea supports the role of the referendum as a necessary step towards 
secession, provided that procedural standards are satisfied.  
10. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has gone to the heart of the research. Starting with a historical overview and 
passing through a legal inquiry of selected cases, the Chapter has highlighted the pitfalls and the 
potential advantages of the use of referenda in the context of territorial changes in international law. 
The question we have tried to answer is whether territorial referenda are a sufficient, or only a 
necessary element for the creation of a new entity through secession. The answer coming out of the 
research is in the negative, although practice shows some elements in support of a necessary role of 
the referendum. The argumentation was developed with a multi layered approach. Firstly, it was 
clarified which kind of popular consultations the study was referring to. Secondly, indications of a 
general international law rule were searched, through opinio juris and practice, in particular in the 
cases of Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia and Crimea. Further elements were found in the interpretation 
of the few constitutions recognising a right to secede. Nevertheless, the research did not stick to the 
negative answer to the main questions. While conducting the inquiry about the existence of a 
customary rule, a procedural aspect common to most of referenda conducted in well-established 
democracies arose, notably the obligation triggered by the referendum to conduct negotiations 
flowing upon the parent State and the sub-unit. 
The first part of the study has tried to convey the idea that not all popular consultations have 
the same nature. In fact, assuming that an international law rule on unilateral secession through 
referendum finds its origins in the consultations carried out after WW I is not fully persuasive. 
Plebiscites and referenda have many common aspects; they are even used interchangeably. However, 
their ratio seems to be different. International law plebiscites were carried out after WW I on the basis 
of the Versailles treaty. Their legal basis was an international agreement whereby the major powers 
have already established the division of the territories. Plebiscites, therefore, were basically votes on 
consent. During the decolonisation period, UN-led consultations followed mostly the same model. 
Rightly so, because consultations were not necessarily considered binding. By contrast, referenda 
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held during the dissolution of SFRY in principle represent a watershed in the road to the consolidation 
of an international rule about seceding referenda. They were called by the sub-units in the Federation, 
most of them had an established majority threshold and the Badinter Commission paid due regard to 
the legitimising role of referendum in creation of statehood. The study demonstrated that despite 
being important for the consolidation of an opinio juris and practice about secession and referenda, 
popular consultations held from the dissolution of the SFRY until the last years, do not display enough 
similarities. The Badinter Commission itself was mostly concerned with protection of minorities and 
respect for the rule of law. Arguably, the context of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia weights a lot in the 
formulation of the Opinions. It was with the case of Quebec that the research reached a new point: 
the Supreme Court of Canada looks at Quebec’s proposed secession from a procedural standpoint, 
arguing that the seceding entity and the parent State have to follow some kind of due process before 
Quebec may secede from Canada. Both parties, the argument continues, are under an obligation to 
conduct fair negotiations, albeit there is no obligation of result. The Scottish case, where the 
Edinburgh Agreement expressly provides for negotiations after the independence referendum 
supports the point just explained.  In other words, a sort of democratically-lead secession, closer to a 
devolution, could be in the way of consolidation in international law. Upon the parent State there is 
also the obligation to call at the negotiation table all the other interest parties, such as the 
representatives of the other regions of the country. For this purpose, the fact that the people of Quebec, 
or Scotland, did not secede is of less importance, because the importance lies in the process. Two 
cases do not make a rule, yet from a certain point of view, also the case of Catalonia runs in favour 
of the assumption above. The refusal by the government of Madrid and the rigid position of the 
judiciary against non-binding referendum in Catalonia could be interpreted a sign of awareness of the 
legitimising power of this tool. In other words, the denial of the value of referendum demonstrates 
that the democratic process is important. Nevertheless, although the referendum is becoming more 
and more necessary in the process of secession, it needs to be “encapsulated” in the framework of the 
respect of other conditions, such the adoption of a specific procedure for its organisation and the 
opening of negotiations on the basis of its results. Recalling the case of Crimea, the fact that the 
referendum was considered null is not tantamount to say that territorial referendum could not be the 
lawful procedural step towards independence. As it will be showed in the next Chapter in the section 
devoted to international reactions, states’ declarations supported a free and fair territorial referendum. 
Thus, the opposition to the Crimean referendum was grounded on the violation of the procedural 
standards for the holding of territorial referendum, alongside other violations of international law 
linked to the use of force by a third party. As far as the obligation to negotiate a territorial change is 
concerned, its main features can be described as follows. Reference Re Secession addresses to the 
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parent State the obligation to open a meaningful negotiation once a clear territorial referendum is 
done, whilst both parties have the duty to participate in good faith. However, it clearly requires all 
the interest parties to participate: not only the sub-unit and the government, but also all the other 
regions of the country. Interestingly enough, also the Edinburgh Agreement binds the parties to 
engage in negotiations whatever the result of the Scottish referendum. Moreover, the Spanish Court 
in STC 259/2015 suggested that the people of Catalonia could enter into negotiation with the 
government and follow the Constitution to modify the territorial assessment.807 Read along these 
lines, there are already many supportive points for the consolidation of an international rule. The 
obligation to negotiate does not extend to the results of the negotiations, albeit there remains an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. The Supreme Court of Canada itself excluded that it was the 
duty of the Court to establish what should be the result of the negotiations,808 because those belong 
to the realm of politics. Lastly, practice also gives some tips over the subjects entitled to organise a 
referendum. Sub-units claiming secession in these cases can be identified objectively as communities: 
they have their own Parliament ruling on a majority basis, an established territory, language and 
history on their side. Even in case of Crimea’s referendum it has been opined that the region could 
well organise a referendum. The unlawfulness of the fact does not lie in the referendum, but in the 
annexation.809  By contrast, it would be too farfetched to claim that a rule in this sense is already 
consolidated in practice. Many elements rebut this process. In the case of Western Sahara the ICJ 
itself has acknowledged that referenda might be not always be necessary,810 a statement which  runs 
against the consolidation of the role of referenda in international law, albeit the Court did not clarify 
under which circumstances the referendum is not needed.811 In sum, practice suggests that referenda 
are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for secession under international law.  
Taking the case of Scotland, the distinguishing factor in the attempt to secede by Scotland is 
the consent of the parent State, an element that vitiates the value of the Scottish case for the 
consolidation of an international law rule allowing unilateral secession through referendum. 
Undoubtedly, the fact that the country had in force a law on referendum has facilitated the steps 
towards the popular consultation: the Scottish government followed the guidelines of the Edinburgh 
Agreement and the requirements of the PPERA to organise and hold the independence referendum. 
The clarity about the procedure to follow, as well as a clear agreement on all the issues concerning 
																																								 																				
807 Constitutional Court of Spain, STC 259/2015, cit., fundamento juridico 7, p. 185 
808 B. Stankovski: “Is There an Obligation to Negotiate Secession in International Law? From Reference re Secession of 
Quebec to Kosovo Advisory Opinion and Beyond”, ESIL Research Paper, Conference Paper No. 13/2015, vol. 6 n.5, 
http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/1187 
809 J. Vidmar: “The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will of the People”, cit., pp. 365-383. 
810 ICJ, Western Sahara, cit., para. 59. 
811 J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., p. 247. 
184 
 
the organization and the effects of the referendum served as a precondition for the development of a 
genuine debate between the no and yes side. This ultimately fostered a meaningful deliberation. 
Overall, the argument concerning the interrelation between popular consent and self-determination 
should be taken with caution. Claiming that the is a right vested in the people to retrieve consent to 
the government is one thing. Claiming that this right may extend to the chance of secession from the 
parent State is another thing and it means confusing the human right to political participation with the 
right to self-determination.812 On the same line, if it is assumed that territorial referenda are a means 
to express statehood, it could be asked why Palestine has never resorted to a popular consultation. No 
clear indications can be found on this matter, but it could be opined that the community living in 
Palestine has a strong degree of international legitimacy that the people itself may feel they do not 
need to hold a referendum to demonstrate their will to become a State. Besides, their claim is already 
recognized to a certain extent. Furthermore, the avoidance of a territorial referendum may be a way 
to remain flexible in negotiating with the other party, instead of blocking the dialogue in the contest 
between statehood and non-statehood.813 By contrast, the argument on legal effects triggered by 
referenda is more convincing. It lies on a more solid legal basis than the argument that a referendum 
may per se legitimise secession. For instance, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination has stated that despite international law had not recognised a general right of peoples 
to unilaterally secede, the door could be open for a sort of consensual secession achieved “through 
arrangements reached by free agreements of all parties concerned”.814 In other words, it does not 
seem to be too pretentious to claim that if the secession of Crimea was conducted on the model of 
Scotland, or of Quebec, it would have been more defensible also from the point of view of 
international law. The legal argumentation cannot go further.  
The idea we have tried to convey is that a referendum has such a strong moral force that it is 
becoming more and more necessary for territorial changes and that it could trigger an obligation to 
negotiate a different settlement. Even without an explicit provision in the domestic legal order, the 
source of the obligation to start negotiations could be rooted in international law on the basis of 
practice and opinio juris. It is a long way, but practice is moving in that sense. This argument should 
not be misunderstood: from the beginning of the Chapter – when the difference between referenda 
and plebiscites was laid down- it was opined that not all referenda are the same. It was also mentioned 
																																								 																				
812 See Diergaardt Et Al. V. Namibia, Communication n. 760/1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1996 6 September 2000, 
Individual opinion by M. Scheinin “The right to political participation does not provide the citizens with a right to self-
determination”, para. 10.8. 
813 Of this view D. Scheindlin: “Phantom Referendums in Phantom States: Meaningless Farce or a Bridge to Reality?”, 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2012, vol. 18, p. 81.  
814 Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation n.21, UN. DOC A/51/18, 23 
August 1996 para. 6. 
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above that in order to become a necessary step for secession, the referendum has to be linked to the 
respect of other requirements. The cases referred to so far have considered only a free and fair 
territorial referendum. Therefore, it is now time to move to the analysis of the requirements of a free 
and fair territorial referendum. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Requirements for a free and fair territorial referendum…..and beyond 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The previous Chapter almost concluded the study on the interrelation between referenda and 
secession in international law. Whilst the research has found that there is no international rule 
according to which a referendum is sufficient, or necessary, for secession, it cannot but be observed 
that there is a trend in practice to resort to territorial referenda. In this framework, the position of the 
Canadian Supreme Court has been found particularly persuasive, when it states that the referendum 
in support of secession triggers the obligation of the parties to negotiate a new territorial settlement.815 
Although the obligation displayed in Reference Re Secession of Quebec is not yet established at the 
international level, the previous Chapter showed that there are many elements in support of the 
progressive consolidation of a rule in this direction. 
 So far the legal analysis has focused on the referendum as an instrument of secession, without 
any further detail about which type of territorial referendum could better serve the purposes of a 
seceding sub-unit. Only in the argument concerning Scotland it was held that the Scottish 
independence referendum could act as a model for compliance with international standards for 
territorial referenda. The procedural requirements issue dates back to the beginning of the previous 
Chapter, indeed. In light of the practice of the plebiscites set forth by the Versailles treaty, already in 
1919 Wambaugh drew a list of due requirements for an efficient plebiscite on the basis of popular 
consultations’ merits and pitfalls.816 The inquiry about the due standards of a territorial referendum 
is not marginal: whilst the result of a consultation is always likely to exacerbate conflicts, when 
properly organised it can be also a peaceful means to settle disputes.817   
 Moreover, the procedure used to organise and hold a referendum may influence the responses by 
the international community to the search for statehood by the seceding sub-unit. The ICJ itself in the 
opinion on Western Sahara did not refer to the expression of the will of the people in general, but to 
the “freely exercised will of the people”.818 It has to be clarified that not all the modalities of a 
referendum derive from binding international standards. Some may be better viewed as best practices. 
																																								 																				
815 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., paras. 152-153. 
816 See Chapter 3 at pp. 109-110. 
817 M. Qvortrup: “The Regulation of Ethnonational Referendums: A Comparative Overview”, in M. Qvortrup, 
Referendums and Ethnic Conflict,2014, Pennsylvania, pp. 125-126. 
818 ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, cit., recital 55 referring to the right to self-determination states that it “requires 
a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned”. 
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Overall, the existing international standards on territorial referendums can be considered “open-
textured”, because they are based on the practice of many countries. However, some core principles 
can be said to form part and parcel of international customary law. Preserving the empirical approach 
adopted so far, the Chapter will devolve special attention to the cases of Montenegro and Crimea, in 
which the debate about the standards for a referendum about secession arose prominently. As far as 
the October 2017 referendum in Catalonia is concerned, since this research is finalised in the 
immediate aftermath of the vote, at this stage a complete assessment of the referendum is not possible. 
For the study of the procedural standards it suffices to refer to what has been written in Chapter 3.819 
 The progressive consolidation of international standards is grounded in the combination between 
the practice of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and the reactions by the members of 
the international community. In this sense, the study of the procedural standards for a territorial 
referendum joints the inquiry about the reactions of the international community to secessions carried 
out via referenda. The compliance with standards for a free and fair referendum can shape the 
reactions of the international community, from recognition to non-recognition or condemn. For this 
purpose, reactions to the referendum in Crimea as well as to the shortcomings of the referendum in 
Catalonia will be mentioned. Hence, the Chapter will end with some remarks on international 
responses820 to a secession occurred through a referendum.  
 
2. Montenegro: acquiring statehood through a referendum 
One of the fairest procedures for secession was carried out for the change of status of Montenegro. 
The secession by Montenegro is rooted in the scheme set forth by the Constitution of the Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro.821 Nevertheless, in the path towards the independence of Montenegro, the 
domestic and international dimensions deeply interrelate. It was with Montenegro that the 
international community, through the European Union822 and the Council of Europe, started the 
debate on international standards concerning territorial referenda. The Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe and OSCE issued a series of opinions on the legislation in Montenegro which 
constitute the key reference for discerning the procedural standards for a referendum.823 
																																								 																				
819 See Chapter 3 at pp. 175-177. 
820 See Introduction at pp. 14-16. 
821 Charter of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 4 February 2003, Official English translation at 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=67383&p_count=96687 
822 It was held that the progress made by the parties towards the agreement on a federation can be ascribed to the perceived 
prospect of membership to the European Union (then Community). The Federation of Yugoslavia had a cooperation 
agreement with the EU, until its break up. The agreement was substituted in 2001 with the Association Agreement with 
the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. See Council of the European Union, Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, of the other part, 26 March 2001.  
823 Since the hypothesis of secession was enshrined by the Constitution of Montenegro, the case has more relevance for 
constitutional studies. However, in light of the intensive involvement of the international community in the definition of 
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Somehow interestingly, the history of the access to statehood of Montenegro started and ended 
with a referendum. In 1992, a referendum decided that Montenegro would be part of the Federation 
of Yugoslavia.824 In 2006, a referendum opened the way to the independence of the country, so that 
on 26 June 2006 Montenegro become a member of the UN.825 The socialist republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro converged in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the 1992 referendum. The 
Montenegrin separatists boycotted the consultation, thus the referendum left with many political 
instabilities. The relationship between Serbia and Montenegro was facilitated by the European Union, 
as coexistence was not easy with Montenegro trying to distantiate itself from central control. The EU 
promoted the adoption of the 2002 Belgrade Agreement826 which put the basis for the Constitution of 
the Federation between Serbia and Montenegro. As observed by Mancini, “ the Constitutional 
Charter of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro was adopted following the procedure stated in the 
1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, yet the process was not totally domestic 
because the EU promoted and monitored it”.827 The constitutional structure of the Federation partly 
resembled that of the Yugoslav Federation, because it included a right to secede for Serbia and 
Montenegro. In fact, art. 60 ruled that each party within a three-years period had the right to secede, 
provided that a referendum was held.828 In case of vote against secession, a second referendum could 
not be hold before three years from the previous one.829 Interestingly enough, the article expressly 
foresees the decision to secede by Montenegro when it refers to succession of international legal 
personality, thus confirming that the drafters of the Constitution already had in mind that the most 
likely to trigger art. 60 in order to leave the Union would have been Montenegro.830 
																																								 																				
the procedures to carry out the secession, the next pages will provide a focus on this specific aspect. For a comparative 
constitutional analysis of the use of referenda see S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of 
Republican Decision Making, Cambridge, 2012. 
824 S. Dormanovic: “Montenegro: A Miracle in the Balkans”, Journal of Democracy, 2007, vol. 18, pp. 152-153. 
825 United Nations, A/RES/60/264, dated 28 June 2006 upon request of the SC, S/RES/1691, 22 June 2006. 
826 The Agreement was signed by the President of the FRY and those of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro together 
with their respective Prime Ministers. The agreement fixed the main principles for structuring the relations between Serbia 
and Montenegro. Its main points relate to, inter alia, the drafting of the Constitutional Charter of the future Federal Union 
between Serbia and Montenegro and the entitlement to change status, vested in both Republics. See Agreement on 
Principles of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro within the State Union, 14 March 2002, Council of the European 
Union S0047/02. 
827 S. Mancini: “Secession and Self-Determination”, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, cit., 
p.492; see also S. Mancini “Ai Confini del Diritto: Una teoria Democratica sulla Secessione”, Percorsi Costituzionali, 
2014, vol. 3, pp. 623-637. 
828 The Constitution of Montenegro dated 1992 at art. 2 required that any change of frontiers shall be decided upon by 
citizens in a referendum. Besides, the Serbian Constitution at art. 4 established that “any change in the boundaries of the 
Republic of Serbia shall be decided upon by citizens in a referendum”. 
829 Constitutional Charter of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, cit., art. 60: “Upon the expiry of a 3-year period, 
member states shall have the right to initiate the proceedings for the change in its state status or for breaking away from 
the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. The decision on breaking away from the state union of Serbia and Montenegro 
shall be taken following a referendum. Should Montenegro break away from the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
the international instruments pertaining to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly UN SC Resolution 1244, 
would concern and apply in their entirety to Serbia as the successor”.  
830 J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., p. 169. 
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 Further regulation for the popular consultation was to be decided through domestic legislation 
and it is here that the international community stepped in. The involvement of international actors 
such as the OSCE, UE and the Venice Commission concerned both the inter-State level– notably the 
relationship with Serbia- and the enactment of domestic legislation to enable the organisation of the 
vote. The High Representative of the EU Solana witnessed the adoption of the 2005 agreement 
amending the Constitutional Charter whereby “the member state organising a referendum will 
cooperate with the EU on respecting international democratic standards”.831 Reference to 
international democratic standards is a sign of the impact of the subsequent developments of 
international law of statehood following the dissolution of the SFRY. The requirement confirms the 
progressive consolidation of the principle of democracy, but also marks the involvement of external 
actors in the making of the State of Montenegro. Quoting Sen, the legal framework for the 
Montenegrin referendum could be defined as an “eclectic mixture of various elements, from 
International law, federal and local constitutional laws and several legal provisions on a statutory 
level”.832    
2.1. The organisation of the referendum in Montenegro: between international and domestic 
law 
 
The tricky questions on the organisation of the referendum in Montenegro concerned (i) the 
legal effects flowing from the consultation and (ii) administrative issues such as the franchise and 
majority requirement. For the former, the Constitution was not clear about whether the referendum 
was a final vote on independence or it was necessary for the legislative body to confirm the result of 
the vote. The Constitutional Court in 2002 solved the question asserting that the referendum would 
have a final and binding nature. 833 At the other side of the spectrum, the franchise and the quorum 
became the long-standing issues for the referendum until the Law on the referendum on the State 
Legal Status was adopted by the Montenegrin Government on 1 March 2006.834 The drafting process 
saw the decisive involvement of EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe: in order to better understand 
																																								 																				
831 Amendments to the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 29 June 2005, cited by I. 
Gokhan Sen, Sovereignty Referendums, cit., p.122. 
832 I. Gokhan Sen, Sovereignty Referendums in International and Constitutional Law, cit., p. 131.  
833In fact, when Montenegro adopted the 2001 Law on referendum (see fn.835), the movement for the preservation of the 
State Union challenged the admissibility of the law in front of the Constitutional Court. The party argued that the law was 
not compliant with art. 119 of the Constitution, according to which, the argument continued, the positive vote of the 2/3 
of the Parliament was required to validate the decision of the referendum. The Constitutional Court dismissed the claim, 
on the ground that it was art. 2 which had to be considered the key legal basis for the referendum. Therefore, the 
referendum did not require the approval of the Parliament. See OSCE/ ODIHR, Referendum Observation Mission Final 
Report, 4 August 2006, p. 5. See Decision by the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, 17 March 2002, published in 
Official Gazette of Montenegro 14/2002. See K. Friis, “The Referendum in Montenegro: The EU’s Postmodern 
Diplomacy?”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2007, vol.12, p. 76. 
834 See OSCE/ODIHR, Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, cit., p.5. 
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the normative standards referred to by the international actors to help Montenegro in building the 
legal framework for the referendum, it is useful to tackle more in the depth the 2005 Opinion on the 
Compatibility of the legislation in Montenegro adopted by the Venice Commission –hereafter 
“Opinion on the Compatibility”.  
a) Focus: the Venice Commission Opinion  
 The Opinion on the Compatibility was issued upon the request of the Assembly of the Council 
of Europe. It tackles three major areas: 1) the level of participation to the vote; 2) the majority 
requirement and 3) criteria for eligibility to vote.835 
 Before turning to the substance, it merits mentioning here the methodology used in the Opinion 
on Compatibility. The Opinion is grounded on a balance stricken by the Commission between 
international practice and the specific circumstances of Serbia and Montenegro. It does so in light of 
the acknowledgment that there are no international binding standards, but rather good practices spread 
among the European countries. Through this methodology the Commission reaches two objectives: 
on the one side it gives a perusal of the practice of the members of the Council; on the other side it 
contributes to the consolidation of the common standards discerned from its comparative analysis. 
The proposal of a referendum is evaluated through compliance with (i) minimum standards of legality 
and good electoral practice and (ii) other standards – such as the neutrality of the area- that may 
impact on international reactions to referendum. The key consolidated standard is that of a free and 
fair territorial referendum held through democratic elections. All the conditions described in the 
Opinion ultimately serve to guarantee the respect of this standard. For instance, freedom of voters 
can be fulfilled if the question submitted to the electorate is clear, but also if the framework conditions 
for a free vote are satisfied. These amount to, inter alia, freedom of press, organisation of the 
referendum by an impartial electoral commission and insurance of the widest possible access to 
national and international observers.836   
Beginning with the level of participation, art. 37 of the 2001 Law on Referendum837 in 
Montenegro prescribed that “the decision in a referendum is taken by a majority vote of the citizens 
who have voted, provided that the majority of citizens with voting rights have voted”. In expressing 
its opinion on the issue, the Commission starts from the premise that there are no international binding 
standards concerning the minimum turnout. Comparative analysis of the legal provisions among the 
																																								 																				
835Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro concerning the 
organization of Referendums with Applicable International Standards (hereinafter Opinion on the Compatibility of the 
existing legislation in Montenegro), CDL-AD (2005)041, 19 December 2005. 
836 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro, cit., pp. 5-6. 
837 Law on referendum 19, February 2001, Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro no.9/01, English translation 
by OSCE/ODIHR available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2005)076-e 
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members of the Council of Europe has provided a varied panoramic, with only some States setting a 
minimum requirement.838 Thus, in principle there are no obstacles to the maintenance of the threshold 
established pursuant to art. 37 and the requirements set forth by the Law on Referendum are 
considered in conformity with existing practice. 839  
As regards the applicable majority, then, the Commission observes that neither the Constitution 
of Montenegro nor that of the State Union mentions this requirement. The comparative constitutional 
inquiry concerning the other members of the Council of Europe confirms that there is no established 
practice, because only a few states have a qualified majority. However, the Commission continues, 
“the most stringent rules should apply to self-determination referendums”.840 The Opinion upholds 
the ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court of Canada and recalls the Canadian Clarity Act841, which 
expressly refers to a qualified majority, albeit it does not mention it. On the basis of the 
aforementioned, the Opinion considers a minimum turnout of 50% to be compliant with the principle 
of democracy. Such a threshold is also recommended given the thorny relationship between Serbia 
and Montenegro.842  
The final decision to include also a super-majority threshold of 55%+1 was taken with the 
crucial push by the EU, which wanted the popular consultation to give a clear and uncontested 
result.843 However, the approach of the Commission to the majority requirement appears ambiguous 
to some extent.844 The comparative analysis mentioned above showed that a specific majority is not 
common among the member states. By contrast, the Commission is of the view that “the most 
stringent rules of majority should apply to self-determination referendums”, without mentioning a 
definite supporting point for its position. The Commission endorses the ratio decidendi of the 
Supreme Court of Canada to reaffirm that a higher threshold may be necessary,845 but  to further 
complicate the view, then it argues that a simple majority strengthen with a minimum turnout is not 
inconsistent with international law. All in all, the output to be reached seems to be that a negotiated 
																																								 																				
838 In particular, the Commission observes that 12 out of 48 members of the Council of Europe set a 50% minimum 
threshold, while the other countries display significant differences, with a turnout ranging from 25% to 50%. See, Venice 
Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro, cit., paras. 20-22. 
839 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro, cit., para. 27. 
840 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro, cit., para 33. 
841 Clarity Act, Bill C-20, 29 June 2000, art. 2(3) “In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by 
a clear majority of the population of a province that the province ceases to be part of Canada, the House of Commons 
should take into account the views of all political parties represented in the legislative assembly of a province whose 
government proposed the referendum on secession”. 
842 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro, cit., para. 27. 
843 S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Decision Making, cit., p.188; see also 
for an extensive overview of the relationship between the EU and the post-Yugoslav Republics B. Rodeljic, Europe and 
Post-Yugoslav Space, New York, 2016.  
844 A. Pakovic, P. Radan (eds.), On the way to statehood: Secession and Globalisation, 2008, Aldershot; Burlington; 
Ashgate, p. 142. 
845 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro, cit., para. 36. 
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solution among all the stakeholders – Serbia, Montenegro and including the EU- on the majority 
requirement is found, whatever this would be.846 In other words, the supposed ambiguity can be 
justified by the ultimate goal of the Commission, which was the holding of a referendum in a pacified 
and democratic framework. Moreover, the ambiguity was dismissed by the action of the EU. As said, 
the Union pushed for a double threshold, consisting in a super majority plus a required level for 
participation.847 For the super majority, the laws in Montenegro were not conclusive, because they 
prescribed only that a decision has to be taken by the majority of the people who vote. The 2006 law 
on the referendum incorporated international suggestions and provided that in order to become 
independent, the voter turnout should be 50%+1 of the electorate and the support for secession should 
be at least 55% +1 of those voting yes. 
The last issue of concern for the Commission was the criteria for the eligibility to vote. The 
normative framework used for the 1992 referendum was re-drafted through the guidance of the 
OSCE848 and adopted in 2001. Under the domestic law of Montenegro, citizens resident in Serbia do 
not have the right to vote in elections in Montenegro. Pursuant to art. 7 of the Constitutional Charter 
of the Union “a citizen of a member state shall also be a citizen of Serbia and Montenegro. A citizen 
of a member state shall have equal rights and duties in the other member state as its own citizen, 
except for the right to vote and be elected”. Therefore, there was no equality between the political 
rights of the Montenegrin citizens residing in Serbia and the Serbian citizens residing in Montenegro. 
The Commission observes that practice of federal states generally allows the exercise of political 
rights on the basis of the residence.849 However, although the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
is a single legal subject in international law, the Commission argues that de facto it functions as a 
confederation. Hence, it is not advisable to extend the franchise to the citizens living in Serbia, also 
in light of the fact that it is “ desirable to apply the same rules for the eligibility to vote in elections 
and referendum” with a view to make the Parliament “accountable to the same electorate as is taking 
the decision in the referendum”.850 
On 1 March 2006 the Montenegrin Government adopted the Special Law on the Referendum 
on the State Legal Status. The law regulated not only the levels of participation and the turnout, but 
also the establishment of administrative bodies, the financing and the rights of observer groups. The 
																																								 																				
846 Ibid., paras. 29;36.  
847 Ibid., para 62.  
848 Among the international organs involved in the process towards the secession of Montenegro, OCE was the first player 
in time. Its observers monitored the 1997presidential elections and the 1996 elections for the Parliament. The Montenegrin 
Government probably viewed the involvement of the OSCE as a shield against excessive control by Belgrade. In fact, the 
organisation was asked to retain an office in Podgorica. Together with its branch devoted to electoral matters (ODIHR) 
were requested to review and comment on the referendum law. 
849 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro, cit., para. 53. 
850 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro, cit., para. 57. 
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question référendaire included in art. 5 reads “Do you want the republic of Montenegro to be an 
independent State with full international and legal personality?”. The question is clear, requires a yes 
or no answer and presents the object of the consultation, notably independence. A three-tiered model 
was set for the administration of the referendum according to art. 7. At the national level, the Republic 
Referendum Commission supervised the process and was also tasked with the arbitration of disputes 
throughout the referendum process.851 At the local level, 21 municipal referendum commissions and 
polling boards were established. The result of these efforts was a turnout higher than 86% and a 
majority of 55,5% choosing independence.  
The referendum was found to be in line with international standards for democratic electoral 
processes by the OSCE and the Council of Europe. OSCE in particular welcomed the organisation, 
the conduct of the referendum, and confirmed that it “respected fundamental democratic rights” and 
“in general, met international standards for electoral processes that apply to the holding of 
referenda”.852    
b) Requirements and lessons learned from Montenegro  
The case of Montenegro has been viewed both as a model and as a precedent not to be replied. 
On the one side, many elements testify the success of the model. The referendum campaign was 
conducted peacefully and without obstacles, the electoral commissions efficiently worked. The 
question asked, in addition, was clear and precise. The Report of the Political Affairs Committee of 
the Council of Europe expressly called upon the member states to respect the result of the vote. It 
says “the decision (of independence) taken in a democratic manner has to be respected”.853 The 
European Union also welcomed the results, recalling that the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights had confirmed the legality and legitimacy of the vote with respect to 
international standards for democratic electoral processes.854 
 
On the other side, for the purposes of this research is interesting to mention one critique which 
concerns the double majority threshold. It suffices to mention that after the referendum the Assembly 
of the Council of Europe warned not to consider an established practice the majority threshold set for 
the vote in Montenegro.855 The Assembly highlighted that the case was a very peculiar one, in which 
the EU pressured for a 55% threshold “ in a clear political attempt to maintain the State Union”. It 
																																								 																				
851 K. Morrison, Montenegro, A Modern History, 2009, London, p. 205. 
852 OSCE/ODIHR, Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, 4 August 2006, p. 5. 
853 CoE, Report of the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe, 27 June 2006, art. 1. 
854 Council of the European Union, Presidency Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the Declaration of 
Independence by the Montenegrin Parliament, 3 June 2006, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-06-81_en.htm. 
855 CoE, Report of the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe, cit., art. 12. 
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can be inferred that the majority requirement was not seen positively by the other members of the 
international community. The choice was highly influenced by the EU, which made it for “ouvert 
political reasons and would have created a crisis if the result had been, for instance, 54% while 
normally the requirement should have been 50% +1”. Therefore, the threshold should not be 
considered a precedent for future referenda.856 Subsequent international practice in fact has followed 
this line: except for the super majority, the elements discussed in the case of Montenegro were later 
developed by the Venice Commission in the Code of Good Practice on Referendums. 
2.2.  Code of Good Practice on Referendums 
 The 2006 Code of Good Practice on Referendum (hereinafter the Code)857 has been grounded on 
the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.858 Together with the latter, the Code859 reflects the 
spread of democracy through Europe, thus the need to set some guidelines common to the members 
of the Council. One of the major merits of the Code is that the Venice Commission grasps the 
distinctive nature of referenda, if compared for instance with elections. Referenda are a sensitive 
issue, because they call upon a community to decide about fundamental questions involving public 
affairs. Committed to the respect of the rule of law, the Commission states that referenda can be 
organised if and only when they are provided for by the Constitution or a national statute, and when 
procedural rules are settled.860 In other words, the normative analysis seems to be tailored to the 
constitutional legal order. Hence, it could be inferred that once a referendum is grounded on a 
domestic norm, it is legitimate per se.  
 Against this assumption, it should be taken into account that the Code is not limited to the 
constitutional range: it is also concerned with international law perspectives. In the explanatory 
memorandum, the Commission conditions the legitimacy of the referendum to the respect of 
international law. It is clarified that “irrespective of what national law has to say about the 
relationship between international and domestic law, the substantial formulation of the question 
cannot contravene international law”.861 The position is not developed further, as the Code does not 
list the international rules at stake. Nevertheless, they can be inferred by the general scope and 
wording of the document. The Code enshrines the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law. For the purposes of the Code are, inter alia, to show best practices on referendum, the Venice 
Commission takes advantage of member states’ regulations to highlight a trend in international law 
																																								 																				
856 Ibid. 
857 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice on Referendum, 19 March 2007, CDL-AD(2007)008. 
858 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, CDL-AD (2002)23rev, 23 May 2003. 
859 For a trough account of the constitutional guidelines for a referendum see the 2001 Guidelines for Constitutional 
Referendums at National Level, 11 July 2001, COE DOC CDL-INF(2001)10. 
860 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice on Referendum, point I (3)(2)(b)(i) 
861 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice on Referendum, para. 33. 
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and give some suggestions. The fields touched upon in the Code can be grouped in three main 
thematic areas: 1) organisation and wording of the question; 2) eligibility and 3) monitoring of 
referenda.862 
 
 For the first group, the Commission stress that registration should be automatically managed by 
the government and if not, it needs to be open for a long period, guided by an administrative 
procedure. The consistency of the form goes hand by hand with the consistency of the content: the 
clarity of the question is crucial for guaranteeing freedom of opinion. A clear question cannot be 
misleading.863 This means that it has to present a clear option between a yes, no, or blank vote. 
Furthermore, according to the Venice Commission, there should be no exception to vote-counting 
rules, because they might disadvantage the minorities eligible to vote.  
 Eligibility to vote, then, has to be based on the residence. In the Code the Commission compares 
the practice of federal states and observes that some of them – such as Switzerland or Bosnia-
Herzegovina- acknowledge a double citizenship, notably the federal and the entity one. In these cases, 
however, political rights are exercised on the basis of residence. This confirms the validity of the 
residency requirement, but it is not tantamount to say that residency has to be established so far back 
in time such as the period of 24 months prescribed in the law of Montenegro. A reasonable period of 
time should not exceed 6 months.864 The identification of the eligible voters is one of the main points 
with a view to ensure a meaningful participation. Being the future of the sub-unit the subject of the 
referendum, Peters opines that tying the right to vote to residence is consistent with the main purpose 
of a territorial referendum.865 Overall, the residency principle is consolidated in international practice: 
it was used in the plebiscites in the aftermath of the First World War and during the UN-led popular 
consultations. Outside the UN framework, then, the principle was applied to the cases of Montenegro, 
Scotland and Canada. Recalling the analysis carried out in Chapter 2, it is contended that the principle 
of uti possidetis juris should guide the delimitation of the borders.866 Hence, the administrative 
borders of the sub-unit should be considered as the demarcation line for the enjoyment of the 
residency requirement. It could be argued that this model is not completely fair, because it does not 
																																								 																				
862 These fields have progressively begun the main clusters for the evaluation of a referendum. See in this sense the 
Compilation of the Venice Commission and Reports Concerning Referendums, 10 March 2017, CDL-PI (2017)001. 
863 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice on Referendum. para. 3.3.i.c. 
864 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice on Referendum, cit., para. 6. 
865 A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of 14 March 2014 as an abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., p. 
268. 
866 A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of 14 March 2014 as an abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., p. 
269; C. Navari: “Territoriality, self-determination and Crimea after Badinter”, International Affairs, 2014, vol. 90, pp. 
1299-1318; A. Tancredi: “In search of a Fair Balance between the Inviolability of Borders, Self-Determination and 
Secession in International Law”, in M. Nicolini, F. Palermo, E. Milano (eds.), Law, Territory and Conflict Resolution: 
Law as a Problem and Law as a Solution, Leiden, 2016, pp. 90-104 
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involve the whole country’s population. By contrast, the creation of the canton Jura in Switzerland 
involved all the country progressively.867 However, the example remains an unicuum in the 
international arena.  
 Further, the Commission estimates the supervision by an impartial body as an asset for ensuring 
a free and fair referendum. The body should be permanent in nature, tasked with the duty to organise 
the referendum.868 In this framework, external actors should be involved only in “referendum 
observation exercise”.869 Electoral observance should be guaranteed by national and international 
observers, who should be given the widest opportunity to monitor the organisation of the referendum 
as well. Controlling the phases prior to the referendum in fact can prevent complaints against the 
legality of the vote and reinforces the legitimacy of the consultation.870 
 
 The Code also looks at the effects of the referendum, that depend on its binding or consultative 
nature. The Commission maintains that when a referendum is legally binding, “for a certain period 
of time, a text that has been rejected in a referendum may not be adopted by a procedure without 
referendum”.871 Regrettably, the Commission does not enter into the details of the international 
relevance of the vote, so that it is not clear whether the recommendation not to review the text within 
a certain period of time flows from a comparative constitutional analysis only, or it is also grounded 
on some general international law principles. Arguably, the Commission fails to get into the details 
of the argumentation about the consolidated standards in international law. 872 However, it has to 
recalled that in this field, which lies at the intersection between national and international law, 
comparative constitutional analysis can be an authoritative basis for discerning international 
tendencies. Moreover, the authority of the standards has been confirmed by the role of the Venice 
Commission in the crisis in Crimea. The opinion of the Venice Commission about the compatibility 
of the referendum in Crimea with international standards has been supported by the international 
																																								 																				
867 The creation of the Swiss canton Jura followed a bottom-up model, with a procedure of subsequent referenda. Firstly, 
the residents of the future canton Jura were called to vote. Then, a series of referenda were organized in the neighboring 
areas and lastly the entire Swiss population was called to vote. Arguably, the procedure enjoys a high degree of fairness 
and is an exemplary exercise of democracy. However, it has to be born in mind that it has not been replied anywhere. See 
W. Linder, Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies, New-York, 2010, pp. 72-76; P. 
Boillat, Jura: naissance d’un Etat. Aux sources du droit et des institutions jurassiennes, 1989, Lausanne. 
868 Ibid. at para. 3.3.2. 
869 Ibid. at 3.2. 
870 Ibid., at para. i.3.2.a.xiii. 
871 Ibid., at para., 5(a). 
872 For a critique of the value and compelling nature of the requirements elaborated by the Venice Commission see C. 
Santulli: “La Crise Ukrainienne: Position du Problem”, Revue General de Droit International Public, 2014, vol. 118, pp. 
799-820. 
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community,873 thus supporting the acknowledgment of the requirements for a free and fair referendum 
elaborated by the Venice Commission. Germany, for instance, expressed support for the conclusions 
of the Commission even before the opinion was officially released.874 Moreover, the acknowledgment 
of the role of the Commission and of the OSCE with respect to standards for a free and fair territorial 
referendum has been remarked also in March 2017 by the representative of the Delegation of Ukraine 
to the OSCE, who argued that the popular consultation in Crimea “ fell short of democratic standards 
established by the OSCE and the Council of Europe”.875 Therefore, it is now time to get into the 
details of the procedural requirements of the March 2014 referendum in Crimea. 
3. Procedural standards of the Referendum in Crimea 
As it was briefly introduced in Chapter 3, the referendum held in Crimea has been regarded by 
the majority of the members of the international community as null and void. A prominent role is 
played by reasons of violation of the Constitution and respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, 
as well as of international standards for conducting referenda.876 In fact, the referendum has given 
new momentum to the debate over the legitimate standards for a referendum on territorial changes. 
Like in the case of Montenegro, the most interesting academic insights can be gathered from practice 
of the Venice Commission.  
The referendum in Crimea was embedded with a whole series of problems concerning the 
question, the final date of the consultation and the relationship with Ukraine, all of which are tackled 
in the “Opinion on whether the decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea in Ukraine to organise a referendum on becoming a constituent territory of the Russian 
Federation or restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is compatible with Constitutional Principles” –
hereinafter the Opinion.877 Although in the Opinion the imminent referendum is contextualised from 
																																								 																				
873 Only a handful of States have accepted the outcome of the referendum in Crimea: Afghanistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, and North Korea. See M. Fabry: “How to Uphold the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”, German 
Law Journal, 2015, vol.  16, p. 419. 
874 S. Seibert, German government spokesperson,  labelled the referendum illegal and said that it corresponded “largely 
to a draft report of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission”, 17 March 2014, 
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supporting the role of the Venice Commission in delineating binding international standards for free and fair territorial 
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p. 318.  
875 OSCE, Address by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 1137th meeting of the Permanent Council, 17 March 2017, Doc. 
PC.DEL/358/17, http://www.osce.org/permanent-council/307196?download=true. 
876 See Chapter 3 at pp. 181-184.  
877 Venice Commission, Opinion on Whether the Decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea in Ukraine to Organise a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territory of the Russian Federation or 
198 
 
the perspective of European constitutional principles, the Commission extensively relies on 
international standards developed in the Opinion on the compatibility of the existing legislation in 
Montenegro and later in the Code of Good Practice to assess the legitimacy of the scheduled 
referendum. 
3.1 The Venice Commission and the referendum in Crimea: further consolidation of 
international standards 
 
The Opinion condemns the absence of any clear legal basis for the referendum. The unilateral 
referendum was organised outside of the framework of Ukraine’s law:878 n the second Chapter it was 
observed that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea enjoyed autonomy only within the borders of the 
Ukrainian Constitutional order.879 Whilst the Autonomous Republic is empowered to hold local 
referenda,880 the subject matter of the popular consultation cannot contradict the Constitution of the 
parent State. Since art. 134 of the Constitution of Ukraine enshrines the indivisibility of the country 
and states “ Crimea is an indivisible part of Ukraine”, the referendum about secession was in manifest 
violation of the constitutional order.881 
Secondly, the Commission states that the question was ill framed. As argued in the Code of 
Good Practice, international practice corroborates the view that in order to be valid the referendum 
has to be based on a clear question.882 It is useful to recall the wording of the referendum held in 
Crimea, which was the following "1) Do you support the reunification of the Crimea with Russia as 
a subject of the Russian Federation? 2) Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Crimea as of 1992 and the status of the Crimea as a part of Ukraine?".883 The two options 
appeared as alternatives, that is to say that voters were not asked to say yes or no to each question. 
Their choice was between two alternatives. Moreover, not only the people of Crimea had no 
possibility to choose to maintain the Constitution in force in March 2014, but the wording in this 
sense was misleading. The second option put to voters was concerned with the 1992 Constitution, but 
the reference was general. Since the text was amended in 1992 to strengthen the ties of the 
Autonomous Republic with Ukraine, the definite meaning of the second question cannot be 
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878 Venice Commission, Opinion on the referendum in Crimea, cit., para. 21-22. 
879 See Chapter 2 at pp. 87-88. 
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881 Venice Commission, Opinion on the referendum in Crimea, paras. 7-8. 
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detached.884 On these grounds, the Commission concludes that the question was not worded 
neutrally.885 
Thirdly, the framework conditions for the organisation of the referendum were also lacking. 
The Commission upheld the Opinion adopted for the referendum in Montenegro, where it asked the 
authorities organising a referendum to implement art. 25 ICCPR as well as art.3 of the First protocol 
to the ECHR, on the basis of which every citizen shall have the right to vote and be elected in free 
and periodic elections.886 Hence, the authorities in Crimea were required to provide objective 
information, both through media coverage and funding. 887 With a view to guarantee an informed, 
democratic deliberation, there should be a period of campaign silence, arguably longer than the ten 
days occurred in the case of Crimea.888 The steps undertaken by the central authorities in Crimea did 
not ensure freedom of expression and informed deliberation. In particular, the neutrality of the 
government was tainted by the fact that three days before the referendum the Parliament of Crimea 
had declared independence.889 Moreover, while the pro-secession campaign was supported, 
manifestations against the separation from Ukraine were obstructed by the government of Crimea.890 
In addition, the area was not pacified given the support by Russian servicemen to the Crimean 
authorities organising the referendum. Unsurprisingly therefore, international observers from OSCE 
refused to observe the referendum, in light of its flagrant violations of the constitutional framework 
of Ukraine.891  
Lastly, the Commission recalls that no negotiation took place before the declaration of 
independence of Crimea was issued.892 As noted in the Opinion on Montenegro, the subject matter of 
																																								 																				
884 Venice Commission Opinion on the referendum in Crimea, cit., para. 21; J. Vidmar: “The annexation of Crimea and 
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of territorial status under international law”, cit. 
889 Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Crimean Supreme Council 
and Sevastopol City Council, 11 March 2014, see press release https://www.rt.com/news/crimea-parliament-
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Declaration of Independence”, 18 March 2014, EJIL:Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-declaration-of-
independence/. Another proof of the biased position of the authorities in Crimea can be found in the declarations by the 
chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic Konstantinov, saying that “Crimea Will Not Return In the 
Ukraine”, See State Council of the Republic of Crimea, Press Release, 11 March 2014, www.rada.crimea.ua.  
890 See on this point A. Catala: “Secession and Annexation: the Case of Crimea”, German Law Journal, 2015 vol.16, pp. 
581-607; A. Pronin: “Republic of Crimea: A two-day State”, cit., pp. 133-142; S: van Der Driest: “Crimea’s Separation 
from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) Secession in International Law”, cit., pp. 
329–363. 
891 A. Peters: “The Crimean Vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, C. Callies, 
Staat und Staat und Mensch im Kontext des Völker- und Europarechts. Liber Amicorum für Torsten Stein Baden Baden, 
2015, p. 277-279.  
892 Venice Commission, Opinion on the referendum in Crimea, cit., para. 26. 
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the referendum is of such importance that the Commission would require likewise important for the 
parties to embark on meaningful negotiations.893 In fact, the Opinion reads: “the Venice Commission 
can only note that no negotiations aimed at a consensual solution took place before the referendum 
was called”.894 This, also in light of the multi-ethnic composition of the population of Crimea.  
The position of the Venice Commission brings back to the table the general requirement of 
negotiations discussed in the previous Chapter. In particular, the wording used in the Opinion 
advances a model of negotiated secession such as that adopted between Scotland and the UK, 
characterised by an agreement establishing the organisation of a referendum. Arguably, the 
Commission seems to adopt a procedural point of view:  secession is not considered outlaw per se, 
the emphasis being put on the modalities through which it is carried out. This position can be 
interpreted as an endorsement of Reference Re Secession of Quebec and adds credit to the conclusions 
reached in the previous Chapter about the consolidation of an obligation to negotiate a new territorial 
settlement. It is in light of this findings that the case of Crimea becomes an asset for the research at 
stake. Arguably, the referendum held in Crimea has a double role: on the one side, it consolidates the 
practice of sub-units within States holding referenda to secede. On the other side, the fact that the 
international community had contested the manner in which the referendum was organised, allows us 
to safely conclude that there are consolidated requirements for holding a referendum.895 
Nevertheless, what runs against the use of the example of Crimea as a supporting point is the 
subject matter of the referendum, combined with the role of the Russian Federation.896 The legal 
analysis conducted so far has already hinted at affirming that the territorial acquisition by the Russian 
Federation was conducted with the use of force and masked with democratic decision-making 
arguments.897 Hence, alongside the violation of the standards for a free and fair referendum, it is 
above all the use of force by a third party which tainted the validity of the vote.898 There remains an 
open question concerning what would have happened if Crimea had hold a referendum to become 
independent instead of joining the Russian Federation. According to Tancredi's theory of normative 
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due process, the main international law guidelines for secession concern a) the prohibition of the use 
of force; b) the respect of uti possidetis juris and c) the use of territorial referenda. If these due 
requirements are not respected – like in the case at stake- there arise for the model an obligation upon 
the members of the international community not to recognise the newly born entity, even though the 
sub-unit has successfully seceded.899 Following the model, it would be reasonable to expect that the 
international community has not accepted the new claim of title by the people of Crimea - and further 
by the Russian Federation- and has avoided any action implying the legitimisation of this claim. By 
contrast, which is the status of Crimea three years after the referendum? Few countries have officially 
acknowledged the incorporation of Crimea in the Russian Federation,900 but in practice since 2014 it 
has been part of Russia. The current situation opens the door to the considerations about one of the 
thorny questions of international law: recognition.  
4. Between intervention and recognition 
  Although the subject matter of the thesis has been fully explored, a comprehensive analysis 
requires the author to have a look at the aftermath. For the subject matter of the research, this means 
reviewing what happens after a seceding referendum has been carried out. As it was explained in the 
Introduction, researching about whether according to international law referenda are a necessary 
condition for secession implies to focus on international reactions to seceding referenda. In the 
following pages the analysis will be narrowed to the reappraisal of the reactions in the cases already 
tackled, together with some other contested attempts to secede such as Abkhazia, South-Ossetia and 
Transnistria. In all the three examples, referenda were coupled with intervention by a third party. For 
legal scholars, the fact that the third party was the Russian Federation is of less importance, albeit this 
practice has alimented some worthy contribution to comparative studies of international law.901 Much 
more interesting, instead, is the reaction of the international community to such referenda carried out 
in territories which see the presence of a third party. As mentioned above, the shortcomings of Crimea 
highlight how much confusion lies in the application of international law to territorial changes. The 
legal order is filled with many grey areas. As a result, non recognition by the international community 
was frequently grounded on the violation of peremptory norms and the lack of effectiveness 
																																								 																				
899 A. Tancredi: “A Normative Due Process in the Creation of States through Secession”, M.G. Kohen (ed.), Secession. 
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See http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_why_non_recognition_matters_in_crimea6043 
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supporting the new entity. Thus, referenda had a very limited impact. Indeed, the analysis of the 
Crimean case showed that the interaction between the principle of territorial integrity, prohibition of 
the use of force, unilateral declarations of independence and territorial referenda is complex and so 
far it has not left space for clear-cut answers. Hence, the following section will begin with a brief 
account of the theories of recognition and will then proceed with the analysis of recognition of 
referenda carried out (i) with the use of force by an external actor and (ii) in well-established 
democracies through pacific means.  
4.1 Theories of recognition 
 The acquisition of legal personality in international law raises contrastive reactions, but 
mainstream legal scholarship considers that an entity can claim to be a State provided that it satisfies 
all the requirements set forth by the Montevideo Convention.902 According to the Convention, the 
requirements are the following: a) a well-defined territory; b) a population; c) an effective government 
and d) capacity to enter into international relations. The first three elements together constitute the 
effectiveness test which is particularly difficult to overcome, because it requires the State to possess 
a defined population, territory and an effective government. For the latter in particular, having an 
effective government implies being able to exercise control over the territory, without the assistance 
of any other third party, be it the former parent State or a foreign power.903  
 In this framework, the Montevideo Convention assigns to recognition no substantial role. In other 
words, recognition has no impact on the existence of the State as a legal entity in international law. 
In literature, this position has been called declaratory theory.904 The main postulate of the declaratory 
theory is that recognition is no more than a political declaration having no bearing on the subsistence 
of a legal entitlement to statehood. By contrast, the international community – especially in its early 
stages- acknowledged recognition as constitutive of the legal personality of the State. To a certain 
extent, mainstream legal scholarship still discusses the existence of at least some constitutive effects 
																																								 																				
902 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed on 26 December 1933, entered into force on 26 
December 1934, reprinted in The American Journal of International Law (Supplement), 1934, vol. 28, p. 75 ff. 
903 D. Raić, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, cit., pp. 53-83; T. Christakis: “The State as a ‘Primary Fact’: 
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of recognition.905 Arguably, the Montevideo Convention assigns to diplomatic relations a place 
among the requirements for statehood, thus it becomes important to determine on the basis of which 
criteria one State decides to enter into relations with another. Even if recognition is under-valued to 
a declaration – the argument continues- recognition has been used by States as one among the means 
to respond to changes in the world public order.906 Therefore, it seems that there is still some argument 
for the constitutive theory, albeit the declaratory one prevails. The clash between the declaratory and 
constitutive theory has never lost its appeal, due to the challenges arising from the globalisation 
process and the development of other criteria for awarding recognition to a State, such as the respect 
for human rights and democracy.  
 The turning point in this sense was represented by the subsequent developments of the war in 
Yugoslavia. A major shift in the practice of recognition is represented by the EC Guidelines on 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.907 The document sets out some 
additional criteria for recognition, notably respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy. 
It has been held that in so doing, the international community would be acting as a “regulator of self-
determination claims”.908 Following this argument, on the basis of the practice of Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, it could be maintained that recognition was to a certain extent constitutive of the 
legal personality of the State. However, the analysis of the EC Guidelines in its entirety disproves the 
argument, and supports the view that the Guidelines on Recognition did not overturn the international 
set of rules about recognition. Were the Guidelines perceived as a tool to influence the first steps of 
an emerging State? Or were they only deemed to guide the development of diplomatic relations? The 
second option is more convincing. The Guidelines address “these new States” emerging from the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and USSR. Moreover, the signatories affirm that “these new States […] 
have constituted themselves […]”. Accordingly, the term State is not a chance definition. Rather, it 
implies that for the international community these new entities were already states, whilst the EC 
Guidelines were a condition for establishing diplomatic relations.909 This is not tantamount to say that 
the position in support of a constitutive value of recognition is totally unpersuasive. Indeed, quoting 
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Shaw, in the case of SFRY “the dividing line between recognition and the criteria for statehood is 
blurred”.910  
 With a view to frame this debate in the narrow context of the interaction between secession and 
referenda, the study takes again the stand from Reference re Secession of Quebec. The Supreme Court 
of Canada correctly approached the issue of recognition pragmatically. The Court argued that “the 
ultimate success of […] a unilateral secession would be dependent on recognition by the international 
community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, 
amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold 
recognition”.911 The Court stressed that success in acquiring statehood depends on two kinds of 
recognition (i) recognition by the parent State and (ii) by the international community. It would be 
too far-fetched to claim that for the Court recognition is constitutive of the international personality 
of a State to be. Above all, in light of the aside “…the conduct of Quebec and Canada”, the parent 
State and negotiations are assigned a cardinal role for the success of an attempt to secede. That of the 
Court is, rather, a pragmatic interpretation of the extent and limits of the international legal order. 
The rationale underpinning the opinion seems to lie in the belief that the recognition of a unilateral 
secession not only expresses a political standpoint, but also supports the decision of the entity, 
somehow implicitly justifying its claim also in light of international law.912  
 Interestingly enough, the approach of the Court has not remained isolated. Alongside 
international relations’ scholarship913 -which has at various times underlined that in a interdependent 
world recognition has practical effects- international legal bodies have also supported the 
argumentation of the Supreme Court of Canada. For instance, the International Independent Fact-
finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia914 (hereinafter the Fact-finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia) seems to have embraced the same position when it maintains that  “even if recognition has 
only a declaratory value, the recognition of an entity as a State by other states can give a certain 
evidence of its legal status as a state, although this presumption can be refuted on the basis of 
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facts”.915 In this complex interaction between declaratory and constitutive aspects of recognition, the 
referendum may play a crucial role in the “the legality and legitimacy of the secession” as expressed 
in Reference Re Secession of Quebec, because it is one of the most important examples  the free 
expression of the will of the people. As it was explained in the previous Chapter, however, the use of 
this tool may be only the object of a procedural obligation and trigger the duty of the parties to 
negotiate a new territorial settlement. Therefore, the legitimacy of secession may be enhanced by the 
referendum against the opposition of the parent State, without touching upon the law on recognition 
of statehood and principle of effectiveness. In Reference Re Secession of Quebec the Court 
acknowledged the influence of the principle of democracy to international law, especially due to the 
role of the EU.916 However, although in principle the democratic statehood917 argument is convincing, 
when used to support the incidence of a referendum in the claim for secession it offers little by way 
of a conclusive response, as it can be inferred from reactions to the use of this tool. 
4.2 International responses to territorial referenda 
As said in the introduction to this section, conclusions about recognition of entities which have 
successfully unilaterally seceded after a referendum cannot be drawn because there is neither 
sufficient nor consistent practice to support a sound position. However, States’ declarations and 
practice suggest two main kinds of approach. On the one side, when referendum is carried as a cover 
for other violations of international law, legal discourse on recognition is centred on the violation of 
the territorial integrity of the parent State and, at most, of the procedural requirements used to call the 
popular consultation. On the other side, when the referendum is held in well-established democracies, 
in a pacified context, it can be argued that the international community steps aside the dispute. The 
domestic nature of the seceding claim is emphasised, especially the need for the seceding unit and 
the parent State to negotiate a new territorial settlement encompassing, for instance, the increase of 
autonomous powers of the sub-unit with a view to avoid separation. 
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a) Third party intervention  
Many examples of referenda carried as a cover for other violations of international law, such as 
the use of military or paramilitary forces by a third party intervening can be found in the Caucasus 
region and in the State of Moldova. Practice of non-recognition in the cases of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia,918 Transnistria,919 or Crimea, is often compounded by non-recognition of a situation created 
in violation of international law, as well as by the lack of factual independence. The fact that a 
referendum was used in these cases with a view to secure secession through the expression of the will 
of the people, stands behind the scenes. The heavy dependence on a single external patron has been 
a solid ground not to recognise.920 In other words, non-recognition has been evaluated against the 
benchmark of effectivitè and the respect of the Montevideo criteria. For instance, Abkhazia’s 
closeness to the Russian Federation favours the prospect of a future absorption921 and is seen 
suspiciously by the community of States.  
Anyway, the quest for secession via referendum by the above-mentioned units cannot be over-
simplified. Despite being highly dependent on an external actor, the entities’ attempt to build 
democratic institutions is a sign of the importance gathered by concepts of democratic statehood in 
the international legal order.922 Otherwise, unrecognised entities could try to increase their 
effectiveness only through the use of military power to gain effective control in their territory. In this 
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921 See in fact the declaration by President Putin in 2008, reported by the International Crisis group, saying “Abkhazia 
only needs to be recognised by Russia”; International Crisis Group, Abkhazia. Deepening Independence, 26 February 
2010, p.11. 
922 N. Caspersen: “Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus”, Survival, 2008, vol. 50, pp. 113-136  
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framework, it can be argued that organising a referendum is the first step of the strategy pursuant to 
which the entities try to increase their chances to be recognised, by using the tools typical of modern 
democratic systems. The further step is unsurprisingly the building up of democratic institutions.923  
In fact, these same arguments have been used also by the Russian Federation to justify 
recognition. In the declarations of recognition concerning South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, secession is 
considered in compliance with “the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the 
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations […] equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.924 
Additional reference to “a government representing the whole population belonging to the territory” 
sounds like the revival of the remedial right theory. Overall, the main arguments adduced by the 
Russian Federation to justify the support to the nascent entities have been (i) the application of the 
remedial right theory; (ii) the right to self-determination and (iii) the protection of nationals abroad. 
For the latter, Russia in particular held that Russian citizens in Georgia were victims of genocidal 
policies during the 1989-1992 conflict.925 The idea that the State of nationality intervenes to protect 
its citizens residing abroad is a powerful one, albeit is grounded more in practice than in international 
law.926 However, the review of the facts elaborated by the Fact-finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia highlighted that although Abkhazia’s right to internal self-determination was repeatedly 
frustrated in the years following Georgia’s independence, the denial of fundamental rights was not as 
such as to justify a claim to remedial secession.927 Moreover, Russian approaches to the remedial 
secession theory are difficult to disclose. Despite the historical opposition to the exercise of external 
self-determination outside the colonial contest,928 the argument put forward for remedial secession 
																																								 																				
923 Ibid. 
924See the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 August 2008, at: 
<http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/ff61e0682d1506e1c3257523003f9dd 
6?OpenDocument  
925 See for instance the 2008 statement by Russian President Medvedev: “the actions of the Georgian side cannot be 
called anything other than genocide” in Kommersant Online, SKP RF Opened a Criminal Investigation into the Killings 
of Russian Citizens in South Ossetia, August 14, 2008, 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1011523&ThemesID=301; A.K. Niedermaier, Countdown to War in 
Georgia, Minneapolis, 2008, p. 497. See for a complete account Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia, Report, vol. II, cit., pp. 421-428.  
926The international legal basis for the use of force purported at the protection of nationals abroad remains controversial. 
Such typologies of armed activities have been justified as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force or as a form 
of self-defense. In both cases, although the legal contours of the norm are not defined, following the rules about self-
defense it can be held that the use of force aimed at the protection of nationals abroad has to be proportionate to the 
violations witnessed by nationals abroad. See on this line T. Frank, Recourse to Force, State actions against threats and 
armed attacks, 2002, Cambridge, p. 96. See also for a critic of the alleged policy of distribution of passports in the 
neighboring communities by the Russian Federation P. Spiro: “Russia’s Citizenship Power-play in Ukraine is Pretty 
Weak”, OpinioJuris Blog, 7 March 2014 http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/07/russias-citizenship-power-play-ukraine-pretty-
weak/. 
927 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, vol. II, cit., p. 146 f. 
928 See the judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court on Tatarstan, 13 March 1992, where the Court argued that the 
principle of self-determination finds a limit in the protection of territorial integrity. Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation, Gazette of the Congress of the Peoples’ Deputies of the RSFSR and the Supreme RSFSR, 1992, n.13, 
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was that there can be limited exceptional cases for its application, notably when the life of the people 
is seriously put at risk.929 As a result, the international legal order should not oppose the claim to 
secede by sub-units witnessing abuses from the parent State. In any case, for Abkhazia and South-
Ossetia, the position is rebutted by the Report of the Fact-finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 
revealing no substantial deprivation of the right to self-determination to the degree required to trigger 
the right to remedial secession.930 This element, coupled with the fact that both Abkhazia and South-
Ossetia enjoyed substantial autonomy within Georgia, makes the remedial secession theory not 
applicable.  
 
It can be easily inferred that in this framework the choice to use a referendum to support the 
claim for independence has a very little importance. The marginal role assigned to the referendum 
can be explained also by looking at the questions référendaires. The wording in fact sheds some light 
over the ties with an external patron State. For instance, the seceding referendum in South Ossetia 
asked the voters the following questions, “Do you agree that South-Ossetia should be an independent 
State? And 2) do you agree with resolution of 1 September 1991 adopted by the Supreme Soviet of 
Independent South-Ossetia, about remaining with Russia?”. Likewise, the further referendum held in 
2006 read “Should the Republic of South Ossetia retain its current status as independent State, and 
be recognised by the International Community?”.931 In Transnistria, the referendum organised on 17 
September 2006 asked the voters “1) Do you support the independence of the Moldovan Republic of 
Transnistria and the consequent free union of Transnistria with the Russian Federation? 2) Do you 
consider it possible to deny the independence of the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria with 
consequent integration of Transnistria into Moldova?”. The 2008 declaration by the Russian Foreign 
Affairs’ Ministry, recalls that referenda “in recognised democratic states [are recognised] as an 
important legal basis for building civil society” , but seems revealing of the opportunistic use of the 
democratic argument.932  
																																								 																				
translated in Statutes and Decisions: the Laws of the USSR and its successor States, 1994vol. 30, pp. 32-34. See also N. 
Ronzitti, Introduzione al Diritto Internazionale, 2016, p. 236. 
929 This would be the case of violations flowing from the adoption of genocidal policies, such as those attributed to Georgia 
by the Russian Federation to justify the intervention in South-Ossetia and Abkhazia. See, Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, vol. II, cit., p. 27; 144-149. 
930 I. Kotchach: “Self-Determination, Secession, and Sovereignty: South Ossetia’s Claim to Right to External Self-
Determination”, Journal of International Relations, 2010, vol. 12, p.126. 
931 C. Filippini: “Constitutions and Territorial Claims: lessons from the Former Soviet Space”, M. Nicolini, F. Palermo, 
E. Milano (eds.), Law, Territory and Conflict Resolution: Law as a Problem and Law as a Solution, Leiden, 2016, p. 180. 
In the case of Abkhazia, instead, a referendum concerning independence asked the voters whether they wanted to preserve 
the Constitution in force, and was followed by the adoption of the State Act on State Independence of the Republic of 
Abkhazia dated 12 October 1999. See J. O’ Louglhin at al.: “Inside Abkhazia: Survey of Attitudes on a De facto State”, 
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2011, vol. 27, pp. 1-36. 
932 Statement by Russian Minister Lavrov in September 2006 speaking about the incoming referendum in Transnistria, 
available at http://www.rferl.org/a/1071331.html 
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Most public reactions to the Russian assertions in fact were markedly negative. International 
organisations and States have found these referenda unpersuasive and not legally binding. Before the 
2006 referendum by Transnistria, the head of OSCE mission to Moldova declared that “the OSCE 
will not recognise this referendum […] which calls into question the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, […]  particularly when you consider the suggestive character 
of the question”.933 Along the same line, the spokesman of the EU affirmed that the referendum will 
not be recognised and will not have international validity.934 The results of the referendum were 
ignored by the international community, whose main response was the push toward a dialogue 
between the parties.  
In all the three cases, confidence building between the parent State and the separatists unit is 
difficult. As far as Moldova is concerned, the mediation process involving Transnistria, Moldova, 
OSCE, Russia, Ukraine plus the EU and the USA as observers (the so called 5+2 process) has not 
reached conclusive results so far. The insistence of the international community for a solution based 
on more autonomy for Transnistria- for instance on the basis status of Gagauzia -  has never been 
really accepted by Moldovan authorities. However, the 2017 Austrian OSCE Chairperson-in-Office 
has put the Transnistrian issue among his priorities935 and the fact that Moldova has signed on July 
2016 the Association Agreement with the EU – which pushes for “ a common internal vision on the 
settlement process”936 could help reaching a solution.  
For Georgia, on the part of the parent State, opposition to the quest for secession seems to be 
linked to a variety of reasons involving not only territorial integrity. While in the case of Abkhazia 
there is an argument as to the ethnic makeup of the region, for South-Ossetia opposition to secession 
appears to be “shaped by the acute sense of insecurity arising from a Russian military presence in a 
territory that cuts right into the heart of Georgia and threatens the capital city Tblisi”.937 
																																								 																				
933 Statement by K. De Gucht, 20 July 2006, http://www.osce.org/cio/47534. 
934 Yearbook of the United Nations, 2006, vol. 60, pp.485-486. The attitude of the international organisations towards the 
nascent entities is best described by the expression “status neutrality”, used by the OSCE Network of Think Thanks and 
Academic Institutions in the report The Future of OSCE, December 2014, p. 12. The term means that the action of the 
international organisation – i.e. in the conduct of negotiations- does not preclude any outcome as regards the final status 
of the territory at stake. However, the territorial integrity of the parent state is given primary protection. While the 
approach is functional to the normalisation of the dialogue between the separatists and the central government – given 
the high casualties involving civilians- the neutral position can be considered the expression of the belief by the 
international community that the issue is a domestic one. See for instance the Statement by the President of the Security 
Council: “a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, including on the political status of Abkhazia, respecting 
fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia”, 2 December 1994, UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/78.  
935OSCE Press Release “Transdniestrian Settlement Process a priority for Austrian Chairmanship in 2017”, 6 February 
2017, http://www.osce.org/cio/297981. 
936 Council of the Union, Joint statement following the third Association Council meeting between the European Union 
and the Republic of Moldova, 31 March 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/31-
statement-eu-moldova/. 
937 J.K. Linsday: “States’ responses to secession”, Peacebuilding Journal, 2014, vol. 2, pp. 28-44. 
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Notwithstanding  the Sochi Agreement of 1992,938 aimed at favouring a shared solution by means of 
internal self-determination and greater autonomy to the region within the borders of Georgia, the 
parties have been unable to agree on a common plan so far. 939 On the one side, the Georgian 
government has failed to answer to the requests of the separatist entities, because too often it has used 
the force instead of engaging into negotiations. This way, the conflict has been exacerbated. On the 
other side, Abkhazia and South Ossetia never had a positive approach towards negotiations, 
interpreting the role of the UN with suspicion, given the expressed predilection by the organisation 
for the preservation of Georgia’s territorial integrity.940 
 
b)  Reactions to seceding referenda in well-established democracies 
	
Recognition of a sub-unit which has resorted to a referendum to secede from a democratic 
parent State – which often guarantees some forms of autonomy to its sub-units- is all the more 
difficult. Even assuming that the impact of the Montevideo requirements in legal discourse is 
diminishing, that is not tantamount to state that modern criteria of human rights and respect for the 
principle of democracy have outclassed the traditional criteria.941 This is demonstrated by the 
responses of the members of the international community, who usually leave the issue in the hands 
of the parent State only. There have been, indeed, cases in which the international community stepped 
in a territorial dispute and suggested the resort to referendum with a view to acquire statehood. 
However, the common denominator was the potential ethnic tensions preceding and resulting from 
the territorial change.942 For instance, the international community through Opinion n. 4of the 
Badinter Commission pushed Bosnia-Herzegovina to hold a referendum “in order to indicate a 
democratic mandate for independence”.943 The referendum in this case was considered the preferred 
tool to avoid further tensions. In the case of Montenegro, then, the international community was 
involved in the path towards the independence of the country from the very beginning and the attitude 
of international actors was always in support of holding a referendum on independence. The Venice 
Commission itself, called to express its opinion on the requirements for a valid referendum, anchored 
its analysis to an exhaustive perusal of the practice of the Council of Europe’s member states. In this 
																																								 																				
938 Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict signed between Georgia and the Russian 
Federation in Sochi, 24 June 1992. 
939 I. Kotchach: “Self-Determination, Secession, and Sovereignty: South Ossetia’s Claim to Right to External Self-
Determination”, cit., pp. 120-127; M. Sterio, The right to self-determination under International Law: “Selfistans”, 
Secession and the Rule of the Great Powers, cit., pp. 145-146. 
940 See for instance resolution 1462 extending the mandate of the UN mission UNOMIG, in which the Council expresses 
concern for the repeated refusal by Abkhazia to seat at the negotiations’ table. UN S/RES/1462, 30 January 2003. 
941 See on this point J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law, cit., p. 218 and D. Raic, Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination, cit., pp. 151-168. 
942 See D. Bethlehem, M. Weller, The Yugoslav Crisis in International Law, 1997, Cambridge. 
943 S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums. The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation, 2015, Oxford, p. 72. 
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sense, the use of referenda for territorial changes was not felt as an unicuum in the international system 
– i.e. belonging to the Montenegrin Constitutional tradition only- but rather a recognised practice at 
the international level. Moreover, the chances of recognition of the secession carried out by 
referendum may ultimately be increased by the presence of neutral observers, who can ensure a a 
super-partes monitoring .944 
 However, when the territorial integrity of States with long standing constitutional and democratic 
traditions is at stake, the attitude of the other States and international organisations changes. 
Particularly interesting in this sense is the reaction of international organisations, especially the EU, 
since its main pillars refer -inter alia- to the principle of democracy. [The answers to the referenda in 
Scotland and Catalonia are noteworthy in this sense. The Union has so far cautiously avoided to take 
a stance with respect to seceding demands.945 However, the latest developments in Catalonia as well 
as certain declarations released for the Scottish referendum allows us to infer some conclusions. In 
2012, in a letter sent to the UK's House of Lord, President Barroso held that “[...] a new independent 
state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the EU and the 
Treaties would no longer apply on its territory”.946 The same position has been endorsed by other 
institutional representatives including NATO President Van Rompuy.947 In fact, in the case of 
Scotland, no official position on the prospect of an independent Scottish State was taken. 948 What 
has been affirmed is that Scotland would have to ask for accession to the Union as a new entity.949 
Overall, the firm position of the Union is that whenever separation within a member State occurs, the 
new entity has to start proceedings to accede to the Union. Besides, the reaction by President Barroso 
to the official results of the Scottish referendum suggests that the EU does not remain completely 
neutral to territorial changes. In the aftermath of the vote, the EC President welcomed the decision of 
the Scottish people to remain with the UK, stating that “this outcome is good for the united, open and 
stronger Europe that the European Commission stands for”.950 With negotiations over Brexit 
																																								 																				
944 S. Wheatley: “Modelling Democratic Secession”, S. Tierney (ed.), Nationalism and Globalisation,2015, Portland, p. 
150. 
945 See on this topic M. C. Eritja: “The European Union and the Secession of a Territory from an Eu member State”, 
Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, 2015, vol. 2, pp. 479-502. 
946 The Scotsman, In Full: Jose Manuel Barroso's Letter on EU Membership,  10 December 2012, 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/in-full-jose-manuel-barroso-s-letter-on-eu-membership-1-2684237 
947 See the remarks by NATO President Van Rompuy: “Third and more personally, I am confident that Spain will remain 
a united and reliable Member State of the European Union”, 12 December 2013, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140072.  
948 S. Carrell: “Independent Scotland Should Stay in EU, Says Judicial Expert”, The Guardian, 28 November 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/28/independent-scotland-eu-judicial-expert-alex-salmond 
949 See on this point the latest declarations by N. Sturgeon on March 2017 concerning the organization of another 
referendum in the next future, T. Batchelor: “EU says Independent Scotland would not have Automatic Right to become 
new Member”, 13 March 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/scottish-eu-independence-referendum-
scotland-join-queue-membership-apply-a7627201.html 
950 Statement by P. Barroso on the result of the referendum in Scotland, 19 September 2014, 
http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/statement-by-president-barroso-on-the-results-of-the-scottish-referendum/ 
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undergoing, the call for an ever closer Union has been reiterated in October 2017, when Catalonia 
decided to hold an independence referendum. In the period preceding the referendum, Catalan 
president Puigdemont sent a letter to the permanent Representative of Spain at the Council of Europe, 
announcing the will of the Catalan government to organise another referendum on independence.951 
The letter was to be addressed to the Venice Commission, and the answer of the representative is 
noteworthy. Firstly, he recalled that “not only the referendum as such, but also the cooperation with 
the Commission will have to be carried out in agreement with the Spanish authorities”.952 Secondly, 
the letter concludes by stressing that referenda have to be carried out in compliance with the 
Constitution and the applicable legislation. Once again, the interrelation between referenda and 
negotiation is at the centre of the argument.  
 Few weeks before the vote, then, the EU left aside its neutrality and sided with the central 
government, against any attempt to hold a popular consultation in violation of national laws. The 
spokesman of the European Commission reported that the EU “will abide by what the Constitutional 
Court says and what the Spanish Parliament decides.”953 The Union would accept a yes by the people 
of Catalonia “ only in case of a legal referendum”.954 At the moment this thesis is completed, the 
situation in Catalonia is still ongoing, but it can be predicted that few countries will express their 
position, afraid that public comments would fuel separatism also in other regions of the Union. 
Among the few to comment the referendum, the Belgian and the Slovenian Prime Ministers called 
for negotiations and respect for the rule of law.955 Interestingly enough, the Scottish leader Sturgeon 
maintained that people “should be allowed to vote peacefully”.956 Once the results of the referendum 
were published, the European Commission on 2nd October issued an official statement, which put the 
emphasis on the respect of the constitution and the rule of law.957Although the Union deployed every 
kind of use of force, i.e. the aggressive police action and forcible closure of polling stations ordered 
by Madrid, the internal nature of the dispute remains the primary facet of the Catalan issue. This is 
clear by the statement’s express reference to the violation of the Constitution by the Catalan 
authorities organising the referendum.958 In this sense, the answers of the international community, 
																																								 																				
951See the article by Catalan Monitor at http://catalanmonitor.com/2017/05/31/the-letter-from-puigdemont-to-the-venice-
commission-rajoy-has-answered-negatively-to-the-dialogue-offer/ 
952 See, Venice Commission, Letter to the President of the Government of Catalonia, 2 June 2017, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/files/Letter%20to%20the%20President%20of%20the%20Government%20of%20Catalonia.p
df 
953 See declarations released to El Pais, https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/09/15/inenglish/1505463613_515431.html 
954 Ibid. 
955See the latest news at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/catalan-referendum-eu-leaders-remain-muted-
over-police-crackdown 
956 Ibid. 
957 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-3626_en.htm 
958 The statement reads as follows: “Under the Spanish Constitution, yesterday's vote in Catalonia was not legal”, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-3626_en.htm 
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in particular the declaration on behalf of the EU before the referendum support the position that the 
referendum is not yet a necessary tool, but it could become so if it is “accompanied” by other 
conditions, such as domestic legislation or negotiations. The reticence by the international community 
further supports the understanding of the Catalan attempt as a domestic issue, at least so far. On a 
purely speculative level, another supportive point could be that on the basis of the results of the 
referendum the Catalan Government did not implemented the declaration of independence but opted 
for its suspension. 
In light of the above, the reactions of the international community to the seceding referendum 
in well-established democracies are only partly helpful for legal scholars researching on territorial 
referenda and secession. The resilience stressed in the approach of the states is a common practice 
when it comes to the relationship between the parent State and its sub-units. Given that secession is 
felt as a domestic question, the international community leaves the solution of the dispute to the parent 
State. However, it can be concluded that if they have to pronounce themselves on the quest for 
secession by a sub-unit, international organizations and states consider a referendum a proper tool to 
carry out the process of secession, provided that it respects procedural standards, in particular that is 
free and fair, and organized in respect of the rule of law. The very fact that referenda have been 
endorsed in the case of Montenegro, or that the referendum was the tool chosen at the end of the 
negotiations between the UK and Scotland to mention just a few examples, are only the latest signs 
of an emerging trend in the international legal order. That is not tantamount to say that the 
international legal order protects the interests of every sub-unit resorting to a referendum to separate. 
Although very different, the cases of Crimean and Catalonia show hat the referendum cannot subvert 
the illegality of a conduct, be it caused by the violation of peremptory norms or by the absence of a 
legal title to secede under domestic law and the consent of the parent State. In this framework, the 
attempt to secede by Catalonia could turn out to be crucial in shaping the progressive development 
of international law in this field, or more likely, in confirming the current standing of the law. 
5.    Conclusions 
 In this Chapter the research topic has been shifted from the study about the referendum as a 
necessary or a sufficient step to carry out a secession according to international law, to the procedural 
aspects of the organisation of referenda. Once the requirements for a territorial referendum have been 
discerned, the last part of the Chapter has focused on the reactions of the international community to 
seceding referenda. As far as the procedural standards are concerned, the study has departed from the 
premise that while some due requirements for territorial referenda are already well established at the 
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international level, in particular the requirements of freedom and fairness of the vote, the majority of 
them is better conceived as “best practice” adopted by a considerable number of states.959 
5.1 Requirements for holding territorial referenda 
 It was highlighted that the Venice Commission has been particularly engaged in developing good 
practice for referenda. Among the requirements, that of the free expression of the will of people 
deserves the first place, as it is firmly grounded in international law. The 1966 Covenants, together 
with the Declaration on Friendly Relations as well as case-law by the ICJ ensure a solid legal ground 
for the assumption. In the Declaration, the three modalities for exercising the right to self-
determination are always linked to the freely expressed will of the people. For instance, the procedural 
condition for a free association is the free and voluntary decision of the territorial unit, expressed 
through an informed and democratic process.960 The same holds true for the option of integration, 
which should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.961 Nevertheless, 
the freely expressed wishes alone cannot bear the legitimacy of the territorial referendum. In other 
words, if a referendum does not comply with international standards, it cannot constitute a basis in 
international law for the territorial change.962 Some core principles can be said to be part of the 
international legal order, such as the neutralisation of the territory, universal, equal and secret suffrage 
and the clarity of the question. In fact, suffices to recall here that for the equal and secret suffrage, a 
solid legal basis is built by art. 25 of the 1966 Covenants as well as art. 3 of the First Protocol of the 
ECHR.963 Besides, practice corroborates the view that seceding referendums are carried out once, 
involving the seceding unit only. This was the case of UN-led popular consultations, where only the 
colonial units voted. The franchise set up for the referendum in Montenegro in 2006 also supports 
this view, since only the Serbian community living in Montenegro was allowed to vote, while the 
Montenegrin community of Serbia was not. 
 The other requirement is the neutralisation of the territory. It is assumed that in order to allow 
the voters to express their free will, the area of the referendum has to be pacified. Already in 1919, 
																																								 																				
959 It has to be remarked that the existence of international standards is not dependent on the consolidation of a customary 
rule on referenda about secession. In other words, irrespective of the acknowledgment of the international obligation to 
conduct a referendum to secede, if a sub-unit decides to hold a popular consultation about secession, then the referendum 
must satisfy certain requirements. 
960 UN, Declaration on Friendly Relations, cit., principle VI. 
961 Ibid., principle VII(a). 
962 A. Peters: “The Crimean vote of 14 March 2014 as an abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum”, cit., p. 
272. 
963 In particular, art. 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR can be considered one of the pillars of the European Convention 
protection system, since it enshrines a peculiar facet of the principle of democracy. The importance of art. 3 is confirmed 
by the jurisprudence of the Court, which reserves it a significant role despite the wording of the article is limited in scope 
to the election of the legislature. See among the others, ECHR, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, Judgment, 2 
March 1987, para. 47. 
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Wambaugh affirmed the necessity of withdrawal of troops of foreign parties from the territory where 
the plebiscite was scheduled.964 Further framework conditions ensuring a meaningful participation 
are usually set forth by domestic legislation. However, in this Chapter it was contended that other 
requirements can be considered the corollaries of these standards, especially in light of the practice 
of the Venice Commission. In particular, the referendum campaign should ensure the equality of arms 
between the opposite sides, freedom of expression and of the media.965 To sum up, a free and fair 
referendum must ask a clear question, that is to say a clear question référendaire must allow the voters 
to express a yes or no answer. It is thus advisable to have one single question, as it was in Montenegro 
or Scotland or Catalonia- which shall be answerable with a yes or a no.966 Another factor of relevance 
is the qualified majority of the votes casted and the quorum of participation. Moreover, the 
referendum has also to ensure 1) voters’ registration; 2) freedom of speech; 3) the public declaration 
of the results and 4) the presence of a neutral electoral commission. Pragmatically, the respect of this 
standards increases the legitimacy of the claim of the sub-unit not only vis-à-vis the parent State but 
especially the international community, in terms of recognition. However, precisely for the 
recognition, this Chapter has highlighted that the situation is blurred. 
5.2 Recognition, statehood and secession through referendum: a thorny relationship  
As regards international reactions to the organisation of seceding referenda, even assuming that 
other legal criteria were added to the evaluation of the statehood criteria, in particular the respect for 
the principle of democracy, it would be overly permissive to assert that the use of the referendum 
emerged as a binding instrument for achieving statehood. It is well known that Ossetia and Abkhazia 
held more than one referendum, without being recognised. By contrast, in the case of Kosovo there 
was no referendum, but statehood has progressively been acquired and recognitions are numerous. 
Lastly, Czechoslovakia held no referendum as well. Hence, it could be concluded that from the 
international legal standpoint, if one applies the ratio decidendi of the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion 
on Kosovo, the referendum does not seem to infringe the international legal order, just as the 
declaration of independence does not violate international law.967 The fragilities of the international 
legal order are even more clear if one turns to Crimea. Although the referendum was condemned and 
the territorial change not recognized, non-recognition gradually evolved into acquiescence of a fait 
accomplì. 
																																								 																				
964 See Chapter 3, at p.111. 
965 See I. Gokhan Sen, Sovereignty Referendums in International and Constitutional Law, cit., pp. 209-219; 236- 266; M. 
Qvortrop: “Regulation of Ethnonational Referendums: A Comparative Overview” M. Qvortrop, Referendums and Ethnic 
Conflict, cit., p.126-137. 
966 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice of Referendums, cit., para. I.3. 
967 Of this view J. Vidmar: “The annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will of the People”, cit., pp. 365-366. 
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Nevertheless, in terms of procedural obligations there is an argument for the role of the 
referendum. As it was seen in this Chapter, whilst there is no obligation to conduct a referendum to 
secede at the international level, seceding referenda have been more and more connected to the 
opening of negotiations. The argument has been advanced for the exercise of self-determination in 
primis. For instance, Mancini referring to Montenegro opines that negotiations may be interpreted as 
an exercise of self-determination of the two peoples- of Serbia and Montenegro, in its internal 
expression.968 This way, the referendum represents simultaneously the mise en practique of the desire 
to negotiate a solution and the way to exercise self-determination. Further support is given by the fact 
that the Constitution demanded a referendum in order to legally secede from the Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro. In other words, it was the Constitution which build a priori a special relationship 
between negotiations and the holding of territorial referenda.969   
The same reasoning can be transplanted to the case of secession. Arguably, the strong emphasis 
put by the EU, OSCE and CoE in a legal and meaningful referendum cannot be justified only by the 
fact that international actors felt obliged to respect the constitutional mandate. Rather, the referendum 
seems to be considered the tool whose moral value is able to fill in the legitimacy gap left by the 
normative vacuum of the international legal order with respect to secession.970 In any case, the 
referendum is not a sufficient element to create a new entity through secession, even though it is a 
preferred means for justifying a territorial change. The framework conditions for its organisation as 
well as the availability of negotiations with the parent State become crucial. In this sense, the 
referendum held by Catalonia is not only ultra vires, but also not in line with current practice of 
successful exercises of seceding referenda, given the refusal by both parties to embark on meaningful 
negotiations, in opposition to the cases of in Montenegro and Scotland. In the answer of the Council 
of Europe to the PM of Catalonia, for instance, it was seen that the interrelation between referenda 
and negotiation was one of the main arguments. The letter does not detail whether the need to 
negotiate is grounded in international or constitutional law. However, given that the letter by 
Puigdemont concerns the pledge to respect the Code of Good Practice971 and given that the answer 
by the permanent representative recalls this element, it can be inferred that the main point of reference 
is the practice of the Venice Commission itself.  
As mentioned above, the procedures upon which a referendum is organised are very important, 
because the idea of a free and fair referendum is made operational. Consequently, the credibility of 
																																								 																				
968 S. Mancini: “Il Montenegro e la Democrazia della Secessione”, Quaderni Costituzionali, 2007, n.1, pp.157-160. 
969 Ibid. 
970 M. MacLaren: “Trust the People? Democratic Secessionism and Contemporary Practice”, cit., p. 632. 
971 See this Chapter at pp. 197-200. 
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the vote vis-à-vis both the parent State and the international community may be increased.972 In a 
declaration prior to the referendum in Crimea in fact, the G7 maintained that the referendum had no 
legal effect, on the ground that there was no adequate preparation and the territory saw the presence 
of a foreign party. The States’ leaders considered the holding of the referendum in Crimea “a deeply 
flawed process which would have no moral force”.973 For these reasons they affirmed they would not 
recognize the situation created in Crimea.974At the same time, it is interesting to observe that President 
Obama in expressing his concern for the situation in Crimea, recalled that the referendum would 
violate Ukrainian law. Any discussion about a referendum must include Ukraine’s legitimate 
govern.975 What would have happened if Crimea had held a referendum without Russian support and 
then the Ukraine government had accepted to negotiate a new settlement?  
 On a purely speculative level, it can be argued that the reaction of the international community 
would have been different from the mere acquiescence which accompanied the attempt to reach 
independence by Scotland, above all for geostrategic reasons more than for legal arguments. The 
main answer probably would have been stepping aside the dispute, provided that the popular 
consultation ensured the respect of international democratic standards. This topic brings back on the 
table the monitoring of referenda. International monitoring seems to be the manner in which the 
international community gets involved into the process of territorial change. The importance 
attributed to international monitoring can be inferred from the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As 
Peters observes, the referendum in the region of Krajina on 10 November 1991 was not internationally 
monitored: later, when the Badinter Commission issued Opinion n.4, it held that the wishes of the 
people had not been clearly established yet.976 The conclusions of the arbitration Commission 
corroborate the view that international monitoring helps the subsequent recognition of the referendum 
by the other members of the international community.977  
 In light of the above, the research has identified two different scenarios. When a referendum is 
carried out with the support -be it armed or not- of a foreign party, non-recognition by the international 
community is grounded on the violation of the territorial integrity of the parent State. Then, arguments 
concerning how the referendum is conducted are adduced. By contrast, the reconfiguration of 
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territorial borders through a referendum in well-established democracies is left to the discretion of 
the seceding unit and the parent State, provided that compliance with international standards is 
ensured. The respect of international standards for a territorial referendum is progressively becoming 
a conditio sine qua non to legitimise the consultations. The high emphasis on the procedure can be 
also interpreted as a safeguard against the instrumental use of referenda. The referendum held by the 
people of Catalonia, indeed, could leave many open questions about the pros and cons of territorial 
referenda. Arguably, referenda may always have a risky ambivalence and in particular foster 
divisions, as it is demonstrated by the fact that after the Catalan referendum thousands of people 
rallied across Spain in favour of the opening of unity and the beginning of negotiations.978 In this 
sense it could even be even maintained that the democratic nature of seceding referenda should be 
tested against the need to ensure the widest participation by the people, i.e. of all those resident in the 
concerned State. In conclusion, the case casts many doubts concerning whether international practice 
is progressively showing an abuse of the use of the tool referendum and of the understanding of the 
right to free expression of the will of the people.979 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The following pages conclude this study, through a recapitulation of all the main fields followed 
by some final proposals. The role of referenda in the framework of territorial changes is in a constant 
state of growth: in particular, the combination of referenda and quests for secession has gained 
momentum again in the previous years. Although the research has determined that the international 
legal order does not regulate this phenomenon, it has tried to demonstrate that some common patterns 
suggesting the progressive consolidation of a general rule are traceable. An empirical approach has 
been adopted, based on the study of the most recent cases of secession (and attempted ones) via 
referendum, especially Canada, Catalonia, Crimea, Montenegro and Scotland. Keeping in mind (i) 
the high heterogeneity of the practice, and (ii) the fact that in order to have a consolidated trend more 
practice and manifestations of the opinio juris need to be added, the study began from the premise 
that in the above-mentioned cases referenda and secession are deeply intertwined. Moreover, the use 
of referenda for secession often interrelates with arguments of self-determination and democratic 
statehood. Hence, alongside the inquiry about whether a referendum is a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for secession in international law, the principal aim of the study was to investigate if it 
would be possible to shed light on and provide a systematic approach to the blurred panoramic on 
secession, self-determination and referenda just illustrated.  
Some aspects of the research are so problematic that it is difficult to find a conclusive answer. 
The evidence examined suggests that currently holding a referendum has a very limited incidence on 
the creation of a new State entity. While the referendum is not a sufficient condition for creation of 
an entity through secession, there is a tendency supporting the view that it may become a necessary 
condition. In terms of practice and opinio juris, the rule is not yet established in international law, 
nevertheless the inquiry has not reached totally negative results, since it has managed to give a 
systematic reappraisal of the current state of the art. In particular, the research has concluded that: (i) 
secession should be disentangled from self-determination; (ii) although there is no obligation to 
conduct a referendum, practice is consistent in suggesting that referenda may trigger an obligation to 
negotiate a new territorial settlement flowing upon the seceding unit and the parent State. Finally, 
(iii) the investigation concluded that despite the fact that the organization of a referendum has only a 
limited incidence on recognition of statehood, some procedural standards for territorial referenda can 
be said to form part of international customary law. 
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1. Secession: old but new phenomenon 
Needless to say, the starting point of the inquiry was the analysis of secession and its 
relationship with the right to self-determination. Leaving temporarily aside the former, the research 
has conceptualized the right to self-determination from a two-fold perspective, notably the internal 
and external dimension of the right. Although the ICJ maintained that the right to self-determination 
is one of the essential principles under contemporary international law,980 the borders of its 
application beyond the colonial context remain mostly unsettled. The external dimension is 
established as an exception to the doctrine of territorial unity and therefore is very narrow in its 
application. In sum, the relics of colonialism still exercise control over the current enforcement of the 
right to self-determination.981  
In this framework, Chapter 1 has concluded that outside the concept of external self-
determination for colonial units, international law saw the progressive consolidation of the internal 
dimension of self-determination. International provisions on self-determination are clear on the 
options available for its exercise, but provide little guidance as to the content of the right. Neither its 
implications outside decolonization are clarified. Quoting Judge Yusuf, “the right to self-
determination of people has been at the forefront of the humanization and democratization of 
international law”,982 but outside the decolonization period, the right to self-determination seems to 
be mainly consummated in its internal form. This finding has been further confirmed throughout a 
focus on the most recent attempts to secede. The quests for separation advanced by Scotland, 
Catalonia, or Crimea have been based on a broader interpretation of self-determination, in particular 
of its internal dimension. That is to say that a broader bulk of human rights seems to be incorporated 
in the notion of self-determination, including, inter alia, participatory rights, social inclusion and 
property rights. More and more, the realisation of a community of individuals within the borders of 
the State is not limited to participation to the management of public affairs, but encompasses social 
inclusion, fiscal benefits and property rights. Hence, the study has underlined that if a debate about 
the right to self-determination is still topical, it can be so only for its internal dimension.  
However, such updated understanding of the nature of self-determination leads to infer that 
secession cannot be considered a dimension of the right to self-determination. This argument has been 
																																								 																				
980 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
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Importance”, Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 2003, vol. 14, pp. 270-293. 
982 A.A. Yusuf: “The role that equal rights and self-determination of peoples can play in the current world community”, 
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developed throughout a double path. Firstly, methodologically, Chapter 2 has re-conceptualised the 
normative due process for secession,983 testing it against the current challenges to international law 
in the field of territorial changes, such as the increase of seceding aspirations within old and 
consolidated democracies. The combination of legal rules forming the due process requirements listed 
by Tancredi – a) the prohibition of the use of force; b) the respect of uti possidetis juris; and c) the 
use of territorial referenda- finds support in recent practice and stands the test of time. In the examples 
of Scotland, Catalonia, Quebec, or Bougainville, to mention a few, secession does not involve the use 
of force, takes place within the previously established administrative borders and is decided by a 
referendum. In those cases, the conditions for the exercise of the right to self-determination as 
provided for by the international legal order are not met, nor one may claim that secession can be the 
ultima ratio against serious violations of human rights. Although during the day of the referendum in 
Catalonia aggressive police action and forcible closure of polling stations mandated from the parent 
State occurred, the gravity of repression is not sufficiently established to meet the threshold required 
by the remedial right theory.984 
Secondly, going more into detail about the use of secession as a remedy to serious injustices, it 
was underlined that one of the main pitfalls of the remedial secession theory is precisely the 
overlapping of the exercise of the right to self-determination with an alleged right to secede. By 
contrast, in the attempt to discern the relationship between secession and self-determination, the study 
has concluded that it is advisable to disentangle secession from self-determination. One of the most 
relevant conclusions of the study is in fact the disentanglement of secession form self-determination. 
Not only self-determination should not too easily be equated to the acquisition of statehood, but also 
the developments of the international legal order especially with respect to the challenges posed by 
the continuous development of the practice, corroborate the view that secession is not a form of 
external self-determination. The supportive points for this affirmation were explained in Chapter 2, 
where two main differences between self-determination and secession were highlighted: a) their 
ontological meaning; b) their application rationae personae. Outside  colonial situations, the main 
implication of the right to self-determination is found in the right of a people to “participate in its 
future”.985 Secession, by contrast, seeks to break the relationship between people and sovereign power 
at the basis of self-determination, both theoretically and pragmatically. Turning to the French 
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expression for self-determination - “droit des peuples à disposer d’eux mêmes”- completed the picture 
about the disentanglement of secession from self-determination. The French expression suggests that 
the right to self-determination is above all a right to choose: it empowers its bearers to decide on their 
status, both internally and externally. Secession, by contrast, implies the creation of a new entity from 
a pre-existing State. This is not tantamount to maintain that there is no exception to this 
differentiation, because there is at least one exceptional case against which the reasoning above does 
not apply. It is the remedial right theory, whose structure overlaps the exercise of self-determination 
with a right to secede, as it was briefly mentioned above. By arguing that a denial of fundamental 
human rights serves as a ground to justify external self-determination in the form of secession,986 the 
remedial right theory combines the exercise of internal, external self-determination and secession. 
However, it does so without a sound legal basis in international law and a scarce practice. In general, 
the idea that under specific circumstances serious violations of fundamental human rights may trigger 
a right to secede raises contrastive reactions among states. Moreover, it is the rationale underpinning 
the theory which does not fully convince: being anchored to the a contrario reading of the Friendly 
Relations Declaration and its mise en practique very scarce, the legal soundness of the remedial right 
theory is not well established in international law. Although it has a strong moral force, the ratio of 
remedial secession has some backsides, in that the theory offers a solution for separation, not for 
cohesion, even though secession was actually the result of lack of social cohesion.  
Absent the option of remedial secession, sub-units consider the referendum the preferred tool 
to legitimise their claim. On the part of the seceding entity, the rationale underpinning the resort to a 
referendum is intuitive: it lies in the broader concept of democratic statehood in international law. 
Democracy-related arguments have acquired a dominant position in the debate on the international 
law of State creation.987  In a certain sense, the idea that a State has to establish itself in compliance 
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with the principles of democracy and the rule of law has been transposed to the quests for separation, 
by claiming that referenda per se may legitimise secession.988  
2. Territorial referendum in international law 
Overall, the rise of the referendum in international practice has been nourished by a variety of 
factors, among which the practice of the plebiscites and the UN-led decolonization process cover a 
considerable part. Undoubtedly, the referendum has become a preferred means to exercise direct 
democracy, especially in light of the huge practice developed within the Swiss domestic legal 
system.989 Moreover, the revitalization of direct democracy has come side by side with the 
development of European integration, that has pushed for direct democracy and rule of law 
mechanisms.990Although the research shares these findings, Chapter 3 and 4 have adopted a more 
systematic approach, with a view to demonstrate that an international rule according to which 
referenda legitimize per se secession is not consolidated yet.  
One of the main points of departure for determining whether a referendum is a necessary or a 
sufficient condition for secession, or both, was the difference between plebiscites and referenda, 
although they both fall in the cluster of popular consultations. At a first glance, it could be argued 
that the plebiscites widely used from the end of the first World War onwards are the ancestors of 
seceding units’ territorial referenda. Hence, according to this view there would be sufficient practice 
and opinio juris for the consolidation of a customary rule. A more careful scrutiny suggests that the 
assimilation of a plebiscite to a referendum is not fully correct, even if there can always be also hybrid 
examples. In particular, referenda provided for by the majority of the democratic systems are usually 
organised with a clear question référendaire, and other specific procedural requirements. With the 
exception of the difficulties in organising the referendum in Catalonia due to the action of national 
police force, popular consultations carried out in Montenegro, Canada, Scotland all fulfill these 
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requirements. By contrast, it was the agreement between the interested states, then transposed in the 
Treaty of Versailles, which set the use of popular consultations to reconfigure the borders of 
Germany, Poland, Denmark, the former Austrian Empire and Yugoslavia. That is to say that 
plebiscites were mainly votes of consent about a decision already taken by the victorious powers.  
The most important features distinguishing plebiscites from referenda consist of (i) the binding 
effects usually produced by referenda; (ii) the referendum’s clear question, with a yes or no answer 
(iii) the quorum of participation and quorum of approval. Nevertheless, plebiscites and referenda have 
always shared at least two elements, notably the neutralization of the territory and the role of 
international actors. As regards the latter, in the case of plebiscites international commissions ensured 
effective popular consultations free of frauds, whilst in the case of referenda international monitoring 
progressively developed as an international practice. The UN-led decolonization process marked the 
beginning of this practice, however the main instances of the resort to popular consultations in this 
period remained anchored to the plebiscite model. As Crawford observes: “in the vast majority of 
cases the progress to self-government or independence was consensual. It occurred with the 
agreement of the State responsible for the administration of the territory, in accordance with law and 
pursuant to arrangements between the government of that State and local leaders”.991 The approach 
of the UN to the use of popular consultations by colonies does not constitute a solid opinio juris on 
the topic. Throughout a selection of some problematic cases, ex plurimis, the research has stressed 
that with the end of colonial dominions as its main goal, the UN was ready to leave aside the step of 
popular consultations, if it could make easier for the colony to reach independence.  
Indeed, in light of its specific characters, the use of the plebiscite seems to be more suitable for 
colonial units. Arguably, in the framework of the decolonisation, the claim by self-determination 
units was solidly anchored to international law. In this sense, the plebiscite served to give more 
resonance to the exercise of the right to self-determination established under the international legal 
order. Hence, it could be claimed that there was no need for the plebiscite to trigger binding effects, 
because the right to self-determination itself posed international obligations upon the members of the 
international community. By contrast, the lack of an established right to secede makes the choice of 
the appropriate manner for manifesting the desire for secession important. The seceding claim needs 
to be based on a well-established tool and the referendum, being one of the main expressions of direct 
democracy, serves this purpose. The peculiar facets of the referendum, such as the procedural 
requirements and the binding value of the vote can better exhaust the needs of the seceding unit.   
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From the standpoint of the formation of a general international law rule, it was only at the end 
of the 90ies that referenda started to consolidate their position in international practice. Arguably, 
since the dissolution of SFRY and the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been a perception of a 
continuous external drive to democratisation and here the referendum has came back into the business 
of international law.992 Referenda emerged spontaneously with Slovenia’s independence through a 
referendum in December 1990. After it, other twelve referenda on independence were held in 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The emergence of the referendum in this framework created the 
suggestion that by a referendum a sub-unit within a State could legitimately unilaterally secede, 
fostered also by the opinions of the Badinter Commission.993 Anyway, the research showed that 
despite being important for the consolidation of an opinio juris and practice about secession and 
referenda, popular consultations organised in SFRY do not display enough similarities with more 
recent ones to find a common pattern. On the one side, the common view expressed by the Badinter 
Commission in Opinion 1 was that  the SFRY was a Federation embarked on a process of 
dissolution.994 On the other side, even though with Opinion n.4 the referendum has gone a step 
forward from a mere consultation, a reasonable analysis of the Opinions as a whole shows that the 
real issue of concern was that the new Republics were founded on the rule of law and upon a 
constitutional-based protection for minorities. In other words, the international community did not 
take the necessary steps to make the referendum the subject of an international law rule. There were, 
in fact, cases in which the referendum was not carried out but statehood was acquired.995 
In sum, the research found that the referendum is currently neither sufficient nor a necessary 
condition to give rise to a new entity. When the legal order does not perform, it is clear that the 
referendum can offer a moment of “apparent” democratic clarity to shed a light over an incomplete 
set of rules. But from an international legal standpoint there are no well established rules in this 
field.996 In the previous Chapters, however, it was observed that there is a clear tendency to consider 
it a necessary element for secession, in particular when it respects the set of procedural requirements 
above mentioned and when other conditions are satisfied, such as the adoption of domestic law for 
secession, or the negotiation between the parent State and the sub-unit. In this sense, the research has 
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advance the argument that territorial referenda may trigger an obligation to negotiate a new settlement 
upon the parent State and the sub-unit, together with all the interest stakeholders. 
The idea of a negotiated secession is all but new in international legal scholarship and it revolves 
around the assumption that international law could have progressed to the level of requiring the very 
process of secession to be negotiated.997 The argument is not only grounded on the application, by 
analogy, of the duty to pacifically solve disputes. For instance, scholarly literature has not focused 
that much on the fact that the breakaway of Slovenia was preceded by an intensive period of 
negotiations following the referendum.998 Negotiations went on even after the declaration of 
independence, and continued until the other republics massively started to declare independence. 
Whilst it cannot be held that negotiations were perceived as an international obligation, they are 
nevertheless a sign of practice. Furthermore, the hesitations of the international community at that 
time in recognising the entities declaring independence could be explained also by the ongoing 
negotiation with Belgrade, because Belgrade claimed the unity of the federation could be 
preserved.999 Seen from this angle, it can be argued that the duty to negotiate triggered by the 
referendum falls primarily upon the parent State, the same position which seems to have been 
embraced by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Secession. By claiming that the other 
members of the Federation would have an obligation to acknowledge and respect the expression of 
the democratic will, the Supreme Court of Canada does not consider this step an option, but an 
obligation.1000 The negotiation should be open to all the interest parties – e.g. in the case of Canada 
the other provinces of the State. It could be claimed that this kind of obligation does not belong to the 
international legal arena, but is proper of a constitutional analysis.1001 The position is not totally 
convincing. One of the main assumption of this research has been that both secession and referenda 
lie at the intersection between constitutional and international law. This assumption impacts on the 
way legal scholars conduct their inquiry. In particular, the fact that there are no clear rules flowing 
from the international legal order does not mean that the issue is purely domestic. Rather, as the 
Venice Commission has done in developing common standards for the conduct of referenda, the 
inquiry on international principles can take the stand from a comparative constitutional study.1002 In 
																																								 																				
997 B. Stankovski: “Is There an Obligation to Negotiate Secession in International Law? From Reference re Secession of 
Quebec to Kosovo Advisory Opinion and Beyond”, ESIL Research Paper, Conference Paper No. 13/2015, vol. 6 n.5, 
http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/1187 
998 Ibid at p.9. 
999 Ibid. 
1000 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para.88. 
1001 J. Vidmar: “Catalonia. The way Forward is Comparative Constitutional rather than an International Legal 
Argument”, 23 October 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonia-the-way-forward-is-comparative-constitutional-rather-
than-international-legal-argument/ 
1002 See Introduction at p. 12 and Chapter 4 sections 2.1(a) and 3. 
227 
 
fact, the Supreme Court does not detail whether this obligation flows from international or domestic 
law, but looks at the main pillars of the Canadian constitutional order, notably democracy; federalism; 
the rule of law, constitutionalism and respect for minorities. At para. 54 the Court maintains that the 
pillars displayed above “are binding among courts and governments”, irrespective of their being 
grounded in the domestic constitutional order. From this position it could be inferred they may have 
a universal validity.1003  
Actually, if an obligation triggered by the territorial referendum is in the way of formation, it is 
probably directed internally towards the parent State. That is to say that there would be no obligation 
flowing upon the other members of the international community in terms of recognition. The internal 
focus is also justified by the need to ensure that negotiations do not exclude the relevant stakeholders, 
notably by ensuring the participation of minority groups. In fact, in the Opinion of the Venice 
Commission on the referendum in Crimea, the Commission stresses the absence of negotiations about 
a consensual solution among all stakeholders, “especially with participation of all ethnic groups of 
Crimea”.1004	The case of Scotland followed the model laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Reference Re Secession of Quebec: in case of a clear vote cast in favour of secession, that 
manifestation of the popular will cannot be ignored by the parent State.1005 However, as the Supreme 
Court of Canada argued, the obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation of good result. 
Needless to say, there remains an obligation to negotiate in good faith, but Reference Re Secession of 
Quebec excluded that it was the duty of the Court to establish which should be the result of the 
negotiations.1006 It could be held that the position of the Supreme Court is context-dependent. Sub-
units wishing to secede show sensible differences, depending also on the social and legal order of the 
parent State. The fact that they significantly vary, however, does not mean they do not share 
similarities. In the cases of Montenegro, Quebec and Scotland, negotiations were the turning point in 
the definition of the future territorial arrangement and the process was precisely triggered by the 
referendum. At the other side of the spectrum, it could be argued that where negotiations are not 
carried out, the relationship between the sub-unit and the central government, e.g. in Catalonia, is 
exacerbated. It is noteworthy that following the vote, the EU called for a concerted solution,1007 and 
																																								 																				
1003 B. Stankovski: “Is There an Obligation to Negotiate Secession in International Law? From Reference re Secession of 
Quebec to Kosovo Advisory Opinion and Beyond”, cit., pp. 3-4. 
1004 Venice Commission, Opinion n. 762/2014, CDL-AD(2014)002, 21 March 2014, para. 22. 
1005 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 151. 
1006 B. Stankovski: “Is There an Obligation to Negotiate Secession in International Law? From Reference re Secession 
of Quebec to Kosovo Advisory Opinion and Beyond”, cit., p.16. 
1007 Statement on behalf of the EU, STATEMENT/17/3626 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-
3626_en.htm, but see for a different position M. Weller, arguing that Catalonia has already tried all the possible negotiated 
solutions in “Secession and Self-determination in Western Europe: The Case of Catalonia”, 18 October 2017, ejiltalk.org 
/secession-and-self-determination-in-western-europe-the-case-of-catalonia. 
228 
 
people all over Spain rallied across the country in favour of the opening of negotiations.1008 In this 
sense, Sen convincingly argues that referenda “should be a complementary and finalising element of 
a more complex pattern of conflict resolution, including patient negotiations, agreement on an elite 
level and transitory phases”.1009 In other words, the prospects of a negotiated secession could serve 
the purposes of maintaining international stability. In light of the above, it is time to collect all the 
pieces together and summarize a proposal displayed below. 
3. Secession and referendum in international law: the attempt to solve the puzzle 
The road to the general conclusions about the relationship between secession and territorial 
referenda in international law passes by the adoption of the normative due process and the 
differentiation developed by Weller between privileged and unprivileged units. With the notion of 
unprivileged units  it has to be intended those units which do not possess the requirements to exercise 
the right to self-determination, but attempt to obtain statehood in a manner which is not in itself 
internationally unlawful.1010 The way their claims are brought, then, is highly influenced by the 
increasing linkage between international law and concepts relating to democracy.1011 The claims 
advanced by unprivileged units cannot be considered an expression of their right to external self-
determination, unless the units manage to prove that they are entitled to self-determination in its 
consolidated interpretation in the international legal order.1012 Seceding units like Catalonia, Crimea, 
Quebec, Abkhazia, together with the others analysed throughout this study, can be labelled 
unprivileged, as suggested by Weller.1013 Assuming they qualify as unprivileged units, their quests 
are neither protected nor favoured by the international legal order. Hence, unprivileged units need to 
acquire legitimacy internally and externally: they do so by building and strengthening State 
institutions and by trying to prove their political viability through the resort to a referendum 
respectively.1014  
The high emphasis put in the principle of democracy in international law justifies the preference 
for the “tool referendum” by unprivileged units.1015 Even though the referendum per se cannot justify 
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secession as the sub-units wish, one further element that could support the the consolidation of the 
procedural role of the referendum in international law can be found in the interrelation between 
international and constitutional law. In the field of secession, which lies at the intersection between 
international and domestic law, constitutional practice can be topical for discerning the existence of 
general principles of law. The mutual influence between international human rights and international 
law on the one side, and  States’ constitutions on the other side may lead to argue that there is an 
increasing coordination between international and constitutional law.1016 As Sen aptly observes, “the 
current state of sovereignty referendums in contemporary constitutional law must be read in the light 
of the state-centred approach prevalent in international law and the tendency of states to internalise 
the referendum within the confines of their own national legal systems”.1017 However, this positive 
view should be completed with some remarks. The existing difficulties for sub-units attempting to 
acquire statehood following a referendum are best exemplified by the reactions of the international 
community, which are not consistent and difficult to detect. For instance, Kosovo is largely 
recognised although it has not carried out a referendum, whilst Abkhazia is still struggling for 
recognition despite its considerable number of referenda about secession. For the sake of 
completeness, it has to be observed that despite its importance, the threshold for assessing the 
effectiveness requirement seems very subjective. A limited degree of effectiveness is ascribed to 
Abkhazia, but a very low degree of effectiveness was necessary for some states to recognize 
Kosovo.1018  In this sense, it can be safely maintained that when the procedure for secession passes 
from the holding of a referendum in compliance with international standards, secession acquires more 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the parent State and the international community. However, the immediate 
aftermath of the 2017 referendum in Catalonia shows that the use of referendum cannot be a sufficient 
condition for secession. Alongside the doubts surrounding the organisation and administration of the 
referendum, other “collateral” conditions such as the adoption of a procedure for secession guided by 
the rule of law by the parent State and the negotiation between the parties do not seem to be verified. 
Moreover, the fact that the declaration of independence was suspended and not immediately 
implemented on the basis of the vote could also support this position. As regards states’ responses, 
when secession is attempted to in a well-established democracy, other states usually refrain from 
pronouncing themselves on the matter. The idea that a referendum may increase the legitimacy of 
seceding aspirations concurs to the general view that democracy could become a necessary 
requirement for a legitimate government. The recognition of insurgents during the Arab Spring is just 
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the last sign of the democratic-entitlement school of thought pervading international law, according 
to which recognition and non-recognition depend also on the ability by the central government to 
ensure, inter alia, a multi-party system and free periodic elections.1019 Nevertheless, the increasing 
legal soundness of these arguments in international law should not be overvalued. Clearly, the 
progressive development of international law has come to include also principles linked to democratic 
decision-making. After all, the right to have periodical free elections is nothing new: it was included 
in the international Covenants already in 1966. However, when secession is at stake, the progressive 
development of international law is rather uncertain and the democratic decision making argument 
loses power.  
The engagement of the international community in the process of secession by Montenegro as 
well as the path followed by the Scottish and British government towards the 2014 referendum for 
independence support the views expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the need for 
the interest parties to negotiate a new territorial settlement. In this sense, in particular, the Scottish 
case emerged as a model for at least four features, which could be replied elsewhere in order to 
consider legitimate a secession.1020 First of all, fair elections - by which a clear majority endorsing 
secession among the government faction is expressed- should precede any official discussion about 
a territorial referendum. Secondly, domestic law or a special agreement should establish the 
obligation to resort to a referendum in order to carry out a secession. Thirdly, in order to guarantee 
the legality of the vote, procedural standards have to be ensured: the question posed to the voters must 
be extremely clear. Lastly, there comes the importance of a negotiated solution, agreed among the 
parent State and the sub-unit, about the steps to undertake on the basis of the results of the vote.1021  
Arguably, the idea that a referendum might trigger an obligation to negotiate can satisfy also 
those sceptics about the use of referenda in general. In fact, claiming that the seceding referendum 
triggers the obligation upon the parties to embark on negotiations could be consistent with the view 
that referenda alone cannot justify statehood. Rather, there has to be a sound legal basis of another 
type, such as the dissolution of a State or a negotiated procedure with the parent State in order to give 
birth to a new entity. From this perspective, the previously mentioned argument by Sen about 
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referenda as an additional tool in the solution of territorial disputes is even more persuasive. In 
broader terms, the research suggests that one practicable road to foster the progressive development 
of a right to secede in the international legal order passes through the consolidation of a procedure of 
negotiated secession. The position is not new1022 and the cases tackled in this research stressed the 
importance of its revitalisation. Negotiating secession does not imply overlapping the concepts of 
unilateral secession and consensual separation. Secession as a factual instance is still a unilateral act 
undertaken by the seceding-unit only. The fact that secession is voted via referendum shifts the focus 
on the procedure. The importance of the procedural approach is bolstered by the acknowledgment 
that not all territorial referenda may be the basis of a territorial change. With a view to become a 
necessary procedural step for a territorial realignment, the referendum has to comply with certain 
procedural standards. For the procedural requirements one has to rely especially upon the practice of 
the Venice Commission, but a preliminary guidance can be also found in the OSCE's 1990 Charter 
of Paris.1023 Arguably, some other time is necessary for the customary nature of these requirements 
to be confirmed. The self-referential character of the Council of Europe hinted at in the previous 
Chapters casts some doubts over the real tenure of international standards.1024 In particular, the fact 
that the Council of Europe is an international organisation with a continental spirit, thus leaving aside 
other global actors such as the Asian countries, could lead to speak about a regional custom. 
Nevertheless, the critique is partly dismissed by the argumentation developed in Chapter 3 and 4 
about the reactions to the referendum in Crimea and could be further confirmed by the Catalan issue. 
The majority of the members of the international community expressed concern for the violation of 
the standards for a free and fair referendum by Crimea.1025 Merging the various positions taken by 
international organisations and States, it can be safely concluded that the following standards are 
consolidated: (i) the peacefulness of the area, (ii) the clarity of the question, (iii) freedom of the media 
and (iv) international observation.1026  
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4. Conclusion 
Aspiration to statehood is still a timeless issue and even though international law progressively 
develops, its evolution in this field is slow and still under debate. However, the use of referenda to 
legitimise secession is a reality that cannot simply be wished away. Throughout this study, it was 
stressed that the referendum can be extremely powerful in creating momentum for a secession against 
the absence of a normative authority on the issue by the international legal order, provided that it is 
held in compliance with international standards. Nevertheless, the international legal order does not 
prescribe that (i) referenda are sufficient to lawfully secede or (ii) seceding sub-units are required to 
schedule a referendum to secede. For the latter point, however, there are enough elements to maintain 
that a procedural norm in this sense is – at least- already in consolidation. 
In concluding this study, it is important to underline that it is not claimed here that procedural 
standards might substitute the effectiveness test, which remains a very robust argument when it comes 
to secession.1027 Nevertheless, for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, for instance, recognition of 
statehood was given irrespective of hardly effective control. The perception of the legitimacy of the 
claim to statehood depended, inter alia, on the democratic requirement of both states.1028 These same 
arguments do not seem to have changed: let us recall that among the legal justifications presented by 
the Russian Federation to support the annexation of Crimea, one was the democratic expression of 
the will of the people.1029 As Krisch aptly observes, the very fact that the Russian Federation had to 
come out with justifications in support of its conduct in Crimea suggests that international law matters 
when territorial changes are at stake.1030 The easiness with which States exploit some international 
legal discourses also shows the uncertainty and weakness of international law when it comes to 
secession. The same holds true for the procedural and substantive conditions for creation of statehood. 
In this sense, the Crimean case especially shows how much classical rules of international law have 
come under pressure by new legal arguments linked to democracy and human rights protection.  
The dangerous vacuum of the international legal order gives more space for covering 
interventionists practices, as well as for the abuse of the use of the referendum, with a view to cover 
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an illegal conduct. The case of Catalonia best exemplifies the dangers intrinsic in the abuse of this 
tool within well-established democracies. Through in-depth examination of case studies and of the 
interconnection between secession, self-determination and referenda, the research has intended that 
the need for a new international law framework on the use of referenda for territorial changes has 
become even more impellent. 
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